Within any war, there is an associated information war, and the same holds true of the crisis in eastern Ukraine. Russia is concerned that despite the mess in the Donbas region, the rest of Ukraine is growing steadfast in its opposition to Moscow - and Ukraine's election results bear this out. Moscow therefore hopes to portray this conflict as an unnecessary, unfortunate folly propagated by "neo-nazis, ultra-nationalists, anti-Semites and agents of the West." Even before the vote, the ever more alarming portrayals of Ukrainian actions provided a telling indicator of the Kremlin's designs. 

On Oct. 23, Russian daily Komsomolskaya Pravda reported on a recently leaked video supposedly showing Ukrainian soldiers ready to abandon the front lines: "We wont climb inside any tents any longer! We will leave and head home - they wont be able to capture and prosecute all of us!" In the video, soldiers also complain about living conditions and food shortages on the front lines.

What happens to some of these soldiers when they do return - either legitimately or by desertion? KP's correspondent traveled to Kiev on Oct. 24 to read the mood of the people.

"They no longer romanticize Maidan. Hospitals are filled with boys who hide on the floor because they imagine they are under attack. They are quick to fight over careless words. These crippled youth returned to nowhere - no jobs, miniscule pensions..."

The same reporter spoke with Ukrainian journalists who sounded off on the war:

"First off, people in Kiev changed completely. It looks like the junta reprogrammed most Kievan citizens. People are ready to report you to the authorities for what they perceive are alternative points of view on the war. What you end up with is an alternative universe - without Russia, the Great Patriotic War (WWII), Russians - all that remains is Ukraine that is fighting for its freedom for many centuries..."

These are the expressions that prevail across Russian media as Moscow seeks to paint the war as Kiev's tragic mistake. Unfortunately, events may have already entrenched an emotional, divisive new code of conduct. KP's conversation with an ethnic Russia refugee from Donbas spells out the lasting damage.

"Anyone who fled immediately probably wont return - they will be perceived as strangers ... Russian people probably have some internal mechanism that has been activated. They now the world as "us" and "them." And you can no longer stop it."

Despite formal talks between government authorities and student protesters, the risk is growing that demonstrations in Hong Kong will be violently suppressed. Dozens have been injured thus far - possibly hundreds - and tensions between police and protesters are understandably running high. But rather than try to restore calm, Hong Kong chief executive C.Y. Leung made things worse in an interview with foreign media last week, signaling that force is not necessarily a last resort even as he asserted that "there could be a compromise."

Leung's comments were troubling in three important ways. First, in voicing concerns over the prospect of truly democratic elections, which he worried would grant Hong Kong's poorer residents too much influence, he signaled fear - perhaps for the first time since the protests began - of ceding power to the people. If Leung and the territory's tycoons do in fact see protesting students as a threat, then those leaders are more likely to see extreme actions as justifiable, even if they are regrettable.

In the interview, Leung also for the first time echoed Beijing's insistence that "foreign forces" are behind the street protests. "I didn't overhear it in a teahouse, and it's something that concerns us. It's something that we need to deal with." Leung may or may not actually believe this, but either way it provides an excuse to use force in ending the students' occupation of public areas. In Leung's fantasy world, countering the protesters is apparently not just about defending Beijing's preferred path for Hong Kong's political development - it's about resisting foreign intervention. And the young protesters that have taken to the streets are not fellow Hong Kongers, but are instead foreign agents or collaborators.

If police are being issued the "foreign forces" line, they are less likely to be reserved in their use of force. After all, they are now tasked not merely with enforcing the law, but with defending Hong Kong from a foreign threat. The students are no longer members of Hong Kong's youth, but are now a hostile "other" and may be treated as such.

Finally, in claiming that Hong Kong is "lucky" China has yet to intervene, Leung may already be attempting to manage the discourse surrounding a future crackdown. He can clear the streets while claiming he had to do so in order to avoid the possibility of something much worse: a Tiananmen-like bloodbath at the hands of the jackbooted People's Liberation Army or People's Armed Police.

