I remember January 17, 1991 vividly. Saddam Hussein had just invaded Kuwait. After repeatedly ignoring demands to withdraw his troops, the U.S. attacked Iraq, igniting the First Gulf War. Israel was not part of the allied coalition, but Hussein made repeated threats to fire at the Jewish nation if the U.S. attacked. He kept his promise, and Iraq opened fire on Tel Aviv and Haifa.
One week earlier was my friend’s wedding. He was a major in the Israel Air Force (IAF) and many high-ranking IAF officers were in attendance. Everyone agreed, “Hussein will never fire on us and if he does, then we will reduce Iraq to rubble.” They fired, and we did nothing.
This was a watershed moment. The Iraqi attacks made it clear that the Israel home front and infrastructure were under threat and must be protected. Until then, every shekel spent on defense was one less spent on an offensive weapon. One of the critical lessons learned was that Israel must invest in missile defense.
Today, Israel is the only country in the world protected by a multi-layer missile defense system consisting of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, Arrow-2, and Arrow-3. Soon, these systems will be joined by Arrow-4 and the Iron Beam laser. Having played a part in developing these systems that have intercepted thousands of missiles and saved countless lives, this is a source of pride for me.
And yet, since October 7, I’ve had a gnawing fear that Israel is becoming increasingly overdependent on these systems. We’re not going to eliminate Hamas and other terrorist proxies if we only play defense. October 7 clearly showed that Israel’s readiness to hide behind barriers of steel and concrete has led to a loss of initiative, and therefore, deterrence.
From the end of the First Lebanon War in 1982 until June 2000, Israel maintained a "security zone" in southern Lebanon to prevent terror attacks on northern Israeli towns. A friend of mine who once commanded the zone described it as his most difficult role, with soldiers constantly under threat from Hezbollah. Despite the casualties, the security zone brought peace to towns like Metula and Qiryat Shemona, allowing them to prosper with thriving factories, wineries, and dairies.
When Israel evacuated the Gaza Strip in 2005, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon promised future Gazan rocket fires would result in an immediate IDF response. This promise was never kept. Whenever Hamas rocket fire became unbearable, the IDF was content to “mow the lawn” in Gaza, meaning it would use artillery fire, air-launched weapons, and a small incursion of soldiers to “cut Hamas down to size.” Since then, Gazan lawns have been mowed every two years or so, and, until October 7, this strategy seemed to be effective.
On October 8, 2023, Israelis living within three miles of the border were ordered to evacuate their homes because of the danger of a Hezbollah incursion that could have dwarfed the October 7 massacre. Nearly 100,000 people fled to hotels and relatives around the country, turning Upper Galilee into a de facto security zone inside Israel. Over ten months later, houses are still empty, and it doesn’t seem likely that residents will return anytime soon. A colleague, who completed two months of reserve duty in Metula, told me that there is not one house that has not been hit by a missile. Rebuilding will take years. As time passes, it seems less likely that people will return at all.
I have briefed hundreds of American lawmakers on missile defense over the years. While my briefing has evolved, two points remained unchanged:
- Missile defense systems like Iron Dome prevent war. Intercepting rockets reduces Israeli casualties, buying the IDF time to assess the situation and plan an optimum response, reducing the potential for all-out war.
- These systems are not the end-all-be-all of Israel’s defense posture. They do not win wars. Wars will always be won by imposing one’s will upon the enemy.
Over the past two decades, these points have begun to ring hollow. Israel needs to adopt an offensive posture and not be afraid to use force when necessary.
I think about my Congressional briefings on how missile defense systems have prevented war. I ask myself, “What would have happened without Iron Dome, or if Israel were not so reliant upon it?” Perhaps a repeated mowing of the lawn would eventually become insufficient and, after one well-placed Hamas hit, the IDF would be forced to enter Gaza and destroy Hamas once and for all. Such a move might have prevented the October 7 massacre. Hezbollah would likely have been deterred. Perhaps Iran would have watched from afar as its “ring of fire” surrounding Israel was slowly extinguished.
We will never know, but I feel more than a little guilty.
Ari Sacher is a senior policy advisor at the U.S. Israel Education Association and has worked for over twenty-five years as a rocket scientist in Israel.
