In early June, Taiwanese celebrities and influencers offered a rare window into a little understood way that China is seeking to exert influence on the island’s information space. Within the span of just a few days, multiple singers, actors, and YouTubers shared details of paid offers they had allegedly received from Chinese entities to post content online. The requests ranged from posting anodyne videos about travel to China to establishing a political party in Taiwan and sharing a pre-written declaration to encourage unification with China. Potter King, a popular Taiwanese lifestyle YouTuber who was one of the first to raise the alarm about this phenomenon, accused anyone who accepted such offers as being part of a “cultural United Front.” Other commentators pushed back against these accusations, claiming that Potter King and others had inspired a “witch hunt” against organic interactions between Taiwan and China.
Viewed within the broader context of Beijing’s efforts to influence Taiwan, however, the incident speaks to a new and evolving effort to meet young Taiwanese where they are online and proactively influence their views of China. Even as China publicly threatens “diehard” supporters of Taiwan’s sovereignty with the death penalty, Beijing’s emphasis on “softening the soft” side of its policy toward the population merits equal focus as a means for political influence on the island.
Chinese Communist Party leaders, including Xi Jinping himself, have doubled down on efforts to influence young Taiwanese in recent years. In 2022, Xi made history when he addressed his first “open letter” to Taiwan’s youth following that year’s Straits Forum, an annual event that Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council refers to as a “United Front platform” meant to encourage unification under the guise of exchanges. The letter stated that young people were responsible for the “future prospects of the motherland” and encouraged young Taiwanese audience members to “proceed together with one heart” with their counterparts in China. Similarly in 2023, Xi encouraged young people at the forum to “chase their dreams, build their dreams, and achieve their dreams” in China. It is important to note that the Straits Forum is not an exclusively youth-focused event. Xi’s emphasis on young people’s positive takeaways from the event is indicative of a broader effort to win the hearts and minds of this demographic in Taiwan.
More recently, Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and a top advisor to President Xi Jinping on Taiwan policy, has also singled out Taiwanese youth in multiple public appearances. This includes urging Chinese policymakers to make it easier for young Taiwanese people to travel, work, study, and get married in China. While his suggestions might appear to align with Taiwanese proposals to reopen limited people-to-people exchanges with Beijing, Wang’s outreach to Taiwanese youth is situated firmly within a desire to achieve the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” calling into question the legitimacy of any such proposals.
Layered on top of these official directives is China’s unique approach to exerting influence globally through what it characterizes as “cognitive warfare.” China’s cognitive warfare has become a critical component of its strategic approach towards Taiwan and other geopolitical objectives. As defined in Chinese military literature, cognitive warfare aims to “interfere with, change, and control the cognition process of the enemy, control the enemy’s knowledge acquisition, distort the enemy’s cultural values and way of thinking, and ultimately influence decision-making and control the enemy’s actions.”
China is significantly expanding its cognitive warfare capabilities beyond mere doctrinal statements. This is evident in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) research into big data analytics, brain imaging technologies, and cognitive modeling, as well as the establishment of dedicated psychological warfare units like PLASSF Base 311. While the Strategic Support Force was recently reorganized, Base 311 likely continues to operate, possibly under the new Cyberspace Force or Information Support Force. A crucial element of China's cognitive warfare infrastructure is the State Key Laboratory for Communication Content Cognition (传播内容认知 国家重点实验室), established in 2019 under the People's Daily Online. In 2022, it was among the first 20 laboratories to be reorganized as "National Key Laboratories," underscoring its strategic importance. The lab focuses on three main areas: precise dissemination of mainstream values, intelligent content review and security rating, and cyberspace governance based on content communication. It aims to leverage technology to empower the spread of mainstream values and safeguard national political, ideological, and cultural security. This laboratory represents a substantial investment by the Chinese government in developing advanced tools for shaping and controlling the information environment, both domestically and potentially in its cognitive warfare efforts abroad.
Cognitive warfare employs subtle, long-term strategies to gradually reshape perceptions. For instance, China might consistently promote cultural content that emphasizes shared heritage between China and Taiwan, gradually fostering a sense of common identity among young Taiwanese people. This could include sponsoring popular media, cultural exchanges, or online influencers that subtly reinforce themes of cultural unity. Over time, these efforts could work to normalize the idea of closer ties between Taiwan and China in the minds of young Taiwanese, without explicitly pushing a political agenda.