Leung has set down his markers for what is possible: at best, vague hopes for an alteration of the makeup of Hong Kong's nominating committee; at worst, a forceful end to street protests.

Now, following weeks of deafening silence, perhaps it is time for U.S. President Barack Obama to set some markers of his own. He has yet to issue a single statement on the protests in Hong Kong, much to the pleasure of the communists in Beijing. But instead of fretting about the inconvenient timing of the demonstrations, which look like they will drag on through the APEC summit in the Chinese capital, the president could take advantage of the summit to throw his support behind Hong Kongers' democratic aspirations. He should make clear to Chinese President Xi Jinping that there will be a price to pay in the event of a crackdown, whether it comes at the hands of local or central authorities.

In particular, Obama should warn Xi that following a violent outcome, his first phone call will be to Taiwan's President Ma Ying-jeou, whom he will invite to visit the White House. Ma has offered full-throated support for Hong Kong's protesters and for the democratization of mainland China. The prospect of an Obama-Ma summit on how to achieve those ends would get China's attention and would demonstrate, for the first time, an American seriousness of purpose in responding to the crisis in Hong Kong.

Michael Mazza is a research fellow in Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi appears to have developed a strong rapport with U.S. President Barack Obama during his recent visit to Washington. In a Sept. 30 column for the Washington Post, the two leaders mapped out an ambitious agenda for increased collaboration on a number of issues. Bureaucrats in both countries now assume the responsibility of bringing that shared vision to life. 

One area particularly ripe for deeper engagement is cyber security - an emerging national security issue for both countries, and one in which the level and the scope of the threat is fast expanding.

India boasts the world's third-largest population of online users, and Indians' increasing reliance on the internet leaves the country increasingly vulnerable to cyber warfare. The threat comes from criminal hackers, terrorist networks, and nation-states conducting espionage or trying to disrupt critical infrastructure. Cyber warfare can take an enormous toll on commercial activity, military readiness, and public safety. Guarding against increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks has therefore become a focal point of Indian and U.S. national security strategy.  

India was among the biggest victims of GhostNet, a global cyber espionage campaign that targeted governmental, research and military organizations. Beyond this campaign, Chinese espionage likely wrought India's most serious cyber breaches, including the March 2013 hacking of India's Defense Research and Development Organization's computer systems. In June 2012, cyber attacks were reported on the systems of the Indian Navy's Eastern Command, which is responsible for maritime activities in the South China Sea. 

Further, the internet helps militant groups spread propaganda, communicate with one another, and recruit members. Washington and Delhi share this concern, but the Indian domestic terrorist group Indian Mujahideen (IM) is particularly adept at using social media to communicate and recruit. IM members reportedly use Facebook and other chat sites to exchange cryptic messages while relying on proxy internet providers and software to mask their locations.  

Overcoming Suspicions

While the U.S.-India engagement on cyber security issues stretches back more than a decade, concrete cooperation remains minimal. There are specific reasons for this. 

A 2006 spying scandal that involved U.S. and Indian officials participating in a cyber security forum dampened cooperation for several years. Indian officials have since remained highly suspicious of U.S. motives and believe that Washington will look for ways to exploit any cyber security cooperation for the purposes of its own intelligence gathering. 

A recently-published study by the Heritage Foundation and New Delhi-based think tank Observer Research Foundation, titled Indo-U.S. Cooperation on Internet Governance and Cyber Security, argues that the growing challenges pertaining to global cyber security demand that India and the United States build a foundation of mutual trust and cooperation on intelligence and counterterrorism.  

The report highlights the need to expand Indo-U.S. cyber security dialogue to cover the international dimensions of the problem. The bilateral dialogue has so far focused narrowly on technical issues. The authors acknowledge, however, that the vast difference in cyber capabilities of both countries - as well as deep divisions within the United States over whether to pursue unilateral or multilateral approaches - hinder their ability to forge a consensus on international cyber norms and regulations. 

