Media coverage of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent trip to Ukraine focused on how it was the first time an Indian prime minister had visited modern Ukraine. It is equally important, and no coincidence, that his visit came as Ukraine is plunging deeper into an escalating war with India’s longtime defense patron, Russia.
India has long preached a “Non-Aligned” foreign policy with an emphasis on maintaining its “strategic autonomy.” Yet it has rarely broken with Russia in the over five decades since the two countries signed a defense pact. Indeed, Non-Alignment has historically been synonymous with Non-American.
Over the past decade, however, the Modi government has shed much of this historical baggage and substantially strengthened ties with the U.S. More recently, India has also begun to show more independence from Russia. Modi’s visit to Kiev is only the latest example.
To be sure, the takeaways from Modi’s visit were modest; India is not countenancing a sharp break with Russia. Nonetheless, Modi’s visit to Ukraine has lessons for Washington policymakers.
Balancing Act
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, New Delhi has been walking a fine line, avoiding any overt criticism of Putin’s war while condemning the bloodshed and calling for an immediate end to hostilities.
Russia still garners considerable, if waning, sympathy in New Delhi, especially among older generations. Many Indians believe the West bears some responsibility for the conflict by provoking Russian insecurities with discussions about NATO’s eastward expansion to Ukraine.
The Indian government has also taken advantage of discounted Russian energy exports, both for domestic consumption and for re-export at a profit, a move tacitly welcomed by the West at a time of rising inflation.
At the same time, Modi has repeatedly signaled his discomfort with the conflict, twice telling President Putin in person: “This is not an era of war.”
Modi was noticeably perturbed when Russian forces bombed a Ukrainian children’s hospital while he was visiting Moscow in July. “The sight of innocent children dying shatters your heart, and that pain is very terrifying,” he told Putin at a public exchange. During his subsequent visit to Ukraine, Modi visited a memorial for children killed in conflict.
Russian Reliability
Beyond the humanitarian cost of the war, many in India are alarmed by the way the conflict is accelerating Russia’s drift further into China’s orbit. Russia’s primary strategic value to India has been its ability to serve as an arms supplier and geopolitical patron. Once a stalwart hedge against China, Russia’s reliability on that front is increasingly in doubt.
Russia refused to take sides during the deadly border clash between Chinese and Indian forces in 2020, even as the Trump administration delivered military aid and intelligence to India. Since the consecration of the China-Russia “no limits partnership” on the eve of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, it’s increasingly difficult to deny Moscow is “all-in” on its bet on Beijing.
For India, Russia is also not the defense partner it once was. First, India now has more options, systematically diversifying imports over the past 15 years to include American, European, and even Israeli hardware in addition to bolstering its indigenous defense industry.
Second, whereas Russia used to sell India premier military platforms that could compete with or outclass Chinese systems, now Russia is selling its best equipment to China too, sometimes first. And in a growing number of cases, China’s indigenous hardware is superior to Russian kit.
Third, Russia’s defense industrial base is straining. India recently scrapped some large deals for new helicopters and jet fighters and is preparing to ground its entire fleet of Soviet-era MiG-21s next year. India will increasingly have to look elsewhere if it wants to maintain a degree of parity with the People’s Liberation Army.
US policy
India and Russia have been slowly drifting apart and now their relationship is being tested by a paradox: India’s biggest threat is Russia’s closest partner.
While it is tempting for the U.S. to seek to accelerate this rift, no amount of U.S. pressure will force India to unwind its ties with Russia quicker than it wants to, but the U.S. can make the alternatives more attractive.
There is a long road ahead. Even after 15 years of pretty remarkable progress in India-U.S. relations, New Delhi is not convinced of America’s reliability. An erratic, late 20th century track record of sanctioning India and arming Pakistan is not far from the collective Indian memory.
Neither is the recent wave of attacks by U.S. progressives which have accused the Modi government of being a “fascist” threat to Indian democracy. New Delhi wonders if another wave of sanctions or another pivot to Pakistan might be just around the corner.
Unless those concerns are addressed, India will resist tying its fate too closely to America’s or severing ties with Russia, even as it continues pretty robust tactical cooperation with the U.S. in a large number of areas where interests overlap.
That is, unless China forces India’s hand—which, on Beijing’s current trajectory, is not a remote possibility. India has pretty clearly signaled that while a fickle U.S. should be approached with caution, submission to Chinese hegemony is a non-starter.
Until that happens, America will have to demonstrate that it can be a reliable and superior alternative if it is to position itself as India’s 21st century partner of choice.
Jeff M. Smith is director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation.
