Amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have expressed an interest in joining NATO. Should they apply, many believe that the acceptance of these Nordic countries would be a given, and even a benefit to the alliance. Both bring relatively capable militaries. Finland can mobilize 280,000 troops and its defense spending exceeds that of some existing NATO allies, while Sweden has a strong navy and geographic benefit. But this view fails to acknowledge a key deficiency: these prospective additions undercut effective deterrence and raise the risk of confrontation with Russia, as new obligations present challenges to both European and US security.
Just because Finland and Sweden would offer militaries more capable and well-funded than other NATO allies does not mean that there is a compelling reason to admit them or to upend decades of success with non-alignment. This is especially true now, with the situation in Ukraine offering insights into the escalatory nature of NATO expansion and the benefit non-alignment may have had in this case. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was at least in part due to the prospect of NATO expansion, perceiving expansion as a threat to its security interests. For years, policymakers declined to address this concern. Preceding the invasion, Ukraine’s potential membership was not a topic of negotiations. Even following the conflict, messaging from US and NATO representatives continues to emphasize that the alliance’s door will remain open.
In contrast, non-alignment has been a defining feature of Finland and Sweden’s foreign policy for decades, which has allowed them to cultivate a more strategic relationship and greater dialogue with Russia than what currently exists been Russia and NATO. In addition to their military capabilities, both countries have effectively leveraged their prospective NATO membership as a deterrent to Russian interference in their region. The understanding that both could join NATO, but choose not to, necessitates a degree of caution and adds complexity to Russia’s decision making in this region, tempering relations. Even more, Russia has explicitly praised Finnish and Swedish neutrality as “one of the most important contributions…to ensuring stability on the European continent.” It is clear that neutrality is accepted while expansion is escalatory.
More broadly, the NATO alliance itself is to be defensive in nature with the goal of deterring Russian aggression. Practically, this means additions to the alliance should contribute but be weighed against the riskiness of provoking war with a nuclear superpower. With the potential addition of Finland, NATO’s border with Russia would double, extending defense obligations significantly. While doubling NATO’s obligation along what would be a contentious border, Finland and Sweden would receive collective security guarantees under Article 5. This is the primary appeal to membership for both countries, which is both problematic and unwarranted.
Neither Finland nor Sweden are facing an increased threat to their security. There is no reason to assume Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has left Russia weaker than before, correlates to an increased threat in the Nordic region. Finland and Sweden reacting as though it does may inadvertently create a situation where Russia will perceive a new security threat and act accordingly. Understanding this and knowing that it will fuel NATO’s already heightened tensions with Russia, making additional security guarantees would be contrary to defense and deterrence aims. This prospective expansion, then, would be at best risky, and at worst dangerous.
Russia has already been clear that should Finland and Sweden join there would be a significant response, including nuclear deployments in the Baltic region and military repositioning, in an attempt to balance against a perceived security threat. There is also the potential for economic and cyber responses. This all heightens tension and increases the risk of escalation and miscalculation in an area where, comparatively speaking, there is currently low risk.
At a time where a wider conflict in Europe is a legitimate concern, necessarily involving the US due to NATO existing obligations in neighboring countries, there is no compelling reason to expand those obligations further or to fundamentally alter a stable security environment by admitting either Finland or Sweden. The current push, while understandable, is ultimately short-sighted. Public support for NATO membership has traditionally been low in these countries. In Finland, support increased from only 24 percent to 68 percent in the course of four months – an incredible shift, catalyzed by Putin’s February invasion of Ukraine.
In this context, Finland and Sweden may decide to apply for membership. Many existing NATO allies are likely to approve. But where the US is the predominant military power and is asked to use that power on behalf of others, it must be mindful of both costs and benefits. In removing their effective deterrent, non-alignment, any military benefit that these countries offer to NATO is overshadowed by the riskiness of bringing the alliance another step closer to confrontation with Russia. As it stands now, the US should quietly advise against NATO membership for Finland and Sweden and should seriously reconsider the alliance’s open-door policy.
Karina Mariotti has a bachelor’s in political science, with coursework in foreign policy and international security. The views expressed are the author's own.
