Power abhors a vacuum, the saying goes, so perhaps it’s no surprise that nine Japanese lawmakers—a record high—have declared their candidacy since Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced he would not seek reelection.
While Kishida’s decision was not unexpected, given his low poll ratings and ruling party scandals, the abruptness surprised even potential successors who scrambled to respond. The crowded field of qualified contenders, coupled with the dissolution of Japan’s political coalition system, makes predicting Kishida’s successor infinitely more difficult than previous selections.
Kishida leaves an impressive legacy, including greater security accomplishments than was expected of someone who described himself as a “dove,” in contrast to previous Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s “hawk.” Although the candidates have differences on some economic and social issues, all would maintain Japan’s foreign policies emphasizing strong ties to the U.S. and augmenting deterrence against the growing threats from China and North Korea.
A crowded, uncertain playing field.
Kishida’s three-year term as the president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) expires this month. After his decision not to run again, the party announced it would hold its election on September 27 to choose a successor who, under Japan’s parliamentary system, would become the country’s prime minister. Kishida’s successor will not be elected by Japan’s populace but rather by a limited number of LDP lawmakers and selected party representatives. A general election must take place by October 2025, though the LDP could call a snap election prior to that.
At least 10 lawmakers have announced interest in running to replace Kishida. Previous inter-party elections were heavily influenced by formal factions whose leaders wielded great sway over determining candidates and selecting the winner. However, almost all factions were dissolved this year and the remaining faction’s boss indicated he would not press members to vote for a single candidate. The result is a larger number of candidates with less predictability of the election outcome.
Taking a hit for the team.
Kishida’s plummeting popularity was due mostly to public disaffection with the LDP’s inability to improve the economy as well as widespread political funding scandals amongst party lawmakers. Kishida’s “new form of capitalism” didn’t live up to its promises to address lagging wages and rising living costs.
Late last year it was revealed that more than dozens of LDP lawmakers and officials had been underreporting and pocketing cash from party fundraising parties. Kishida dismissed four cabinet ministers while others resigned or were indicted. In March, a party task force punished LDP member for violations, dissolved intraparty coalitions, and imposed stricter fundraising reporting rules. Despite these steps, the public remained harshly critical of the party and Kishida’s handling of the scandal, though he had not been implicated.
Kishida and LDP leaders felt the need for a fresh face at the top to rekindle support for the party prior to next year’s upper and lower house parliamentary elections. Despite the widespread scandal, the LDP is expected to again win the elections since the opposition remains in disarray and the LDP has ruled the country almost exclusively since the end of World War II.
Kishida’s impressive legacy.
In contrast to his low domestic approval, Kishida’s foreign and security policies have been lauded by the international community. Kishida was able to achieve what Abe could not: pledging to double Japan’s defense spending and develop long-range counter-strike capabilities. Both actions, which the U.S. had long pressed Tokyo to adopt, were welcomed by a populace increasingly nervous of the escalating Chinese threat to the Indo-Pacific.
In December 2022 national security documents, Kishida’s administration delineated extensive defense reforms to develop new military capabilities and bolster Japan’s endeavors to assume greater responsibilities for its own defense and in the region. Previously, any government attempt to expand the role of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces was greeted with extensive public and legislative protests.
Diplomatically, Kishida has also been a tour-de-force. Kishida welcomed South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol’s attempt to defuse long-standing animosities between the two countries. Yoon and Kishida revived dormant security and economic ties that set the foundation for greater trilateral military, economic, and diplomatic coordination with the United States which was encapsulated in the historic August 2023 Camp David agreement.
Kishida has been a stalwart advocate for greater collaboration amongst Indo-Pacific nations against China’s increasingly belligerent actions, warning that “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” Kishida convened the first ever Japan-U.S.-Philippines trilateral summit to demonstrate support for Manila’s struggle to protect its maritime sovereignty and maintain freedom of navigation from Chinese encroachment. His administration loosened restrictions on defense exports to allow for greater security capacity-building of southeast Asian nations.
The path ahead.
While the near-term political scene in Japan is murky, the long-term prospects for the bilateral U.S.-Japan relationship remain clearly optimistic. All the potential LDP leadership candidates support their party’s stalwart commitment to enhancing the alliance with Washington. Recent initiatives by both Tokyo and Washington to improve their military command structures in Japan will enable stronger coordination between the two nations’ military forces.
While the trend line is positive, the next Japanese prime minister will face daunting challenges to gaining the trust of the electorate, righting the national economy, and maintaining—and paying for—Tokyo’s plans to augment its military capabilities. Regardless of leadership changes, the United States and Japan must stand together with like-minded regional partners against increasing dire security threats.
Bruce Klingner is Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation. He previously served 20 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, including as CIA’s deputy division chief for Korea.
