The invasion of Ukraine has underscored Russia’s enduring capacity to disrupt global stability. Yet, as the United States navigates an increasingly competitive geopolitical environment dominated by China’s ascendancy, we must recalibrate our strategy toward Russia. The objective should not be the total defeat of Russia—a nuclear-armed state—but its transformation into a pivot power that seeks to balance its interests between Washington and Beijing. This approach, and a similar approach argued for by this author relative to North Korea, aligns with the long-term imperatives of American national security and the evolving global balance of power.
We must examine the historical, ideological, and geopolitical currents that drive Russian behavior to achieve this. While Russia’s imperialism is undeniable, it is rooted not solely in aggression but in a complex tapestry of religious messianism, fears of Western superiority, and legitimate security concerns. Any strategy that ignores these dynamics is destined to fail.
Russia’s geography has always rendered it vulnerable to invasion. From the Mongol yoke in the 13th century to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s incursions, from Sweden under Charles XII to Napoleon’s Grande Armée, and from the German Kaiser’s troops to Hitler’s Wehrmacht, Russia’s history is punctuated by existential threats. These invasions have fostered a deep-seated paranoia, reinforcing a perception that security can only be achieved through strategic depth and control over neighboring territories.
This fear was compounded by Russia’s cultural and technological inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West. Peter the Great’s reforms were an acknowledgment of this disparity, as were later efforts to modernize under Alexander II and Stalin. Yet, even as Russia sought to emulate Western power, it clung to its unique identity, rooted in Orthodox Christianity and a sense of civilizational mission. This messianism, which casts Russia as a defender of traditional values against Western decadence, remains a cornerstone of its worldview.
This is well encapsulated by Kissinger when he wrote,
“Over centuries the strange Russian empire has seeped outward from the Duchy of Muscovy, spreading east and west across endless plains where no geographical obstacle except distance set a limit to human ambition, inundating what resisted, absorbing what yielded. This sea of land has, of course, been a temptation for invaders as well, but as it has eventually swallowed up all conquerors—aided no little by a hard climate—it has impelled the Russian people who have endured to identify security with pushing back all surrounding countries. Perhaps from this insecure history, perhaps from a sense of inferiority, Russia’s rulers—Communists or tsars—have responded by identifying security not only with distance but also with domination. They have never believed that they could build a moral consensus among other peoples. Absolute security for Russia has meant infinite insecurity for all its neighbors.”
This should have been obvious to U.S. policymakers, but it was generally ignored or dismissed throughout most of the post-Cold War era.
George Kennan, the architect of containment and generally considered the greatest Russian hand in US history, warned that NATO’s expansion into Eastern Europe would provoke Russian hostility. He called it the “most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era”.
His prediction proved prescient.
Unfortunately, in the aftermath of the Cold War, an alternative European security structure could have been pursued—one that integrated Russia rather than alienated it.
Under Boris Yeltsin, Russia sought a partnership with the West. The 1990s offered a fleeting window for redefining the European order. A security architecture that included Russia as a stakeholder, possibly through a revamped Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), might have alleviated Moscow’s fears. Guarantees of neutrality for former Warsaw Pact states and economic integration could have provided the security and prosperity necessary for Russia to shed its imperial impulses.
These policies would have been somewhat similar to how the European security architecture was changed after the Napoleonic Wars with the creation of the Concert of Europe, as Kissinger outlined in his magisterial A World Restored.
Instead, NATO expanded eastward, exacerbating Russian insecurities and feeding a vicious cycle of Russian responses that only made its neighbors also feel more insecure in a classic security dilemma. While the Baltic states and Eastern Europe understandably sought protection from a historically aggressive neighbor, the absence of an inclusive security framework left Russia feeling encircled. This perceived encroachment was a key element that fueled Vladimir Putin’s rise and subsequent revanchist agenda.
The United States must now confront the reality that Russia’s total defeat is neither desirable nor feasible. Unlike Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, Russia possesses a vast nuclear arsenal, rendering any attempt to impose unconditional surrender unthinkable. Moreover, the dissolution of the Russian Federation would likely lead to chaos: civil wars, the proliferation of nuclear materials, and the rise of Islamist terrorism across its southern borders. A weakened Russia could also invite Chinese territorial ambitions, further destabilizing Eurasia.
While Russia will never become a faithful Western ally, it need not be a permanent adversary. The current trajectory risks solidifying a Sino-Russian axis that tilts the global balance of power with Russia playing the role of a great spoiler. Beijing’s economic might and Moscow’s military capabilities complement each other, creating a partnership that threatens American interests. Breaking this alignment should be a central aim of U.S. foreign policy.
Meanwhile, China, not Russia, represents the foremost challenge to American security and economic primacy. Its Belt and Road Initiative, militarization of the South China Sea, and ambitions for technological dominance underscore its global aspirations. Unlike Russia, which risks becoming a declining power, China is a rising one, with the potential to reshape the international order.
A triangulating Russia would force Beijing to divert resources and attention, reducing its capacity to confront the United States much as a triangulating China once did against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. By fostering a relationship with Moscow that offers economic and political alternatives to dependence on China, Washington can compel Beijing to “watch its back,” thereby diluting its strategic focus.
The United States must adopt a pragmatic approach to transform Russia from a spoiler to a pivot state. This does not mean condoning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine but recognizing the limits of punitive measures. The West, especially the incoming Trump Administration, must open channels for dialogue with Moscow while drawing a redline at existing, but not future, NATO members.
Economic incentives, such as selective sanctions relief and trade opportunities, could encourage Russia to recalibrate its alignment. At the same time, Washington should engage with third-party mediators—perhaps India—to explore common ground. Cultural and educational exchanges could also foster a more nuanced understanding between the two nations, reducing mutual distrust.
A long-term solution will require reimagining the European security architecture. While NATO’s role remains indispensable, it should not continue to expand further east, including the addition of Ukraine. Meanwhile, a parallel structure that includes Russia could offer a path forward. This might involve a renewed OSCE with binding territorial integrity and mutual defense commitments.
Such a framework must address Russia’s legitimate security concerns while upholding the sovereignty of its neighbors. It should also include mechanisms for economic cooperation, energy security, and arms control. By integrating Russia into a rules-based order, the West can mitigate its imperial impulses and reduce the likelihood of future conflicts.
The United States must approach Russia’s challenge with a strategic vision not merely a moral lens. The objective is not to defeat Russia but to shape its choices. By offering an alternative to dependence on China, Washington can, over time, transform Russia into a pivot state that balances its interests between East and West.
This approach requires patience, pragmatism, and a willingness to engage with a rival. It acknowledges Russia’s historical insecurities and ideological motivations while addressing the geopolitical realities of the 21st century. As America confronts China’s rise, it must recognize that a triangulating Russia serves its interests far better than a Sino-Russian axis.
This will not be easy, especially in the wake of the largest war in Europe since World War II, but the stakes could not be higher. Today’s choices will determine whether Eurasia becomes a theater of unrelenting conflict or a foundation for a stable and balanced world order. America has the power to steer this course—if we have the wisdom to act.
Greg R. Lawson is a Contributing Analyst at Wikistrat
