In January 2024, the United States Department of Energy (DoE) issued a request for proposals (RFP) for uranium enrichment services to meet President Biden’s goal of net-zero emissions by 2050. Uranium, a clean nuclear energy source, is becoming increasingly relevant. Uranium stocks are rising, and future demand for the metal is set to increase as nations like the U.S. begin testing new types of nuclear reactors. As Washington prepares to expand domestic uranium production, it should be looking to further cooperation with countries that wield extensive uranium reserves, namely Kazakhstan.
But that’s made difficult by the U.S.’s current hostile attitudes toward pursuing cooperation with both Russia and China.
The DoE’s proposals highlight the need to “expand global uranium enrichment and conversion capacity over the next three years and establish a resilient uranium supply market.” That will be hard to do without cooperation from Kazakhstan, the largest and most prosperous Central Asian country, which is a leading uranium mining producer, with 43% of the world’s supply. Astana provided the U.S. with 25% of Washington’s uranium imports in 2022.
Thankfully, Astana is willing to help. At the 2023 COP28 summit, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev emphasized Astana’s desire to facilitate carbon-free power generation on a global scale by acting as a prominent uranium exporter.
The U.S. has a unique opportunity to expand and improve cooperation with Kazakhstan by further developing a critical trade corridor flowing through Central Asia. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, or the “Middle Corridor,” which spans the Central Asian steppe, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus Mountains, is an efficient trade route to ship goods between East Asia and Europe, including Kazakh uranium, made all the more important by the fact that the trade routes that flow through Russia, including the “Northern Corridor” are plagued by the Russo-Ukrainian War.
But the U.S.’s explicit goal of alienating and bypassing Russia complicates things. Kazakhstan shares with Russia the world’s second-largest border and hosts a sizable Russian minority. It relies on Russia heavily for security. Therefore, Astana must maintain cordial relations with Moscow.
Whatsmore, China, which also borders Kazakhstan, has become a prolific investor in the region. The U.S. cannot directly compete with China in Central Asia, but Kazakhstan's interest in having a diverse set of partners creates opportunities for Washington. As an example of this, Kazakhstan’s oil and gas industry has enabled American companies like ExxonMobile to enter joint energy ventures with Russian, Chinese, and Kazakh companies.
To ensure the success of the transport of uranium through the Middle Corridor, the U.S. should bring China and Russia to the table.
China would benefit from a developed Middle Corridor, which gives Beijing access to international markets. While the corridor could lead to a greater degree of Chinese influence in Central Asia, Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan, aim to diversify trade partners and not become beholden to one great power. Cooperating with China to improve logistics and simplify processes will allow Washington to gain legitimacy as a partner of goodwill in Central Asia and assuage Central Asian fears of being the next battleground for U.S.-China-Russia competition. Despite China’s interests in Kazakh uranium, Beijing must accept that Kazakhstan wants a variety of partners. Besides, improved transport logistics westward serves Beijing’s interests in the long run.
Engaging with Russia will also be necessary for ensuring the long-term peaceful transfer of goods like uranium through the Middle Corridor. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the corridor has led Moscow to consider the trade route as a critical threat to its interests in maintaining a degree of control in Central Asia. Irrespective of Russia’s declining role in Central Asia due to being tied up in its war in Ukraine, the U.S. needs to maintain dialogue with Russia to ensure the security of trade via the Middle Corridor. Thus, Washington should present the Middle Corridor to Moscow as a North-South logistic opportunity for all parties rather than a direct challenge to the Northern Corridor, given the fact that Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan have become critical corridors for Russia to reach international markets.
While the chaos caused by the Russo-Ukrainian War is fueling the demand for the Middle Corridor, the opportunity for alternative routes will continue to be a goal for Central Asian countries and their commercial partners. The U.S. needs to reevaluate its role in the war and how it affects its ability to cooperate with Russia in the Middle Corridor. Perpetual aid to Ukraine is likely not sustainable as transfers of funds to Ukraine are being held up in the U.S. and EU and will be an impediment to future commercial opportunities in Eurasia. Additionally, Washington should put on the table the possibility of easing sanctions on the Northern Corridor in exchange for Moscow cooperating with the various countries that want alternative routes.
With its desire to be independent and forge its unique future, Kazakhstan is poised to be an essential player in combating the consequences of climate change with its large uranium reserves. However, reliable and efficient transit routes will be critical for Kazakhstan to achieve its objectives. Through a concerted diplomatic effort, the U.S. can lead the charge in fulfilling its own interests while allowing Kazakhstan to balance foreign influence on itself and steering clear of friction with Russia and China.
Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs. He is also a Contributor with Young Voices.
