An Iran-U.S. Summit?
AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite
An Iran-U.S. Summit?
AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite
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Yes, everything has been written and said about how awkward, counterproductive, and dangerous U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal is. We have been warned that Iran, if deprived of the economic benefits it draws from the nuclear deal, will have no incentive to stop its enrichment of uranium or to slow the development of its ballistic missile program. Moreover, the argument runs, Trump’s decision has strengthened the weight of hard-liners within Iran, much to the detriment of the so-called pragmatists of that country’s regime.

As a result, Iran will be inclined and able to develop the bomb at a much faster pace than what the so-called sunset provisions of the 2015 nuclear deal would allow to.

Conclusion: Only a misfiring mind could have conceived what President Trump has just done.

But another reading is possible of the events surrounding Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Here is why. 

For starters, the aforementioned narrative neglects two key constraints on the resumption of Iran’s nuclear program: the country’s growing economic and social malaise, and the reluctance of the other signatories of the nuclear deal to sponsor or even tolerate Iran’s accession to the club of nuclear powers. 

Mismanagement, corruption, and economically unsustainable geopolitical ambitions have taken a heavy toll on the country’s economy. The regime has used much of the revenue secured through the 2015 nuclear deal not to improve the living conditions of its citizens and modernize Iran’s economy, but to finance terrorism, beef up its military involvement in Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon, and try to destabilize Israel. All too naturally, social malaise has grown, the population is losing patience, and the street protests that started last December are gaining intensity nationwide. If protests keep mounting and the economic situation continues to deteriorate, the unity of the regime may be at stake.

For all their gesticulations against Trump’s decision to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear deal, European signatories cannot do much to salvage that agreement and thereby help reactivate Iran’s economy. The reason is simple: European firms will hardly dare make transactions with Iran for fear of losing access to U.S. goods and financial markets. They will prefer to remain on the sideline until an agreement between the United States and their governments is reached. 

Add to this the fact that Iran’s main allies, Russia and China, on which Tehran critically depends in both diplomatic and commercial matters, would not be at ease with a nuclear-armed Iran. They will willingly help Iran’s regime as it arm-wrestles with the United States, but not to the point of enabling Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

In light of these considerations, the mullahs will likely be less than resolute in confronting Washington and resuming their nuclear program. The survival of their regime is at stake, and they surely know that. This explains the moderation of their reaction to the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal. 

It is worth noting that in the days preceding Trump’s decision, Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, went so far as to warn that the United States would face “severe consequences” if Trump pulled out of the deal. Yet once the withdrawal materialized, President Rouhani toned down his rhetoric and pointed out that his country would continue to stick to the deal so long as the other signatories kept their sanctions lifted. 

Iran’s regime has shown restrain, too, in the military realm. True, in the hours following Trump’s decision there was an exchange of fire between Iran and Israel – an exchange initiated and provoked by Iran. At the end, Iran turned out to be on the losing side: A number of its military installations were destroyed and Iranian troops were killed, while no casualty was registered on Israel’s side. Yet, rather than pursuing their provocations against Israel, the mullahs have adopted an attitude of restraint for now.

Its caution shows that the Iranian regime knows it is not in Tehran’s interest to assume a belligerent attitude against Trump’s decision. This is all the more so as the U.S. president has warned that Iran’s regime would face “very severe consequences” if it resumes its nuclear program. And the mullahs may have noticed that Trump is the kind of politician who -- unlike his predecessor -- seeks to stand by his promises and red-line threats. Tax cuts, deregulation, relocation of the U.S. embassy in Jerusalem, and withdrawal from the Paris Accord and more recently from the Iran nuclear deal, form part of the electoral promises that Trump has not shied away from implementing.

For all these reasons, should Iran’s regime wish to salvage and ultimately consolidate its power, its leaders will hardly find a better way of doing so than trying to enter into direct negotiations with the U.S. president and his representatives.

This is why a U.S.-Iran summit cannot be ruled out. 

President Trump’s advocacy of regime change in Iran might thus turn out to be a sort of bargaining chip, a threatening device aimed at inducing the mullahs to negotiate a new deal.

For such a game-changing event to take place, however, Iran will have to be prepared to put on hold, or even relinquish, not only its nuclear program but also its support of terrorism, its expansionist adventures and, not the least, its attempts to destroy or destabilize Israel.

This hypothetical turn of events, admittedly, may be difficult to imagine today. Not more and not less difficult, though, than it was to anticipate a few months ago the smallest glimmer ofthaw between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump. It may not be probable, but it is at least plausible.

 If and when a U.S.-Iran summit takes place, there will be something in it for everyone. The mullahs will be content with having salvaged their regime. Russia and China, as well as the European signatories of the 2015 deal, will gladly claim some credit for the breakthrough. Israel as well as Sunni States will feel some relief – while remaining vigilant of course. Trump’s supporters will applaud the prowess of their icon. Never-Trumpers and like-minded pundits, on their part, will be delighted to contend (in conformity with their customary practice) that silly Donald was caught in a trap set by the Iranian regime with the help of Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.