In response to these efforts, Taiwan has begun to develop countermeasures. In January 2024, Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau established a Cognitive Warfare Research Center. This center aims to build a unified system to combat false information across Taiwan, potentially connecting with similar systems in other countries in the future. The center focuses on collecting and analyzing information spread by foreign actors that could impact Taiwan's national security, social stability, and relations with allies. Chinese-owned social media platforms like TikTok have been identified as key targets for the center's efforts to counter cognitive warfare tactics. However, it is less clear how these defenses can be applied to content that falls outside the realm of “true” and “false.”
Recent revelations from Taiwanese artists and internet celebrities have shed light on one such facet of China’s multipronged influence apparatus. Several public figures, including pop singer Hsieh He-hsian, reported receiving messages from entities claiming to be Chinese media companies, offering lucrative opportunities in exchange for posting a document, titled “A New Type of Cross-Strait Relationship,” that calls for closer economic ties, cultural exchanges, and gradual political convergence between Taiwan and China. The purported offer also required the celebrities to establish a new political party in Taiwan that would advocate for reunification and promote Beijing’s interests on the island. While the authenticity of these claims has not been independently verified, Taiwan’s government has prosecuted such activities in the past. Targeting celebrities with these tactics, however, would mark a shift to new, younger audiences.
These overtures extend beyond individual outreach; in early June, a Taiwanese influencer revealed that the China Cross-Strait Youth Association (中國海峽兩岸青年協會) had invited Taiwanese internet celebrities to participate in an all-expenses-paid “Cross-Strait Youth Culture Month” in China. The offer, corroborated by multiple other influencers, stipulated that creators produce apolitical video content about Chinese culture and related topics. The seemingly innocuous cultural content could serve as a Trojan horse for subtle political messaging - one screenshot of the alleged offer showed the organizers were specifically looking for influencers who regularly comment on political affairs - while potentially eroding Taiwan’s distinct identity and fostering a sense of cultural affinity with China. While the association claimed to only offer tickets and lodging, it’s worth noting that influencers typically don’t create content for free. The unclear source of funding for this initiative raises questions about potential hidden agendas or undisclosed financial incentives that could compromise the integrity and independence of the participating Taiwanese creators.
China is also working to train a new generation of Taiwanese influencers. For example, a “Cross-Strait Youth Anchor Training Camp” has been launched in Hangzhou, bringing together young broadcasters from both sides of Taiwan Strait for professional development and cultural exchange.This initiative, part of a broader “Thousand Taiwanese Youth Broadcasters Training” program co-run by the Hangzhou Taiwanese Business Association from 2020 to 2022, aims to cultivate 1,000 Taiwanese youth as anchors and influencers. The program covers various topics of online content creation, including short-form video production, live streaming techniques, and e-commerce hosting skills.
While the stated aims of these types of activities focus on professional development and cultural exchange, the involvement of certain entities suggest these programs could potentially serve broader political purposes. For instance, the Youth Anchor Training Camp is co-organized by entities with clear ties to the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front work, including the Taiwan Affairs Office, and government-linked groups in Fujian Province and Xiamen City. In 2020, these groups also held a Cross-Strait Youth Internet Celebrity Anchor Competition and a Young Internet Celebrity Anchor Training Camp, attracting 200 participants including Taiwanese youths and Taiwanese people living in China. In photos from the events, participants are holding signs with slogans like “Heart tied to both sides of the Strait, love for China” (心系两岸 爱中华), which encapsulates the deeper political and ideological objectives behind these seemingly innocuous cultural exchanges.
These initiatives also appear consistent with existing United Front strategies designed to gradually influence Taiwanese youth’s perception of China. The strategy is multifaceted and far-reaching, as evidenced by Zhejiang province's "New Eight Measures" to benefit Taiwan. The New Eight Measures, while broadly economically focused, also offer 1,200 training positions for Taiwanese youth in e-commerce broadcasting with the goal of cultivating at least 30 “top e-commerce broadcasters.” By conducting these trainings in China and using a “Taiwanese-leading-Taiwanese” approach, these programs circumvent legal barriers that previously prevented direct recruitment of internet celebrities in Taiwan.
By targeting influencers, content creators, and aspiring media professionals, Beijing aims to cultivate a generation of Taiwanese voices that will amplify pro-China narratives, either explicitly or implicitly. Through embedding pro-China sentiments within entertaining or seemingly neutral content, these campaigns can bypass traditional political barriers and reach audiences that might otherwise be unreceptive to overt propaganda. Over time, this subtle influence could potentially erode Taiwan’s distinct identity and weaken resistance to the idea of unification among younger generations.
