A while back, Matthew Yglesias argued that the genius of the Iraq surge was that it lowered expectations for victory, allowing Washington to use the downward trend in violence as a cover for a withdrawal without the aura of defeat.
But what happens if it's no longer possible for Washington to convince itself it won:
'Although there are no firm figures, security and political officials say hundreds of the well-disciplined fighters â?? many of whom have gained extensive knowledge about the American military â?? appear to have rejoined Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Beyond that, officials say that even many of the Awakening fighters still on the Iraqi government payroll, possibly thousands of them, covertly aid the insurgency.The defections have been driven in part by frustration with the Shiite-led government, which Awakening members say is intent on destroying them, as well as by pressure from Al Qaeda. The exodus has accelerated since Iraqâ??s inconclusive parliamentary elections in March, which have left Sunnis uncertain of retaining what little political influence they have and which appear to have provided Al Qaeda new opportunities to lure back fighters.
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There was tremendous violence following the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in the 1970s, but the U.S. was able to stay aloof from the consequences because it had fully disentangled itself from its Southeast Asian war. There are 50,000 U.S. troops still inside Iraq. Are they hedges against Iraq's fragmented and potentially violent politics, or hostages to it?