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May 1, 2013

French Diplomat Warns of Western Failure in Afghanistan

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A French diplomat has let slip what has been obvious to many Americans for quite some time: the Western nation building project in Afghanistan is in dire shape:

The positive spin from the Americans has been running especially hard the last few weeks, as Congressional committees in Washington focus on spending bills and the Obama administration, trying to secure money for a few more years here, talks up the country’s progress. The same is going on at the European Union, where the tone has been sterner than in the past, but still glosses predictions of Afghanistan’s future with upbeat words like “promise” and “potential.”

Despite that, one of those rare truth-telling moments came at a farewell cocktail party last week hosted by the departing French ambassador to Kabul: Bernard Bajolet, who is leaving to head France’s Direction Génerale de la Sécurité Extérieure, its foreign intelligence service....

That the Afghan project is on thin ice and that, collectively, the West was responsible for a chunk of what went wrong, though much of the rest the Afghans were responsible for. That the West had done a good job of fighting terrorism, but that most of that was done on Pakistani soil, not on the Afghan side of the border. And that without fundamental changes in how Afghanistan did business, the Afghan government, and by extension the West’s investment in it, would come to little.

His tone was neither shrill nor reproachful. It was matter-of-fact.

Look, this is why the bags-of-cash-to-Karzai story was neither surprising nor all that lamentable: what else could we do? Sure, it would have been nice if everyone in the U.S. government was on the same page about how to "influence" Afghanistan's government, but when is the U.S. government (let alone a consortium of international players, all with their own interests) ever on the same page?

(AP Photo)

March 29, 2013

Report Places Iraq and Afghan War Costs at Between $4 and $6 Trillion

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A new report from Havard's Linda Bilmes estimates the total cost of both wars at between $4 and $6 trillion. Here's how Bilmes frames the accounting:

This includes long-term medical care and disability compensation for service members, veterans and families, military replenishment and social and economic costs. The largest portion of that bill is yet to be paid. Since 2001, the US has expanded the quality, quantity, availability and eligibility of benefits for military personnel and veterans. This has led to unprecedented growth in the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense budgets. These benefits will increase further over the next 40 years. Additional funds are committed to replacing large quantities of basic equipment used in the wars and to support ongoing diplomatic presence and military assistance in the Iraq and Afghanistan region. The large sums borrowed to finance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will also impose substantial long-term debt servicing costs.

Bilmes notes that the U.S. has already borrowed $2 trillion to pay for both wars, making it a significant component of the $9 trillion in debt the U.S. has larded onto its balance sheet since 2001. Of this, an estimated $87 billion was wasted in Iraq reconstruction projects and $61 billion was siphoned off in boondoggle Afghan projects.

"Throughout the past decade," Bilmes writes, "the United States has underestimated the length, difficulty, cost and economic consequences of these wars, and has failed to plan how to pay for them."

(AP Photo)

March 26, 2013

See Every Drone Strike in Pakistan on This Interactive Map

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An interactive graphic from Pitch Interactive maps out all the known drone strikes that the U.S. has launched in Pakistan, including the estimated civilian death toll. It uses data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism and the New America Foundation as its source. (Graphic Detail has a nice backgrounder on how the project came together.)

According to the Bureau, there have been 366 U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan responsible for the deaths of between 2,537-3,581 people. Of those, an estimated 411-884 were civilians and 168-197 were children.

These figures are not without their critics but they are the closest thing we have to a rough approximation of U.S. drone activity.

(Image: Pitch Interactive)

March 4, 2013

"Insider" Attacks in Afghanistan Doubled in 2012

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Almost double the number of NATO troops were attacked by their Afghan "allies" in 2012 than in 2011, according to the Washington Times. There were 20 "insider" attacks in 2011 and 47 registered by NATO in 2012. The attacks killed 61 NATO soldiers (most of whom were Americans).

One unnamed Army officer quoted by the Times called these insider attacks the "most effective innovation in tactics employed by the Taliban over the course of the entire war."

One reason such attacks proved so effective was because NATO rapidly enlarged the size of the Afghan security force in the hopes of handing over security responsibilities to local troops after 2014. This mass recruitment resulted in less rigorous vetting, allowing Taliban agents to infiltrate the service or pay-off vulnerable recruits.

(AP Photo)

February 19, 2013

The Silent Weapon in the War Against the Taliban: Viagra

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Counterinsurgency, we're frequently told, is a battle for "hearts and minds." In Afghanistan, British and American forces have evidently concluded that one way to win a man's heart is through his pants.

Writing in Newsweek, Ron Moreau and Sami Yousafzai detail how one British Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand embarked on a campaign to win over local mullahs by plying them with clothing, food and medicine. As "Operation Mullah" unfolded and the Brits began to earn the trust of local clerics, they received additional requests:

It was not long before some imams even began to take team members into their confidence and to disclose their most personal complaints, such as their sexual debilities. The answer to the imams’ pleas: Viagra. “We hesitantly gave Viagra to a few mullahs,” says the adviser. “And after a few months they were all demanding the drug, so we began ordering and distributing large quantities.”
This story, alas, does not have a happy ending, at least for the British. After taking these Viagra-popping imams on a tour of the UK (to show how Muslims live and worship freely in the West) they were reportedly dismayed to hear the clerics refer to the British and Americans as "invaders" who would soon be driven out of Afghanistan.

This isn't the first time Viagra has been used in an attempt to win Afghans over to their Western occupiers. The CIA reportedly plied friendly warlords with the drug as payback for tips on the Taliban's whereabouts. Viagra was preferred to cash because, as one CIA operator told the Washington Post, a warlord's sudden extravagance would be noticeable and instantly suspect. His prowess and nocturnal stamina, less so (unless he suffered one of the dreaded side effects).

Not surprisingly, the Taliban are less enthusiastic about the stuff. Just last week, the Pakistani Taliban warned shopkeepers in the Khyber region to stop selling Viagra and "obscene films."

(Photo: Pfizer)

February 14, 2013

Has Obama Lost Pakistan?

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In his State of the Union address earlier this week, President Barack Obama had this to say about U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the (mostly) Muslim world:

Today, the organization that attacked us on 9/11 is a shadow of its former self. Different al Qaeda affiliates and extremist groups have emerged – from the Arabian Peninsula to Africa. The threat these groups pose is evolving. But to meet this threat, we don’t need to send tens of thousands of our sons and daughters abroad, or occupy other nations. Instead, we will need to help countries like Yemen, Libya, and Somalia provide for their own security, and help allies who take the fight to terrorists, as we have in Mali. And, where necessary, through a range of capabilities, we will continue to take direct action against those terrorists who pose the gravest threat to Americans.

As we do, we must enlist our values in the fight. That is why my Administration has worked tirelessly to forge a durable legal and policy framework to guide our counterterrorism operations. Throughout, we have kept Congress fully informed of our efforts. I recognize that in our democracy, no one should just take my word that we’re doing things the right way. So, in the months ahead, I will continue to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world.

One place left unmentioned in the president's address was Pakistan, where a recent Gallup poll indicates that disapproval of U.S. leadership is at an all-time high:

With President Barack Obama's first term characterized by strained relations between Pakistan and the U.S., more than nine in 10 Pakistanis (92%) disapprove of U.S. leadership and 4% approve, the lowest approval rating Pakistanis have ever given.
Pakistanis now more than at any other time in the past three years feel threatened by interaction with the West, according to a May 12-June 6, 2012, survey. A majority (55%) say interaction between Muslim and Western societies is "more of a threat," up significantly from 39% in 2011. This sharp increase is observed at a time of heightened Pakistani concerns regarding U.S. encroachment on Pakistani sovereignty, including an intensified number of U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, as well as the aforementioned May 2011 killing of bin Laden by the United States military.

Enlisting "values" in the fight against terrorism is all well and good, but values projection isn't a direct marketing campaign. American values are understood abroad not through rhetoric, but through policy. While drones are certainly a more cost efficient, and less invasive, form of interventionism, they are a form of intervention nonetheless. The president came into office hoping for a reset with the Muslim world, but the "Muslim world" isn't a place; it's a concept comprised of many different sects, regions, languages, nationalities and interests. As it turns out, matters of sovereignty, national identity, regional supremacy and patriotism matter to Muslims, too. (Shocking, I know!)

Over 10 percent of the world's Muslim population resides in restive, nuclear-armed Pakistan. There's certainly no panacea for fighting fringe organizations like al-Qaeda, but if President Obama is so concerned about Muslim extremism, then he might want to stop alienating the places where most of the world's Muslims happen to live.

February 7, 2013

Afghans Paid More in Bribes in 2012

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Corruption cost Afghans $3.9 billion last year, according to a new report from the UN. That's a 40 percent increase from last year and is double what the Afghan government takes in in revenue.

Interestingly, the number of Afghans who say they have paid bribes is down nine percent since 2009 (to 50 percent); yet a full 68 percent of Afghans surveyed said it was just fine if lower public officials supplemented their incomes with bribery.

(AP Photo)

January 16, 2013

Pakistan Foreign Minister: bin Laden Was an "Intelligence Failure"

Amidst growing international frustration with Pakistan, Hina Rabbani Khar defends her country's policies. She describes the discovery of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan as a "huge intelligence failure" and "infuriating."

At least one of those descriptions is accurate...

January 14, 2013

Staying in Afghanistan

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There is a growing chorus of right-of-center national security analysts warning that President Obama's Afghan pullout is going to end in disaster. While I don't agree with their prescription (stationing tens of thousands of troops in Afghanistan indefinitely) I do think they're right to warn about the deterioration in security that's likely to follow a U.S. withdrawal. Afghanistan may not revert completely to Taliban rule or abject disorder, but it seems foolish to blithely assume, as the Obama administration's public rhetoric suggests, that all is well on the path to a stable "transition" to Afghan control.

But this deterioration points to one of the underlying problems with stationing troops in Afghanistan forever. If ten years of U.S. and international efforts have not produced durable stability, why would ten or twenty more years do the same?

More broadly, the failure in Afghanistan points to a central issue facing U.S. and Western counter-terrorism policy in general -- how to deal with ungoverned spaces? The French intervention in Mali, the not-so-covert American campaigns in the Horn of Africa and Yemen, the drone war in Pakistan -- these are all ways of grappling with the threat without committing massive numbers of soldiers and financial resources to rebuild governing institutions. It's likely that Afghanistan will fall into this category as well after 2014. This template may not satisfy the neoconservative fantasy of Kipling 2.0, but it's hard to see a feasible alternative that won't quickly bankrupt already economically challenged governments.

(AP Photo)

December 24, 2012

Keeping Troops in Afghanistan

Max Boot argues that the U.S. should station large numbers of troops in Afghanistan indefinitely, then undermines his argument at the end of his op-ed:

It is hard to imagine how anyone in the Obama administration could conclude that a force of just 6,000 personnel would be sufficient after 2014 when, even with 68,000 troops today, the United States cannot prevent the Taliban and Haqqanis from operating openly an hour’s drive from Kabul. Such a precipitous drawdown vastly increases the risk of a Taliban takeover. [Emphasis mine.]

It's obvious to even the war's die-hard supporters that there is no sufficient American force available to keep the Taliban and Haqqani militants from threatening Afghanistan. So why subject an arbitrary number to an indefinite stay in Afghanistan?

November 27, 2012

How Many Troops Does the U.S. Need to Maintain in Afghanistan?

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According to the Wall Street Journal, the Obama administration is negotiating to leave 10,000 or more U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014 - the date which, you'll recall, Vice President Biden adamantly insisted there would no U.S. troops in the country. Imagine that.

These 10,000, according to the Journal, would be on hand for counterterrorism missions and to continue training Afghan security forces.

Is this enough? Too many? Kimberly and Frederick Kagan argue that the U.S. would need to sustain three times as many troops to safely conduct both missions.

I'm not qualified to judge which precise number is logistically or practically wise, but this is almost besides the point. The central question is: is it worth it to have 10,000 (or 30,000 troops) in Afghanistan to battle what is left of al-Qaeda? Are the remnants of the organization that potent? Can the threat from al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal region be mitigated another way? And finally, how likely is it that this troop commitment will yoke the U.S. to the fate of the current Afghan government and lead to calls for more troops down the road if the Taliban insurgency grows more lethal (the Kagans' analysis does not even grapple with such a possibility, which should raise red flags).

It's striking that we can talk blithely about such a long-term commitment without any debate or argument about al-Qaeda's potency in Pakistan's tribal region. I'm not averse to leaving forces behind in Afghanistan for such a purpose, but it would be nice if the administration presented some evidence or made some kind of argument that they're vitally necessary.

(AP Photo)

November 6, 2012

Pakistan's War on Education

Mohammed Hanif recounts the country's hostility to education, which goes well beyond the brutal depredations of the Taliban:

What is conveniently ignored in the debate over Malala is the fact that every 10th child in the world who doesn't go to school is Pakistani. The Taliban are not the only ones keeping kids out of school. Some fairly secularly minded people think of Pakistan's children as someone else's children – not deserving the education that their money buys for their own kids. As such, Pakistan is a booming marketplace for private education. Ask anyone on the street, and they'll tell you it's the biggest business in Pakistan.

October 25, 2012

Is Afghanistan a U.S. Win or Loss?

Steven Metz makes the case for the win column, arguing along lines I've long agreed with: when viewed through a narrow prism of striking back at al-Qaeda and running out the Taliban, the U.S. did succeed in Afghanistan. It is only in light of the expanded goals of state building and waging a counter-insurgency that the U.S. has fallen short. Here's Metz:

For a while it appeared that the United States might attain this more ambitious outcome. But American strategy quickly floundered on flawed assumptions: that it was possible to build an Afghan government which shared American priorities and objectives; that it was advisable to build a centralized Afghan state in which the national government controlled all national territory; and that it was possible not only to defeat the Taliban decisively, but to eradicate them. None of these assumptions proved true. The regime of Afghan President Hamid Karzai had very different priorities and objectives than its American allies. A national government in full control of Afghanistan was an historical rarity unlikely to be recreated. And so long as the Taliban had sanctuary in Pakistan, it could not be eradicated.

Joshua Foust isn't buying it:

It is difficult to see how one avoids the conclusion that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan has failed. That doesn’t mean it is a defeat, per se, but our original objectives, several times over, have proven impossible to meet. In the aftermath, however, we should be pondering how to manage that failure to avoid defeat. Assisting Afghanistan in the security transition post-withdrawal, encouraging them to reconcile the political elements of the Taliban, and cracking down on Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorist groups inside Afghanistan all require continued presence, attention, and — yes — even troops. It will be a far cry from the idealist goals President Obama initially came into office with, but it would not be a total defeat somehow redefined as a success.

