Call it the most tantalizing 2.6 seconds of streaming video, at least for the geopolitical geek set: A live shot on official Russian TV of a military briefing for President Vladimir Putin -- with a cutaway to an over-the-shoulder shot of a Russian general's briefing book, open to a page titled "Ocean Multipurpose System Status-6," with schematics of what appears to be a drone submarine -- armed with a nuclear warhead.
What's it for? According to translations of the Russian text: "Purpose -- the defeat of the important economic facilities in the area of the enemy coast ... causing unacceptable damage to ... the country through the establishment of extensive zones of radioactive contamination, unsuitable for implementation in these areas of military, economic, business, or other activity for a long time."
So, was this real -- an errant glance behind Russia's nuclear curtain? Or is this nuclear peekaboo a throwback to Soviet maskirovka -- staged deception to wrong-foot adversaries by making the mythical look real?
Whatever the case, the reveal of Status-6 follows the unquestionably real November test of Russia's Nudol, a direct ascent anti-satellite missile -- which itself followed China's test of its own anti-satellite missile, the Dong Neng-3. In addition to demonstrating the capability to disable a U.S. satellite by "kinetic means" -- a collision at more than 10 times the speed of sound -- the impact would scatter space debris that could remain floating in orbital paths for centuries.
The common thread? A desire by both countries to not only destroying enemy forces, but also enemy infrastructure. In the old nuclear strategy dichotomy of counter-force versus counter-value, this is a new category -- not aimed at military, nor civilian mass casualties, but something between: critical infrastructure, for military and civilian, whether in space or on land.
Add these threats to the constant drizzle of cyberattacks on our financial networks, energy grid, and the like -- whether from Tehran, Pyongyang, or an Internet cafe in Raqqa -- and the odds grow shorter. Sooner or later, expect a hit.
An unpleasant prospect, to be sure. What would it take for the U.S. to reconstitute the Internet -- or the global positioning system -- or major shipping and transportation corridors, or power grids - or any and all combinations of the above, and to do it from a standing start, when all of these incredibly complex systems have been evolved and improved over years and decades?
The fact that we would rather not imagine these hypothetical horribles is no excuse for failing to anticipate how the task would be addressed. One thing is certain: As each of these systems is dependent on highly engineered materials, we would need more of the raw inputs -- more of the metals, materials, and composites which our modern dreams are made of -- and we'd need them absolutely, positively overnight.
That would take more than merely punching up a website order form and submitting a request for hundreds of tons of the Periodic Table, with free shipping from some future FedEx drone fleet. In our world of just-in-time manufacturing, where piece-parts of the simplest objects are miraculously sourced from around the globe, we'd find out in a hurry where our raw materials come from -- and whether their nations of origin are inclined in time of crisis to fill or orders, or to let us do without.
And that's the problem. Since the close of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, the United States has forgotten that certain metals and minerals have strategic value, and where they come from matters. Instead, in a period of rapid globalization aided by the siren-song of becoming a "post-industrialized economy," the U.S. has seen its share of global mineral exploration spending drop from around 20 percent to less than 10 percent, leaving it largely dependent on other countries for key metals and minerals.
As for where these metals and minerals come from, the implications for America's defense preparedness are ominous. In the Department of Defense's most recent National Defense Stockpile Requirements Report, of the 12 materials with identified shortfalls that the Pentagon report recommends for stockpiling, China is a significant supplier of all 12. As for Russia, the Soviet Union twice used resource access as a weapon, cutting off U.S. supply of chromium and manganese during the Berlin Blockade and the Korean War. Today, Russia is a key supplier of chromium, cobalt, palladium, and scandium. As a student of Soviet history, this lesson will not be lost on Russia's current leader.
Of course there are redoubts within the U.S government, where serious experts express serious worry about our critical material shortfalls and the risks they pose. There are periodic reports that sound alarms, punctuated by stories about counterfeit parts or waivers for Chinese magnets on our advanced fighters -- even a "60 Minutes" expose on the subject. But nothing changes at the level of policy.
Take the most publicized case of the rare earth elements, used in all manner of devices from smartphones to smart bombs, for which after decades of dominance, the U.S. found itself 100 percent dependent on Chinese supply. In 2015, after years of struggling to rebuild U.S. production capacity, the lone American rare earth mine went bankrupt. In the case of another U.S. proposed rare earths mining project, federal bureaucrats -- who took a year simply to put someone in charge to evaluate the project -- announced this month without explanation that there will be another year's delay in the review process.
In 2011, the Obama administration launched an initiative to "support U.S. institutions in the effort to discover, manufacture, and deploy advanced materials twice as fast, at a fraction of the cost." Meanwhile, the time it takes to bring an American mine through permitting and into production -- already twice as slow as other mining nations -- is growing even longer, to a world's-worst seven to 10 years. It's going to prove difficult for American innovators to be twice as fast when it takes twice as long to produce the materials that are key to modern technology.
The sad fact is that there is no reason for the U.S. to pursue a policy of unilateral disarmament in the resource wars.
In the geological sense, the U.S. has the resources it needs to power the development of the world's most advanced military -- and, in the worst-case scenario, to recover from an attack aimed at knocking out vital space and terrestrial infrastructure. It's getting those resources out of the ground and into the hands of the scientists and engineers that's the problem today. No one's connecting the dots between the advanced apps that define our modern life, and the metals and minerals they're made of.
Until we do, we'd better hope the horrific weapons like the one shown for a split-second on Russian TV are an elaborate ruse, and not a glimpse of our unfortunate future.