Moreover, these initiatives create a complex web of economic and professional incentives that can make it difficult for Taiwanese youth to resist China’s soft power. The promise of career opportunities, larger audiences, and financial rewards in the vast Chinese market may lead some influencers to self-censor or align their content with Beijing’s preferences, even without direct coercion. Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, while welcoming healthy cross-strait exchanges, has expressed concern over potential involvement of China’s United Front Work Department in such activities. This highlights the challenging balance Taiwan faces in maintaining open cultural and economic ties with China while safeguarding against political influence operations.
Emerging technologies and content formats are helping Beijing both co-opt these genuine local voices and manufacture others. The resulting products - both genuine and inauthentic - are tailored to Taiwanese media consumption habits: survey data shows that “watching free videos” is the number one reason Taiwanese people use the internet. Furthermore, nearly a quarter of Taiwanese people, primarily university age and younger, reported using TikTok in 2023. Pro-China influence efforts have clearly taken note of this shifting content preference; a screenshot from one of the artists claiming to have been contacted to make pro-China content showed the entity specifically requested one deliverable: a TikTok video more than 60 seconds in length.
China’s cognitive warfare apparatus and unattributed aligned actors have also turned to generative AI to further scale and amplify content where genuine creators are not an option. These efforts have overwhelmingly targeted figures from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is traditionally more skeptical of ties with China and more supportive of Taiwanese sovereignty. In one case, accounts associated with the Chinese state-linked Spamouflage influence operation used AI-generated video avatars to narrate excerpts from a fake “book” questioning the personal integrity of former President Tsai Ing-wen directly prior to the January election. Similarly, a video of a woman claiming President Lai had multiple mistresses was later shown to have been produced using deepfake technology. Yet another video of Lai himself, manipulated with AI tools to appear to be endorsing the opposition candidates, was posted as a short-form video to YouTube and TikTok. AI-generated audio clips meant to boost the opposition ticket were also posted overwhelmingly to YouTube, proof of the importance of video platforms to China’s influence activities in Taiwan.
Notably, a majority of this inauthentic content attempted to negatively portray President Lai Ching-te, the DPP, and related figures without expending nearly as much effort or resources to push positive narratives about either opposition candidate or their party. The strategy suggests that these influence efforts may be more about encouraging young people in Taiwan to disengage from politics altogether, rather than to support a specific candidate or party. Fortunately, Taiwan’s robust fact-checking ecosystem, home to agile civil society organizations that have built relationships with major platforms and integrations with popular Taiwanese apps, was largely able to keep pace with these efforts and mitigate their damaging effects during this year’s election. In this environment, a cadre of co-opted creators with existing ties to local audiences may be even more attractive to Beijing - it is much more difficult to “debunk” a video that claims to simply be sharing the culture and beauty of China.
Xi’s approach to Taiwan, characterized as “softer on the soft issues and harder on the hard issues,” shows China’s multifaceted strategy toward exerting influence. In Taiwan’s case, this dual approach aims to simultaneously attract and pressure the population.
While China watchers have paid close attention to the “harder” side of China’s policies, such as provocative military exercises and threats of the death penalty against so-called separatists, the “soft” side of China’s influence often raises fewer alarms. Yet these efforts may foster a young population that feels hopeless and disaffected with their own government, while at the same time receptive to the economic and cultural promise of China. Such a shift would be key to Beijing’s goal to take the island without fighting.
The threat of cognitive warfare also extends beyond Taiwan. This "pay-for-play" approach using real people poses unique risks to democratic processes and national security worldwide. To combat this, democracies might consider several policy options. First, implementing stricter disclosure requirements for sponsored content, especially when foreign entities are involved. Second, providing financial incentives or alternative revenue streams for local influencers to reduce the appeal of foreign offers. Third, investing in programs to educate influencers about the broader implications of their platform and the potential for exploitation. These measures, combined with broader efforts to improve media literacy and critical thinking among the general public to defend against more traditional influence efforts, could help build resilience against cognitive warfare tactics. As democracies worldwide grapple with similar challenges, Taiwan's evolving policy toolkit may offer valuable lessons. The key lies in finding a balance between countering foreign influence and preserving the freedoms that make democratic societies worth defending.