Managing failure is a far cry from simply declaring success and walking away. By arguing for just that, Metz is doing the war, and the very real challenges it poses to the future security of the region and the U.S., a disservice.

I think Foust is right that "managing failure" is a more accurate description, but his I think his description of what needs to be done reveals why folks like Metz are looking for a way to ease America's exit from the war.

To wit: what if the U.S. can't reconcile "political elements" of the Taliban with a U.S.-aligned government in Kabul? What if Afghan forces cannot stand on their own after 2014? What if "cracking down on Pakistan" doesn't work? Is the U.S. fated to fight a proxy war against Pakistan inside Afghanistan for decades? Why is that in the U.S. interest?

By 2014, the Afghans will have had over another year of training. If they cannot adequately hold their own against the Taliban, what is the rationale for continued investment in U.S. blood and treasure?

What I take Metz to be saying is that, when viewed through the prism of keeping the U.S. safe from terrorism, the U.S. has done just about all it can do in Afghanistan. The threat isn't completely gone, as Foust notes, and waiting around until it is is an unreasonable standard. It doesn't take much for a small group of people to organize a killing spree - no matter where they are.

If the U.S. is reluctant to dump tens of thousands of U.S. troops into Mali, or Yemen, or Somalia to combat jihadists, it makes no sense to sustain such a huge presence in Afghanistan for so long. An abrupt exit and complete cessation of all aid next month would be counter-productive, but Afghanistan has to be relegated to the ranks of countries - like Yemen - that pose a manageable risk to the U.S. and not a fetish object because it just so happened to be where bin Laden found a place to live for few years.

We also, really, need context. The threat that any American will die from terrorism - from Afghanistan or anywhere - is infinitesimal. At a certain point, a basic cost/benefit analysis has to kick in.

October 16, 2012

Political Honesty: Afghan Pullout Edition

"We are leaving in 2014, period, and in the process, we're going to be saving over the next 10 years another $800 billion," Biden said. "We've been in this war for over a decade. The primary objective is almost completed. Now all we're doing is putting the Kabul government in a position to be able to maintain their own security. It's their responsibility, not America's." - Joseph Biden, October 2012
Last week, U.S. and Afghan negotiators met in Kabul to talk about the Bilateral Security Agreement that will govern the extension of U.S. troops past 2014, when President Barack Obama said the combat mission in Afghanistan will end and the U.S. will complete the transition of the entire country to Afghan government control....

Grossman said Tuesday that the point of the upcoming negotiations is to agree on an extension of the U.S. troop presence well past 2014, for the purposes of conducting counterterrorism operations and training and advising the Afghan security forces. - Josh Rogin, October 2012

In other words, when a politican says "we are leaving" it actually means "we are trying to stay."

What's particularly galling about this is that the administration won't actually defend its position on the merits. If leaving a residual force inside Afghanistan is a good idea, let's hear the rationale. While I am skeptical of a large-scale counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, I'm sure I'm not alone in seeing the value in retaining a force to target whatever al-Qaeda elements still remain inside Afghanistan (and over the border in Pakistan).

Instead, we get dishonesty.

October 12, 2012

Scoring the VP Debate

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Speaking strictly about the foreign policy sections of last night's VP debate (and not about Biden's near-constant harrumphing), I thought the vice president had the edge, but he was not without his shortcomings. To tick off the list:

Libya: Ryan made some of the strongest points of the night on Libya - not ideological points about the wisdom of the intervention - but on the more basic insistence that the consulate was woefully insecure and that the administration's response to the attack was completely inadequate. As Josh Rogin pointed out, Biden completely contradicted the State Department by insisting that the administration had no idea that the consulate had requested more security - digging the administration even deeper into a mess they should have never created in the first place.

Syria: Biden (and the moderator) essentially forced Ryan into conceding that the major thing a Romney administration would do differently in Syria would be to call Assad bad names. Literally, the big difference Ryan was able to elucidate between his ticket and the Obama administration was that when the Syrian revolt started he would not have called Bashar Assad a reformer. It was extremely obvious that there was no substantive difference in policy between the two camps when it came to America's response. (Incidentally, Biden appeared to suggest that the U.S. was actually arming the rebels - did anyone catch that?)

Afghanistan: Here too, Biden exposed the Romney/Ryan position as little more than baseless carping. Ryan agreed with the 2014 withdrawal but said that more U.S. troops should be in Afghanistan currently fighting and dying rather, as Biden noted, than "trained" Afghans. But while Biden sounded emphatic about a U.S. departure in 2014, the actual agreement between Kabul and Washington leaves open the possibility that small numbers of combat troops will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 for counter-terrorism missions. Biden's strident insistence that we'd be out of there no matter what was either a signal that the U.S. would not seek to keep troops there beyond the deadline or a misrepresentation of the administration's longer-term strategy.

Iran: Both Ryan and Biden fell victim to their own rhetoric on Iran. For his part, Ryan's insistence that the U.S. had to have "credibility" for the Mullahs to knuckle under was exploded, painfully, when Martha Raddatz asked him if he really expected the U.S. to restore this supposedly lost credibility in two months - or by the time Iran is expected to reach the 90 percent enrichment thresh-hold they are moving toward. As with Syria (and reflecting, I think, the over-reliance on neoconservative advisers) it was clear that the the Romney/Ryan position places an amazing amount of faith in bombastic rhetoric to achieve concrete ends.

Ryan's principle Iran argument was that it took the Obama administration too long to enact crushing sanctions - a point I think Biden dealt with by noting that Iran is actually not building a bomb and that time remains on our side. Ryan was also running away from the very clear implication of his rhetoric: that a vote for Romney/Ryan is a vote for another war in the Mideast.

Yet Biden fell into his own trap on Iran. While trying to tamp down the hysteria about an imminent Iranian weapon, Biden also pointedly noted that the U.S. would stop Iran from getting a bomb no matter what and that "this president doesn't bluff." So even as Biden was trying to paint Ryan as eager for another war in the Mideast, he was explicitly promising that the Obama administration would start one itself if Iran didn't change course.

Stepping back, it was rather disheartening to see, as Larison noted, a foreign policy discussion that omitted extremely important issues like China, Asia and the Eurozone crisis. There's more - a lot more - to U.S. foreign policy than the Middle East, but you would never know it listening to the debate.

(AP Photo)

October 3, 2012

Negotiating with the Taliban: Hopeless?

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Spencer Ackerman writes that the U.S. effort in Afghanistan is rapidly collapsing absent a new-found willingness to negotiate with the Taliban:

Without a settlement with the Taliban, there is no hope of ending an insurgency that withstood the U.S. troop surge of 2010-2012. The U.S. will either have to rely on an Afghan security force that has killed more than 50 U.S. and NATO troops this year alone, or end up prolonging its costly commitment to Afghanistan.

According to The New York Times, U.S. officials have given up on their on-again, off-again talks with the Taliban, and are punting negotiations over to the Afghans after the major U.S. drawdown in 2014. It’s entirely possible that’s a negotiating tactic to compel the Taliban to come to terms. But if the U.S. isn’t bluffing, writes the Times, “one of the cornerstones of [its] strategy to end the war” has crumbled.

Even the most earnest U.S. negotiating effort is bound to hit upon a major American disadvantage: at some point, U.S. forces will leave Afghanistan, while the Taliban remain. The U.S. is trying to paper over this dynamic with promises to never leave but how believable are those pledges? The U.S. and NATO presence is going to be scaled back after 2014, and given that the surge of U.S. forces wasn't able to blunt the Taliban's momentum, it's hard to imagine fewer forces would do any better. What incentive does the Taliban have to make major concessions - or honor them once Western forces are dramatically drawn down?

That leaves the U.S. with very little leverage to negotiate with. Perhaps the only remaining, credible threat would be to make clear that harboring international terrorists on Afghan soil is a U.S. red line that would invite air strikes and special forces attacks - the kind that swiftly collapsed the Taliban regime and drove them out of the country in 2001/2. Ultimately, preventing Afghan territory from serving as a base for global terror strikes is the only "vital" U.S. interest in the country anyway.

(AP Photo)

September 27, 2012

Debating Drones

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Joshua Foust makes some good points pushing back against the Living Under Drones report, noting that the methodology was designed to produce a somewhat skewed report:

For starters, the sample size of the study is 130 people. In a country of 175 million, that is just not representative. 130 respondents isn't representative even of the 800,000 or so people in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the region of Pakistan where most drone strikes occur. Moreover, according to the report's methodology section, there is no indication of how many respondents were actual victims of drone strikes, since among those 130 they also interviewed "current and former Pakistani government officials, representatives from five major Pakistani political parties, subject matter experts, lawyers, medical professionals, development and humanitarian workers, members of civil society, academics, and journalists."

The authors did not conduct interviews in the FATA, but Islamabad, Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Peshawar. The direct victims they interviewed were contacted initially by the non-profit advocacy group Foundation for Fundamental Rights, which is not a neutral observer (their explicit mission is to end the use of drones in Pakistan).

Foust also asks an important question: if not drones, what? When the Pakistani army attempted to clear militants from the FATA, it resulted in massive destruction and tens of thousands of refugees - far worse than the toll inflicted by U.S. drones.

But does this mean the drone program, in its current form, is the "only" choice? Foust thinks so:

The targets of drone strikes in Pakistan sponsor insurgents in the region that kill U.S. soldiers and destabilize the Pakistani state (that is why Pakistani officials demand greater control over targeting). They cannot simply be left alone to continue such violent attacks. And given the Pakistani government's reluctance either to grant the FATA the political inclusion necessary for normal governance or to establish an effective police force (right now it has neither), there is no writ of the state to impose order and establish the rule of law.

But here's the thing: how many drone strikes are targeting international terrorists (i.e. those training or plotting to hit U.S. and Western targets abroad) and how many are hitting local insurgents who are fighting the U.S. because it's decamped in Afghanistan?

This seems like a critical distinction (although these two militant groups likely collaborate) because one group poses an enduring threat to the United States and the other ceases to be an American problem once Washington abandons its flailing nation building effort in Afghanistan. From publicly available information, it's not always clear which of these groups is being targeted. The tempo of the drone strikes suggests that it's less about hitting international terrorists and more about extending the Afghan war into the Pakistani sanctuaries that are out of reach of U.S. troops.

That leads to a second, far more important, question: is the U.S. targetting militants that threaten the Pakistani state, or those sponsored by the Pakistani state. It's rather perverse to argue that drones are critical to protect Pakistan from militant violence when that country's intelligence service believes it is at war with you and uses militants to advance its own interests.

Underlying these questions is a somewhat understandable/somewhat troubling lack of clarity (and outright falsehoods) from the Obama administration as to what's going on. While much of the concern over the drone war comes from questions about its effectiveness (or lack thereof) in curbing terrorist violence, we should be equally concerned about how the use of this weapon is enshrining some of the worst tendencies in Washington with respect to democratic accountability and the rule of law.

(AP Photo)

September 26, 2012

The Costs of the U.S. Drone War

A new report, Living Under Drones, goes on the ground in Pakistan to document the U.S. drone war. I've just started reading it, but the above teaser video does a good job setting up the overall thrust. Long story short: the U.S. line on drone strikes as being surgical appears to be vastly overstated.

September 19, 2012

Has the U.S. Admitted Defeat in Afghanistan?

James Joyner thinks so:

That the war in Afghanistan has been unwinnable has been obvious to most outside analysts since well before the so-called surge of 2009. Now, the United States government has finally admitted the obvious in deeds if not words.

Following the murder of six NATO troops in yet another "green on blue" attack in which Afghan soldiers supposedly fighting on our side killed NATO troops, the coalition has all but ended combined operations with Afghan army and police forces at the tactical level, requiring general officer approval for exceptions.

While spokesmen insisted that "we're not walking away" from the training and advisory mission that is the ostensible reason for continued Western presence in Afghanistan eleven years into the fight there, that statement rings hollow. As American Security Project Central and South Asia specialist Joshua Foust puts it, "The training mission is the foundation of the current strategy. Without that mission, the strategy collapses. The war is adrift, and it's hard to see how anyone can avoid a complete disaster at this point."

As Joyner notes, it would be nice if the presidential contenders could spare a few minutes to sketch out their thoughts on what U.S. policy toward Afghanistan is going to look like going forward.

August 17, 2012

Who Will Determine Afghanistan's Fate?

Michael Hart makes an obvious, if politically uncomfortable, point:

However effective Western military organizations are in transitioning to Afghan control, the country’s future will not be decided primarily by the residual structures and legacies of Western involvement, the current Taliban insurgency or even any formal process of reconciliation. Rather, it will be decided more by the country’s ethnic character, the particular nature of local and national governance, and the influence of neighboring powers with enduring geopolitical and strategic imperatives in the region far stronger than those of the West.

In other words, the future of Afghanistan will be determined by forces that antedate the latest Western effort to direct a turbulent area—and which probably will long survive this and future efforts to dominate the country.

The key questions that emerge from this conclusion are whether the U.S. can preserve the ability to deny al-Qaeda safe havens should the Taliban re-establish control over larger portions of Afghanistan and whether a non-Pashtun stronghold can hold out against a stronger Taliban insurgency. Hart makes the case the answer can be a provisional "yes" to both, but the reality is that Afghanistan is going to remain a violent and dangerous state for years to come.

July 25, 2012

Romney Sets Afghan Timetable (But It's Different Than Obama's ... Somehow)

David Sherfinski makes a good catch:

Earlier this year, presumptive Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney called President Obama "extraordinarily naive" for putting a timetable of transferring control of Afghanistan to the country's security forces by the end of 2014.

On Tuesday, speaking at the Veterans of Foreign Wars' annual meeting, he said that "as president, my goal in Afghanistan will be to complete a successful transition to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014."

But did you know that not all timetables are alike? According to Romney's senior adviser Kevin Madden:

"[Mr. Romney] mentioned the date as a goal to turn over to Afghan security forces, but not as a political calendar — instead, a calendar for securing the situation there," Mr. Madden continued. "I think the president put the premium on the calendar, where Governor Romney is putting a premium on the situation on the ground."

Naturally.

July 9, 2012

Driving with NATO Through Pakistan

GlobalPost's Suzanna Koster interviews a NATO truck driver making the dangerous journey from Pakistan.

June 6, 2012

Going to War with Pakistan Won't Stabilize Afghanistan

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Max Boot wants to send drones after the Taliban inside Pakistan:

There have been a few drone strikes on the Haqqani Network in and around Waziristan, Pakistan, but none, so far as I am aware, on the Taliban leadership headquartered in Quetta, Pakistan–nor on the operational Taliban hub at Chaman, Pakistan, just across the border from southern Afghanistan. These groups are actively killing Americans all the time–more than al-Qaeda Central can boast of these days. Yet we have not unleashed the CIA and Special Operations Forces to do to them what they have done to al-Qaeda. Why not? Largely because of the sensitivities of the Pakistani government which is an active sponsor of the Taliban and the Haqqanis.

