Russia’s approach to the Baltic states is occasionally framed as an imminent territorial takeover. This view has become salient since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, when other nearby countries became concerned that they may be in Russia’s sights. In fact, Russia is unlikely to be interested in a territorial incursion in the Baltics, not least because this would trigger NATO’s Article 5, its collective defense principle, and because Russia would be unlikely to win in a conflict against NATO allies. Additionally, as some polls indicate, a conflict close to Russia’s own borders might not have the full support of the Russian population. For instance, a 2017 poll from the independent Levada Center polling agency, the latest on the subject, showed declining support for Russia’s involvement in other border conflicts, such as in eastern Ukraine. However, a more recent poll by state pollster All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) showed that 71 percent of respondents were in favor of the proposed amendment to the Russian constitution stating that the Russian government is responsible for defending compatriots abroad. But Russia has many other tools—more effective than covert or overt military aggression—at its disposal to influence the Baltic states. Their significant ethnic Russian populations and enduring dependence on Russia for energy enable Moscow to maintain its status as one the most powerful regional stakeholders.
