Of all the names associated with contemporary American foreign policy, few evoke stronger reactions than Richard Holbrooke. By many accounts, Holbrooke was arrogant, dismissive and a bully. As a former colleague told me, "he kissed up and kicked down." He was also possibly the most influential American diplomat since George Kennan. His vision and forceful personality forged the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), which have led to nearly two decades of sustained peace in the Balkans. It is to this iron-willed diplomat that the current administration -- which faces a crisis in Syria no less daunting than that faced by President Clinton during Bosnia-Herzegovina's civil war in the 1990s -- should look.
Some of the most thoughtful words on Syria were recently written by Jeffrey Goldberg, who conceded that he is "one of the approximately three columnists in the U.S. who don't know exactly what President Obama ought to do in Syria." The sense that one must do something rather than nothing grips many policymakers and pundits. Yet none of the "somethings" proposed are likely to bring about an end to the bloodshed. The recent decision to arm the rebels merely formalizes what has been taking place covertly for more than a year; most observers agree that the proposed no-fly zone would have no meaningful impact, except as a step toward direct U.S. military intervention; few expect the small arms shipments to Syria's disintegrating secular rebel groups to alter the outcome, as momentum has swung back toward Assad in recent weeks. The administration's indecision and vacillations are reminiscent of those of the Clinton administration two decades ago. Into that uncertainty stepped Holbrooke.
From the earliest days of the war in Bosnia, Holbrooke, then Ambassador to Germany, advocated for an international force to intervene to establish peace. It was he who insisted on the unconventional location of an Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio, where limited access to the press would preclude media posturing and leaks. A loosely affiliated, regionally autonomous Bosnia was agreed to by the principals in the terms of the accords; an Implementation Force (IFOR) was responsible for implementing the accords using the novel technique of "peace enforcing." It was the crowning achievement of Holbrooke's career, perhaps the most significant foreign policy success of the Clinton administration.
Much like Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Syria as a nation does not exist in any meaningful way today, and has not for more than two years. It is now split into three distinct groups: Alawi, Sunni and Kurd. The ruling Alawites are most analogous to Bosnia's Serbs (both groups, incidentally, have close ties to Russia). The Sunni majority most closely resembles the (also Sunni) Bosnian Muslims -- poorly organized, with links to the Gulf states that enable them to import mujahedeen and other extremists, though Bosnia imported far fewer than Syria. And the Kurds, like the Croats, remain largely on the periphery of the civil war, preferring to focus on political independence. Before peace could be achieved, it had to be acknowledged that Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be reconstituted. Similarly, attempting to restore Syria under a single government would be not only futile but dangerous.
As I recently wrote, backing Syria's Al-Qaeda-affiliated rebels would be contrary to American interests; reports from Syria increasingly confirm this. The Sunni world has essentially declared war on Assad, the Alawi and those who stand with them -- namely, Christians and some of the Sunni elite. The vast resources of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states stand ready to provide aid and arms to extremists.
Perhaps the best argument against the Dayton model for Syria is the presence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates among the Sunni rebels. Of course, if this fact constitutes an argument against intervention, it would be an even stronger argument against arming Syria's rebels. As the administration's only course of action has been to arm the rebels, examining Dayton as a possible model for Syria is as good (or bad) an idea as any.
Applying the basic tenets of Dayton to Syria would look something like this:
- The international community, led by the U.S. and Russia, would outline the peace plan, which would include boundaries for three quasi-autonomous regions (Alawi, Sunni, and Kurdish); the establishment of a "zone of separation" (ZOS) between the warring factions; the resettlement of Syrian refugees who fled to Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey into their respective regions; and the resettlement of some Syrians (either voluntarily or by compulsion) to their appropriate regional zone.
- The factions from Syria's civil war would be compelled to take their places at the negotiation table, where the particulars of the accord would be presented to them largely as a fait accompli, as they were at Dayton.
- NATO, Russia, and other members of the international peace-enforcing expedition would deploy to maintain the integrity of the ZOS, oversee resettlement and reintegration efforts, and provide stability until such time as regional elections are feasible.
This was, in brief, the formula that ultimately succeeded in Bosnia. But even if feasible, it would be immensely difficult to achieve.
As a young American soldier who was part of IFOR, I witnessed Holbrooke's plan implemented first hand. Forever seared in my memory is the Bosnian farmer in the Zone of Separation (ZOS) who set his home and farmland ablaze rather than see it handed over to a generational enemy. Difficult though it is to imagine, Syria is incomparably more volatile than Bosnia two decades ago; it is the focal point of a wider Sunni-Shia conflict, where Saudi Arabia and Iran -- and now America and Russia -- wage war by proxy.
Syria is beset with perils on all sides. Inaction protracts a grave humanitarian crisis and permits Iran and Hezbollah a greater foothold in Syria; supporting the rebels advances the strategic interests Al-Qaeda and Saudi-backed extremists. Syria has been reduced to barbarism -- quite literally, to cannibalism and now the beheading of Christians. An international peace-enforcing expedition, of the kind that brought peace to Bosnia in 1996, may offer a viable solution for Syria. Whatever the faults of Richard Holbrooke, the administration could benefit from his force of will today -- rather than prolonging conflict by equipping America's enemies.