But so what? The Pakistanis have declining leverage over us; they have kept their supply line to Afghanistan closed since last fall and it has not seriously disrupted NATO operations. The administration needs to figure out whether it’s serious about leaving a more stable Afghanistan behind when the bulk of U.S. troops are withdrawn. If it is, it will unleash the Reapers against the Taliban and Haqqanis–not just against al-Qaeda.

It's just as likely that U.S. efforts to expand the number of drone war targets would lead Pakistan to destabilize Afghanistan even more than it has already done. Drones can't defeat the Taliban insurgency. What they can do, at best, is pare back the leadership. But if that comes at the expense of enraging Pakistan, the gains would be quickly undermined. As Anatol Lieven has noted, Pakistan has indeed supported the Afghan Taliban but it has not equipped them with very powerful weaponry nor directed them to wage the kind of proxy war they could fight if the Pakistani military decided it wanted to (aka what happened to the Soviets during their Afghan occupation).

The end result of this strategy would be to turn Afghanistan into a proxy-war battlefield between the CIA and ISI at a time when the CIA should be focused on keeping whatever's left of al-Qaeda from rearing its head. Utopian schemes of an Afghanistan free of Taliban or Pakistani influence shouldn't get in the way (again) of a more limited and achievable goal.

A wider drone campaign against sensitive Pakistani targets also enhances the risks of destabilizing Pakistan, which would be an absolute disaster for U.S. interests for reasons that should be clear to everyone.

(AP Photo)

May 21, 2012

Obama's Fuzzy Afghan Math

At the Monday meetings, leaders will also discuss the expense of continued support for Afghanistan’s security forces after 2014.

The United States spent $12 billion last year, 95 percent of the total cost, to train and equip an Afghan army and police force that is expected to total 352,000 by this fall. With a gross domestic product of about $17 billion, Afghanistan is incapable of funding a force that size.

As it looks for a way to cut future costs and assumes an eventual political solution to the war among the Afghans themselves, the administration has projected that Afghanistan’s security needs could be met even if the force were cut by up to one-third. It estimates the cost of sustaining the reduced force at about $4.1 billion a year, half of which the United States would provide. Afghanistan would pay about $500,000. [Emphasis mine] - Washington Post

I think these numbers tell the story of Afghanistan. First, we just spent $12 billion to bring Afghan security forces to a level that is patently unsustainable - and so the Afghan Army is going to shrink back to a more manageable size. We literally spent billions and put U.S. trainers at risk to develop an army that's going to shrink away in two years. How is that not an egregious waste?

Moreover, even the $4 billion-a-year seems fanciful. First, it's grounded on the assumption of a political settlement. Is that likely? What if there isn't one? And what if Europe decides to pass on "investing" anymore of their increasingly scarce resources in Afghanistan? I don't know how much aid the Taliban is receiving from Pakistan or Persian Gulf donors, but I'm willing to bet it's nothing remotely close to $4 billion, and they're fighting just fine. What the Afghans are missing isn't shiny uniforms or training in how to kill one another, but institutions worth fighting for. The U.S. has not developed those institutions after 10 years and it's impossible to imagine those institutions developing as the aid begins to dry up and the Afghans are left to "take the lead."

May 16, 2012

Putting a Price Tag on the Afghan War

Anthony Cordesman tries (pdf):

The fact remains, however, that if the CRS and OMB figures for FY2001-FY2013 that follow are totaled for all direct spending on the war, they reach $641.7 billion, of which $198.2 billion – or over 30% – will be spent in FY2012 and FY2013. This is an incredible amount of money to have spent with so few controls, so few plans, so little auditing, and almost no credible measures of effectiveness

As Cordesman also notes, it's laid the foundation for a tremendous amount of Afghan corruption and created a state so precarious it could easily collapse as the funding is withdrawn - as it must be, over time.

It will be interesting to see if the self-styled stewards of America's fiscal responsibility will have anything to say about this. Just today, National Review published a piece lambasting the (admittedly poor) investment in GM which soaked tax payers to the tune of about $66 billion. I wonder what they'd make of the hundreds of billions invested in Afghanistan - a growing share of which is being spent on President Obama's watch.

May 3, 2012

Time Well Spent

Powell and Musharraf on Tuesday both emphasized a role for moderate Taliban elements in a future government, although the Northern Alliance immediately rejected any Taliban presence in a future political arrangement. - Time, 2001
In coordination with the Afghan government, my Administration has been in direct discussions with the Taliban. We have made it clear that they can be a part of this future if they break with al Qaeda, renounce violence, and abide by Afghan laws. Many members of the Taliban - from foot soldiers to leaders - have indicated an interest in reconciliation. A path to peace is now set before them. Those who refuse to walk it will face strong Afghan Security Forces, backed by the United States and our allies. - President Obama, 2012

Rather than find some kind of ad-hoc, messy and compromising ending to the Afghan war in 2001, Washington decided to spend hundreds of lives and billions of dollars to find an ad-hoc, messy and compromising ending to the Afghan war in 2012 (or 2014 or whenever). Brilliant.

March 19, 2012

Can the U.S. Work an Afghan Miracle?

Max Boot cautions against "going wobbly" in Afghanistan:

But President Obama’s hesitancy and irresolution should not be an excuse for Republicans to abandon the war effort. They should continue to pressure the president to respect the advice of his commanders in the field, who want to keep 68,000 troops through 2014, with a substantial residual presence after that.

What, after all, is the alternative? Peace talks have scant prospect of success given that the Taliban are now betting—perhaps rightly—that they can simply wait us out. The likely result of a precipitous American pullout, which would trigger an equally hasty exit by our NATO allies, would be a major Taliban offensive in the east and south that would aim to take back Kandahar, Marja, and other population centers that have been secured at considerable cost over the past few years. The Afghan security forces would be likely to splinter along ethnic lines, and the entire country could well be plunged into a civil war as it was in the 1990s, when Kabul was regularly on the receiving end of artillery bombardments.

So if the U.S. reverts to its "residual force" footprint now instead of 2014, all these terrible things will happen. But if we don't, then all of the nascent problems Boot highlights would be resolved or substantially mitigated in 18 months?

No one is unrealistic about what a withdrawal of U.S. troops will mean for Afghanistan's internal security, but seeing as that is ultimately an issue for Afghans to resolve, the focus needs to be on how large numbers of troops and related expenses are serving U.S. security interests.

March 15, 2012

Victor Davis Hanson, Meet Robert Pape

Victor Davis Hanson wants an explanation for the increase in violence in Afghanistan:

There are lots of legitimate differences over U.S. policy in Afghanistan. Arguments continue over what happened to the “good” or “real” war that after the first five years of relative quiet (from 2001 through 2006 there were never more than 100 Americans lost per year) began heating up in 2007–8 (even as Iraq quieted), and by 2009 (317 lost) and 2010 (499 lost) had become a mess, even as we began to pour reinforcements and more money into the country. (No one to this date has explained adequately why violence increased even as we put more troops and material into the country and disengaged our efforts and attention from Iraq. There are all sorts of possible explanations, but none really have been offered.)

It's not much of a mystery. Here's Robert Pape:

In 2001, the United States toppled the Taliban and kicked Al Qaeda out of Afghanistan with just a few thousand of its own troops, primarily through the combination of American air power and local ground forces from the Northern Alliance. Then, for the next several years, the United States and NATO modestly increased their footprint to about 20,000 troops, mainly limiting the mission to guarding Kabul, the capital. Up until 2004, there was little terrorism in Afghanistan and little sense that things were deteriorating.

Then, in 2005, the United States and NATO began to systematically extend their military presence across Afghanistan. The goals were to defeat the tiny insurgency that did exist at the time, eradicate poppy crops and encourage local support for the central government. Western forces were deployed in all major regions, including the Pashtun areas in the south and east, and today have ballooned to more than 100,000 troops.

As Western occupation grew, the use of the two most worrisome forms of terrorism in Afghanistan — suicide attacks and homemade bombs — escalated in parallel. There were no recorded suicide attacks in Afghanistan before 2001. According to data I have collected, in the immediate aftermath of America’s conquest, the nation experienced only a small number: none in 2002, two in 2003, five in 2004 and nine in 2005.

But in 2006, suicide attacks began to increase by an order of magnitude — with 97 in 2006, 142 in 2007, 148 in 2008 and more than 60 in the first half of 2009. Moreover, the overwhelming percentage of the suicide attacks (80 percent) has been against United States and allied troops or their bases rather than Afghan civilians, and nearly all (95 percent) carried out by Afghans....

The picture is clear: the more Western troops we have sent to Afghanistan, the more the local residents have viewed themselves as under foreign occupation, leading to a rise in suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks. (We see this pattern pretty much any time an “outside” armed force has tried to pacify a region, from the West Bank to Kashmir to Sri Lanka.)

March 13, 2012

Rory Stewart on Afghanistan

Rory Stewart, the British MP who traveled Afghanistan on foot in 2001 and 2002, argues that it's time to accelerate the Western withdrawal:

Did our mission go wrong because Nato had too few troops; or because it sent too many? Could a different strategy have fixed the situation; or was it always impossible? The reason no longer matters. Whatever the explanation, things will not improve: Nato will not “solve the relationship with Pakistan”; it will never create “an effective, credible, legitimate Afghan government”; and in most parts of the country it has already lost “the hearts and minds” of the Afghan people.

Some US and UK generals have long been pressing for “just one more fighting season”. They feel that with just a little more time, things will improve. They are wrong. The longer we stay, the worse things will become. The Prime Minister made a wise and difficult decision to set a final end-date for combat operations. The UK cannot leave tomorrow because we need to ensure an orderly transfer, help the Afghan government take over, safely extract our men and equipment, and stay in step with our Nato allies (and in particular the US).


February 27, 2012

Aimless in Afghanistan

The U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan sent a top-secret cable to Washington last month warning that the persistence of enemy havens in Pakistan was placing the success of the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan in jeopardy, U.S. officials said.

The cable, written by Ryan C. Crocker, amounted to an admission that years of U.S. efforts to curtail insurgent activity in Pakistan by the lethal Haqqani network, a key Taliban ally, were failing. Because of the intended secrecy of that message, Crocker sent it through CIA channels rather than the usual State Department ones. - Washington Post

It's understandable why Washington wants Pakistan to end its support for the Haqqani network, but it's impossible to understand why we've based our Afghan strategy around the idea that this support is actually going to disappear and Afghanistan will be "stabilized" according to our prerogatives. It's been obvious for years now that Pakistan is looking out for its own interests in Afghanistan irrespective of American threats or inducements. Yet 10 years later, here is America's ambassador saying that all of our efforts will go to pot unless Pakistan does something it has repeatedly made clear it would not do.

Bernard Finel is equally exasperated:

See, our approach to both those countries has been posited on the believe that they are somehow acting contrary to their own interests and that if we just educate them they’ll come around. What do I mean?

Well, we escalated in Afghanistan on the assumption that it would be in Pakistan’s interest to suppress radical groups across the border. Why? Because they are “obviously” a threat to Pakistan. But look, the Pakistanis are not stupid. They get that there is a double-edged sword dynamic here, but they have made a conscious choice to use radical groups as a proxy both to maintain influence in Afghanistan and as a hedge against India. They have a redline, apparently, about the expansion of those groups into Pakistan proper — at least into the provinces beyond the FATA — but otherwise, they have zero interest in supporting the eradication of groups like the Haqqani network. But instead of understanding this definition of their interests, we continue to act as if they are operating under some sort of false consciousness that we can alter simply by, you know, explaining their own interests to them.

Myra MacDonald makes another critique:

Meanwhile, the U.S. strategy is, and has always been, internally inconsistent. At one level it wants to retain military bases in Afghanistan after 2014, which could be used for drone strikes and other military operations against Pakistan where many of the Islamist militants are based. Yet it needs Pakistani endorsement for a deal with Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, whose support is required to bring the rest of the movement on board and who is, despite Pakistani official denials, believed to be living in an Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) safe house, most likely in Karachi.

In short, however inconsistent the strategy, it has depended on bluff. And that bluff is weakening.

I am increasingly reminded of the words of one western official speaking last year on Afghanistan: ”We stay we lose, we leave we lose.”

I think it's this zero-sum thinking that has gotten us into trouble in the first place. America can't "lose" in Afghanistan. We've killed bin Laden and shredded most of the senior leadership that perpetrated 9/11. Why is this not enough?

February 2, 2012

Have We Forgotten What Afghanistan Was Like in 2001?

Kori Schake argues that the Obama administration is prematurely writing off the Afghan war:

The evident confusion among senior policy makers in the administration prefigures the administration's cratering commitment to win the war in Afghanistan. The White House has narrowed its war aims from defeating all threats to only defeating al Qaeda. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, testified to Congress this week that the deaths of senior al Qaeda leadership have brought us to a "critical transitional phase for the terrorist threat," in which the organization has a better than 50 percent probability of fragmenting and becoming incapable of mass-casualty attacks.

The White House appears set to use progress against al Qaeda as justification for accelerating an end to the war in Afghanistan. Since the president has concluded that we aren't fighting the Taliban, just al Qaeda, no need to stick around Afghanistan until the government of that country can provide security and prevent recidivism to Taliban control. The president will declare victory for having taken from al Qaeda the ability to organize large scale attacks, and piously intone that nation building in Afghanistan is Afghanistan's responsibility.

This policy will not win the war in Afghanistan. It will not even end the war in Afghanistan. It will only end our involvement in that ongoing war.


Afghanistan was at war with itself before the U.S. arrived. That it will be at war when we depart isn't really a surprise and isn't something the U.S. can really prevent, or is 11 years worth of proof insufficient on this score?

It's also not clear to me why defeating al-Qaeda is somehow an insufficient standard for victory here. Rather, it is the standard.

Does Schake believe that the Afghan Taliban really have the werewithal or intent to take the fight to the United States once we depart Afghanistan? If Rory Stewart's testimony is to be believed, large numbers of them could not locate the United States on a map.

To the extent that the Afghan Taliban will play host to what's left of al-Qaeda, that is a threat that we can tackle with a far lighter footprint and, yes, no nation building. Complete disengagement would be a mistake. But we need to put the commitment to Afghanistan alongside some rational cost/benefit analysis about the threat we're attempting to mitigate. The danger of an American dying of a terrorist attack on U.S. soil is vanishingly small. It's not zero and will never be zero - no matter how long we stay in Afghanistan and how much money we sink into the place.