Dr. Raja Mohan, an Indian strategic thinker, notes the likely tension between India's tradition of favoring multilateralism and the imperative to build its domestic cyber security capabilities. In other words, Mohan writes, "India's national interests (on cyber security issues) may not be aligned with the collective positions of the South."

Another author of the report, Dr. Steven Bucci, Heritage's director of foreign and national security policy studies, makes a strong case for rejecting a regulatory approach. Instead, he recommends developing a legislative framework that "harnesses the power of U.S. and Indian industry and ingenuity, while safeguarding the freedoms and privacy of individual citizens." 

Building on Domestic Progress

India has begun to address its cyber security challenges in a serious way. The Indian government published its first ever National Cyber Security Policy in July 2013. The policy emphasizes research and development of indigenous security technology and enhanced public-private partnerships. It further encourages private organizations and companies to adopt more effective IT regulations and infrastructure that conform with international best practices, and it calls for developing a workforce of 500,000 cyber specialists over the next five years. 

To further boost cyber security, India recently set up the National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre, responsible for protecting assets in sectors like defense, finance, energy and telecommunications. Still, U.S. spending on cyber security outstrips Indian spending by 100 times. 

The United States and India have much to gain from deepening their cooperation in cyber security. If both sides work to craft a unified approach to the challenges facing the cyber security world, it would signal that the digital leaders are ready to take on the responsibility to craft a more secure. yet more open, cyberspace. 

Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow in The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center.

Passing through the Southern Carpathian Mountains to reach the Transylvanian Plateau, my thoughts wander back to the idea of Europa Karpat - "Europe of the Carpathians." The term itself came from a panel at the Economic Forum in Krynica to discuss deepened cooperation among the Carpathian states - Ukraine, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, and Croatia. To me, Europa Karpat resonates with the word "borderlands," and the long road I'm charting through the region brings to mind the paths its countries have traveled toward a common destiny.

The Carpathians are a transitional zone where the ideas of West and East interlace. Cultural notions and material goods move through customs points in the mountains, while geography has made of this region a natural buffer zone for empires since antiquity - as it does now for the current world powers. These borderlands have an established function as a cultural intermediary. The villager on the other side of the mountain is never a complete stranger, though he may well be a foreigner. It follows to discuss how the EU membership of some countries in the region could be a catalyst for better connections, better cooperation. This is what was expected of the Visegrad Group and, to a certain extent, of the European Union's Eastern Partnership initiative. These efforts have mostly disappointed, but are the countries of Central Europe on a path to increased cooperation in the 21st century?

A landscape of change

We're on the road moving north, and it's impossible not to note the changing architectural styles of the villages. The gardens on the southern side of the mountains - expansive and open to the eyes of the passerby - are a marked contrast to the enclosed, gated spaces on the approach to the Transylvanian plateau. On the skylines farther north, the gothic roofs of Evangelical churches call and their Byzantine Orthodox counterparts respond. Here, the mountains express an embedded, natural tolerance that remains resilient. Is this the nature of the "Middle Europe," as the Germans (Zwischeneuropa) and the French (Europe Mediane) call it - the reflection in stone and steeple of an unrecognized shared fate of resilience?

The shared fate that built nations in the Carpathians is one of conflict and stretches back to the middle of the 19th Century, when the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires competed to draw the boundaries of their influence. Conflict and contrast, that is - as in most places, the national myths that eventually sketched state boundaries in Central Europe were drawn by the whatever separated "our group" from "their group." But in this region, the bluntness of West-East stereotypes leads each group to look down on neighbors with particular ferocity, viewing them as less developed and somewhat barbaric. Such views were imposed on these neighboring societies from the beginning - a historical streaming of the empires' heritage to the region.

Religious and class differences in lifestyle and mentality shaped the image of the Westerners in the eyes of the Easterners. For instance, the Byzantine Orthodox sees the Western Christian as secularised and shallow. In the eyes of the West, the Christian of the East is idolatrous, backward and superstitious. Europa Karpat is where these views shake hands. They form the basis for defining how Hungarians and Romanians, Hungarians and Serbians, Polish and Ukrainians, and Polish and Belorussians, perceive one another. 

