The contentious Israeli judicial legislation has kept in the background what I believe is the much more consequential policy initiative: A return to the 1980s “Iron Fist” policy of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin. At the time, he believed that the only way to stop the First Intifada was to make clear that violence would be met with harsh reprisals.
Until this year, Israel leadership had contained the conflict by weaving Israeli Arabs into the educational, occupational, and political fabric of the country. In addition, the Abraham Accords made clear that the economic and military interests of other Arab countries would no longer be held captive to the decisions of the Palestinian Authority. Finally, the post-Netanyahu government embraced a strategy of “Shrinking the Conflict:” not allowing small flashpoints to fuel larger conflicts. It included stances such as allowing more Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank to work within Israel, expanding permits for West Bank housing, and an unwillingness to evict Bedouin communities from strategic West Bank locations. Within Israel, it meant seeking compromises on evictions in East Jerusalem and Bedouin areas, and the passage of Knesset legislation that would dramatically improve the circumstances of Israeli Arab communities, including three new Bedouin towns.
As Shrinking the Conflict policies began to reduce tensions, hundreds of gunmen belonging to militant groups, most notably Islamic Jihad and the Lion’s Den, stepped up their militancy. The Palestinian Authority was unwilling or unable to control these groups so it was left to Israel Defense Force (IDF) to respond. When the IDF efforts began neutralizing these forces during summer 2022, Islamic Jihad initiated a bombing campaigned. It fizzled because the “Shrinking the Conflict” strategy had created an unwillingness among Palestinians to risk its benefits.
Israeli momentary success, however, led to a change in terrorist strategy. It now concentrated low-level attacks on Jewish families living in isolated West Bank settlements. The limited government response to the dozens of killings of settlers signaled to many a failure of the Shrinking the Conflict strategy which increasingly was seen by the rightwing as appeasement.
When two Jewish brothers were killed February 23, settlers responded with a rampage through the neighboring Palestinian village of Huwara. More than 30 homes and 100 cars were set afire. Four Palestinians were seriously injured, with one death, and another 95 were treated for smoke inhalation. Not only did the IDF not intervene but Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, a settler leader in charge of the administration of the West Bank, called for the village to be "wiped out" by the Israeli army. Echoing “Iron Fist” policies, Smotrich claimed Huwara is a “hostile village” and supports a “disproportionate response” by the IDF against the town for every act of terrorism in order to establish deterrence.
A move to Iron Fist policies was further signaled by granting Itamar Ben-Gvir extended powers over the police as part of initial coalition agreements and then agreed to form a “National Guard” under his direct supervision. He has vowed stronger backing for police actions taken in the line of duty. Ben-Gvir has been a racist admirer of the Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldstein and the late Jewish supremacist Rabbi Meir Kahane. For more than a decade, Ben-Gvir has defended “radicals suspected in cases of Jewish terror and hate crimes.”
Rabin did not have racist animus to Palestinians; the Iron Fist was a tactical response. Once he realized that it was ineffective, he switched to seeking a peace accord, and was able to convince Israeli Arab parties to support his efforts. By contrast, Ben Gvir and Smotrich are driven by deeply Jewish supremacist beliefs and are committed to controlling the entire West Bank. Unlike an increasing share of the Israeli public, they perceive Israeli Arabs as fifth columnists who also must be subjugated.
The broad-based opposition to the initial judicial reform legislation has caused Netanyahu to pullback with a constructive compromise likely. By contrast, except for a few voices among military leaders, only the Israeli leftwing is similarly outraged by the power that Ben-Gvir has obtained over law enforcement. Unfortunately, probably a majority of Israeli Jews support a move towards an Iron Fist approach.
Consistent with this new approach, security forces just acted in heavy-handed ways when clearing the Aqsa Mosque compound, knowing it would lead to an escalation with Hamas and Hezbollah. It also can only escalate the number of Palestinian reprisal attacks both inside Israel and in the West Bank. Maybe this new strategy will successfully quell the killings, particularly since previous IDF actions have hollowed out the West Bank terrorist infrastructure. However, this is a dangerous game with a racist messianic leadership that is unlikely to pullback without concerted broad-based efforts. Hopefully, these efforts will build once a constructive judicial compromise enables Israeli Jews to focus more clearly on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Robert Cherry is an American Enterprise Institute affiliate and his just released book, The State of the Black Family: Sixty Years of Tragedies and Failures and New Initiatives Offering Hope (Emancipation Books). The views expressed are the author's own.