February 1, 2012

Pakistan's Support for the Taliban Invalidates U.S. Strategy

One of the central arguments sustaining American strategy in Afghanistan is that a failure to stabilize Afghanistan would have disastrous consequences in Pakistan. Proponents of the Afghan surge argued that while Afghanistan may not be strategically worth such a huge investment in blood and treasure, the prospect of instability spilling into nuclear-armed Pakistan warranted the move.

This argument never made much sense and a recent leaked NATO report confirms it:

The U.S. military said in the document Pakistan's powerful Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) security agency was assisting the Taliban in directing attacks against foreign forces.

Pakistan is the architect of instability in Afghanistan, not its victim. It's more than a little ridiculous to argue that we have to fight Pakistan-backed insurgent forces for the sake of Pakistan's security.

January 31, 2012

President Obama Defends Drone War

In his YouTube/Google + question and answer, President Obama fielded some questions about America's drone campaign. Here, via USA Today, is his defense:

Well, you know, I think that we have to be judicious in how we use drones.

But understand that probably our ability to respect the sovereignty of other countries and to limit our incursions into somebody else's territory is enhanced by the fact that we are able to pinpoint strike on al Qaeda operative in a place where the capacities of that military in that country may not be able to get them.

So, obviously, a lot of these strikes have been in the Fattah [sic] and going after al Qaeda suspects, who are up in very tough terrain along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. For us to be able to get them in another way would involve probably a lot more intrusive military actions than the one that we're already engaging in.

That doesn't mean that we shouldn't be careful about how we proceed on this. And you know, obviously, I'm looking forward to a time where al Qaeda is no longer operative network and, you know, we can refocus a lot of our assets and attention on other issues.

But this is something that we're still having to deal with, there's still active plots that are directed against the United States, and I think we are on the offense now. Al Qaeda's been really weakened, but we've still got a little more work to do, and we've got to make sure that we're using all our capacities in order to deal with it.

Speaking of Google+, you can now find RCW there as well.

January 5, 2012

Unfinished Business in Afghanistan

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Two Marines walk the dusty streets at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan, Dec. 18. As the final U.S. forces departed Iraq, nearly 100,000 American troops continued counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan.
Photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones

By Brian Adam Jones

I have a rather polite alarm clock next to my bed.

At night, it douses my room in a cool, blue light. In the morning, it gently nudges me awake with soft tones that gradually increase in severity. The clock offers a welcome contrast to the lonely and gritty discomfort of Afghanistan, to the very concept of War.

But at 5 a.m. on Christmas morning, I was not happy to hear it.

Grumpy and bleary-eyed, I pulled on my desert camouflage uniform and laced up my boots. I’m sure my sentiment was echoed by the other American military men and women spending Christmas away from home.

As a combat journalist and communications specialist with 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) in Helmand province, Afghanistan, my Christmas morning was spent facilitating a live interview between a Detroit television station and two hometown heroes.

Not far away, on adjacent Camp Bastion, Marine Corps UH-1Y Hueys lifted off into the cold morning air.

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 369 launched Operation Noel, an effort to deliver care packages and Christmas cheer to Marines in remote outposts that don’t regularly receive mail and don’t enjoy the relative safety I have here at Camp Leatherneck.

While most of the remaining American forces in Iraq were able to make it home in time for Christmas, nearly 100,000 other U.S. troops spent Christmas morning in Afghanistan, quietly working as a part of an international coalition to create an increasingly peaceful and independent infrastructure here.

Continue reading "Unfinished Business in Afghanistan" »

December 15, 2011

A Marine's Christmas Song

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Master Sgt. Robert Allen, a native of Pawnee, Okla., serves as the aircraft rescue firefighting chief for Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 in Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan. An avid musician, Allen wrote a Christmas song for his wife, Carla, as he spends the holidays away from her and their three children.
- Photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones

By Brian Adam Jones

Afghanistan’s getting cold. My Marines and I have hung our Christmas stockings from a table with care, and strung lights along the top of the plywood wall in our office on the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) compound on Camp Leatherneck.

As public affairs Marines, Thanksgiving was spent linking Marines with their hometown television, radio and newspaper outlets, with Christmas promising much of the same.

My favorite part of my job as a combat journalist is meeting and interacting with all the great men and women in uniform, proud Americans who leave their friends and loved ones in the spirit of defense.

But there’s one Marine I’ve met here who certainly stands out.

Master Sgt. Robert Allen, an aircraft rescue firefighter with Marine Wing Support Squadron 371, loves playing the guitar. The first time I met the bald-headed Oklahoman with a big smile, it was to take his photo for articles by the Tulsa World and Stillwater News Press.

“Hey,” he said to me anxiously, “Can you listen to this song I wrote, let me know if you think it’s any good?”

Continue reading "A Marine's Christmas Song" »

December 12, 2011

In Photos: America's Secret Drone War

Danger Room has assembled a powerful slide show of graphic photos taken by Noor Behram, a resident of North Waziristan:

Before posting Behram's photos we took a number of measures to confirm as best we could what was being shown. We verified Behram’s bona fides with other news organizations. We sifted through the images, tossing out any pictures that couldn’t correlate with previously reported drone attacks. Then we grilled Behram in a series of lengthy Skype interviews from Pakistan, translated by Akbar, about the circumstances surrounding each of the images.

Still, we weren't at the events depicted. We don't know for sure if the destruction and casualties shown in the photos were caused by CIA drones or Pakistani militants. Even Behram, who drives at great personal risk to the scenes of the strikes, has little choice but to rely on the accounts of alleged eyewitnesses to learn what happened.

But we know for sure that these are rare photos from a war zone most Americans never see.

Behram's images are not conclusive proof that the Obama administration was incorrect (or disingenuous) when it claimed that no civilians had been killed by U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, but it's additional evidence that the claim was unfounded. It does beggar belief why such a claim was made in the first place. I suspect most Americans would support drone strikes even if the administration acknowledged that they carry the risk of killing innocent bystanders. Yet rather than level with the public about the hazy nature of the drone campaign, the administration insisted on a clear-cut assertion that no "non-combatants" had been killed.

November 18, 2011

Pakistan Leadership Woes

More good news out of Pakistan:

A growing storm over a confidential memo is laying bare the profound division between Pakistan’s powerful army and its civilian government, and the nation’s relationship with the United States is again at the center of the gulf.

At issue are allegations that the government of President Asif Ali Zardari asked for U.S. help to prevent a military coup after the Navy SEAL raid in May that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan. The claim is thought to have enraged Pakistan’s army, and the resulting controversy prompted Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, Husain Haqqani, to offer his resignation this week.

The Cable's Josh Rogin has been all over this story.

November 17, 2011

Haqqanis on Tape

According to the Long War Journal, the Haqqani Network has taken a page out of the al-Qaeda playbook and released a video of its fighters doing the jungle-gym routine.

The Journal quotes a source saying that the camp is located in Pakistan.

November 11, 2011

Leadership in the Afghan Sky

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Sgt Maj. Steven Lunsford mans the .50-caliber machine gun on a CH-53E Super Stallion during a recent mission in the Afghan sky. Lunsford is the sergeant major of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadron 464.
-- Photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones


By Brian Adam Jones

Boarding a CH-53E Super Stallion at Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, recently, I thought a member of the helicopter’s crew looked familiar.

For a recent project I was working in the Helmand River valley, I flew on a Super Stallion from Camp Bastion, a major aviation port in Afghanistan, to a small landing zone attached to a patrol base.

As one of the first passengers on the aircraft at Camp Bastion, I attentively watched a Marine in a flight suit as he attended to cargo being loaded onto the massive aircraft.

Crew chiefs or aerial observers aid with the operations of the helicopter, manning .50-caliber machine guns and managing passengers and cargo. This post is frequently stood by young, junior Marines and noncommissioned officers, but from what I could see of him from under the visor on his helmet, this Marine was older, and I knew him from somewhere.

Continue reading "Leadership in the Afghan Sky" »

November 10, 2011

The Truth About Afghanistan

Army Major General Peter Fuller was relieved of his command for telling the truth Politico that Hamid Karzai was an ungrateful ally. Joshua Foust makes the case that it was the right call and that to the extent that Karzai is a problem, he's one of America's own making:

Complaining about Karzai's zealous regard of Afghan interests over American interests is something of a tradition in both the military and the pro-military commentary class. And in almost all cases, those complaints miss the point entirely. Karzai's failures have little to do with who Karzai is as a person, but are rather tied up in the fundamentally unworkable institution of the Afghan President -- an institution we, the United States (including the United States Military) created for him. His failure is our failure, and complaining about his failure should also imply complaining about our own failure.

Tom Ricks pitches in with a list of 19 true things that insiders and veterans of Afghanistan agree on but that a General shouldn't say. The list should be read in full but a few, in particular, stand out:

Even non-Taliban Afghans don't much like us.

Afghans didn't get the memo about all our successes, so they are positioning themselves for the post-American civil war.

And they're not the only ones getting ready. The future of Afghanistan is probably evolving up north now as the Indians, Russians and Pakistanis jockey with old Northern Alliance types. Interestingly, we're paying more and getting less than any other player.

Speaking of positioning for the post-American civil war, why would the Pakistanis sell out their best proxy shock troops now?

This last point in particular is something I have yet to understand. It seems that every month, Secretary Clinton pops into Pakistan to deliver a "tough" message about how this time, Pakistan better get its act together or else. But the incentives for Pakistan to do this are very weak next to the stakes involved (although there have been hopeful signs of Pakistani rapprochement with India of late). As with Iraq and Iranian influence, the interests at play are geographical ones that no amount of American "will" or rhetoric can surmount.

November 7, 2011

Bombs Away

If you haven't yet read the Wall Street Journal's piece on the U.S. drone program, it's definitely worth your time. In it, we learn about the two-fold nature of drone targeting:

The March 17 attack was a "signature" strike, one of two types used by the CIA, and the most controversial within the administration. Signature strikes target groups of men believed to be militants associated with terrorist groups, but whose identities aren't always known. The bulk of CIA's drone strikes are signature strikes.

The second type of drone strike, known as a "personality" strike, targets known terrorist leaders and has faced less internal scrutiny.

During the 1990s the Clinton administration reportedly agonized over firing submarine-based cruise missiles into Afghanistan to kill bin Laden due to a variety of concerns (the intel was sketchy, there was a high risk of collateral damage, a Gulf prince had parked his jet too close to the target, etc.). This overabundance of caution arguably allowed the 9/11 attacks to unfold. Today, we have the reverse: the U.S. is not only willing to use force against al-Qaeda's leadership (a good thing) but to fire bombs willy-nilly* into Pakistan's tribal region in the hopes of hitting something important.

Without access to any of the intelligence used in targeting, it's impossible to say what's going on but it's telling that the administration is admitting that, in some instances at least, it's willing to kill groups of people inside Pakistan without a firm grasp of their culpability. Is this a strategy that the administration hopes to export into Yemen and Somalia?

Paradoxically, the end result of this aggressive strategy may be the same as the Clinton-era indecisiveness - a heightened risk of a terrorist attack.

*Some poetic license here.

October 28, 2011

A Glimpse at the Future of Afghanistan

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Capt. Michael Gagnon teaches Afghan children how to fist bump in the Helmand River Valley of southwestern Afghanistan, Oct. 21. Gagnon, a native of Oxford, Mass., commands a team of roughly 20 men dubbed “Task Force Nomad.” Over the next several weeks, the task force, a subset of Marine Wing Support Squadron 371, will construct or improve helicopter landing zones along the valley.
-- Photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones


By Brian Adam Jones

Last week, I like to think I had the opportunity to glimpse at the future of Afghanistan.

“Yo, Gimme some chocolate,” said the Pashtun boy.

Four English words and a spirited request for candy demonstrated the effects of a decade of American presence in the region.

“Yo,” answered Capt. Michael Gagnon, a logistics officer with Marine Wing Support Squadron 371. He responded in Pashto that he didn’t have any.

As of last week, I had been in Afghanistan roughly two and a half months and I’d hardly seen any Afghans.

My role as a combat journalist with 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Forward) means I don’t have the opportunity to interact with the population the way other forces do, but nonetheless, I was eager to be on the ground.

I traveled to the Helmand River Valley to spend a few days with Gagnon, who is on his third Afghan deployment in two years, and his small team, operating out of Patrol Base Alcatraz to construct helicopter landing zones for the small outposts here.

Having spent the last two months in the desert, I found the Helmand River Valley weird. I hadn’t seen a tree since July when I left North Carolina for Afghanistan. The thin strip of lush vegetation surrounding either side of the Helmand River was surreal to me, and I was eager to explore it.

In the midst of constructing a helicopter landing zone for one of the countless patrol bases that dot the heavily-populated valley, Gagnon, myself and the rest of the team encountered a group of curious Afghan children.

Continue reading "A Glimpse at the Future of Afghanistan" »

October 19, 2011

My Path to Afghanistan

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1st Lt. Austin Skinner, the platoon commander of 2nd Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, searches a vehicle during drug interdiction operations in southwestern Afghanistan, Aug. 18.
-- Photo by Cpl. Brian Adam Jones


By Brian Adam Jones

My path to Afghanistan was as unpredictable as America’s.

I didn’t deserve a single opportunity afforded to me, and I had several. I grew up in an upper-middle-class family in Maryland and New York City. I graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy, an elite boarding school in New Hampshire before starting college at Hofstra University on Long Island.

My biggest issue as a teenager was that my laziness exceeded my intelligence. I had no work ethic, no discipline and a frail, selective concept of morality.

The older I got, the more I realized I needed to tear things down and rebuild them the way I wanted them.

At 20, I enlisted in the Marine Corps.

Two years later, an Air Force C-17 Globemaster carried me from Manas Air Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan to Camp Bastion, Afghanistan. I looked out the small window on the door of the plane as the landscape below gradually shifted from snow-capped mountains to barren desert.

I landed in that desert late one summer morning, blasted by hot air as the back ramp of the Globemaster opened.

Continue reading "My Path to Afghanistan" »

October 18, 2011

Why the U.S. Fails With Pakistan

AEI's Thomas Donnelly unearths what I think is a good insight into why the U.S. has so much trouble convincing Pakistan to do what Washington wants it to do:

Pakistan’s problems are deep; indeed, they are embedded in the country’s very identity. But our strategic interests are equally deep. The war in Afghanistan and the rise of India are indicators that the balance of power in South Asia​—​like the balance of power in Europe, the Persian Gulf, or Pacific Asia​—​is emerging as a core security concern of the United States and an increasingly important test of the international system.

A coherent American strategy rests on convincing Islamabad of three things: that the United States has come to South Asia to stay; that India’s rise should be met with strategic cooperation, not competition; and that playing a “China card” won’t work. [Emphasis mine]

I don't think it's plausible to argue that America's interests in Pakistan run as deep as Pakistan's "very identity." Can you imagine what an outside power would have to do to change Washington's conviction that America is an exceptional nation created to spread freedom to the far corners of the Earth? Neither can I, which is why any strategy predicated on such a fundamental revolution in another country's political identity is destined to fail.

