U.S. President Donald Trump’s 12-day, 5-country tour of Asia was well planned. It started with old friends, was followed by a near-peer rival, and concluded with two countries that may yield the largest return on investment of American time and energy — Vietnam and the Philippines. The waxing and waning of Chinese and American influence among these regional states should be closely monitored as a leading indicator of the Sino-American power struggle within the greater Indo-Pacific.
In Japan and South Korea, the president was greeted with friendly smiles and open arms. These visits exhibited textbook ally diplomacy, beginning with reaffirmations of existing alliances, reiterations of the important economic ties between the nations, and securing cooperation on shared external threats.
But when the president reached China, the positive momentum began to falter.
While there were positives on the economic side, including $253 billion-worth of deals and Chinese concessions on market access for U.S. companies, other gains were limited. President Trump’s “warm” feelings for Chinese President Xi Jinping gave U.S. allies, partners, and potential partners, all of them actively counter-balancing China, reason for pause. Moreover, he achieved no further clarity on intellectual property rights, adherence to established international norms on the global air and sea commons, or an agreed-upon strategy for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. For a president that has promised tough action on China, there appeared to be no substantive talks on military flashpoints.
But the converging and diverging national interests of these “big four” Indo-Pacific countries are well-documented, well-defined, and well-understood by the global community. This maturity often means that negotiations relegate potential benefits to areas on the margins of the most prominent issues.
Enter Vietnam and the Philippines — two states with markedly different histories with the United States. Their locations, maritime orientations, and existing relations with the United States and China provide both Vietnam and the Philippines with outsized shares in the strategic calculus of nations wishing to act as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, the stops in both Vietnam and the Philippines were a deliberate, strategic play by the president’s team to provide Trump with two comparatively low risk, high-reward visits on his Asia tour.
Vietnam, a communist country that fought a bloody war with the United States 50 years ago, finds itself actively soliciting closer ties with its one-time foe. Vietnam’s current policy decisions are heavily influenced by its centuries-long rivalry with China; a rivalry that once again has been brought to the forefront by overly assertive Chinese actions regarding fishing rights in the contested South China Sea. Vietnam imposes strict limits on its international diplomacy with its so-called three no’s policy, meaning no military alliances, no foreign bases, and no letting any one country use Vietnam to harm another. Yet its ongoing disputes with China present opportunities for greater cooperation with the United States.
Prior to the presidential visit, Vietnam was concerned by America’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the downturn in freedom of navigation operations performed by the U.S. Navy in the South China Sea. Trump’s reassurance that the United States remains committed to upholding established international norms in the global commons, and the mention of a possible Vietnam-U.S. free trade agreement, assuaged many Vietnamese fears. In return, Washington received assurances of greater intellectual property rights enforcement coupled with increased trade. To be sure, the total dollar amount of trade deals will not approach the $253 billion agreed to with China. However, Trump’s diplomatic labors in Vietnam secured a staunch, long-term, and vocal regional partner with a proven international track record of active resistance to extraordinary Chinese maritime claims.
In contrast to Vietnam stands the Philippines. Once a close ally of the United States, it has moved closer to Beijing under the leadership of President Rodrigo Duterte. This cooling of U.S.-Philippines ties is viewed as important indicator of waning U.S. regional influence. More important for the Chinese, Filipino acquiescence to China’s claims in the South China Sea, despite an international tribunal ruling in the Philippines’ favor, is a critical “lawfare” component to the ultimate normalization and international acceptance of Chinese sovereignty claims outlined in its 9-dash line. To this end, the Chinese government has committed substantial time, money, and national prestige in cultivating its relationship with Duterte. If Trump succeeds in reversing the trajectory of the U.S.-Filipino relationship, this would be a major diplomatic success and a striking blow to larger Chinese designs within the region.
For now, the jury remains out on the overall success or failure of Trump’s Asia trip. Seemingly, the Japanese, Korean, and Chinese legs of the trip played out as expected, with incremental movement on the most pressing issues. However, if Trump successfully aligned U.S. national interests with those of Vietnam and the Philippines, he will have cultivated fertile ground from which to further grow American leadership in the region. Trump’s diplomacy with two “also-visited” countries may ultimately have the greatest strategic impact for advancing America’s interest in the Indo-Pacific.
Thomas Bodine is the Navy federal executive fellow and Karl Friedhoff is the public opinion and foreign policy fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. The views expressed here are the authors' own.
