This article was originally published by Stratfor Worldview and is reprinted here with permission.
With the inauguration of Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva on Jan. 1, Latin America's six largest economies are now run by leftist governments. In addition to Lula, these leaders include Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador in Mexico, Alberto Fernandez in Argentina, Gabriel Boric in Chile, Gustavo Petro in Colombia and Dina Boluarte in Peru. All of these leaders replaced a more conservative or centrist predecessor and, with the exception of Fernandez and Lopez Obrador, have also all been elected in the past 18 months. This signals that the swing to the ideological left in Latin America is both relatively new and a shift from the region's recent past.
Echoes of the 'Pink Tide'
If a leftist wave in Latin America sounds familiar, it's because it is. Between the late 1990s and the early 2010s, voters in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador and Venezuela ousted their business-friendly governments that, over the previous decade, introduced neoliberal reforms, which spurred economic growth but mostly failed to address inequality. And in their place, voters elected left-wing governments that sought to introduce policies aimed at benefiting the majority of the population.
Often referred to as the ''pink tide,'' this shift toward leftist, populist politics ushered in a period of increased social spending and protectionist policies in Latin America. The region's first ''pink tide'' leader was Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who was elected in 1999. The next was Brazilian President Lula (who was first elected in 2002 and was recently re-elected after beating former far-right president Jair Bolsonaro). Then came Argentine President Nestor Kirchner (who was elected in 2003), followed by Bolivian President Evo Morales (who was elected in 2005) and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa (who was elected in 2007).
Driven by high commodity prices and Chinese demand for raw goods, for years these left-wing governments enjoyed high approval ratings while pushing against countries they viewed as imperialist, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain. But the pink tide began to unravel in the 2010s as populist measures declined in popularity. This led to the demise of several governments, and the rise of more conservative, business-friendly governments in their place.
A New Pink Tide?
Today's wave of Latin American leftist leaders deserves closer inspection before we start calling it a second ''pink tide.'' For one, the swing to the left appears to mostly be the product of ''pocketbook voting,'' in which voters punish incumbents — and countries' established political elite — for their country's economic troubles.
Indeed, the four newest leaders were all elected at a time of mounting global economic uncertainty amid the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic and (more recently) Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which has translated to high(er) inflation and unemployment rates in Latin America. Chilean President Gabriel Boric was elected in December 2021; Colombian President Gustavo Petro was elected in June 2022; Brazilian President Lula da Silva was elected in October 2022; and Peru's former vice president-turned-president Dina Boluarte assumed power in December 2022 after the impeachment of her predecessor Pedro Castillo (who hailed from Boluarte's same leftist party and took office in July 2021).
During times of financial hardship, voters often oust incumbent governments and ideologies in favor of newer voices promoting a different way of fixing the economy. Ecuador's February 2021 presidential election — in which conservative banker Guillermo Lasso defeated the populist candidate Andres Arauz (who was backed by the country's former left-wing president) by promising economic abundance via pro-free market policies — serves as a reminder that it is not a leftist wave but rather an anti-establishment environment. The same desire for new leadership also contributed to Chilean President Boric's electoral victory in December 2021 and Colombian President Petro's victory in June 2022, given that their leftist campaigns both focused on juxtaposing against the highly unpopular political establishment.
Similarly, public support for today's leftist leaders is lower than that of the previous pink tide, leading to a high degree of political instability in some countries. During the pink tide, a commodity boom saw global prices skyrocket for Latin America's energy, agricultural, metal and mineral exports, which enabled leaders to expand widely popular social programs. In fact, Argentina's populist former president (and current vice president), Cristina Fernandez de Kircher, completed her second term in 2015 with just over a 50% approval rating. Brazilian President da Lula ended his second term in 2010 with an 83% approval rating, and Venezuela's Chavez had a 57% approval rating when he died after 14 years in office.
By contrast, today's leftist figures have seen their approval rating drop quickly after only a few months in the position, due to their inability to quickly follow through on promised reforms and maintain high levels of welfare spending amid a global economic slowdown. Chilean President Boric's approval rating currently stands at about 33%, hindering his ability to enact a new constitutional reform process. Argentine President Fernandez's abysmal 7.9% approval rating signals that he will almost certainly be a one-term president, as even his own coalition is considering fielding another candidate in the country's next general election in October 2023.
Finally, today's leftist leaders do not have the same charismatic appeal as the figures of the early 2000s, demonstrating key differences between the leftist shift in the 2000s and that of today. Though the impact of charisma is difficult to measure, the ascension of Latin America's leftist swing in the 2000s came in part due to politicians' ability to read and cater to the political climate. The impassioned speeches of Venezuela's Chavez drew millions of viewers each night and Brazil's Lula saw a record number of attendees at his rallies. Today's leftist leaders lack the same draw of their predecessors and have, in turn, struggled to garner the same levels of popular support. Even the public image of Brazil's once-popular Lula has been tarnished by corruption allegations and a brief period of jail time — eking out a 1.8% victory over Bolsonaro in what was the closest presidential election in Brazil's history.