October 7, 2011

The Afghan War's Original Sin

In Kabul and Washington, the push is on to wind down a fight that on Friday will mark its 10th anniversary. U.S. officials, who are facing a future of fewer troops and less money for reconstruction, are narrowing their goals for the country. The constrained ambitions come amid pressure from the Obama administration to scale back the U.S. commitment at a time of flagging public support. - Washington Post

There's a telling scene at the 10 minute mark of this Frontline documentary on Afghanistan that I think speaks volumes about our situation there. In it, a former Taliban commander who has flipped sides to support the government has a conversation with a village elder not knowing his microphone is still on. Watching it, one gets the sense that there were two possible outcomes for the U.S. in Afghanistan in October 2011 - a massive effort to police, secure and rebuild the country costing trillions of dollars and entailing the deployment of close to a million coalition forces to seal the borders with Pakistan. Or a sharper pull out that left in place some intelligence collection and the bribing of Northern Alliance fighters to keep the Taliban and al-Qaeda rump on defense. The disastrous hybrid that the Bush administration pursued and that the Obama administration doubled down on has made us even more enemies in Afghanistan without accomplishing all that much.

Watch the full episode. See more FRONTLINE.

October 5, 2011

U.S. Veterans Views on War

A new poll from Pew Research takes the pulse of U.S. veteran's views on war as compared to other Americans:

While Americans remain supportive of their all-volunteer military (only one half of 1% of the population has been on active duty service in the past decade), the length of the conflicts has reshaped attitudes toward war and sacrifice, the survey found.

Nine out of 10 expressed pride in the troops and three-quarters say they thanked someone in the military. But 45% said neither of the wars fought after the September 11, 2001, attacks has been worth the cost and only a quarter said they are following news of the wars closely. And half of the public say the wars have made little difference in their lives....

More than half of post-9/11 veterans also felt that too much reliance on military force to combat terrorism leads to more terrorism. On this topic, the public view was nearly identical -- 52% said too much force is not a recipe for success.

Post-9/11 veterans were keen supporters of nation-building with 59% supporting those roles for America's service members. But only 45% of the public and pre-9/11 veterans thought the military should be involved.

September 28, 2011

What Is the Obama Administration Doing in Afghanistan?

Pivoting off of the revelation that the U.S. had been aware for years that Pakistan was willing to kill U.S. troops and foment instability in Afghanistan to pursue its interests, Michael Cohen wonders how the administration could have still doubled down in Afghanistan:

One thing we've seen repeatedly in regard to the war in Afghanistan is that Pakistan will, even at the risk of eroding their alliance with the United States, aggressively pursue its interests in Afghanistan - and yet the US strategy for Afghanistan has been based, in part, on the notion that Islamabad would shift its strategic calculus at the urging of US officials (and the carrot of foreign assistance). Two years later we're seeing the singular foolish [sic] of that strategy - but again it should have been evident back then. Rather than trying to get Pakistan to act against its interests the United States should have been looking to put in place a strategy that melded with Pakistan's strategic calculus regarding Afghanistan. We're today reaping the ill-rewards of that approach.

What's even more surreal about this whole episode is that many of the advocates of the Afghanistan surge - including Frederick Kagan and Stephen Biddle - insisted that one of the reasons more American lives and money had to be put at risk in Afghanistan was to - wait for it - protect Pakistan! They saw the Taliban and the instability they caused as a threat to Pakistan when in reality - and as was evident at the time - Pakistan was the architect of this instability and was using it toward their own ends. In other words, the surge boosters completely misread the strategic dynamic.

Like Cohen, I am trying hard to understand the administration's Afghanistan policy - is it being driven by wishful thinking, political cowardice, sheer incompetence or is it just an inability on my part to see the big picture (where things are actually better than they appear). I'm open to any of those interpretations at this point...

September 26, 2011

Graham Throws Down the Gauntlet

Senator Graham is apparently open to starting a war with Pakistan. That will help stabilize Afghanistan.

Haqqanis

But even as the Americans pledge revenge against the Haqqanis, and even amid a new debate in the Obama administration about how to blunt the group’s power, there is a growing belief that it could be too late. To many frustrated officials, they represent a missed opportunity with haunting consequences. Responsible for hundreds of American deaths, the Haqqanis probably will outlast the United States troops in Afghanistan and command large swaths of territory there once the shooting stops. - New York Times

Of course they will outlast the United States: they live there.

September 22, 2011

Pakistan's War on the U.S.

U.S. officials said there was mounting evidence that Pakistan's powerful intelligence agency had encouraged a guerrilla network to attack U.S. targets, while a Senate committee voted to make aid to Islamabad conditional on fighting the militants.

The decision by the Senate Appropriations Committee, which did not specify any amount of aid for Pakistan in fiscal 2012, reflects growing anger in Washington over militants operating out of Pakistan and battling U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Some U.S. intelligence reporting alleges that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) specifically directed, or urged, the Haqqani network to carry out an attack last week on the U.S. Embassy and a NATO headquarters in Kabul, according to two U.S. officials and a source familiar with recent U.S.-Pakistan official contacts. - Reuters


So the U.S. is providing billions in aid to Pakistan's government and that government's intelligence service is urging its proxies to target and kill Americans. Is there any precedent for this? It sounds rather insane.

September 13, 2011

U.S. Views on Winning Afghanistan

A new poll from Rasmussen:

Just 21% of Adults believe the original mission behind the war in Afghanistan has been accomplished. A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 60% think the mission has not been accomplished, with another 18% not sure.

Thirty-five percent (35%) of Republicans think the mission to end al Qaeda’s safe harbor has been accomplished, but that compares to just 10% of Democrats and 19% of adults not affiliated with either of the major parties. Most Democrats (75%) and most unaffiliated adults (59%) feel the mission has not been accomplished, and even a plurality (47%) of Republicans agrees.

Yet these findings come at a time when 59% of Likely Voters want all U.S. troops brought home from Afghanistan either immediately or within the next year. Just 22% believe the United States has a clearly defined mission in Afghanistan.

September 6, 2011

9/11's Impact on Pakistan

As the U.S. takes stock of the decade since the 9/11 attacks, it's worth considering the impact elsewhere. First up, Pakistan:

Before 9/11, Pakistan had suffered just one suicide bombing — a 1995 attack on the Egyptian Embassy in the capital, Islamabad, that killed 15 people. In the last decade, suicide bombers have struck Pakistani targets more than 290 times, killing at least 4,600 people and injuring 10,000.

The country averaged nearly six terrorist attacks of various kinds each day in 2010, according to a report by the Pak Institute for Peace Studies....

For Pakistanis, said Cyril Almeida, a leading Pakistani columnist, "it was easy to connect the dots. 9/11 happened, America invaded Afghanistan, and Pakistan went to hell. That's the most common narrative that's offered."

Pakistan's leaders maintain that the alliance with the U.S. against Islamic militants has destroyed the country's investment climate, caused widespread unemployment and ravaged productivity. The government estimates the alliance has cost it $67 billion over the last 10 years.

But it's not as simple as that. Since 2001, the U.S. has sent Pakistan more than $20 billion in direct aid and military reimbursements. And from 2003 to 2007 under Musharraf, the economy grew at a robust rate of 6% a year.

August 5, 2011

Aid Down the Rabbit Hole in Afghanistan

The International Crisis Group relays the latest from Afghanistan:

There is no possibility that any amount of international assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will stabilise the country in the next three years unless there are significant changes in international strategies, priorities and programs. Nor will the Afghan state be in a position by 2015 to provide basic services to its citizens, further undermining domestic stability. Moreover, a rush to the exit and ill-conceived plans for reconciliation with the insurgency by the U.S. and its allies could threaten such gains as have been achieved in education, health and women’s rights since the Taliban’s ouster.

The amount of international aid disbursed since 2001 – $57 billion against $90 billion pledged – is a fraction of what has been spent on the war effort. More importantly, it has largely failed to fulfil the international community’s pledges to rebuild Afghanistan. Poor planning and oversight have affected projects’ effectiveness and sustainability, with local authorities lacking the means to keep projects running, layers of subcontractors reducing the amounts that reach the ground and aid delivery further undermined by corruption in Kabul and bribes paid to insurgent groups to ensure security for development projects.

Is there any way that Afghanistan will not collapse as NATO starts to draw down? It seems impossible to conceive of any other outcome.

July 29, 2011

The Continuation of Politics

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Joshua Foust dissects America's failures in Afghanistan:

The biggest barriers to Afghanistan developing economically are political, institutional, and regulatory—not physical or security or investment. Yet, most of the U.S. government’s efforts to improve Afghanistan’s security focus on physical solutions (like expanding the airport in Kandahar to export things like fruit and cement), security solutions (like the Village Security Operations the special operations forces are so enamored with), or foreign direct investment (as the TFBSO is so focused on). They focus on the wrong solutions to the wrong problem.

The U.S. government is not very active in resolving the political issues plaguing Afghanistan’s government, or its relationships with Iran and Pakistan, two absolutely crucial prerequisites to it ever becoming a stable country again. We should not expect a particularly successful outcome so long as the politics of the region are relegated to secondary concerns, if they are concerns at all.

I think it's not simply a lack of concern - it's an inability to solve these political problems. It's not as if the U.S. is not trying - perhaps not at the level of the Afghan potato farmers whose plight Foust relays in his post, but certainly at the level of envoys and embassies. To the extent that this hasn't worked, is it really an issue of inattention or simply reflective of the sheer difficulty (impossibility) of the task?

(AP Photo)

July 21, 2011

The CIA's Controversial Vaccine Program

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The news last week that the CIA held a fake polio clinic in Pakistan to get bin Laden's children's DNA has sparked something of an outcry among some journalists. Matthew Steinglass is the latest to pile on, calling the program "despicable and stupid." The basic contention is that there's a lot of ignorance and paranoia in Pakistan, and in the region generally, about vaccinations, and therefore the CIA should have let this ignorance and conspiratorial paranoia guide its attempts to verify bin Laden's identity.

While I'm sympathetic to the argument that the U.S. frequently leaps before it looks when it comes to foreign policy, much of the case against this CIA program hinges on hindsight. Steinglass arguess that: "If the fake vaccination campaign was a necessary part of the operation to "take out" Osama bin Laden, it would have been better to leave Mr bin Laden in. One more ailing ex-terrorist holed up in a ratty house in remote Pakistan, watching old videos of himself; this was not worth jeopardising global vaccination campaigns."

But of course, no one knew he was holed up in a (not at all remote) house watching videos of himself before he was killed. Still, maybe the CIA did over-reach here. What do you think?

(AP Photo)

Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal

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Via the Federation of American Scientists, an analysis of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Click the image for a larger version. According to FAS, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal may approach that of Great Britain in the next decade. Good times.

July 20, 2011

Containing Pakistan

David Rothkopf thinks the U.S. should form an alliance with India to contain Pakistan:

Pakistan is America's ally, of course. We say it all the time. Unfortunately, Pakistan also harbors our enemies, supports our enemies, tolerates the intolerable by our enemies, and is therefore also our enemy. Not all of Pakistan, of course. Just some of the most influential of its elites and institutions as well as substantial cross-sections of its population.

Pakistan therefore has no one to blame for the steady deepening of the security ties between the United States and India than itself. As containing the problems within Pakistan through cooperation with the Pakistanis looks increasingly difficult, it is only natural that the United States should simultaneously develop a Plan B approach. That approach is containment and it necessarily must involve a partnership with India.

I think a tighter partnership with India is very much in America's interests, but not because it's going to somehow squeeze Pakistan into abandoning its support for militant groups. In fact, if the U.S. is frustrated with Pakistan's behavior now, it beggars belief that we'll somehow get more cooperation out of them by teaming up with an arch-enemy. Nor is it clear how this will "contain" Pakistan since the use of militant proxies is almost impossible to stop.

What would potentially solve, or at least mitigate, Pakistan's support for militant groups would be a change in the dynamic between itself and India, and to the extent that greater U.S. ties to India could encourage a rapprochement there it's all for the better. But that's unlikely to happen, given how India views outside interference on the Kashmir issue.

July 18, 2011

Few Americans Think Afghanistan Will Improve

According to a new poll from Rasmussen:

The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey of Likely Voters shows that just 22% now believe the situation in Afghanistan will get better in the next six months. Thirty-five percent (35%) expect the situation to get worse, while 30% predict it will remain about the same. Thirteen percent (13%) are undecided.

The number of voters expecting the situation to improve hovered around 20% for months until May when it jumped to 27% following bin Laden’s death. Last month, 26% expected the situation to get better.

July 17, 2011

Afghan Lessons from Rambo III

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The Washington Post's Pamela Constable looks back through sepia-tinted glasses on 10 years of western involvement in Afghanistan and laments at the loss of the Kabul she once knew:

I can’t find my old house, my old street or the bakery where I used to watch the early-morning ritual of men slapping dough into hot ovens beneath the floor. They’ve all vanished behind a high-security superstructure of barricades and barbed wire, a foreign architecture of war. Elsewhere in the Afghan capital, a parallel construction boom is underway. The slapdash sprawl of nouveau riche development has sprouted modern apartment buildings, glass-plated shopping centers, wedding halls with fairy lights, and gaudy mansions with gold swan faucets and Greco-Roman balustrades, commissioned by wealthy men with many bodyguards and no taxable income.

She concludes that the real tragedy of Afghanistan is how little advantage it has taken of the enormous international goodwill that followed the defeat of the Taliban in 2001:

Showered with far too much aid, clever Afghans have learned to imitate Western jargon, skim project funds and put their relatives on the payroll — while many show little interest in learning the modern skills that would propel their country forward. At its core, this remains a society of tribal values and survival instincts. Goals such as democracy and nationhood come much further down the list.

There's little to take issue with in her analysis. However, one overlooked cause of today's frustration might be the boundless optimism she describes after the fall of the Taliban:

I was privileged to witness that awakening and to experience the exhilaration of a society being given a new chance after a generation of war and ideological whiplash. In those early years, I met Afghan exiles who had given up careers in Germany or Australia to participate in their homeland’s renaissance, and American jurists and agronomists who had come to help rebuild an alien land.
Foreigners were welcome everywhere, and a new generation of Afghans was in a hurry to catch up. In the cities, I met girls who led exercise classes and boys who took computer lessons at dawn. In rural areas, women still hid behind curtains and veils, but schools reopened in tents, and mud-choked irrigation canals were cleaned. In 2004, long lines of villagers proudly flashed their ink-dipped thumbs after voting in the country’s first real democratic election.

