Hamas is considering a strategic choice not to join directly the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) even if it wins elections, AP reported Thursday. Quoting unnamed sources within the movement, the wire service said the idea, which gained currency in recent closed meetings of Hamas leaders, facilitated May's rapprochement with the rival Fatah movement. This hands-off approach, as it is being described, is based on both ideological and pragmatic lines of reasoning.
Hamas reportedly views the strategy as a way to continue to stick to its position of refusing to recognize Israel's right to exist, while at the same time not making Palestinians pay the price of isolation. Additionally, the thinking goes, it allows Hamas not to have to shoulder the burden of governance, which it feels has cost the group in terms of popular support. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the group has actually decided to adopt this new strategy.
In reality, this is not a new approach. It is a snapshot of Hamas trying to deal with a strategic dilemma it has faced since its founding. On one hand, Hamas cannot dump its status as a radical movement with a militia. At the same time, the group cannot afford to be left out of the political mainstream.
This dualism is tied to the fact that at its core, Hamas is rooted in the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), which is about achieving power via democratic politics. But because of the Israeli occupation, and the sub-national status of the Palestinian Territories, Hamas has moved toward armed struggle, officially when the Palestinian branch of the MB became Hamas in 1987.
Hamas cannot behave solely as a political force because there is no Palestinian state, which means it has to engage in armed struggle. But because of this, it is an international pariah and Fatah dominates the political mainstream. Hamas can't let that happen either, which is why it ventured into mainstream politics by competing in the 2006 legislative elections (though it did not give up its status as an armed movement fighting Israel).
Hamas won 74 out of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (Fatah bagged only 45), a victory that the Palestinian Islamist movement was not expecting - nor was Hamas prepared to govern the PNA. This is why it called for a coalition government despite having the numbers to form its own government.
Shortly after its formation, the coalition government ran into problems. Armed clashes between the two groups broke out in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in late 2006, for a number of reasons. Internally, Hamas was caught between governance and its status as a resistance movement. Disagreements between Hamas and Fatah (with the latter in control of the PNA presidency) persisted. And international pressure on the PNA was brought to bear, as the West and Israel encouraged Fatah to throw Hamas out of the government
Fearing that the Fatah-backed PNA was about to get rid of its government and even seize control of Gaza, Hamas engaged in a pre-emptive move, seized control of Gaza and evicted Fatah/PNA forces in June 2007. Since then, we have had a civil war between Fatah and Hamas, with the latter under siege in Gaza. Israel's Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09 dealt a further blow to Hamas. The Turkish flotilla in 2010 didn't help break the siege of Gaza, nor did it ease Hamas' isolation.
But with Arab unrest creating a new political environment across the region, the core of Hamas leadership sees an opening through which it can enhance its status as a major Palestinian player. Yet it faces resistance from within to the idea of involvement in the political mainstream. Even those moving toward negotiations are unable to give up armed resistance; but there is also no turning back. Thus, Hamas remains stuck, between armed struggle and political participation, as it has been over the past five years - a situation that is unlikely to change anytime soon.