As such, the recent swing to the left in Latin America is more the result of an anti-incumbent environment — born out of a high degree of economic volatility. In other words, voters are primarily electing their leaders based on disdain for the existing political elites that they feel have failed to significantly improve living standards, and are less concerned with candidates' political party.
Latin American citizens' expectation of quick results and their government's failure to deliver on them due to economic realities has, in fact, also seen the rise of far-right ideologies by creating a cycle of ineffective governance and voter frustration with ''status quo'' politics. As voters in Latin America turn away from the center-right, center-left and, in some cases, the far-leftist ideology seen as the ''political elite,'' far-right candidates have begun to boost their appeal by marketing themselves as anti-establishment.
When he was first elected in 2018, Bolsonaro was widely popular. Despite a turbulent term rife with corruption scandals and controversy over his administration's handling of the COVID-19 crisis, Bolsonaro still almost defeated Lula in the 2022 election. And in response to that narrow defeat, his angry supporters also broke into and vandalized the headquarters of the country's three branches of government in Brasilia on Jan. 8 — further showing that Bolsonaro and his far-right ''political outsider'' message still deeply resonates among many Brazilians.
In recent years, other South American countries have seen the rise of radical, ultra-conservative leaders as well, including Argentina's libertarian figure Javier Milei, Chile's former presidential candidate Jose Antonio Kast and Colombia's former presidential candidate Rodolfo Hernandez. Most of these leaders have generated support by speaking to social concerns such as immigration and abortion, though some (such as Ecuador's Lasso) have maintained a strictly economic message. All of their policy platforms, however, have nationalist undertones.
These far-right political figures have and will likely continue to serve as strong opposing voices to the leftist leaders currently in office, both undermining their legitimacy and potentially using their parties' prominence in Congress to stall policymaking. As such, the political environment in countries across South America will likely become increasingly polarized, creating a climate ripe for widespread social unrest.
On the surface, Mexico appears to be the outlier of the anti-incumbent push in Latin America, as President Lopez Obrador enjoys a high approval rating despite rising inflation. However, this is due to the president's own efforts to maintain the appearance of a political outsider by juxtaposing his ruling MORENA party with the establishment parties of the opposition coalition — as exemplified by an Aug. 2021 referendum on prosecuting former presidents for alleged crimes. A new political movement that speaks to the issues affecting the millions of Mexicans living in poverty could have the power to divide Lopez Obrador's voter base, though no such movement is currently on the horizon.
An Opportunity for Regional Integration?
The election of like-minded leftist governments in Latin America's six largest economies will almost certainly lead to a revival of regional summits, as well as increase the potential for collaboration on climate change initiatives. Leftist leaders across Latin America are expected to convene at some point in 2023, likely before Argentina's general election in October. Such a summit would offer an opportunity for leftist leaders to discuss coordination on the global stage, such as voting at the United Nations or the Organization of American States. Latin American powers could also come together to demand the United States and European Union provide more financing for efforts aimed at curbing deforestation in the Amazon — especially given that every country that claims territory in the vast rainforest (with the exception of Ecuador) now has a leftist leader. Another area in which leftist leaders could collaborate is formally recognizing the rule of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro (who's the heir of the country's pink tide president Chavez) in an effort to end the unsuccessful experiment of dual governments in Venezuela.
But while Latin America is experiencing a convergence of leftist ideologies, governments are unlikely to fully seize the opportunity to bolster their economic and trade ties with one another due to protectionist trade policies and the amount of political capital being spent on domestic issues. The governments in Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru support increasing the state's role in the economy. However, they also support preserving the greater business-friendly economic model installed by their predecessors and will remain wary of making any sweeping structural changes that could close their countries' relatively open economies. This contrasts with the leftist leaders of Argentina and Brazil, who have promoted a shift to a populist economic model and will probably continue championing protectionist trade policies — hindering any attempt to significantly deepen regional trade integration. Additionally, the countries that could explore expanded trade relations with their closest neighbors — Chile, Colombia and Peru — are all facing domestic constraints that will force their attention inwards (with Chile's government focused on rewriting its constitution, Colombia's government focused on striking peace deals with guerilla groups, and Peru's government focused on staying alive amid ongoing protests over former President Castillo's ousting).
Thus, while there may be some coordination on climate funding or cross-border security efforts, the region's intersection of leftist governments will mostly be characterized by the resurgence of regional diplomatic meetings and rhetorical alliances. And given that Latin America's recent swing to the left is rooted in anti-incumbent sentiment due to poor economic conditions, this period of ideological convergence will probably be short-lived as well, since governments that fail to spur rapid economic growth will likely be ousted in the next election cycle.
