Emmanuel Macron won France’s presidential election in April handily. But the dust is settling from the surprising parliamentary elections that followed a few weeks ago. The French political scene looks less stable in certain ways but not fundamentally in doubt—although in France anything can happen.
There was never much doubt that Macron would win the presidential election, because his runoff opponent was once again the far-right leader, Marine Le Pen, as in 2017. Nor was there much doubt that his margin of victory would be smaller than before. Le Pen had softened her tone, and in this election she had the additional advantage of Eric Zemmour, a farther-right insurgent who made her look less radical.
In the parliamentary election, the question was whether Macron’s new coalition of three parties would win an absolute majority (as his own party did by itself in 2017). Pollsters said it would not, and indeed it did not. But its losses were even larger than expected. In the 577-seat parliament, a majority is 289. The Macron coalition got only 245. Thus, the coalition is running a minority government that needs 44 votes elsewhere to pass bills.
This minority situation is not as hopeless than it seems, because the largest opposition parties are totally opposed to each other, far-right and far-left. These are Le Pen’s far-right National Rally (89 seats) and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s 131-seat coalition of left-wing parties (his own France Unbowed party plus Greens, Socialists, and Communists).
Even if the two parties cynically conspired to overthrow the government, they would not have the votes to succeed. And voters might make them pay for risking political chaos.
There are votes elsewhere in parliament that Macron’s minority government can hope to rally on a case-by-case, negotiated basis. The most important is the Republicans (Les Républicains), an establishment center-right party that won 61 seats,— that is, enough to create a voting majority with the Macronists.
But the Republicans are defining themselves as being in the opposition, refusing to join the Macronist government coalition. Why are they playing hard to get?
It’s parliamentary gamesmanship. It gives the Republicans policy leverage, and being in opposition gives their top leaders a look of independent stature as presidential contenders in 2027. (Their leader—Nicolas Sarkozy—was elected president in 2007 and another one, Franêž”ois Fillon, was a top contender in 2017 until he was caught in a financial scandal.)
A different political division
In sum, as opposed to the familiar left/right pattern, French politics is now divided into three blocs. Le Pen’s populist/nationalist RN party, Macron’s center-left/center-right coalition, and the populist/-anti-capitalist left-wing Mélenchon coalition.
Both Mélenchon and Le Pen are gut-level anti-NATO, anti-U.S., anti-EU nationalists, sympathetic in past years to Putin’s Russia as a part of an independent Greater Europe in which France would be diplomatic leader. Merely by existing, they weaken Europe and the transatlantic connection. In power they would provoke crisis.
At the same time, it’s remarkable that all three blocs depend on a single leader.
The National Rally (formerly the National Front) is a kind of family brand — Marine Le Pen is the daughter of founder Jean-Marie Le Pen. Mélenchon’s far-left coalition exists only because of him — he succeeded with France Unbowed while the others (Greens, Socialists, and Communists) failed. Macron’s party was a surge movement created by him for the 2017 election. After him, le deluge?
Hypothetically, France's government could stay stable over parliament's five year term: Macron is president, a majority to overthrow the government is unlikely to emerge, and a parliament with a Macronist minority coalition should be able to govern with ad-hoc support from the Republicans and perhaps others. (Macron is now talking about a 'national unity' majority.)
But innovative legislation will be difficult. Especially concerning hard choices involving people’s personal lives, such as retirement age, as well as standard of living issues such as inflation and low salaries and pensions. The green energy transition will also be harder to organize.
Many people see Macron as “pro-business”—and this is correct. But they assume that to be pro-business is to be anti-middle and working class, rather than looking to growth and more jobs as a social as well as economic policy. But this conflict of economic culture is not limited to France.
The broad conclusion is this: Despite losing his parliamentary majority, Macron has successfully held the center as France’s ruling political principle. Increased influence of far-right and far-left mentalities is not, or not yet, out of control. No other leader in France could have done so well, and with luck the political temperature could decline.
The question is whether circumstances will produce more social conflict and more far-right, far-left polarization. The “yellow vest” movement is not forgotten.
As for the world seen from Paris: Macron will run French foreign policy as he has in the past five years. He has been criticized by some for trying too hard with too little geopolitical weight. This is an old story, going back to Charles de Gaulle. France tries to punch above its weight.
What would you have him do?
No one says that Macron is an intellectual lightweight, dishonest, unreliable, not willing to take calculated risks, or unwilling, for example, to help Ukraine against Russian aggression.
There is thus plenty of room for criticism. Yet it is not difficult to admire a leader like Macron.