There’s no sugarcoating what’s going on in Brazil. The world’s ninth-largest economy is in the throes of the worst political tumult since the country returned to democracy. With elections just weeks away, the man leading the polls, Jair Bolsonaro, is simply a nightmare.
Openly yearning for the days of Brazil’s military dictatorship, former army captain Bolsonaro has built a brand around unrelenting attacks on women, racial and religious minorities, the LGBT community, human rights defenders, and Brazil’s marginalized poor.
With an added sympathy vote from an assassination attempt last month, the long-discarded possibility that Bolsonaro might reach the presidency is becoming more real by the day. People are now forced to reckon with what Brazil might look like under his rule.
The answer: not much worse than it is now. Certainly not better, but not much worse.
If Bolsonaro does win in October, it could be Brazil’s hated political system that ends up constraining his worst tendencies. Brazil’s semi-parliamentary system of “coalitional presidentialism” requires political allies to agree on cabinets and by nature breeds some of the world’s most flagrant horse-trading. As a result, Brazil’s congress is corrupt and sclerotic; indeed, it is one of the biggest causes of Brazilians’ unprecedented dissatisfaction with their political class.
But, cynical as it sounds, that very system is in some ways a safeguard against Bolsonaro’s worst tendencies.
Brazilians have in two separate referendums rejected a switch to a parliamentary system. The truth is that in some ways they already live in one. With nearly 30 parties represented in Congress -- the largest of them holds just 12 percent of seats -- broad coalition-building is the only way to govern.
This makes congressional support far more consequential than popular support. One need only look at incumbent Michel Temer, whose 2-3 percent approval ratings did not stop him from passing major reforms through a congress with which he adeptly courts favor.
On the flip side, if Bolsonaro does indeed make it to the presidency, his far higher favorability among the public won’t translate into an ability to govern with Brazil’s political elite. Brazil’s fragmented party landscape means that alliances are key.
Were he elected today, Bolsonaro’s party alliances would grant him 2 percent of the lower house’s support. By contrast, establishment favorite Geraldo Alckmin would enjoy the support of 53 percent.
Bolsonaro’s supporters rebut such pessimism with a promise to sweep congressional elections next month, granting their candidate a reliable nucleus of support. But all signs point to a lack of a big shake-up in the configuration of Congress.
In fact, a recent study puts the prospect for congressional change this year at its lowest ever. With nearly 80 percent of current incumbents running for re-election, and recent changes in electoral law greatly favoring incumbents, the percentage of congressional newcomers is expected to be the lowest since 1990.
Bolsonaro will be boxed in by the corrupt reality of Brazil’s Congress. If he sticks to his campaign guns and doesn’t play the give-and-take games Congress demands, reality will hit hard. Very hard.
In this scenario, many expect his presidency to look much like his 27 years in Congress -- during which he managed to pass only two of his 171 proposed bills into law. The result of sticking with a contrarian, Trump-like governing style, predicts Brazilian political scientist Ricardo Sennes, would be impeachment within nine months. Remember that in Brazil, impeachment isn’t what it is in the United States. It tends to function more like a vote of no confidence -- yet another example of the country’s flirtation with parliamentarism.
Bolsonaro’s other option would be to swallow his pride and play along, and this is a likelier outcome. In this scenario, we would see one of the few silver linings to Brazil’s labyrinthine political system: its moderating factor.
Forced to cobble together a coalition, Bolsonaro will see his radical tendencies tamed. His most extreme proposals will be wrung through committee after committee, getting watered down to the point of being unrecognizable. His promise to appoint military generals to a third of his ministries will be short-lived as he finds himself forced to offer posts to centrist party members in exchange for support.
Bolsonaro’s victory is no forgone conclusion. He may well see defeat as Brazilians rally against him in the way the French did against Marine Le Pen. Yes, Brazil desperately needs deep structural reform in its politics. Any Brazilian, from your taxi driver to your political science professor, will tell you that. But until its lawmakers muster the will to fix the deep rot, we can at least take solace in knowing Brazil’s apocalyptic candidate won’t bring an apocalyptic presidency.
Peter Schechter is a political analyst, author, and co-host of the international affairs podcast Altamar. A Latin America specialist, he was previously the Atlantic Council’s senior vice president for strategic initiatives. He is on Twitter at @PDSchechter. The views expressed are the author’s own.