Libby Lange is a Director for SCSP's Intelligence Panel and previously served as a speechwriter for former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, and Lilly Min-Chen Lee is SCSP's Research Assistant for the Platforms Panel. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET) and a Doctoral Fellow in International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University
In early June, Taiwanese celebrities and influencers offered a rare window into a little understood way that China is seeking to exert influence on the island’s information space. Within the span of just a few days, multiple singers, actors, and YouTubers shared details of paid offers they had allegedly received from Chinese entities to post content online. The requests ranged from posting anodyne videos about travel to China to establishing a political party in Taiwan and sharing a pre-written declaration to encourage unification with China. Potter King, a popular Taiwanese lifestyle YouTuber who was one of the first to raise the alarm about this phenomenon, accused anyone who accepted such offers as being part of a “cultural United Front.” Other commentators pushed back against these accusations, claiming that Potter King and others had inspired a “witch hunt” against organic interactions between Taiwan and China. Viewed within the broader context of Beijing’s efforts to influence Taiwan, however, the incident speaks to a new and evolving effort to meet young Taiwanese where they are online and proactively influence their views of China. Even as China publicly threatens “diehard” supporters of Taiwan’s sovereignty with the death penalty, Beijing’s emphasis on “softening the soft” side of its policy toward the population merits equal focus as a means for political influence on the island. Orchestrating Influence Chinese Communist Party leaders, including Xi Jinping himself, have doubled down on efforts to influence young Taiwanese in recent years. In 2022, Xi made history when he addressed his first “open letter” to Taiwan’s youth following that year’s Straits Forum, an annual event that Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council refers to as a “United Front platform” meant to encourage unification under the guise of exchanges. The letter stated that young people were responsible for the “future prospects of the motherland” and encouraged young Taiwanese audience members to “proceed together with one heart” with their counterparts in China. Similarly in 2023, Xi encouraged young people at the forum to “chase their dreams, build their dreams, and achieve their dreams” in China. It is important to note that the Straits Forum is not an exclusively youth-focused event. Xi’s emphasis on young people’s positive takeaways from the event is indicative of a broader effort to win the hearts and minds of this demographic in Taiwan. More recently, Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and a top advisor to President Xi Jinping on Taiwan policy, has also singled out Taiwanese youth in multiple public appearances. This includes urging Chinese policymakers to make it easier for young Taiwanese people to travel, work, study, and get married in China. While his suggestions might appear to align with Taiwanese proposals to reopen limited people-to-people exchanges with Beijing, Wang’s outreach to Taiwanese youth is situated firmly within a desire to achieve the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” calling into question the legitimacy of any such proposals. Layered on top of these official directives is China’s unique approach to exerting influence globally through what it characterizes as “cognitive warfare.” China’s cognitive warfare has become a critical component of its strategic approach towards Taiwan and other geopolitical objectives. As defined in Chinese military literature, cognitive warfare aims to “interfere with, change, and control the cognition process of the enemy, control the enemy’s knowledge acquisition, distort the enemy’s cultural values and way of thinking, and ultimately influence decision-making and control the enemy’s actions.” China is significantly expanding its cognitive warfare capabilities beyond mere doctrinal statements. This is evident in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) research into big data analytics, brain imaging technologies, and cognitive modeling, as well as the establishment of dedicated psychological warfare units like PLASSF Base 311. While the Strategic Support Force was recently reorganized, Base 311 likely continues to operate, possibly under the new Cyberspace Force or Information Support Force. A crucial element of China's cognitive warfare infrastructure is the State Key Laboratory for Communication Content Cognition (传播内容认知 国家重点实验室), established in 2019 under the People's Daily Online. In 2022, it was among the first 20 laboratories to be reorganized as "National Key Laboratories," underscoring its strategic importance. The lab focuses on three main areas: precise dissemination of mainstream values, intelligent content review and security rating, and cyberspace governance based on content communication. It aims to leverage technology to empower the spread of mainstream values and safeguard national political, ideological, and cultural security. This laboratory represents a substantial investment by the Chinese government in developing advanced tools for shaping and controlling the information environment, both domestically and potentially in its cognitive warfare efforts abroad. Cognitive warfare employs subtle, long-term strategies to gradually reshape perceptions. For instance, China might consistently promote cultural content that emphasizes shared heritage between China and Taiwan, gradually fostering a sense of common identity among young Taiwanese people. This could include sponsoring popular media, cultural exchanges, or online influencers that subtly reinforce themes of cultural unity. Over time, these efforts could work to normalize the idea of