In the movie The Sum of All Fears, based on the book by Tom Clancy, a nuclear-armed Israeli aircraft is shot down over the Syrian desert at the height of the 1973 October war. The rest of the plot – a terrorist conspiracy that causes a nuclear stand-off in the present day between the US and a weak Russia – is probably the US president Barack Obama’s worst nightmare.
Avoiding such an extreme scenario was the impetus for the recent arms reduction treaty with Russia and the Washington nuclear summit.
Arab and Israeli viewers probably reacted differently to the movie. For Arabs, Israel’s presumed willingness to use its nuclear weapons is exactly why they want the country disarmed. For Israelis, using nuclear weapons as a last resort is a legitimate, if officially unconfirmed, response to any threat to its existence.
Israel is purposefully ambiguous on whether it has or is willing to use nuclear weapons. This is partly to avoid international opprobrium, partly to avoid forcing Arab states into a nuclear arms race, and partly to preserve doctrinal flexibility.
How to deal with this ambiguity has long puzzled Middle Eastern governments and analysts. This conundrum is now compounded by the prospect of Iran following in Israel’s footsteps: obtaining a nuclear weapons capability but never being clear on whether it possesses actual weapons.