The Taliban were a symptom, not a cause, of Afghanistan's troubles. Instead of curing the condition their excision only exposed the deeper fissures of Afghan society.Instilling the belief in Afghans and foreign donor governments that things would change for the better overnight, instead of the reality of trading in one basket of problems for another filled with longer standing issues, is part of what has added to Afghan and donor fatigue.

The war would have been a hard sell to Congress and other NATO governments if they had been told beforehand that it would last over a decade and its end would have little resemblance to a traditional victory. But at least this would have girded governments and their citizens for what was needed to do the job right or allowed them to bow out gracefully before getting stuck in the mire of nation building. But the business of coalition building requires compromise and consensus, which all too often means kicking these questions of commitment down to succeeding administrations.

This is not the first time western expectations have split from reality in Afghanistan.

In 1988, Rambo III hit theaters across the U.S. The movie, the most violent of its day, lionized the pious Mujahideen in their battle against the godless Soviets (see clip here). The film makes much of the Afghan struggle for freedom (another clip here and here), providing a glimpse into the popular opinion of the day.

However, only a year after the movie's release the U.S. disengaged with Afghanistan. Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the problem seemed solved to western eyes. The much-vaunted Mujahideen, re-labeled warlords, were left to fight among themselves and would eventually spawn the Taliban.

In the closing credits to Rambo III the film is dedicated to "the brave Mujahideen fighters of Afghanistan." After the attacks of 9/11 this was changed to "the gallant people of Afghanistan."

As the U.S. declares a marginal victory and begins extracting itself from Afghanistan once again, it is worth remembering that expectations ought to be managed and that pedestals are inherently unstable.

Alim

July 12, 2011

Osama bin Laden's DNA

The Guardian has an interesting piece on the hunt for Osama:

The CIA organised a fake vaccination programme in the town where it believed Osama bin Laden was hiding in an elaborate attempt to obtain DNA from the fugitive al-Qaida leader's family, a Guardian investigation has found.

As part of extensive preparations for the raid that killed Bin Laden in May, CIA agents recruited a senior Pakistani doctor to organise the vaccine drive in Abbottabad, even starting the "project" in a poorer part of town to make it look more authentic, according to Pakistani and US officials and local residents.

The doctor, Shakil Afridi, has since been arrested by the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) for co-operating with American intelligence agents.

As difficult as an operation such as this undoubtedly was, it seems easier than the efforts to transform the Karzai government into a less-corrupt steward of America's interests.

July 11, 2011

The Taliban's Momentum

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The Obama administration contends that the Afghanistan surge has blunted the Taliban's momentum. Spencer Ackerman notes that Taliban attacks have actually increased:

According to military statistics acquired by Danger Room, attacks initiated by insurgents from May 1 to June 30 rose 2 percent from that same period in 2010. That’s the dawn of the so-called “spring fighting season,” when the Taliban typically fight the hardest. And it seemingly contradicts Petraeus’ assertion to the New York Times this morning that “insurgent attack numbers are lower” for the first time since 2006....

Can the insurgency’s momentum be reversed with fewer U.S. troops? Heading to Afghanistan on Saturday, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta urged the military to keep “maximum pressure on the Taliban” in order to convince insurgents to sue for peace. The reigning theory is that the Taliban won’t talk seriously until they take a beating. Peace talks are the only political strategy on hand to end the war, but the numbers hardly give a reason to believe the Taliban should feel cowed.

And if al-Qaida is all but iced, as Panetta argues, then it may not be so important that the Taliban’s momentum has merely stalled, since the U.S. only cares about the Taliban insofar as it aids al-Qaida. But would Obama have endorsed the surge if he knew that the most it would accomplish after 18 months is a two percent increase in insurgent attacks?

Even if the Taliban is considerably weaker now than it was 18 months ago, it doesn't bode well for the long-term security of Afghanistan that they can mount more operations despite the full court press from the U.S. and its coalition partners. The Obama administration needs something akin to the Anbar Awakening among the Pashtuns to really drive down violence - and that doesn't seem to be happening. Quite the contrary, as M K Bhadrakumar writes, the "serpent of Pashtun nationalism" has reared its head and is attacking both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Still, a regional solution might be possible. As Bhadrakumar suggests, India and Pakistan are moving slowly toward reconcilable positions on the future of Afghanistan. Faster, please.

(AP Photo)

July 1, 2011

Vietnam Redux

Gideon Rachman sees echoes of the Vietnam end game in Afghanistan:

I don’t know whose bright idea it was to schedule peace talks with the Taliban in Munich. But somebody with a sense of history might have avoided that location. Ever since Chamberlain and Daladier signed over the Sudetenland to Hitler there in 1938, the phrase “Munich agreement” has had an unfortunate ring to it.

That said, the talks with the Taliban remind me more of Kissinger’s protracted negotiations with North Vietnam in the 1970s. In both cases, the fighting was taking place alongside the negotiating. In both cases, the Americans were trying desperately to get out of a protracted conflict that they had concluded could not be won on the battlefield. In both cases they were destabilising the region by bombing enemy safe-havens in a third country – Cambodia then, Pakistan now.

Amazing that Washington has found itself in similar (although not identical) circumstances.

June 30, 2011

Obama's Afghan Dishonesty

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Peter Beinart dings President Obama for failing to level with the American people about the consequences of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan:

Even if we stayed for 20 years, building a government that can stand on its own might be beyond our capacity. We’d go broke trying, and there is little reason to believe the future of this Afghan government is vital to U.S. security. Barack Obama didn’t even say so in his speech.

But Obama did imply that his administration’s surge has so weakened the Taliban that they’ll trade their weapons for negotiations and eventually join the current government, thus allowing the U.S. to leave an Afghanistan headed towards peace. That’s what Mr. Amini was disputing. There’s an honest way to advocate for withdrawal from Afghanistan and a dishonest way. The dishonest way is to suggest that we’ll leave behind a government that can secure the country and a political process than can end the war. The honest way is to acknowledge that the Afghanistan we leave behind will be a chaotic, ugly place where the Taliban rules large swaths of the country, and much of what we have built may be washed away.

That's a winning message to take into 2012, isn't it?

But seriously, spinning the U.S. withdrawal doesn't make a lot of sense. I suspect most Americans understand that the U.S. will leave Afghanistan much as we found it - at war with itself.

(AP Photo)

June 29, 2011

Americans Support Obama's Afghan Pullout

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According to a new Gallup poll:

Americans broadly support President Barack Obama's plan to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in Afghanistan this year, with additional troops scheduled to leave by the end of next summer and the remainder by 2014. Nearly three-quarters, 72%, are in favor, while 23% are opposed.

The vast majority of Democrats and independents, as well as half of Republicans, favor the outlines of Obama's plan, according to the June 25-26 Gallup poll.

The same poll finds a more mixed reaction to the near-term goal of having 30,000 U.S. troops out of Afghanistan in 15 months. Forty-three percent of Americans consider this number about right, 29% call it too low, and 19% too high.ort President Barack Obama's plan to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in Afghanistan this year, with additional troops scheduled to leave by the end of next summer and the remainder by 2014. Nearly three-quarters, 72%, are in favor, while 23% are opposed.

June 28, 2011

The Costs of Afghanistan

Robert Kagan argues that continuing to nation build inside Afghanistan is actually a bargain:

Failure in Afghanistan will cost much, much more than the billions spent on this surge. What was the cost to the U.S. economy of the attacks on 9/11? What will be the cost if the terrorist groups now operating in Afghanistan—the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e Taiba, as well as al Qaeda—are able to reconstitute safe havens and the next president has to send troops back in to clear them out again? It is a peculiar kind of wisdom that can only see the problems and costs of today and cannot imagine the problems and costs of tomorrow.

This is a particularly interesting line of argument and one that I think undermines Kagan's case for the surge. First - the benchmark is not the costs of 9/11, since there is nothing we're doing inside Afghanistan that will prevent another mass-casualty terrorist attack inside the United States. There are multiple countries that play host to al-Qaeda cells and there is even the possibility of a small number of U.S. citizens banding together to commit some atrocity. Even a large-scale withdrawal from Afghanistan would not be so comprehensive as to leave the U.S. with no means of collecting intelligence or targeting terrorist camps. It is difficult - though not impossible - to imagine a scenario whereby al-Qaeda is able to get itself reconfigured in Afghanistan to the point where they can launch a sophisticated mass-casualty terrorist attack against the continental United States. They have been trying to do so from within Pakistan to no avail and it is far easier to travel from Pakistan to the UK and then from the UK to the U.S. than to travel from Afghanistan into the West.

Still, it's happened once so let's assume for the sake of argument that it does indeed happen again. What would it cost the U.S.? There's no fixed number for the "costs of 9/11" as such, but there are estimates of the economic toll the attacks wrought. The estimated economic cost of 9/11 was in the neighborhood of $40 billion in insured losses and $28 billion in property damage. Other estimates range from $50 - $100 billion in economic costs of the attacks themselves. A World Bank study estimated a $90 billion drop in national income. Finally, a study (pdf) by the Congressional Research Service concluded "that 9/11 is more appropriately viewed as a human tragedy than as an economic calamity. Notwithstanding their dire costs in human life, the direct effects of the attacks were too small and too geographically concentrated to make a significant dent in the nation’s economic output."

This doesn't capture all of the economic costs of 9/11, since it led to the creation of new bureaucracies and the war in Afghanistan. And it obviously ignores the devastating human toll, which must be a vital part of any cost/benefit analysis. Still, I think those are serviceable numbers. So at the high-end, the 9/11 attacks cost the U.S. $100 billion. For the fiscal year 2010, the U.S. spent $105 billion in Afghanistan. This year, the figure is expected to be $108 billion. This spending also doesn't capture the human costs nor the costs of long-term care for the wounded who return home unable to work and in need of care. Nevertheless, it seems that it's costing the U.S. far more to conduct a counter-insurgency inside Afghanistan than the economic damage wrought by 9/11.

But Kagan does helpfully elucidate the central argument: the war in Afghanistan is about keeping the U.S. homeland safe from terrorist attacks. Keeping the Taliban from ruling parts of Afghanistan is a means to that end - not the end itself. Properly framed, there are obviously "less expensive" ways of keeping al-Qaeda from attacking the United States.

It's also worth stating that the prospect that anyone will die from terrorism is vanishingly small:

Just to give you some context here, one of my friends, an astronomer, has calculated the worldwide chance of anyone being killed by international terrorism outside of war zones over an 80-year lifetime, assuming, incidentally, that every several years there is another 9/11. It comes out to be 1 in 80,000. Since he is an astronomer, he has also calculated the chance of being killed by a comet or asteroid over a lifetime of 80 years, and it comes out to be about the same.

June 27, 2011

Kabul’s Car Market Gets Pimped Out

Just over a month ago, an irresistible slice-of-life story jumped the divide between Afghan and western media.

National Public Radio was the first to report on the trend story of Afghan aversion to the number 39:

It’s hard to find a credible story to explain what exactly it means, but everyone knows it’s bad. Many Afghans say that the number 39 translates into morda-gow, which literally means “dead cow” but is also a well-known slang term for a procurer of prostitutes — a pimp.

In Afghanistan, being called a pimp is offensive, and calling someone a pimp could carry deadly consequences. Similarly, being associated with the number 39 — whether it’s on a vehicle license plate, an apartment number or a post office box — is considered a great shame. And some people will go to great lengths to avoid it.

Three weeks later the Wall Street Journal weighed in on the conspiracy theories swirling around the growing taboo:

One rather credible conspiracy theory contends that the entire 39 mania has been inflamed by underhanded Kabul car dealers.

Kabul car dealer Mahfuzullah Khairkhwa, who has 39 on his own license plate, admitted that, at the very least, he takes advantage of the curse to turn an easy profit.

“The problem is only in Kabul,” said Mr. Khairkhwa, who conceded that he could knock several thousand dollars off the purchase price of a car in Kabul with 39 on its plate and then turn around to sell it for a profit in the surrounding provinces, where the urban legend has yet to spread.

The head of the union of car dealers in Kabul offered a retort in a Reuters piece this month:

Najibullah Amiri, blames corrupt police officers for fanning the trend.

The issue has gained prominence just as number plates for Afghan cars — which carry five digits — rolled over from the series that starts with 38, to a new series that starts with 39.

Amiri said officials at the police traffic department charge buyers between $200 and $500 to change a “39″ number plate for a new car to something less offensive.

This is not the first salacious episode involving Kabul’s automotive fleet. As the “39″ story was breaking, drivers were urgently removing rainbow decals that had begun arriving stuck onto imported cars and became fashionable until conservative Afghans learned they were also gay pride symbols.

Rainbow stickers can be peeled off but Kabul’s problem with pimp-mobiles has, overnight, thrown the city’s booming car sales industry into chaos. Dealers are reporting that “thousands of dollars of stock is now sitting unwanted in their yards, with even a prime condition vehicle almost unsaleable if its plates bear the now-hated numerals.”

To read the rest of this article, visit Forbes.com, where it was originally published.

Why America Won, Then Lost, the Afghan War

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I was travelling during President Obama's Afghan speech and after reading and abosrbing the commentary surrounding it, I think it's clear that President Obama was faced with an impossible rhetorical task - he had to explain to the United States that it won, then lost, the Afghan war.

The problem that has plagued the Afghan war from the start has been Washington's inability to define a narrow, achievable objective. Since January 2002, the U.S. squandered a quick and limited victory against the Taliban and al-Qaeda by larding on additional objectives involving the political structure of the Afghan state. The basic idea was noble enough - the U.S. would help rebuild an Afghanistan that could forge a terror-free, post-Taliban era.

Unfortunately, the move from a limited goal of destroying al-Qaeda's safe haven and killing those responsible for 9/11 to the more ambitious goal of creating a post-Taliban Afghanistan was well beyond anything the U.S. had the capabilities, resources or will to achieve. It was a goal at odds with how bin Laden's global terror network had evolved since losing its Afghan safe haven. It was also premised on the debatable proposition that regular Afghans would staff a national army tasked with fighting and dying to advance American policy priorities.

The Obama administration has paid lip service to this reality, publicly ratcheting down U.S. goals, but rather than adjust tactics it simply doubled down on the original proposition that Afghanistan could be rebuilt (i.e. "stabilized") to the point that the U.S. could leave the place relatively in tact before departing.

After listening to the president's speech, I believe Obama wants to appear committed to unwinding the U.S. nation building effort, but he is still bound by an orthodoxy that insists that the U.S. can build an Afghan state that's to its liking. It's an understandable, even commendable, impulse. It is also a counter-productive one.

(AP Photo)

June 24, 2011

The Duke Of Wellington’s Take on the Afghan War

Gentlemen,

Whilst marching from Portugal to a position which commands the approach to Madrid and the French forces, my officers have been diligently complying with your requests which have been sent by His Majesty’s ship from London to Lisbon and thence by dispatch to our headquarters.

