The U.S. Has an Interest in Serbia’s Stability

Protests in Serbia are often interpreted as a fight for democratization, against corruption, and for the defense of European values. But the reality of the political scene in the country is far more complex.

Western capitals and media sometimes assume that the alternative to the Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, is a pro-Western, democrat who would irreversibly align Serbia with the EU and categorically expedite the reform process. However, this assumption is naive at best and dangerously wrong at worst.

Aleksandar Vučić built a relationship with the United States and the European Union based on pragmatic cooperation, despite frequent criticism of his domestic politics among some in the West, which has brought Serbia closer to the West’s economic and security frameworks. Under his leadership, Serbia has remained a key stabilizing factor in the Balkans, especially when regional tensions have increased—from political crises in Montenegro to open conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

American and European officials, including senior diplomats, privately admit that Vučić is the main guarantor that the region will not slide into chaos. His ability to strike a balance between Western expectations and Serbia's internal politics has enabled Belgrade to remain a reliable partner in maintaining peace in the Balkans.

This stability is not the result of mere political survival—it is the result of carefully built relations with Brussels and Washington and a willingness to accept and implement certain reforms, including Serbia's alignment with key EU policies and US interests in the region.

Vučić's relationship with the West was built through a series of concrete steps by which he showed that he is willing to take decisions that, even if they are often unpopular in Serbia, are in the interest of regional peace and stability, as well as transatlantic relations.

Firstly, the Vučić government has significantly improved military and security relations with the West. Although he was not responsible for Serbia's accession to the NATO Partnership for Peace program, which was signed back in 2006, his government has further deepened cooperation with the Alliance through joint training, military-technical cooperation, and increasing the interoperability of the Serbian armed forces with Western partners.

A result of this strategy is the agreement concluded last year for the purchase of 12 French Rafale aircraft worth 2.7 billion euros, with which the largest army in the Balkans is strategically turning away from its traditional Russian supplier and toward Western partners. In this way, the strategic line of Russian influence, which is more than 60 years old, is being broken.

Under Vučić, Serbia’s steps to align with NATO have strengthened its role as a stable factor in the region, preventing the escalation of conflicts, and adhered to a realpolitik approach to security policy.

Secondly, in 2020, during Trump's first term in office, Vučić signed an economic normalization agreement with Kosovo in Washington, which represented a revolutionary shift in the decades-long frozen conflict. Although it did not resolve the matter of Kosovo’s status, this agreement enabled the opening of new economic channels between Belgrade and Pristina, thus reducing the risk of new conflicts.

Thirdly, the Vučić government made it possible to strengthen economic cooperation with the West. Today, German, Italian, French, and American companies are the largest investors in Serbia, and Belgrade has developed into an important technological and industrial center in the region, which would not be possible without close cooperation with Brussels and Washington, as well as Berlin and Paris.

Since Vučić came to power, foreign direct investment from Western countries has increased significantly, while the European Union has remained Serbia's most important economic partner. For years, Serbia has been the record-holder in Southeast Europe in terms of attracting foreign direct investment, amounting to around EUR 4–5 billion per year. At the same time, three quarters of this FDI comes from the West.

Moreover, it must be remembered that the Vučić government, and not previous Serbian governments, initiated the negotiation process with the EU regarding Serbia's accession to the Union. One must also take into account the efforts of his government to create a trade union between the Balkan states through the Open Balkan project, following the example of the open market on which the EU was forged.

While the demonstrations in Belgrade and other cities arouse sympathy in the West, the real question any serious analyst should be asking is: Who would come to power if Vučić leaves?

The main opposition force in Serbia is not a homogeneous, pro-Western coalition but a fragmented bloc dominated by populist, right-wing, and pro-Russian parties. Their messages are not what Brussels and Washington would like to hear. They openly reject any compromise on the Kosovo issue, are firmly opposed to NATO and the EU, and demand a much stronger orientation toward Moscow and Beijing.

Even within the “civic opposition,” there is strong anti-American and anti-European rhetoric. Many of the groups leading the protests are not explicitly pro-Western—their narrative is often characterized by populism, anger at the West for supporting Vučić, and unrealistic expectations of changes in Serbia's political course, given that they do not represent a majority of Serbian society.

Despite internal criticism, Serbia under Vučić has become a pillar of stability in a region that is still suffering from the severe consequences of the breakup of Yugoslavia. While Bosnia and Herzegovina struggles with constant political crises, Montenegro goes through waves of internal divisions, and Kosovo remains a potential point of conflict, Serbia has remained stable and has a predictable foreign policy.

The loss of Serbia as a stable partner for the West would mean creating space for greater Russian and Chinese influence in the region and increasing political uncertainty. At a time when Europe is confronted with Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine, internal economic challenges, and the rise of right-wing populist movements, the last thing Brussels and Washington want is another unpredictable political crisis in the Balkans.

Aleksandar Vučić is not a perfect leader from the West’s point of view, but he is a predictable and reliable partner. The alternative to his leadership, as it currently exists in Serbia, is not a modern, pro-European, democratic option but radicalized political chaos in which the West could lose its most stable partner in the Balkans.

Western diplomats and analysts need to move away from the simplistic narrative of "good protesters” opposing an “evil autocrat” and start thinking seriously about the real consequences of political change in Serbia. Because if Vučić leaves without a clear alternative, the question is not whether Serbia will take a step backwards but how far it will go in that direction.

Dr. Orhan Dragaš is Director of the International Security Institute in Belgrade, Serbia. He is author of The End of the Russian World: Russia, Ukraine, Balkans; Russia: From a Failed State to a Rogue State; and The Modern Intelligence-Security Community, Utopia or Reality.