What is national identity? What forces and events compel the development of new models of political thought that drive populations to accept new norms and altered realities? Arguably, the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 was more than just "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century," as Russian President Vladimir Putin describes it. Moscow saw millions of people suddenly lose the concept of national unity and a shared national purpose. Russia after 1991 dropped the social, cultural, and political norms that the Soviet Union carried across many decades.
So the Russian government, and many in the country's consolidating political elite, sought to develop and nurture a concept that would once again bring a shared sense of purpose and unity to bind the vastness of Russia - and to all of the former Soviet space. If United States has democracy, Muslim states have Islam, and leading Asian states have deep historical and cultural roots to sustain their national narratives, what, if anything, can bring together Russia and her numerous neighbors?
In November, Russian daily Gazeta.ru published an opinion piece by geopolitical commentator Vadim Dubnov, titled Novorossiya from Luhansk to Tiraspol. In it, the author seeks to explain what drove the numerous separatist conflicts that shook the Soviet Union, and then many of the independent nations born in its wake, starting in the late 1980s. Dubnov's says that the problems in eastern Ukraine, and the current frozen separatist conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, stem from the policies of Soviet and post-1991 Moscow.
"The separatism of the 1990s began in the late-Soviet 1980s. Formally, there was no pure "separatism," since there were no independent states at that time. (Separatist) wars began as former Soviet states declared sovereignty, but they were born of developments that began before the collapse of the Soviet power. In other words, when Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan gained their independence, they also purchased existing territorial problems."
In explaining the current crisis in Ukraine, and the two separatist "republics" that have emerged - Luhansk and Donetsk - Dubnov juxtaposes the hostilities there with a conflict that erupted in then-Soviet Moldova, specifically in the Pridenstrovie, or Transdniestria, region. Armed clashes between Pridnestrovie separatists and Moldovan security forces erupted as early as November 1990. The conflict erupted into full-blown war in March 1992, until a cease-fire was reached that July. At that time, Russian military forces and pro-Russian informal military formations fought on the side of Transdniestria, echoing today's conflict in eastern Ukraine. The result was a separatist victory, and Russia's patronage to the separatist capital, Tiraspol, continues to this day.
As in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, these separatists were mostly ethnic Russians concerned that their rights and privileges would be put to risk, considering newly independent Moldova's pro-Western course. Transdniestria remains an independent, unrecognized republic sandwiched between Moldova to its west and western Ukraine to its east, with Russia the only country of consequence to lend any support. Given its strategic location, there is now concern that Moscow may reactivate this frozen conflict, seeking to extend its influence over ethnic Russians residing there and to create problems for Moldova and Ukraine - countries whose military forces and economic potential are already stretched to the limit.
Dubnov continues:
"This project, code-named "Pridnestrovie," had one clear goal: to make it difficult for the (Soviet) republics to escape from the USSR. Other goals were not set, because the life of the project was limited to the lifespan of the Soviet superpower ... After the Soviet demise, Russia inherited the management of these separatist projects, which it tried to use to pressure its neighbors. In addition, each of the potential new, unrecognized countries - Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan and Transdinstria in Moldova - would be given a chance at independence if their interests matched up with the interests of the Kremlin."
According to Dubnov, the roots of today's conflict in Ukraine trace back to the separatist wars of the 1990s and Moscow's attempts to influence them in its favor. Officially a closed Soviet project, this mandate for interference in fact survives as Russian policy. However, geopolitical developments in the 1990s did not allow Moscow to fully realize its goals: "Separatists did not become levers of pressure on Georgia or Moldova, since these states learned to live rather well without the separatist regions."
Now, according to Dubnov, everything has turned upside down: In Crimea, pro-Russian fervor was already widespread, but in Donetsk and Luhansk, it was necessary to develop a new line of political thought in order to create in the regions' pro-Russia citizens a desire to "Save the Soviet Union." And while it was never clear why the Russians should rejoice in Transdiniestria's separation from Moldova, or that of Abkhazia from Georgia, everything has come together in Ukraine - the ideal laboratory for a neo-Soviet project.
Dubnov writes that Kiev offered two ideal conditions for the experiment:
"Everything that happened in the Ukraine was inspired by the West, and the only language that can describe what happened is the language of the Great Patriotic War (WWII)."
Moscow has openly stated that the Ukrainian government and its armed forces are inspired after the anti-communist and anti-Soviet guerrilla formations that officially sided with invading Nazi Germany against Moscow. "The battle for Ukraine is a continuation of the Soviet military doctrine, considered defensive at that time, and whose legacy was supposed to have been the establishment of sovereignty doomed to failure in places like Abkhazia and Transdnistria."
This, Dubnov concludes, avenges the Soviet past, and Moscow is willing to carry the effort to its fullest extent:
"Current events in Ukraine... thrillingly avenge everything that was thought impossible ... Unrecognized Tiraspol is preparing for a referendum and Russia is hinting that it can officially recognize the breakaway state. And then there will be a Novorossiya - from Lugansk to Tiraspol - like Crimea, ours, regardless of whether there is global recognition and irrespective of the opinions of people in Luhanks and Donetsk. it will exist to counter existing enemies, foreign and domestic. It will cut off Ukraine from the sea ... It's not just revenge - its a national idea. One does not refuse such a chance."