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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s attendance at the China-hosted Belt and Road Forum – Putin’s first significant trip abroad since the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest – demonstrates the Russia-China “no limits” relationship is not only strong, but that Moscow is increasingly Beijing’s junior partner. Together, Russia and China are the most significant threat to the United States. Washington should leverage China’s internal politics, national interests, and nationalist ideology to weaken the Moscow-Beijing relationship and prevent an even greater threat from emerging.

The United States should start by engaging and enhancing the profiles of Chinese officials and outside advisors who do not hold favorable views toward Russia to influence Beijing’s policy. Support for Moscow’s war in Ukraine or a strong Russia-China relationship is brittle. Some prominent individuals even view Russia as a threat to China’s interests. Washington can promote their views through standard diplomatic engagement and backchanneling through track two and 1.5 diplomacy. These individuals – particularly those affiliated with state- and party-run research organizations – could then convey their analysis in concert with U.S. opinions to policy makers. But for official and unofficial diplomacy to be effective, the United States should highlight that an overly strong Russia-China relationship is harmful to Beijing’s interests.

Naturally, Washington should emphasize that China’s “neutral” stance and instances of providing lethal support to Russia’s war effort in Ukraine has harmed its economic relationships with Europe and the United States and will continue to do so. Weaker imports from and exports to the collective West will continue to lower China’s economic growth outlook and amplify social ills, such as youth unemployment. Beijing’s close relationship with Moscow also helps fuel suspicion of Chinese international investments – even relatively benign ones – leading to lost time, capital, and future economic gains.

Beyond the negative economic impact, the United States should highlight China’s deteriorating regional and global geopolitical situation partly due to its close Russia ties. Primarily, China’s association with Russia and its war in Ukraine have shone an even brighter spotlight on cross strait tensions and a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. NATO has homed in on Taiwan and sought to increase its activities with its Indo-Pacific partners. G7 declarations noting the necessity of peace across the Taiwan strait have multiplied. South Korea and Japan have also agreed to diplomatic language effectively warning China over a potential conflict. As a result, China’s neighbors have increasingly focused their defense and economic policies against China.

These efforts go beyond a Taiwan scenario. The Philippines has grown more closely aligned with the United States and has been more willing to press its claims in the South China Sea. Other claimant states have made progress in resolving their claims, thereby increasing their bargaining power vis a vis Beijing. Vietnam recently upgraded its relationship with the United States to a comprehensive strategic partnership – on par with Sino-Vietnamese relations.

Besides playing on its security concerns, Washington should convey to Beijing that its strong relationship with Moscow also threatens the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control. Since the Russia-Ukraine War, Western leaders have leaned into the democracy versus authoritarianism narrative, which could be used to support regime change efforts abroad – including in China. As the representative of Western foreign policy views, U.S. President Joe Biden has even implied that authoritarian states continue wars of aggression until they are stopped. The logical conclusion is that the only way to stop authoritarian states from making war is to end the regime. Others have been more specific about the CCP and have used Russia’s war in Ukraine to further inflate the CCP’s threat to the United States and the globe. A break in the China-Russia relationship could help dampen this sentiment, a core Chinese interest.

Perhaps most effectively, Washington could use Chinese nationalism to help break the Beijing-Moscow partnership. After all, Russia took more Chinese land during the Qing Dynasty with its multiple unequal treaties than any other colonial power. Half of Manchuria was lost. Later, Soviet machinations broke off Mongolia and even supported a separate Xinjiang state. The Russia-China friendship treaty expires in 2027 – opening a potential path for China to resume past territorial claims, or at least obtain new rights. Reminding Beijing of this distant past and potential future – and using it in public diplomacy – could add strains to Russo-Chinese relations.

A China-Russia axis is the greatest threat to U.S. national security. Only Russia and China together have enough collective power to subdue the Eurasian continent – with its vast resources and economic potential – and direct it against America. While Washington should work to peel Moscow from Beijing, the United States can also seek to use Chinese politics, interests, and nationalism to encourage China to make a clean break.

Quinn Marschik is a Contributing Fellow at Defense Priorities.