The Yemeni civil war originated in 2014, when the Houthi movement (representing the Zaydi Shiite Islamic minority) seized control of the capital, Sana’a. in the following years, the conflict progressively escalated, with the rebel forces consolidating their control over the northern regions, while the internationally recognised government retained authority over portions of the southern territory, including the port city of Aden, which was transformed into the temporary seat of the government.
The country’s economic situation has drastically deteriorated: Yemen’s GDP has undergone a significant contraction, and rampant inflation has severely undermined the population’s purchasing power. Simultaneously, the ongoing hostilities and frequent aerial bombardments have devastated the country’s essential infrastructure, compromising access to vital public services: access to safe drinking water is extremely limited, and the healthcare system is on the verge of collapse, with approximately 40% of medical facilities rendered inoperative.
According to United Nations data, more than 19.5 million Yemenis need humanitarian assistance, and approximately 17 million are unable to meet their basic nutritional needs. Furthermore, official figures (which are almost certainly underestimates) report 4.9 million internally displaced persons, the majority of whom are women and children.
In the Yemeni context, the most prominent international actor is undoubtedly neighbouring Saudi Arabia. Riyadh intervened in the conflict in March 2015 as the primary sponsor of the Arab coalition, which supports the internationally recognised government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. Despite its clear military superiority, Saudi Arabia has failed to achieve substantial victories on the ground, and the protracted nature of the conflict has led to a gradual disengagement by Riyadh, culminating in dialogue processes with the Houthis held in Muscat and Sana’a throughout 2023 and 2024.
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also played a critical role. As part of the Saudi-led coalition, Abu Dhabi established a naval and military presence in strategic ports such as Aden, Mukalla, and the island of Socotra, pursuing a strategy of “maritime projection” in the Arabian Sea and the Horn of Africa. However, since 2019, the UAE has significantly reduced its direct involvement due to internal divisions within the coalition: actually, while Riyadh has consistently pursued the goal of Yemeni national unity, Abu Dhabi has tended to support a model of controlled fragmentation. Nevertheless, the UAE continues to back local militias and exerts considerable economic and military influence in the region.
The United States has aligned itself with the coalition, adopting a position marked by substantial strategic ambiguity. Washington’s military and logistical support for the Hadi government must be interpreted primarily through an anti-Iranian lens, as Tehran is the principal military and financial backer of the Houthi rebels. Although the Biden administration initially signalled a partial withdrawal of military support from the coalition, U.S. involvement intensified again since 2024 in response to Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The joint military operation (conduced with the United Kingdom) was justified on the grounds of self-defence and the protection of freedom of navigation. However, at its core, the operation aimed to neutralise a potential collateral threat within the broader context of the Israeli Palestinian conflict.
In this context, negotiations conduced under the auspices of the United Nations have thus far yielded only partial and temporary outcomes, such as the short-lived truce of 2022. Ceasefires are typically violated within the first month, as they lack effective enforcement mechanisms and therefore quickly lose credibility and efficacy.
Nevertheless, in the course of 2024, some encouraging signs of openness have emerged. The Southern Transitional Council (one of the key armed groups engaged in hostilities against both the Houthi rebels and the Hadi government) has proposed a form of federalism as a potential solution to facilitate national reconciliation. Saudi Arabia, increasingly burdened by the high costs of the conflict and counting international pressure, has also signalled an interaction to reduce its direct military involvement, while continuing to exert political and military influence through local actors.
In the long term, the reconstruction of Yemen will require a coordinated effort among local, regional, and international actor. It is worth emphasising that Yemeni instability has repercussions far beyond the country’s borders: the Houthis’ control over parts of the Red Sea coastline extends to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, posing a serious threat to some of the world’s busiest maritime trade routes.
For an inclusive peace process (one that encompasses all components of Yemeni society) to succeed, a genuine political will on the part of the currently involved actors is essential: prioritising the reconstruction of strategic infrastructure, the survival of civil society, and economic recovery must go hand-in-hand with the promotion of a comprehensive national reconciliation agenda. Within this framework, the international community bears the formidable responsibility of facilitating and supporting this delicate process.
Matteo Balzarini Zane, bachelor degree in Political Science, International Relation and Human Rights at the University of Padua (Italy). Author of the book “Forgotten Wars: Annual Report 2024” (available on Amazon). His X account is @m_balzarinizane.