My first reaction to hearing that the Taliban had apparently sent out an imposter to negotiate with NATO over a peace settlement was that it poured a decent amount of cold water over those who think that a "political settlement" is really possible. If the Taliban really wanted to explore a deal, they wouldn't be duping us. Michael Cohen sees it differently:
'What is lacking is a recognition that the Taliban (who are certainly bad guys) will likely have a long-term role to play in Afghanistan's future - and that this is something that all sides in the conflict, particularly the US, are going to have to accept. Now in an ideal world, the Taliban wouldn't play much of any role in Afghanistan's future - but we don't live in an ideal world and we are far past the point where it's even possible for the US to dictate the terms of Afghanistan's future. We have neither the time nor the resources nor the inclination nor the knowledge to do such a thing.'
I agree with the last part - about time and resources - but I'm not sure putting our faith in a political settlement is really feasible at this point. A political settlement implies that there's going to be some kind of agreed-upon equilibrium in the country, even if that means the Taliban rule over portions of the country. Is that likely, given that we can't even sit down with, you know, actual Taliban? How can you even discuss the contours of post-war settlement if your interlocutors aren't real?
UPDATE: Thinking a bit more about this, it often seems that the term "political settlement" serves the same totemic function for progressives that the word "victory" does for conservatives - an aspirational goal that starts to fall apart the minute it's subjected to serious scrutiny. What's frequently meant by the term political settlement is to have U.S. and NATO forces leave Afghanistan and let the chips fall where they may. But rather than defend that argument, it's couched in terms that make it more palatable to the public.
After all, it's not like both Bush and Obama administrations have not been seeking a political settlement or actively engaging regional stakeholders. It's just that those regional stakeholders have conflicting ideas for what an ideal post-war Afghanistan looks like and so those efforts tend to run aground.
At root, both the case for "victory" and the case for a "political settlement" in Afghanistan rest on a kind of evasiveness about the truly limited ability of the U.S. to orchestrate the fates of millions of people and multiple governments half a world away. Obviously, both outcomes are possible. The U.S. has won military victories before just as it has played a role in forging political settlements between warring parties. But in the case of Afghanistan what we seem to have among elite opinion is a group that wants to stay and a group that wants to leave, and both are groping for whatever arguments buttress that case.