Sweden and Finland’s move to join NATO is a pivotal issue for European regional security.
The two Nordic states signed accession protocols in July 2022 after a speedy application process and received welcoming ratifications by almost all member states over the summer and early fall. There are two holdouts — Hungary and Turkey. And while Hungary has pledged to ratify in early 2023, Turkey is still expressing concerns over this new round of NATO expansion. Ankara is especially fixated on Sweden, which it claims has failed to meet terms that Turkey has put forth.
Ankara’s concerns are centered on its wish that Sweden extradite or financially freeze individuals that Turkey claims are involved with terrorism and with a coup attempt in the country in 2016. The people in question are currently in Sweden, and Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has stated that Stockholm will not meet these terms. Kristersson says the demands fall outside of an agreement made between Sweden, Turkey, and Finland that was designed over the summer to help overcome Turkey’s concerns.
A Sprawling Array of Interests
Large alliances come with strengths, but they have their faults as well. One potential weakness is being exposed as Sweden attempts to persuade Turkey to ratify its accession into NATO. States may make certain commitments to their allies, but they will always put their own interests first, even if those interests put them at odds with their allies. Turkey’s keenest interest is its own internal security, and if Ankara feels that actions taken by Sweden put that security at risk, then it is not out of place for Turkey to seek a resolution. Likewise, it is not unreasonable for Sweden to reject demands to compromise its own sovereignty or values.
Another emerging problem is the fallout from a protest that recently took place outside the Turkish embassy in Stockholm, during which protestors burned Qurans. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan later said Turkey will not ratify Sweden’s accession while Quran burning is permitted in Sweden, where such actions are protected as freedom of speech. Radically divergent values systems are bound to act as another avenue for clashing interests in broad alliances.
Meanwhile, Turkey has other interests it must consider before signing on to a NATO expansion — interests such as its own relations with Russia. While most NATO members have sought to reduce or cut ties with Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has maintained and indeed deepened relations with Moscow. It has increased energy imports from Russia and deepened its cooperation in Syria. The relationship is not always harmonious, though. Turkey has joined its NATO allies in sending weapons to Ukraine and finds itself in opposition to Russian interests on several other issues, including the still-simmering conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Turkey has also hosted negotiations between Russian, Ukrainian, and NATO-member leaders. The unique position Turkey occupies is one it must navigate carefully, and signing off on a historic NATO expansion would undoubtedly alter its relations with Russia.
Strategic Realities
Of course, NATO members differ not only in their interests, but also in capabilities and strategic importance. Turkey has a far larger military than Sweden, with 445,000 active-duty personnel compared to Sweden’s 16,000. Though Sweden lies close to Russia, the Baltic Sea is already well covered by NATO members. Turkey alone straddles the Bosporus Strait and is NATO’s conduit into the Middle East and Central Asia. It is predictable that Turkey would use its vital importance to the alliance as leverage to shape developments. And while Sweden has made pledges to overcome some of its military shortcomings, such as speeding up its timeline to meet the 2% of GDP threshold for defense spending, new developments between the U.S. and Sweden risk undermining the value that Stockholm could hope to bring to NATO should Turkey ratify. Let’s explain.
Sweden and the U.S. have begun discussions on a defense cooperation agreement that would expand the bilateral relationship even more significantly than NATO membership would. The agreement would allow the U.S. to station military forces in Sweden. While this move might seem to some as an appropriate way to address security concerns in the region, it could also prove to be a step in the wrong direction, especially in the anticipated eventuality that Sweden joins NATO.
Sweden and Finland’s push to join NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is rational, as having a large belligerent neighbor is surely concerning. However, Russia’s troubles in Ukraine have shown that the potential threat it poses is not as great as once thought — a revelation that supports the view that European NATO members should shoulder more of the burden when it comes to deterring Russia, so that the U.S. can reconfigure its military posture. The problem that has prevented this shift is a continuing reluctance by European allies to increase military spending, and this is linked to Washington’s eagerness to supply Europe with U.S. troops and weapons. These states, including prospective member Sweden, need some motivation to move in the right direction, and putting more U.S. military assets in Europe sends the exact opposite message.
This mindset should also extend to U.S. interactions with Turkey, as the Biden administration seeks to gain Congressional approval to sell F-16s to Ankara. While the administration claims the deal is not a “quid pro quo” regarding Sweden and Finland’s NATO accession, the matters are undoubtedly connected, and the prospect of sending more U.S. weapons to Turkey shows that Washington is still clinging to an outdated Transatlantic strategy.
A massive alliance like NATO is bound to run into issues as it brings together such vastly different states as Turkey and Sweden. NATO will need to maneuver through the accession issue in a way that does not let Turkey abuse its position, yet also does not alienate a valuable member — especially since the European countries in NATO should be taking on more responsibility for their regional defense.
Chad Kunkle is a Recipient of a B.S. and M.S. in International Affairs from Florida State University and former intern at the Hudson Institute. The views expressed are the author's own.