Social stereotypes of the other grew to reflect national images of self. The Poles and the Hungarians think of themselves as aristocrats in contrast with the Slovaks, the Romanians, the Belorussians. The Czechs define themselves in relation to the Germans - they wished to build their nation on folk and middle-class traditions as well as on Bohemian traits, creating the image of a democratic and plebeian Czech nation. They are the bourgeois of the region. 

These class-based stereotypes oppose the peasant to the noble and the urban inhabitant to the villager. This vernacular interaction among social classes, with few exceptions, seems to define the historical behavior of countries in Central Europe, when dealing with one another or with outsiders. A contemporary example is the way Poland balances its foreign policy: between the "noble" Weimar Triangle (Germany-France-Poland), more of a public relations endeavour than anything, and the humbler Visegrad Group.

The Cold War redefined this interaction, at least for a time. These countries, and the social strata within them, shared similar destinies. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, for instance, left an indelible mark. For at least a generation, Central Europeans felt united against a common evil - Communism and the system erected around it - though it took different forms in each satellite. After the uniformity imposed by totalitarianism, a new model has emerged for nation-building in Central and Eastern Europe - one built around the individual, the citizen, and the concept of universal equality. It has served as a starting point in the transition toward democratic societies in which ethnically and culturally separate communities have rediscovered traditions and have grown a newfound respect for "the other." Democracy has thus crystalized Carpathian regionalism, adding another layer of history to the interactions among its peoples.

In the contemporary argot of the European Union, regionalization refers to coherence in economic development among nation states. In this sense, the countries in Central Europe - member states of the EU - have many reasons to enhance cooperation. We have seen some initiatives, mostly led by Poland, to speak with a common voice during debates in Brussels - debates on solving the European economic crisis and developing a European banking union.  

The new pivots for cooperation

The Ukraine crisis has the potential now to raise Central European cooperation to a new level. Defense policymakers in these countries, while still looking for U.S. patronage and guidance to manage the threats at their borders, are becoming more and more aware that their countries' defense is in their own hands. The geopolitical realities surrounding the evolution of the new Cold War will have a vernacular expression in the Carpathians. They may go further and create the solid basis that the countries in the borderlands of Central Europe needed for closer cooperation. 

Until the Ukraine crisis, discussions between these countries and their Western partners mostly addressed economic development. Threat assessment and more stringent mapping of energy sources are now the dominant topics. Indeed, energy is the pivot of the new Cold War, and it is no wonder that while Poland is calling for the creation of an energy union, Romania - the country least dependent on Russian gas in the region - is seeking to reform its energy sector through sustained investment. 

Sergei Ivanov, Russia's presidential chief of staff and a former defense minister, gave an interview last week  to the Komsomolskaya Pravda daily in which he discussed Russia's current political, economic and military conditions. Given Ivanov's high standing in the Russian government, his statements directly reflect the presidential point of view - they can be directly attributed to President Vladimir Putin. And the use of one particularly potent term may reveal much about Russia's intentions toward Ukraine.

Ivanov mentioned the importance of creating a buffer zone between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian rebels as a means for gradually achieving peace, and he played down Russia's role as an active player in the Ukrainian conflict:

On the map, there is a clear line that separates militias from the armed forces of Ukraine, which creates a buffer zone to allow OSCE observers to mediate. I am absolutely convinced that this will form at least some basis for a political dialogue. As long as people are shooting at each other, such dialogue is impossible. This is a necessary first step - you have to understand that I cannot guarantee anything. After all, Russia is not party to the conflict. This is a Ukrainian civil war.

Ivanov gave a sobering assessment of the current situation in Crimea. Answering the reporter's question on whether or not Russia should more actively support Novorossiya - a Russian term for the portions of eastern Ukraine currently embroiled in conflict with pro-Russian forces, Ivanov replied:

How else can we support such regions? We support them morally because we desire real democracy for those territories - not the so-called Ukrainian democracy - we want human rights to be respected. The West blames us for Crimea. But if the Crimeans did not resist the coup in Kiev and the arrival to power of nationalists and open russophobes - I repeat, russophobes - what would have happened there? A blood bath, perhaps even worse than what is happening today in Donbas.

