The Obama administration invokes Iran to defend Libyan operation.
'â??It shouldnâ??t be overstated that this was the deciding factor, or even a principal factorâ? in the decision to intervene in Libya, Benjamin J. Rhodes, a senior aide who joined in the meeting, said last week. But, he added, the effect on Iran was always included in the discussion. In this case, he said, â??the ability to apply this kind of force in the region this quickly â?? even as we deal with other military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan â?? combined with the nature of this broad coalition sends a very strong message to Iran about our capabilities, militarily and diplomatically.â?ÂThat afternoon in the Situation Room vividly demonstrates a rarely stated fact about the administrationâ??s responses to the uprisings sweeping the region: The Obama team holds no illusions about Colonel Qaddafiâ??s long-term importance. Libya is a sideshow. Containing Iranâ??s power remains their central goal in the Middle East. Every decision â?? from Libya to Yemen to Bahrain to Syria â?? is being examined under the prism of how it will affect what was, until mid-January, the dominating calculus in the Obama administrationâ??s regional strategy: how to slow Iranâ??s nuclear progress, and speed the arrival of opportunities for a successful uprising there. - David Sanger
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There's a lot to say about this, if it indeed reflects the administration's thinking. The first thing to point out is that the idea that America's intervention in Libya is in any way frightening to Tehran strikes me as an enormous stretch.
First, the Obama administration set up a multitude of conditions before it used force: the prospect of an imminent and massive humanitarian catastrophe, strong multilateral backing, NATO in the lead, etc. None of those conditions would likely be met for a preemptive military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities. Second, the administration has talked tough about removing Gaddafi but has failed to match its military strategy with its rhetoric. Far from fearing the display of American fire power and capabilities, the Supreme Leader & co. would likely conclude (if they haven't already) that American politicians let their mouths run far ahead of their intentions.
Finally, as Doug Bandow pointed out, the administration has actually dealt a massive blow to its hopes of convincing rogue regimes to disarm peacefully. Why on Earth would Iran - watching what's happening to Libya's erstwhile regime - give up a nuclear weapon now and leave itself vulnerable to military action? This is the lesson North Korea has drawn from Libya and it is, from the standpoint of a rogue regime, an utterly correct one.
The administration needs to get their Libya spin straight. On Friday, they're telling David Brooks that they plunged the U.S. into the middle of Libya's civil war with the understanding that it could hamstring the U.S. for years to come; on Sunday they're telling David Sanger that Libya is a "sideshow." Another lesson that Iran, and more charitable observers, is likely to draw from these conflicting signals is that the administration doesn't actually have a coherent strategy - for Libya, for Iran or for the greater Middle East. That's understandable, given the fast-moving unrest and tumult, but it is considerably less forgivable now that they've gone ahead and entangled the U.S. into a deeply problematic civil war.