The Real Losers of WikiLeaks

By Couloumbis, Ahlstrom & Weaver
December 17, 2010

The WikiLeaks stakes are arguably great: On one side are the advocates of freedom of information in democratic societies; on the other are those focused on national security.

Regardless of the merits and demerits of each side, those who will most regret this massive flood of classified cables are - historians and diplomats!

Historians will be frustrated because they are used to mining government archives 30-or-more years after an event, when all are safely out of power or dead, to find nuggets and synthesize a “novel” view based on multiple perspectives and primary source material so that history can be rewritten by the insertion of “new information” to the mosaic of prior work.

Diplomats will henceforth think twice about using adjectives or speculating on private motives and shady practices of state leaders. Their tendency will be to assume that confidentiality is no longer assured, and they will have to abide by a modified old rule: “Don’t put in writing what you don’t want to read on the Internet.”

Wikileaks will continue dripping – Chinese-torture style. But unlike historians and diplomats, cartoonists and journalists rejoice at the steady supply of embarrassing, comedic and gossipy material about leaders all over the world.

The WikiLeaks have undermined the old saw that “diplomats are gentlemen sent abroad to lie for their country.” In most cases exposed by the leaks, American diplomats and their political leaders say in private what they say in public – in sharp contrast, for example, with the Arab oligarchs. What has been surprising thus far is that the information in the documents is so - unsurprising. 

In any case, in an age of instant global electronic communication and YouTube clips, the profile of a traditional diplomat is strikingly unglamorous and approaching that of a glorified messenger.

A late 16th century European description of a successful ambassador would disqualify most today. Ottaviano Maggi’s profile (in his 1596 De Legato) said an ambassador “should be a trained theologian, should be well versed in Aristotle and Plato, and should be able at a moment’s notice to solve the most abstruse problems in correct dialectical form; he should also be expert in mathematics, architecture, music, physics, and civil and canon law. He should speak and write Latin fluently and must also be proficient in Greek, Spanish, French, German, and Turkish. While being a trained classical scholar, an historian, a geographer, and an expert in military science, he must also have a cultured taste for poetry. And above all he must be of excellent family, rich, and endowed with a fine physical presence.”

Henry Kissinger, in his essay The Necessity for Choice, updated Maggi 365 years later with a blunt assessment of the qualities necessary for effective foreign policy decision-making: “They must be able to manipulate events and people. They must play the power game in total secrecy, unconstrained by parliaments which lack the temperament for diplomacy. They must connive with the largest possible number of allies. They must not be afraid to use force when necessary to maintain order. They must avoid ironclad rules of conduct; an occasional show of ‘credible irrationality’ may be instructive. They must not shy away from duplicity, cynicism or unscrupulousness, all of which are acceptable tools of statecraft. They must never burn their bridges behind them. And if possible they must always be charming, clever and visible.”

While Kissinger clearly lived up to his characterization when called by Richard Nixon to service from his academic lair some eight years later, the diplomats of WikiLeaks are more journalists than Renaissance men and women.

For the short term, the most damage will no doubt be done not to the reputation of America and her overseas representatives, but to the necessarily confidential exchanges which create both trust and understanding among leaders and governments and allow relatively orderly conduct of international relations.

Britain’s astute commentator on diplomacy, Sir Harold Nicolson, was quite correct when he wrote that diplomacy must proceed in secret, but its results must be public.

WikiLeaks got it wrong by doing the reverse.

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