Ivanov expressed hope that the fighting won't resume, and he added that if common sense prevails and a conclusive cease-fire is reached, Russia may act as a guarantor.

What stands out from this interview is Ivanov's official use of the term Novorossiya - an old Imperial name for Ukrainian territories where today a majority of the population speaks Russian. The term has been bandied about by pro-Russian forces and Russian nationalists who believe these areas should be part of the Russian Federation. But its use by so high an official as Ivanov cannot be a slip of the tongue. Rather, it is a reflection of Moscow's official policy toward Ukrainian regions that may eventually fall under official Russian control.

The stunning collapse of the Iraqi army, despite repeated assurances from U.S. military commanders that it was a competent fighting force, was a critical factor in enabling the Islamic State's startling advance in Iraq. The failure of the Iraqi army after years of training at the hands of the world's best military and a huge influx of U.S. cash should have given Washington pause.

So what's a beleaguered administration to do? According to David Ignatius, the White House is likely mulling over a variety of strategies that entail... training new fighting forces:

Accelerate the training of the Iraqi army and a new Sunni national guard. Hundreds of foreign trainers, drawn from the special forces of the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Australia and other nations, will be working with the Iraqi military. A similar effort is needed for the Sunni guard. Plans call for three battalions of tribal fighters in Anbar and three more in Salahuddin province. U.S. officials believe a quick start for this program will boost morale among Sunni tribal leaders who say they’re ready to fight the extremists but lack the tools....

Speed the training of the moderate Free Syrian Army so it can battle the Islamic State’s militants. Easier said than done: The FSA is a ragtag force that must be rebuilt into a real rebel army with a solid command structure. Some officials argue for doubling the planned force to 10,000 and speeding completion of training camps in Jordan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

What's maddening about the above is not simply that we have seen, first-hand, that this has already failed in Iraq, it's that the administration is sitting on a CIA study surveying decades of covert U.S. efforts to train and equip fighting forces around the world. According to the New York Times, the "still-classified review... concluded that many past attempts by the agency to arm foreign forces covertly had a minimal impact on the long-term outcome of a conflict. They were even less effective, the report found, when the militias fought without any direct American support on the ground."

So despite having a fair amount of empirical evidence that training various groups of armed men will likely backfire, the administration is evidently still considering it as a serious option. 

Turkey's parliament recently called for more forceful involvement in Syria, and observers are now looking for clues on how Turkey may change its role in the crisis south of the border. The focus has been on Turkey's function as a main transit route for Islamist radicals. However, any shift in Ankara's foreign policy should not prioritize border control or invasion. Ankara's most effective contribution to changing the course of events in Syria would be a strategic reassessment of how weapons are allowed to flow across Turkish borders to opposition groups in Syria.

During the day, border crossings between Syria and Turkey provide a vital lifeline to the masses still residing in opposition-held northern Syrian areas. Essential goods come in and out, and passport-holding Syrians are free to enter Turkey. The business carried out across Turkey's borders at night, however, is of a different character. After the crossings close for civilians, trucks loaded with weapons rumble through, loaded with cargoes meant to arm Syria's many opposition groups. The improper oversight of these deliveries is a key obstacle to the development of a coherent Syrian opposition.

To be clear, the deliveries are vital to the Syrian opposition. Without these weapons, an even larger segment of northern Syria's population would have to flee regime forces and the Islamic State fighters who are close to encircling Aleppo and capturing the important border crossing near Azaz. Yet Turkey's weapons supply policy is also contributing to the instability. It is arguably at the root of the Syrian nationalist opposition's disarray, and by extension Turkey's handling of the situation hinders any resolution to Syria's crisis. In so doing, there is an opportunity for NATO to become more engaged in Syria and therefore become an actor which can politically direct the opponents to Assad's rule.