We have enumerated our saddles, bridles, tents and tent poles, and all manner of sundry items for which His Majesty’s Government holds me accountable. I have dispatched reports on the character, wit and spleen of every officer. Each item and every farthing has been accounted for with two regrettable exceptions for which I beg your indulgence.

Unfortunately the sum of one shilling and ninepence remains unaccounted for in one infantry battalion’s petty cash and there has been a hideous confusion as to the number of jars of raspberry jam issued to one cavalry regiment during a sandstorm in western Spain. This reprehensible carelessness may be related to the pressure of circumstance, since we are at war with France, a fact which may come as a bit of a surprise to you gentlemen in Whitehall.

This brings me to my present purpose, which is to request elucidation of my instruction from His Majesty’s Government so that I may better understand why I am dragging an army over these barren plains. I construe that perforce it must be one of two alternative duties, as given below. I shall pursue either with the best of my ability, but I cannot do both:

1. To train an army of uniformed British clerks in Spain for the benefit of the
accountants and copy-boys in London or, perchance…
2. To see to it the forces of Napoleon are driven out of Spain

Your most obedient servant,

Wellington

The above letter - dated August 11th, 1812, and addressed to the British Foreign office in London - is attributed to the Duke of Wellington who, at the time, was waging his Peninsular Campaign. The war for the Iberian Peninsula, which would thrust the general to prominence, marked an early example of modern warfare. For it was on the Spanish plains that pitched battles between standing armies of professional soldiers gave way to the spontaneous emergence of large-scale guerrilla warfare (the term guerrilla, being the diminutive of guerra, Spanish for “war” or quite literally “little war”). The British press quickly seized on the novel uprising: for the first time, peoples, not princes, were in rebellion against the “Great Disturber.”

To read the rest of this article, visit Forbes.com, where it was originally published.

Jon Huntsman's Foreign Policy

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In a 2012 Republican presidential field with relatively little foreign policy heft, Jon Huntsman has it in spades. The former ambassador and oft-traveled billionaire, heir to a massive chemical conglomerate fortune, is one of the most globally minded candidates in a field of otherwise parochial, or even isolationist, figures within the party.

Talking to his associates from his time in China, one hears near-universal respect for the man and his views of America's role within the world - even to the point of turning his time away from the states in China into a potential political asset, an instance of confronting communists with a case for freedom. They'll tell you Huntsman truly does view his role as one of duty and service to the nation - even to the point of setting aside his Mormon religious views on drinking alcohol to drink the disgusting baijiu liquor which is mandatory at Chinese events (I'm told Huntsman would drink the clear alcohol once and then switch to water, hoping no one noticed after the first round). Huntsman's tenure as ambassador was marked by only one significant public gaffe, a bizarre incident where he attended, then fled, from a Jasmine Revolution protest, attracting attention for the large American flag patch on his arm (he claims he stumbled across the protest by accident).

Yet for someone whose campaign has already adopted a view prioritizing global issues, and whose announcement in front of the statue of liberty this week was purposefully constructed to spark recollections of Ronald Reagan's run against Jimmy Carter, Huntsman's publicly-expressed foreign policy views seem to have more in common with Carter than with Reagan.

Without question, Huntsman is the furthest left of any purportedly serious candidate for the nomination when it comes to forming a response to Afghanistan. His press release on the president's remarks this week emphasized his approval for "a safe but rapid withdrawal," but his critique on NBC's Today show went much further. Asked by host Ann Curry whether he thought a drawdown of 30,000 troops by next year was too much or too rapid, Huntsman responded by saying that "I think that we can probably be more aggressive over the next year" in drawing down troops.

Despite the comparisons to John McCain's 2008 presidential run - and on the campaign and organizational side, there are many - Huntsman's statement could not be more at odds with McCain's views on Afghanistan and the necessity of preventing losses of the gains made in the past two years. Like Obama, Huntsman emphasized the need for “nation building at home” (as if the two goals are inconsistent) - but Huntsman went further, saying it was time to "get serious about what needs to be done on the ground, not a counter-insurgency but a counter-terror effort." While nearly every Republican in the race has emphasized the need to heed the advice of the commanders with on-the-ground experience on the front, Huntsman is purposefully setting himself apart in unequivocally rejecting the advice of Gen. David Petraeus and Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from afar. More significantly, in supporting a more aggressive drawdown to be replaced by a limited counter-terror strategy, Huntsman is essentially endorsing the view by Vice President Joe Biden - a view which proved too rapid and risky even for President Obama.

Whether you agree with them or not, even supporters must concede that Huntsman's foreign policy views are a clear rejection not just of George W. Bush, but of thirty years of the views of Republican nominees on the proper attitude toward war fighting and engagement. One does not have to accept the view of Washington's neoconservative elite in order to take a view of America's role in the world that has been consistent in the Republican Party since the post-Nixon era. And Huntsman's foreign policy team - which includes former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, CFR head Richard Haass and former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the leaker of Valerie Plame's identity - has already sparked concern among Jewish groups that Huntsman's views on America's relationship with Israel could be as out of sync with Republican values as the rest of his portfolio.

Rather than playing games of triangulation, Huntsman may simply be saying what he believes. But perhaps the reason he's caught fire with so many leading media figures is that he's saying things they tend to agree with. This is all well and good, and coherent so far as it goes. It's just not very Republican.

(AP Photo)

June 23, 2011

Obama's Political Calculation on Afghanistan

There was little surprising about President Obama's announcement last night that he will withdraw 10,000 U.S. troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2011, increasing to the full level of his 33,000-troop surge by the end of next summer. But there are a number of questions sparked by his remarks; questions we won't know the answers to for some time, raising concerns about the long-term results of this decision.

Despite the intonations of some commentators about its catastrophic consequences - Jen Rubin at the Washington Post called it "the most irresponsible speech ever given in wartime by a U.S. president," while Dana Milbank is calling it Obama's "Mission Accomplished" moment - this actually can be measured as a slight win for those forces within the administration who argued for a slower drawdown than was politically preferable. It certainly was not a victory Senate Armed Service Chairman Sen. Carl Levin, who wanted 50 percent more, or for Vice President Joe Biden, who reportedly wanted forces withdrawn by the beginning of next summer.

The real test of how much of a victory it is for the commanders likely depends on how much leeway the White House gives them on which 10,000 personnel come home - support battalions, or warfighters. Yet while most commentators are focused on the number, it is the timing of this withdrawal's second phase that should concern people more than the number. As the New York Times notes this morning, "the most significant effect of President Obama’s latest orders will be felt at this time next year, when as many as 23,000 American troops who would have been on missions at the peak of the summer fighting season will instead be packing for home."

And while I typically reject William Kristol's views on foreign policy, he seems right on this score: This is a timing decision made with the 2012 election primarily in mind, not the security picture or in anticipation of changing facts on the ground.

Triangulating works as domestic politics for a reason: Your metric for judging the outcome is making a decision placed between two poles that appeals to the largest portion of the electorate. This is less wise when it comes to strategic decision-making, particularly considering the potential consequences of this decision not just for Afghanistan or for American security, but for the nearly 70,000 U.S. troops who will remain in Afghanistan after this drawdown is complete.

It's hard to shake the feeling that Obama may come to regret deploying this approach to his decision-making process at some point in the future. But as Kori Schake noted prior to the remarks last night: "It's the president's choice. That's what he gets elected for."

And the consequences, for good or ill, could come to define his presidency. Let's hope he's right.

Counting Blood and Treasure

Last night U.S. President Barak Obama announced the beginning of the end of his Afghan surge. Ten thousand U.S. troops will be home by the end of the year, with the remaining 20,000 surge troops returning stateside by next summer. That will leave approximately 70,000 to focus on Afghanistan’s restive borders to the south and east. Some of those will trickle back by 2014, when full security of the country is to be handed over to Afghan forces. Others are likely to be stationed at semi-permanent bases across the country into the near future.

The drawdown is seen as deeper and faster than anticipated by the Pentagon and, rather than signaling overwhelming success, reflects the heightened fiscal pressures that have descended on Washington along with the uncertainties surrounding the broad nation-building mission in the wake of Osama bin Laden’s death.

To read the rest of this article, visit Forbes.com, where it was originally published.

June 22, 2011

At War With Afghanistan

As President Obama prepares to tell us how many troops he will withdraw from Afghanistan, it's worth pointing out that the U.S. was never supposed to a launch a war against Afghanistan. It was supposed to be against several hundred Arabs and a hodge-podge of other nationalities who had taken up shop in Afghanistan to plot terrorist attacks, plus a slice of the Afghan population that thought sheltering them was a good idea. When the Bush administration largely accomplished that in early 2002, it decided to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory by turning the war into a quest to give Afghanistan something it had not had in decades: a stable government.

This was a classic example of moving the goal posts, and it has been costly.

June 16, 2011

Burying the Lede in Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s second vice President, Karim Khalili, the Minister of Interior, Bismillah Khan Mohammadi, MoI leadership, NTM-A Deputy Commanding General and EUPOL and German Police Project Team officials gathered for the ribbon cutting ceremony of Afghanistan’s largest premier police training facility.

So began a press release from the NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan (NTM-A). The article describes the modern training facilities that will house 3,000 cadets once construction is completed. The U.S.-funded, $106 million dollar facility has an impressive "23 barracks, eight classrooms, 23 guard towers, three dining facilities, three headquarters and administration buildings, gym, auditorium, medical facility, fire station and international trainers compound."

That fire station must have come in handy during yesterday's ribbon cutting ceremony, for, you see, the NATO public affairs officers missed a more gripping intro to their report.

Buried deep in the story was this apparent throwaway graf:

As the ceremony was concluding, a rocket impacted in the training center. There were no injuries or fatalities during the attack and dignitaries were able to safely depart the site. Wardak province has a history of sporadic rocket attacks that are the ongoing focus of Afghan and NATO forces in that area.

The Associated Press framed the incident differently:

The round crashed down and exploded within the grounds of the facility during its inauguration Wednesday, sending panicked police recruits crawling across the floor of a meeting hall and prompting bodyguards to bundle one of Afghanistan's vice presidents and the government minister in charge of police forces into helicopters and flee.

Spin is one thing but when self-congratulatory ribbon cuttings are deemed more news worthy than rocket attacks on senior Afghan politicians and NATO officials, a firm grounding in reality has somehow slipped away, if not in Afghanistan as a whole then at least in NATO's public affairs department.

Alim

June 15, 2011

Balkanizing Afghanistan

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In the coming weeks, President Barak Obama will announce exactly what shape the termination of his Afghan surge will take. In light of this, and in the aftermath of bin Laden's death, pundits have been falling over themselves to voice just what all this means for the future of the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Gates has called for a gradual withdrawal while Democrats in Congress are eager for a more hasty departure. The White House itself has said that the July drawdown will be "real" and the final decision will be based on "conditions on the ground" lining up with the president's stated objectives of defeating al-Qaeda and stabilizing Afghanistan, according to CFR.org.

Part of the calculus behind any drawdown schedule will be the progress of peace negotiations with the Taliban. Yesterday, The Express Tribune, a Pakistani newspaper affiliated with The International Tribune, ran a story alleging that, according to an unnamed source, the United States had made direct contact with Taliban leader Mullah Omar via an intermediary, a former Taliban spokesman known as Mohammad Hanif who was arrested by U.S. forces in 2007.

Rumors on high-level secret negotiations between the U.S. and the Taliban have been swirling around Kabul for at least a year. Some of this hearsay could be credible, such as talks in Germany, the Persian Gulf and Turkey, while in others instances the U.S. has been outright hoodwinked by Taliban impostors.

According to the Express article, the U.S. had offered the Taliban control over the south of Afghanistan, while leaving the north for the other political forces under American influence. However, this was rejected by the Taliban.

Should this turn out to be true, it would seem the U.S. has taken a page from a recent Foreign Affairs article penned by Robert D. Blackwill, former U.S. ambassador to India and former deputy national security adviser for strategic planning.

In the article Blackwill writes:

Current U.S. policy toward Afghanistan involves spending scores of billions of dollars and suffering several hundred allied deaths annually to prevent the Afghan Taliban from controlling the Afghan Pashtun homeland -- with little end in sight. Those who ask for more time for the existing strategy to succeed often fail to spell out what they think the odds are that it will work in the next few years, what amount of casualties and resources they think the attempt is worth, and why. That calculus suggests that it is time to shift to Plan B....The time has come, therefore, to switch to the least bad alternative -- acceptance of a de facto partition of the country.

Blackwill proposes a long term combat role for as many as 50,000 U.S. troops in the north half of the country, ceding the rest of the country to the Taliban. "...Washington should accept that the Taliban will inevitably control most of the Pashtun south and east and that the price of forestalling that outcome is far too high for the United States to continue paying," argues Blackwill. The former ambassador's proposal amounts to a decade of nation-building in the north and counterterrorism in the south.

If the U.S. is indeed offering to barter half of Afghanistan for a peace treaty, perhaps the Obama administration has reluctantly arrived at the same conclusion as Blackwill: "Accepting a de facto partition of Afghanistan has enough downsides that choosing it makes sense only if the other options available are even worse. They are."

Alim

(AP Photo)

June 13, 2011

Kabul Hustle

Kabul is a hustle. But with a little scratch, a little nerve, a little luck and, yes, perhaps a little graft, all things are possible.

The economy grew by a blistering 22.5 percent last year, agriculture alone by 53 percent thanks to ample wet weather. The service sector bounded by double digits and mining, the purported panacea the country’s been longing for, jumped by a third.

Security, however, is at its worst since 2001, Afghanistan continues to provide 90 percent of the world’s heroin, the country ranks as second most corrupt and relies more heavily on foreign aid than any other.

It’s in front of such a backdrop that everyday Afghans have been eking out an existence through the nearly 10-year war.

A recent Guardian article illustrates how this drama is playing out in the capital of Kabul:

The 10-year international effort has seen Kabul change from being a moribund city of fewer than 400,000 to a bustling metropolis of 4.5 million flush with cash. The last two years have seen an explosion in conspicuous consumption. There are blocks of luxury apartments under construction, giant video hoardings advertising energy drinks, BMWs and Hummers blasting their way through the traffic with overpowered horns. Miralam Hosseini, 56, sells at least two $140,000 4x4s every week. Across the street from his showroom, an electronics shops stocks the latest 52in flat screen.
To read the rest of this article, visit Forbes.com, where it was originally published.

June 9, 2011

Debating Afghanistan

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Danielle Pletka makes the case for victory in Afghanistan:

The choices for America in Afghanistan are simpler than they appear in the fog of political debate: We can win or we can lose. Definitions can be debated, but in short, victory will mean that Afghanistan will not be a sustainable operational haven for al Qaeda, its political and terrorist affiliates, or a base for aggression against the U.S. and its allies.