closer ties between Taiwan and China in the minds of young Taiwanese, without explicitly pushing a political agenda. In response to these efforts, Taiwan has begun to develop countermeasures. In January 2024, Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau established a Cognitive Warfare Research Center. This center aims to build a unified system to combat false information across Taiwan, potentially connecting with similar systems in other countries in the future. The center focuses on collecting and analyzing information spread by foreign actors that could impact Taiwan's national security, social stability, and relations with allies. Chinese-owned social media platforms like TikTok have been identified as key targets for the center's efforts to counter cognitive warfare tactics. However, it is less clear how these defenses can be applied to content that falls outside the realm of “true” and “false.” Buying Hearts and Minds Recent revelations from Taiwanese artists and internet celebrities have shed light on one such facet of China’s multipronged influence apparatus. Several public figures, including pop singer Hsieh He-hsian, reported receiving messages from entities claiming to be Chinese media companies, offering lucrative opportunities in exchange for posting a document, titled “A New Type of Cross-Strait Relationship,” that calls for closer economic ties, cultural exchanges, and gradual political convergence between Taiwan and China. The purported offer also required the celebrities to establish a new political party in Taiwan that would advocate for reunification and promote Beijing’s interests on the island. While the authenticity of these claims has not been independently verified, Taiwan’s government has prosecuted such activities in the past. Targeting celebrities with these tactics, however, would mark a shift to new, younger audiences. These overtures extend beyond individual outreach; in early June, a Taiwanese influencer revealed that the China Cross-Strait Youth Association (中國海峽兩岸青年協會) had invited Taiwanese internet celebrities to participate in an all-expenses-paid “Cross-Strait Youth Culture Month” in China. The offer, corroborated by multiple other influencers, stipulated that creators produce apolitical video content about Chinese culture and related topics. The seemingly innocuous cultural content could serve as a Trojan horse for subtle political messaging - one screenshot of the alleged offer showed the organizers were specifically looking for influencers who regularly comment on political affairs - while potentially eroding Taiwan’s distinct identity and fostering a sense of cultural affinity with China. While the association claimed to only offer tickets and lodging, it’s worth noting that influencers typically don’t create content for free. The unclear source of funding for this initiative raises questions about potential hidden agendas or undisclosed financial incentives that could compromise the integrity and independence of the participating Taiwanese creators. China is also working to train a new generation of Taiwanese influencers. For example, a “Cross-Strait Youth Anchor Training Camp” has been launched in Hangzhou, bringing together young broadcasters from both sides of Taiwan Strait for professional development and cultural exchange.This initiative, part of a broader “Thousand Taiwanese Youth Broadcasters Training” program co-run by the Hangzhou Taiwanese Business Association from 2020 to 2022, aims to cultivate 1,000 Taiwanese youth as anchors and influencers. The program covers various topics of online content creation, including short-form video production, live streaming techniques, and e-commerce hosting skills. While the stated aims of these types of activities focus on professional development and cultural exchange, the involvement of certain entities suggest these programs could potentially serve broader political purposes. For instance, the Youth Anchor Training Camp is co-organized by entities with clear ties to the Chinese Communist Party’s United Front work, including the Taiwan Affairs Office, and government-linked groups in Fujian Province and Xiamen City. In 2020, these groups also held a Cross-Strait Youth Internet Celebrity Anchor Competition and a Young Internet Celebrity Anchor Training Camp, attracting 200 participants including Taiwanese youths and Taiwanese people living in China. In photos from the events, participants are holding signs with slogans like “Heart tied to both sides of the Strait, love for China” (心系两岸 爱中华), which encapsulates the deeper political and ideological objectives behind these seemingly innocuous cultural exchanges. These initiatives also appear consistent with existing United Front strategies designed to gradually influence Taiwanese youth’s perception of China. The strategy is multifaceted and far-reaching, as evidenced by Zhejiang province's "New Eight Measures" to benefit Taiwan. The New Eight Measures, while broadly economically focused, also offer 1,200 training positions for Taiwanese youth in e-commerce broadcasting with the goal of cultivating at least 30 “top e-commerce broadcasters.” By conducting these trainings in China and using a “Taiwanese-leading-Taiwanese” approach, these programs circumvent legal barriers that previously prevented direct recruitment of internet celebrities in Taiwan. By targeting influencers, content creators, and aspiring media professionals, Beijing aims to cultivate a generation of Taiwanese voices that will amplify pro-China narratives, either explicitly or implicitly. Through embedding pro-China sentiments within entertaining or seemingly neutral content, these campaigns can bypass traditional political barriers and reach audiences that might otherwise be unreceptive to overt propaganda. Over time, this subtle influence could potentially erode Taiwan’s distinct identity and weaken resistance to the idea of unification among younger generations. Moreover, these initiatives create a complex web of economic and