Scrutinize Turkey's weapons supply role

Turkey's role as the key transit route for foreign fighters and arms was established at the outset of the Syrian civil war. Ankara figured that by helping arm the opposition, it could contribute to a relatively quick end to the conflict, and an Ankara-friendly government would take charge in Damascus. There were plenty of donors who wanted to contribute to the cause: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates supplied weapons to a variety of groups, while Western governments supplied medical aid and communications equipment. Each donor supported the groups they saw as more closely aligned with their interest. 

Three years on, Turkey's laissez-faire policy on weapons flows has failed miserably. Studies show that there are currently around 1,500 different opposition groups in Syria - and that number relates directly to the way weapons are distributed. A policy guided by strategy and implemented with the help of other NATO members would beget a coherent Syrian opposition - an absolutely central component to bringing the war to an end. This streamlining of supplies would be a top-down process, but it would be effective, since Syrian fighters are quite naturally drawn to groups that can supply them with weapons, training, food and a basic living standard. Military coherence, in other words, will result in a politically legitimate opposition movement.

Establish viable Syrian partners

Such a change could lessen the willingness of some donors to contribute, and Turkey would certainly reject some donations from Gulf states, meaning another power would have to step in to fill the void, unless the West wants to ensure an Assad or Islamic State victory. By implementing a policy of slow strangulating the extreme elements of the opposition, it would give Obama a golden ticket to establish a viable Syrian force that could counter Bashar al Assad's forces as well as the Islamic State.

Creating a viable opposition force in Syria is clearly in the West's interest. One of the main lessons we can draw from the U.S.-sponsored peace negotiations in Geneva is that Damascus does not take the opposition seriously.  It is not difficult to understand why. In front of them sat a group of people with little real sway over the movements of armed groups on the ground. Further, opposition forces pose little existential threat to the regime - at best they control parts of cities, but in most cases, they control suburbs. It is never a good idea to hold negotiations with the opposing parties on such unequal footing. Not only will negotiations not succeed under such circumstances - they might even worsen the situation.

The West has long complained that there is no viable partner on the ground that it can work with. No such partner is likely to emerge if the West continues to engage the opposition so casually. Building leadership is not complicated. It rests on simple questions: What gives a person authority? What factors contribute to a leader being effective and uncontested?

First of all, they need to be able to deliver to their soldiers. This means military supplies, but also food, clothing and shelter. They need to be able to win battles. For this to happen, leaders need a strategic understanding of how, where and when to fight. Further, they need to have the funds necessary to train their soldiers. 

Since the start of the uprising, the moderate opposition has been ever-changing mosaic of groups splitting apart and creating new coalitions. However, some opposition groups have maintained their rank and file soldiers and have thereby continue to gain strength. These have often been the Islamist forces such as Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah. Their coherence shows that consistency and effectiveness is possible. The disarray has been within the more secular and moderate groups, and this underlines the strong link between fluid lines of supply, and the lack of a strong moderate opposition. If supplies to moderates become consistent, we will see an organic emergence of pro-western leaders.

There is one element that western engagement will not inevitably produce: a strong non-sectarian political vision for a post-Assad Syria. However, by letting the current slapdash policy continue, we can be absolutely certain this will never happen. Through engagement, Washington's influence will rise. By not seriously engaging, it loses to more radical forces.

Move toward a political settlement

There is no clear path to victory for any of Syria's warring factions. A political settlement is the only possible solution to a crisis that both sides see as existential. However, a just and sustainable political settlement cannot be reached without a balance of power on the battlefield. An equilibrium of two forces, recognizing that no one can win an outright victory, would be the only basis for political talks between the opposition and the regime. Obama now wants to engage more forcefully in Syria. In so doing, he should address the key cause of the rise of ISIS, which is the increasingly failed state in Syria. In cooperation with Turkey and other NATO members, Obama should work to lay the foundations on which a political settlement can be built.

