As political violence engulfs the Middle East, the White House seems to sink deeper into incoherence and passivity. Will reports of a massive chemical attack on Syrian civilians finally rouse President Obama from his torpor, or will they become just the latest outrage du jour in the region's never-ending horror show?
The Syrian opposition claimed that forces loyal to Syrian dictator Bashar Assad used chemical weapons to kill over 1,000 civilians in the Ghouta suburb of Damascus. Buttressing these reports were harrowing videos of people struggling to breath and photos of scores of bodies that born no outward signs of injury. If confirmed, the poison gas attack would put Assad in the same league as Iraq's Saddam Hussein, who used chemical bombs to wipe out 5,000 Kurds in the town of Halabja in 1988.
The alleged massacre coincides with the arrival in Syria of a UN team charged with investigating reports that the regime unleashed small-scale chemical attacks against opponents last spring. The timing suggests how little Assad worries about crossing the "red line" President Obama has drawn against the use of chemical weapons. Or perhaps it's a veiled warning about what he's prepared to do if Western powers intervene in Syria.
Although warmly applauded by foreign policy "realists," the administration's resolve to stand aloof from crisis has been a strategic and moral failure. What began as a civil uprising has morphed into something worse: a full-fledged proxy war that is inflaming the region's sectarian divisions. As Shia Iran and Hezbollah fight to save their ally Assad, Sunni jihadis -- some marching under the banner of al Qaeda - are pouring into Syria. This makes it easier for Assad to posture as a protector of Alawite and Christian minorities and a bulwark against the very Salafist terrorists that keep U.S. intelligence agencies awake at night.
But this is emphatically not a case of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." America has no interest in the survival of a homicidal tyrant and war criminal like Assad, even if his fall presents openings to Sunni extremists in Syria. And in truth, the United States isn't very good -- thankfully -- at the kind of cold blooded realpolitik that counsels standing by while Assad, Iran and Hezbollah and Sunni fanatics bleed each other in Syria.
The problem with that approach, of course, is collateral damage, aka, all those Syrian civilians who keep getting caught in the crossfire. More than 100,000 of them already have perished, and there's no end in sight. Washington asked yesterday for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, but was stymied by Russia, which claimed that Syrian rebels staged the attack in a deliberate "provocation." At what point does the international community bestir itself to stop mass murder, even if that means overriding Vladimir Putin's objections to "foreign interference" in Syria? Is the idea of collective security dead?
President Obama said a year ago that Assad's use of chemical weapons would force him to "change my calculus" about U.S. intervention in Syria. It's time for the president to get out his calculator. America's interest lies in hastening Assad's departure, which would at least give Syrians a chance to establish a decent government while also dealing a major setback to Iran's bid for regional hegemony. This doesn't require U.S. troops on the ground, but it does mean stepped up efforts by the West to shift the balance of military power toward the rebels. Once Assad is gone, we will need to recalibrate our policies to help moderate forces in the Syria resistance prevent extremists from taking power. There's no doubt that this course too is filled with pitfalls, but at least it envisions a way of eventually stopping the slaughter on terms consistent with both humanitarian values and U.S. interests.
In Egypt, as well as Syria, the Arab Spring has taken a terrible turn. The only thing clear about Obama's response has been a desire not to get the United States entangled in the region's endemic political chaos and violence. Given our frustrating interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, that impulse is understandable -- but it's not a policy.
For Washington, the costs and dangers of non-intervention are mounting. Admittedly, as Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote recently, it's often hard to discern friend from foe in Syria, and moderate forces seem weak relative to the jihadis. It's also hard to tell who the good guys are in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. But it shouldn't be this difficult for our leaders to articulate clearly what's at stake for America in these conflicts. No U.S. policy toward Middle East will work if we don't know our own mind.