professional incentives that can make it difficult for Taiwanese youth to resist China’s soft power. The promise of career opportunities, larger audiences, and financial rewards in the vast Chinese market may lead some influencers to self-censor or align their content with Beijing’s preferences, even without direct coercion. Taiwan’s Executive Yuan, while welcoming healthy cross-strait exchanges, has expressed concern over potential involvement of China’s United Front Work Department in such activities. This highlights the challenging balance Taiwan faces in maintaining open cultural and economic ties with China while safeguarding against political influence operations. Manufacturing Disengagement Emerging technologies and content formats are helping Beijing both co-opt these genuine local voices and manufacture others. The resulting products - both genuine and inauthentic - are tailored to Taiwanese media consumption habits: survey data shows that “watching free videos” is the number one reason Taiwanese people use the internet. Furthermore, nearly a quarter of Taiwanese people, primarily university age and younger, reported using TikTok in 2023. Pro-China influence efforts have clearly taken note of this shifting content preference; a screenshot from one of the artists claiming to have been contacted to make pro-China content showed the entity specifically requested one deliverable: a TikTok video more than 60 seconds in length. China’s cognitive warfare apparatus and unattributed aligned actors have also turned to generative AI to further scale and amplify content where genuine creators are not an option. These efforts have overwhelmingly targeted figures from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which is traditionally more skeptical of ties with China and more supportive of Taiwanese sovereignty. In one case, accounts associated with the Chinese state-linked Spamouflage influence operation used AI-generated video avatars to narrate excerpts from a fake “book” questioning the personal integrity of former President Tsai Ing-wen directly prior to the January election. Similarly, a video of a woman claiming President Lai had multiple mistresses was later shown to have been produced using deepfake technology. Yet another video of Lai himself, manipulated with AI tools to appear to be endorsing the opposition candidates, was posted as a short-form video to YouTube and TikTok. AI-generated audio clips meant to boost the opposition ticket were also posted overwhelmingly to YouTube, proof of the importance of video platforms to China’s influence activities in Taiwan. Notably, a majority of this inauthentic content attempted to negatively portray President Lai Ching-te, the DPP, and related figures without expending nearly as much effort or resources to push positive narratives about either opposition candidate or their party. The strategy suggests that these influence efforts may be more about encouraging young people in Taiwan to disengage from politics altogether, rather than to support a specific candidate or party. Fortunately, Taiwan’s robust fact-checking ecosystem, home to agile civil society organizations that have built relationships with major platforms and integrations with popular Taiwanese apps, was largely able to keep pace with these efforts and mitigate their damaging effects during this year’s election. In this environment, a cadre of co-opted creators with existing ties to local audiences may be even more attractive to Beijing - it is much more difficult to “debunk” a video that claims to simply be sharing the culture and beauty of China. Soft Power, Hard Threats Xi’s approach to Taiwan, characterized as “softer on the soft issues and harder on the hard issues,” shows China’s multifaceted strategy toward exerting influence. In Taiwan’s case, this dual approach aims to simultaneously attract and pressure the population. While China watchers have paid close attention to the “harder” side of China’s policies, such as provocative military exercises and threats of the death penalty against so-called separatists, the “soft” side of China’s influence often raises fewer alarms. Yet these efforts may foster a young population that feels hopeless and disaffected with their own government, while at the same time receptive to the economic and cultural promise of China. Such a shift would be key to Beijing’s goal to take the island without fighting. The threat of cognitive warfare also extends beyond Taiwan. This "pay-for-play" approach using real people poses unique risks to democratic processes and national security worldwide. To combat this, democracies might consider several policy options. First, implementing stricter disclosure requirements for sponsored content, especially when foreign entities are involved. Second, providing financial incentives or alternative revenue streams for local influencers to reduce the appeal of foreign offers. Third, investing in programs to educate influencers about the broader implications of their platform and the potential for exploitation. These measures, combined with broader efforts to improve media literacy and critical thinking among the general public to defend against more traditional influence efforts, could help build resilience against cognitive warfare tactics. As democracies worldwide grapple with similar challenges, Taiwan's evolving policy toolkit may offer valuable lessons. The key lies in finding a balance between countering foreign influence and preserving the freedoms that make democratic societies worth defending. Libby Lange is a Director for SCSP's Intelligence Panel and previously served as a speechwriter for former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, and Lilly Min-Chen Lee is SCSP's Research Assistant for the Platforms Panel. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the Research Institute for Democracy, Society and Emerging Technology (DSET) and a Doctoral Fellow in International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University