What does this mean for U.S. involvement? Washington needs to push Ankara to dramatically revise its policies and change the way its borders operate. The free flow of rebels and equipment into Syria has to stop. There needs to be strong border control, including in remote areas where most fighters cross. Beyond that, if the response to the new policy is disengagement by Gulf countries that supply opposition groups, Washington should assure Turkey that it will supply enough weapons and equipment for the opposition continue resisting the Assad regime. The goal should be to build up a nationalist opposition that is strong enough to threaten Assad's survival, only then will there be negotiations.

Russia's foreign policy establishment is undertaking a profound review of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. This is not necessarily new - some level of internal debate and apportioning of blame has persisted for 24 years now - but recent Russian actions in Ukraine have emboldened those in the Kremlin who wish to "right the wrongs" of the fateful events of 1991. 

Starting in January 1991, and pressured by unrest in its constituent republics, the Soviet Union began to break apart. Lithuania is considered by many to have catalyzed that process. Peaceful civilian protests at the Vilnius Radio and Television headquarters and at the city's television transmission tower on Jan. 13, 1991, prompted heavy-handed suppression by the Soviet military. This in turn triggered more resistance by ethnic Lithuanians. All told, the clashes left 14 civilians dead and almost 1,000 more injured. 

Russia's post-Soviet narrative

Turning back to the present: Russia has turned up the pressure on on the Baltics, and there is widespread fear throughout the region that Moscow's threatening rhetoric matches the words that preceded its actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. Among other moves, Moscow has placed Lithuania's commercial exports on its anti-EU sanctions list.

Against this backdrop, the Komsomolskaya Pravda daily this week interviewed author Vladislav Shved, whose book, roughly translated into English as "Lithuania against Russia and Alpha," recounts the fateful events of early 1991.

The sentiments expressed in the interview are a good barometer of how Lithuania's anti-Soviet resistance is seen in Russian policy circles - and what that could mean as Russia contemplates future actions in the post-Soviet space.

Shved recalls the rise of anti-Russian sentiment in Lithuania in the lead-up to 1991, drawing parallels with the attitudes of the Ukrainians who gathered at Maidan Square in Kiev at the end of 2013. 

"(Then Soviet premiere) Gorbachev thought that he would be accepted into the European house after he let go of the Baltics, and he turned a blind eye to what was happening there. He was a dilettante and did not know Russia's history. Tsarist Russia was hounded as much (by the West) as today Russia is!" 

The author alludes to the actions of the Soviet elite military detachments sent to pacify Lithuanians in 1991, and he notes ongoing Lithuanian parliamentary proceedings against former Soviet leaders: 

"Following instructions from Washington - and Lithuania is accustomed to working with such instructions - today's Lithuanian parliamentarians have decided that is is necessary to finish Russia off. Namely, it is necessary to prove that Russia is the successor of a criminal state. And when 79 former Soviet - and now Russian - citizens are judged and found to be war criminals (for their actions in storming the afore-mentioned TV tower), Lithuania will then be able to claim that Russia is the successor state to a criminal entity and must be held morally and financially responsible."

Shved hints that Lithuanian leaders orchestrated the actions that culminated in the storming of the tower:

"A hastily conducted independence referendum gathered less then 40 percent of support across Lithuania in 1991...The separatists tried to accelerate the course of events, because they knew that they wouldn't get two-thirds of the vote in an official referendum. They then staged a tragedy at the TV tower in order to assure Lithuanians that the Soviet regime is criminal. Events in January 1991 had to unfold in such a way as to come off as bloody as possible..."

Shved, who was part of the ruling Communist Party government in Lithuania until 1991, then outlines a list of territorial concessions granted Lithuania in the Soviet era. Noting with particular sharpness that Vilnius, the country's capital, was among those concessions, the author accuses contemporary Lithuanians of being ungrateful for their country's post-WWII reality.

Such rhetoric is hardly new, but in the context of rising tensions between Russian and Lithuania it is rather worrisome. The three Baltic nations are NATO and EU members, but Russia may have considerable leverage over Latvia and Estonia - in both countries, more than 25 percent of the population is ethnically Russian. The same cannot be said of Lithuania, which has a very small ethnic Russian minority, though it maintains extensive commercial contacts with the Russian Federation. In order to increase pressure on this small country, Russia has to establish a narrative that discredits Lithuania's post-independence achievements.

