August marks the 42nd anniversary of President Ronald Reagan’s Third U.S.-China Joint Communique. Reagan accomplished this feat during a period of intense debate over the United States’ relationship with China to avoid a cross-Strait crisis. While today’s debate appears to reject hard-nosed diplomacy, interest-based and clear-eyed diplomacy with China is needed to restore stability to the relationship. A fourth communique would be a bold and beneficial tool to reorient U.S.-China relations to focus on national interests and avoid conflict.
Both Washington and Beijing use the Three Communiques as the framework for relations. A new one could establish additional guidance for the conduct and goals of each country’s policy.
It should begin with focusing on issues and tension points in the U.S.-China relationship, namely trade, national security, and political affairs. Both countries should acknowledge that trade and investment restrictions – including Chinese market access and fair treatment and U.S. technology trade controls and tariffs – have created tension and distrust. Recognizing key national security issues, such as Chinese espionage and support for Russia’s war in Ukraine and U.S. military operations near China, are important to clearing the air. Even mentioning different interpretations of human rights and political systems as a source of distrust in the relationship would signal that despite the existing political chasm, Washington and Beijing are willing to talk.
Each country’s redlines should be clearly defined, setting the guardrails of the U.S.-China relationship. Like with the previous Three Communiques creating a flexible Taiwan policy which has preserved regional peace, inclusion of redlines should be specific enough for each country to know when to back down, but vague enough to allow interpretation to meet domestic political needs. Washington should unequivocally affirm its vital interests are safeguarding U.S. sovereignty and territorial integrity (including its overseas territories), economic prosperity, and political system. Likewise, Beijing should restate its core interests of sovereignty (meaning rejecting outside interference in China’s domestic political affairs), territorial integrity, and economic development.
Offering potential pathways to reduce tension points while avoiding the redlines in a mutually beneficial way should form the final third of the communique. Given the complementary but competing nature of their redlines, a realistic roadmap to managing the relationship to avoid conflict should be possible.
The core of the trade section should be reciprocity. Both sides should seek to implement reciprocal trade, investment, and regulatory policies. Beijing would largely be responsible for implementing these policies. Upon verified and sustained implementation, Washington could lift non-national and economic security related trade and investment restrictions. This would create a more level economic playing field with global implications, allowing U.S. workers and businesses to better compete for jobs and markets.
A national security component should focus on conflict minimization. Washington and Beijing should commit to diplomatic initiatives to resolve key flashpoints, like the South and East China Sea disputes, and respect the outcomes. This means China should consider both bilateral and multilateral engagements to move a South China Sea resolution forward with the United States agnostic on how it is resolved. Agreeing to avoid dangerous military maneuvers to minimize the risk of an accident which could spiral into conflict should be a no brainer.
While primarily focusing on the Indo-Pacific region, casting a wider net to Latin America and Eastern Europe, where U.S. security interests are more important or where the United States could be drawn into war, should be considered. China should broadly commit to extricating itself from Latin America, with the U.S. goal of closing the Chinese spy base in Cuba and military-run space station in Argentina, to further reduce tensions. Additionally, both countries could agree to work toward a swift resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war given nuclear escalation risks benefiting no one.
Dialogue should also be expanded – on the condition that progress is made in other areas. Though not a return to the grandiose U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, talking more and at higher levels would help both sides air grievances and work to address problems before they become crises.
Finally, the fourth communique’s remarks on political issues should be clear, but brief: respect for political systems with no intention to change them. Beijing should commit to non-interference or influence in U.S. elections at any level, including through social media, donations, or other means. Equally, Washington should pledge to respect China’s form of government and to not seek or support regime change in China, which would include balkanization.
Crafting a new document with China will be difficult – especially during or after a U.S. election – but one could be used to redefine U.S.-China relations in a more useful direction and avoid conflict. The Reagan administration’s courage in 1982 could be the inspiration needed for the President of the United States and Xi Jinping to make it happen.
Quinn Marschik is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.
