North Korea tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile in October, prompting the U.S. Envoy for North Korea, Sung Kim, to call on Pyongyang to “cease these provocations and other destabilizing activities, and instead, engage in dialogue.” What dialogue would look like is unclear. Citing hostile U.S. intentions, Pyongyang has refused to engage in talks with Washington since early 2019.
U.S. President Joe Biden has insisted that his goal is the “total denuclearization” of North Korea. This policy has failed in the past and will continue to fail because North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un’s primary objective is to ensure the survival of his regime. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate insurance policy to deter any outside military effort to change the regime in Pyongyang. A more prudent U.S. policy would acknowledge that demanding North Korea give up its deterrent capability in effect prevents diplomacy from taking place. Instead, the U.S. should pursue other more attainable goals, including freezing further North Korean development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
North Korea is estimated to possess a stockpile of 25-50 nuclear warheads and maintains a sophisticated ballistic missile program with short, intermediate and long-range capacities. The recent submarine-launched missile test signals Pyongyang’s intent to develop a secure second-strike capability. Because it is difficult to track, the ability to launch a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile from a submarine provides a strong deterrent to any first strike on North Korea’s ground-based launch platforms. The risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike on the U.S. homeland, Seoul, or Tokyo is simply too high to entertain the idea of a pre-emptive attack on North Korea.
The proliferation of nuclear warheads and associated delivery systems does, however, dangerously increase the risk of miscalculation. Since Pyongyang already maintains a small but credible nuclear deterrent, it may be enticed to halt further nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development in exchange for sanctions relief. These two aims would be tangible policy wins for the United States and would lower tensions on the Korean peninsula.
Kim Jong-Un’s past actions indicate that he is a rational leader. Despite exchanging harsh rhetoric with Washington, he was willing to de-escalate tensions by meeting with former U.S. President Donald Trump and South Korean President Moon Jae-In in 2018 and 2019. Those meetings ultimately failed to bring about any lasting change because they focused primarily on the total denuclearization of North Korea, but they did importantly signal a willingness from Pyongyang to prioritize negotiation over war.
Kim Jong-Un likely views the fates of other strongmen, such as Iraqi and Libyan dictators Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, as a cautionary tale. Hussein’s rule came to an end when the United States invaded Iraq under the pretense that he maintained a secret weapons of mass destruction program. Gaddafi, having given up Libya’s fledgling WMD program in the early 2000’s, was summarily executed by rebels following NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya. Indeed, when U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton recommended applying the “Libya Model” to North Korea in 2018, Pyongyang reacted with threats to walk away from negotiations completely. Pyongyang certainly believes a verifiable nuclear deterrent will prevent anything similar from happening in North Korea.
While diplomacy is preferred, it does take a good-faith effort by both sides to result in any meaningful outcome. The United States should show its willingness to realistically negotiate by dropping total denuclearization as an up-front demand and prioritizing a freeze on additional nuclear weapon and ballistic-missile tests. If North Korea foolishly rejects such overtures, U.S. policy should resort to a strategy of peace through strength. The United States’ vast military superiority means that it can deter North Korea indefinitely. Kim Jong-Un has proven himself to be a brutal authoritarian, but he is not suicidal. North Korea would risk certain annihilation if it instigated a war with the United States or its neighbors. It therefore remains highly improbable that Pyongyang would ever seriously consider such a move.
Biden would be wise to seek a new approach if he wants diplomacy to be a realistic option in regard to North Korea. Accepting the fact that Pyongyang will not give up its nuclear deterrent is a good first step.
Sascha Glaeser is a Research Associate at Defense Priorities. He focuses on US grand strategy, international security, and transatlantic relations. He holds a Master of International Public Affairs and a Bachelor's in International Studies from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. The views expressed are the author's own.