The Shved interview offers a glimpse at how Russia plans to do this: He points out the Soviet pasts of officials including Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaite and Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis, who, Shved points out, was a KGB informant before he was a Russophobe.

"Now the Lithuanian leadership is trying to completely neutralize its Soviet past, presenting it in dark colors in order to demonstrate its heroic role in breaking free of Soviet slavery."

This book could have come and gone, as have sundry similar litanies by former Soviet apparatchiks who wish 1991 never happened. But in 2014, the agitations of former Soviet officials such as Shved warrant a closer look. Elections in neighboring Latvia, for instance, recently brought to power a pro-Russian political party, and Balts are now left wondering whether their political future truly lies with the West, or will instead be sketched around an accommodation with Russia - however uncomfortable that may be.

As if there wasn't enough to worry about on the global stage, the Brookings Institute is out with a new report showing that the global economy is looking increasingly shaky.

According to Brookings, the U.S. remains the only economy that is showing signs of health while growth "in China and other emerging markets appears to be losing momentum." The developed world looks no better, with major European economies like Germany, France and Italy "showing no signs of growth" while Japan's economy actively contracts. Brazil and Russia? Also slumping.

The only other major economy showing signs of life according to Brookings is India, which has seen a rebound in confidence following the appointment of a "reform-minded and credible" central bank governor. 

The bleak Brookings assessment was echoed by the IMF, which released a report this week with a similarly downbeat forecast, revising down global growth rates to 3.3 percent -- the same rate as last year. 

So what's weighing on the global economy? Geopolitical risks were cited by both the IMF and Brookings as a key factor along with deflationary worries, particularly in Europe. 

The IMF compiled this handy chart showing the chances of a recession across the major economic blocs. While no region pushes above the 50 percent mark, Europe looks uncomfortably close.

When American and Western sanctions against Russia went into effect, practically all segments of Russian society - from President Putin down to your average man on the street - struck a defiant tone. Russia will be able to weather this storm, was the message, and the country will go on just fine. There was some truth behind the bluster. While Moscow and St. Petersburg are cosmopolitan cities with all the offerings of their Western European counterparts, the rest of the country - small towns and cities, numerous villages and far-flung population centers - is less integrated into global commercial flows and for the most part already had scant access to products and services covered by the sanctions.

More substantial damage, however, may have been inflicted by Moscow's own retaliatory sanctions. When Russia banned the import of certain products the European Union, there was some concern over Russia's ability to substitute domestic fare for much-liked European foods.

So how have these sanctions hit the wallets of ordinary Russians? The daily Komsomolskaya Pravda dryly remarked that "market forces put everything in its place." Meat, fish, milk and poultry products saw the steepest price hikes in supermarkets across the country. The same can be said for basic vegetables, including that Russian staple the potato. Of course, such price fluctuations will vary from region to region, and those who wish to circumvent the sanctions altogether can still easily find all of the "forbidden fruits."

The same paper, in fact, ran a story explaining how to acquire these products. The article featured a businessman's advice on exploiting a legal loophole: "Register an import company in brotherly Belarus - and import to Russia everything that you need from the West. You can get anything into Moscow through the Customs Union (of which Russia and Belarus are part) - just make sure to register products through the Belorussian company."  

Finally, the Russian government may have a point when it claims that punishing Moscow is impossible - Russia is already part of the global economy. In place of banned Western products, Muscovites may soon be buying Serbian cheese, and potentially shrimp from Indonesia. The forces of supply and demand, in the meantime, will continue to reinforce the Russian black market, which is already robust having weathered the tremendous  ups and downs of the 1990s and 2000s. Recently, government officials in the Voronezh region (close to Ukraine's eastern border) confiscated 15,000 kilograms of banned cheese in what they called the largest and "most brazen" violation to date.