Over the past month, Ukraine has boasted of seizing approximately 500 square miles of the Russian Kursk region, marking the first time that Ukraine has directly attacked and seized Russian territory since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022.
However it is unclear how this offensive will create favorable conditions for a negotiated settlement.
President Zelensky explained that the cross-border incursion into Kursk is step one of a four stage plan for peace. He continued by explaining that the “second direction is [securing] Ukraine’s strategic place in the security infrastructure of the world… [the] third direction is the powerful package of forcing Russia to end the war in a diplomatic way, and the fourth direction is economical.”
Ukrainian leadership seems to forget that the enemy always gets a say, even at the negotiating table. The second pillar outlined by Zelensky appears to be an allusion to Ukraine’s long-stated objective of joining NATO. Realistically, it's unclear how this would result in peace between Russia and Ukraine, when Russian leadership has repeatedly called admitting Ukraine into NATO a red line.
As for the other two pillars, it's unclear how they will be implemented because neither the Ukrainian government nor the Biden administration has publicly outlined a strategic end state for the war and terms that would actually result in peace. While President Biden has argued that the United States will stand with Ukraine for “as long as it takes,” that is not a specific strategy, nor is it a clear indication of what “winning” looks like. Without a clear strategic framework, the flow of strategy from operations to tactics is murky at best.
To make matters worse, directly attacking Russia stretches Ukrainian resources and manpower thin. While Ukraine recently received a $60 billion cash infusion from the United States, it’s unclear if another will come anytime soon. Reports have also surfaced that some Ukrainian men on the front lines are “poorly trained” and refuse to fire their weapons at their enemy. Although Ukraine recently lowered the age of conscription, young men have gone into hiding to avoid the draft. If fighting age men do not want to fight in the war, how will the Ukrainian government restore the morale that is necessary to drive its continuation?
On the other hand, Russia seems to have an untapped reserve of eligible men to continue the fighting. General Christopher Cavoli, Commander of U.S. European Command explained during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing that the Russian army has grown by 15 percent since the invasion of Ukraine, and that the Russian army has grown “far faster” than initial estimates.
It’s clear that Ukraine risks losing the initiative like it did in 2022.
In 2022, Ukraine achieved a string of victories against Russia. This would have been the time to come to the negotiating table and sue for peace. Drunk on the victories of 2022, some neo-conservatives mistakenly called for regime change in Russia while Ukrainian and American leadership continued to push for more war. No one clearly articulated what winning looks like. Then, the war evolved into one of attrition, a grinding conflict with no end in sight.
Now that Ukraine has seized Russian territory, American leaders should not indulge in talk of regime change, or similar arguments that are symptomatic of victory’s disease, a phenomenon that occurs when one side becomes arrogant or complacent after a string of victories.
Although some have openly advocated for regime change in light of Ukraine’s recent victories, regime change could directly threaten negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. To put it bluntly, why would Russian President Vladimir Putin come to the negotiating table if he knew that Americans wanted his head?
If the goal of diplomatic negotiations is peace, it’s also unclear how regime change would achieve that goal. It’s unwise to think that the next guy in line will be any more sympathetic to Ukraine or the United States, and removing Putin from the equation could actually serve to radicalize Russia’s next leader. When discussing regime change, people also like to pass over the fact that Russia has nuclear weapons. Would Putin use his arsenal of nuclear weapons if his power is credibly threatened?
Pursuing regime change isn’t the only symptom of victory’s disease. More commonly, a leader will press forward without a clear strategic end state, or continue to change the terms of victory. Unfortunately, Ukraine runs the risk of falling victim to victory’s disease simply because it’s not clear what feasible strategic end state they would like to achieve.
Although Ukraine has launched a daring offensive into Kursk, there is no reason to assume that this will make Moscow more willing to negotiate an end to the war. We should all hope that the fighting will end and that negotiations for peace will take place soon. Unfortunately, without a clear and realistic strategy, hope may be all that we have.
Demri Scott Greggo is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.