Unfortunately, al-Qaeda does not current enjoy an "operational haven" in Afghanistan - it has one in Pakistan. So we've already won!

Indeed, the idea that we need to wage a massive counter-insurgency to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven begs a number of obvious questions - what about the other countries that either are, or could become, "operational" safe havens for al-Qaeda? Do they get 100,000-plus NATO forces? And what is an "operational" safe haven, anyway? Is there a threshold number of al-Qaeda fighters whereby a U.S. invasion and occupation becomes necessary? (The 9/11 attacks were plotted in, among other places, Hamburg, Germany.)

More fundamentally - how do we know when Afghanistan ceases to be a threat to U.S. security? Most of the recent terrorist plots that have been unearthed have originated in either Pakistan or Yemen. Isn't that significant? Is there any realistic time-frame when the country could not "potentially" be a safe haven? If we couldn't achieve this in 10 years, how much more time do we need?

(AP Photo)

June 8, 2011

The Costs of Afghan Nation Building

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To take the issue of the "affordability" of Afghanistan a bit further, a new Congressional report highlights the costs:

One example cited in the report is the Performance-Based Governors Fund, which is authorized to distribute up to $100,000 a month in U.S. funds to individual provincial leaders for use on local expenses and development projects. In some provinces, it says, “this amount represents a tidal wave of funding” that local officials are incapable of “spending wisely.”

Because oversight is scanty, the report says, the fund encourages corruption. Although the U.S. plan is for the Afghan government to eventually take over this and other programs, it has neither the management capacity nor the funds to do so.

The report also warns that the Afghan economy could slide into a depression with the inevitable decline of the foreign military and development spending that now provides 97 percent of the country’s gross domestic product.

The U.S. could "sustain" this indefinitely, but why would it want to?

(AP Photo)

June 7, 2011

Paying for the Afghan War

What the White House is attempting to do is paint... [nation building] as profligate, contrasting it to the cost-effectiveness of a narrower counter-terror approach. They ought to ask themselves why none of our military leadership is supporting the approach.

This feels like one more example of President Obama leading from behind. He has made little effort to build public support for the war -- he didn't even make a statement on the House debate over withdrawing from Afghanistan. By floating a cost-based objection to his own strategy, the president sets himself up to "respond to pressure" and constrain our effort in Afghanistan. This is terrible leadership on a crucial national security issue.

Responsible people can advocate different approaches to defending ourselves against the terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan and Pakistan. They can also advocate further cuts to defense spending. But it is dangerous to argue the cost of prosecuting a war that, while high, is marginal to our expenditures and by no means the driver of our debt, cannot be afforded. - Kori Schake

I think Shake is correct here - the U.S. can "afford" to continue nation building in Afghanistan through 2014 (or beyond). The more important question she eludes to, however, is: is it worth it? Just because the U.S. can afford a certain policy doesn't mean it's the best option. If the Obama administration concludes that nation building in Afghanistan is not worth it (no matter how "affordable" it is) then it needs to make the case directly.

Politics in Afghanistan

The war in Afghanistan is, at a very fundamental level, political. The dispute growing between the High Peace Council and the National Movement is, at a very fundamental level, political. I’ve been harping on this for years, that many of the biggest problems we face in Afghanistan are neither military nor economic in nature, but political. The U.S. has never had real challenges on the battlefield—the Army and Marines are terrifyingly good at “clearing” areas. But the politics of what to do with those cleared areas has always mystified NATO and ISAF.

The Washington Post recently reported that the Marines have spent nearly $1.3 billion in the last 18 months in Marjeh, and there remains no political structure to assist with governance. Even in supposedly successful places like Nawa, also in Helmand, the Marines have shown a marked inability to understand and affect the political context of the areas they control—and they have been substantially more successful than the Army in doing this! But they’re stuck in a stilted mode of thinking that, once the guys with guns sweep through, they can lavish money upon an area and declare it successful.

This is not a war the Taliban are winning: from a political perspective they’re barely more functional than the Afghan government is. It is a war we are losing—by ignoring the politics of Afghanistan, of the basic political question driving the war (e.g. what will be the ultimate political system of Afghanistan), and the politics preventing Afghans and Taliban from sitting down to negotiate, we are sowing the seeds of failure. - Joshua Foust

This sounds right to me. And let's be fair - it may not be possible for the U.S. to finesse the politics of Afghanistan to get the outcome Washington desires even if (a huge if) we properly understood these politics and the levers we'd need to move them in our direction. A "political" solution is contingent on a lot of factors, some of which may not be amenable to American bombs and/or bribes. The present course suggests the U.S. is simply trying to save face in Afghanistan - delivering enough of a blow to the Taliban that they will be weak enough for the Afghan National Army to hold them at bay when the U.S. departs in 2014.

There are, though, problems with that approach. Specifically, the Afghan National Army and police:

Lt. Gen. William B. Caldwell IV, the American in charge of the NATO effort to train Afghan forces, said Monday that although NATO was on track to reach its goal of training 305,000 army and police forces by October, attrition remained a significant problem. Those forces currently total 296,000.

General Caldwell said that about 30 percent of Afghan soldiers leave the Army every year before their terms of service are up, particularly in areas of heavy combat where they are needed most. In addition, he said that only one in 10 recruits can read and write, meaning NATO must first provide literacy training so that soldiers are able to write their names and read serial numbers on their weapons. So far, he said, NATO has trained 90,000 men in basic literacy.

The Taliban, by contrast, do not have the world's most powerful military alliance training them in military techniques and literacy and equipping them. And yet, with 296,000 men under arms we're still not confident that these Afghan troops can keep the Taliban insurgency at bay. Pretty astounding, isn't it?

June 6, 2011

Should the U.S. Be Judicious With Drone Strikes?

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When it comes to U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan that, according to one Obama official, is the question:

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter, backed by top military officers and other State Department officials, wants the strikes to be more judicious, and argues that Pakistan's views need to be given greater weight if the fight against militancy is to succeed, said current and former U.S. officials.

Defenders of the current drone program take umbrage at the suggestion that the program isn't judicious. "In this context, the phrase 'more judicious' is really code for 'let's appease Pakistani sensitivities,' " said a U.S. official. The CIA has already given Pakistani concerns greater weight in targeting decisions in recent months, the official added. Advocates of sustained strikes also argue that the current rift with the Pakistanis isn't going to be fixed by scaling back the program.

Given the secrecy of the program, it's difficult to tell what kind of targets the CIA is hitting. I take the term "judicious" to mean that drone killings are reserved for "high level" al-Qaeda operatives (like Illyas Kashmiri). Individuals who are typically foreign fighters or clearly linked to acts of terrorism directed against the United States. Given the number and tempo of drone strikes conducted over the past two years, it's clear the CIA is targeting a much wider array of individuals than that. Indeed, it may be more appropriate to view the drone program not so much as a tool to assassinate terrorists in hard-to-reach places but as an extension of the counter-insurgency in Afghanistan: CIA drones can hit militant targets related to the Afghan war that NATO, for political and diplomatic reasons, cannot.

If that is indeed the case, then the drone program is quite analogous to the war in Afghanistan. What started as a limited campaign to target those who would kill Americans has been transformed into a wider and murkier conflict against second-order enemies who are primarily being killed because they are attacking the U.S. presence in the region.

(AP Photo)

June 5, 2011

He Said, She Said

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Sarah Palin dipped into the Afghan fray on Tuesday, posting a Facebook comment in response to President Karzai’s NATO ultimatum on civilian casualties after at least nine civilians were killed in their home in Helmand province:

What President Karzai is saying is that if we don’t severely limit our air campaign he will take “unilateral action.” And he further says that if the airstrikes continue we will be seen as an “occupying” power. This is an indirect way of saying that American and NATO forces will be fair game, which is obviously an unacceptable situation that threatens our troops…Let us be clear: we are in Afghanistan fighting for the Afghan people and for the security of our country and our allies. If President Karzai continues with these public ultimatums, we must consider our options about the immediate future of U.S. troops in his country. If he actually follows through on his claim that Afghan forces will take “unilateral action” against NATO forces who conduct such air raids to take out terrorists and terrorist positions, that should result in the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the suspension of U.S. aid.

The public statements of politicians are made to serve myriad audiences and their rhetoric should not be taken literally. Karzai is attempting to crest the wave of war fatigue and anti-foreigner sentiment rising through Afghanistan. Palin is trying to prove that the view from her Alaskan home extends beyond Russia, right into the heart of Asia. At most, their comments demarcate the extreme positions of the much more nuanced debate taking place behind closed doors and between cooler heads. At the very least they should be dismissed as posturing and brinkmanship.

However, the former governor gets a few things wrong. At no point did Karzai make the threat that “Afghan forces will take ‘unilateral action’ against NATO forces.” It’s his government that will take action, militarily, diplomatically or by other political means. And, in the wake of bin Laden’s death, Palin’s labeling of the Taliban as terrorists is subject to some debate.

Karzai, currently the only one of the two who is an elected official and representing a presidency, must be held to a higher standard of accountability than a private citizen on a non-campaign family bus tour. But with millions of “friends” comes great responsibility. The cyber-phenom that is Sarah Palin has so far stirred almost 4,000 responses to her Afghanistan Facebook post; likely far more than Karzai could ever hope to elicit, and dwarfing a lifetime of responses for this humble blogger.

Alim

(AP Photo)

May 24, 2011

China's Pakistan Base

The news yesterday that China may build a naval base in Pakistan has raised some eyebrows. Gideon Rachman observes:

The story has come out of Pakistan, following the visit of the Pakistani prime minister to China last week. It may simply reflect Pakistani fury with the US, following the Bin Laden killing – rather than any genuine Chinese decision to go for an overseas naval base. Some western policymakers reckon that the Chinese will actually be wincing at the appearance of this story in the western press, since it will heighten the perception that China is overplaying its hand in the Pacific – an idea that has helped America to strengthen its military alliances across the region.

I don't think it's a Pakistan snub to the U.S., after all there are good strategic reasons for Pakistan and China to partner. And, as Rediff reports, they have been steadily expanding ties for some time:

A free trade area is in place from 2006, raw materials exploitation is in full swing in different parts of Pakistan, while China is building (often without international competitive bidding) infrastructure projects such as widening Karakoram highway, railway projects (closer to Abbottabad), port facilities at Gwadar and Karachi, hydro-electric projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, etc. Also, Pakistan procured 50 new fighter aircraft from China during Gilani's visit.

China had in the recent past substantially increased military supplies to Pakistan -- including JF-17 fighters, four frigates, six submarines, early warning aircraft and other ground forces equipment. More such projects are committed during this visit. Some Chinese retired naval officers and others have also demanded recently that China should set up military "facilities" in Pakistan. After the Chinese assistance to the Chashma III and IV nuclear power plants were cleared by the International Atomic Energy Agency in March this year (as a counter to the US-India 123 agreement), and as moves towards the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty are being made, the recent news about substantial increases in Pakistan's capability to produce nuclear warheads, is not surprising.

May 11, 2011

Bin Laden and Nuclear Deterrence

By Elbridge Colby

The eminently gratifying and important killing of Osama bin Ladin is raising a host of questions – about the future of our counterterrorism policy, our relations with Pakistan, the revolutions in the Middle East, etc. One aspect that hasn’t been emphasized as much is that the United States just conducted a kinetic military operation within the confines of a nuclear-armed sovereign nation without its consent. Indeed, reports indicate that the Pakistanis scrambled interceptors once they picked up signs of the U.S. helicopters.

This is interesting because it is further demonstration that there are limits to how expansively nuclear weapons deter. Even if a country, like Pakistan, has a well-established and pretty formidable nuclear weapons capability, another nation has shown itself to be willing and able to penetrate its airspace, insert soldiers onto the ground, conduct military operations and kill targeted individuals – all without Islamabad’s consent. That’s striking because many argue that nuclear weapons possession so radically transforms the way nations behave – irrespective of the posture and nature of the states’ dispute – that possessing states will be protected from any significant military actions, certainly against their home territory. They will, so the argument goes, be so shielded from retort by their nuclear umbrella that they will have leave to get away with almost anything, such as sheltering Osama bin Ladin. There is some amount of truth to this view, of course. Nuclear weapons have enormous deterrent power, and countries will think far more carefully about taking serious action against a nuclear-armed power than against one without means of massively destructive reprisal.

Yet the commendable U.S. decision to go after bin Ladin – in an operation that involved inserting forces right into the middle of a nuclear-armed country and with full knowledge of the possibility that there could be shooting between U.S. and Pakistani forces – shows that nuclear weapons do not provide blanket protection for all manner of evils. Countries that have nuclear weapons can still be confronted and operated against without spurring escalation to nuclear use, particularly when the objective pursued is limited and discriminate, and especially when that objective is connected to a truly vital national interest. Presumably the president’s calculus was that there was almost no conceivable chance that Pakistan would resort to a nuclear response against the United States, which would be perforce irrational given America’s vast retaliatory capability, and that that miniscule probability was outweighed by the great national interest in taking just vengeance on the murderer of almost 3,000 Americans.

This fact should be borne in mind as we consider how to deal with today’s nuclear aspirants – and, perhaps more importantly, should be borne in mind by them. They may, despite our best efforts, succeed in getting nuclear weapons. But this will not give them blank check immunity to harbor the worst terrorists or continually attack South Korea with impunity. If we have the resolve, we can still take discriminate but effective action.
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Elbridge Colby served most recently with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the New START agreement negotiation and ratification effort. Previously, he served as an advisor to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The views expressed here are his own.

Support for Militants in Pakistan

Erik Voeten surveys some recent research:

The second paper finds that Pakistanis who are more favorable towards liberal democracy are also more favorable towards militant groups. The authors ascribe this finding to widespread beliefs among those who favor democracy that Muslim rights and sovereignty are being violated in Kashmir, although the relationship holds for support for all four militant groups.

I guess that Osama Bin Laden made a wise choice when he chose to hide in a middle class suburb.

He also links to a paper (pdf) that suggests that democratization and economic development "may be irrelevant at best and might even be counterproductive" to reversing support for militancy in Pakistan.

Maybe it's time for Plan B - or is that C?

Targeting Americans

It is immaterial whether or not the Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and the others are currently targeting the American homeland. We cannot allow them to create a fundamentalist caliphate stretching from Kabul to Kashmir and beyond. Their takeover of Afghanistan—a first step toward this grandiose goal—would galvanize jihadists and could reverse the loss of momentum they have suffered because of the Arab Spring and bin Laden's death. It would also provide greater impetus to topple the nuclear-armed Pakistan next door. - Max Boot

If it's immaterial that a certain group of people are or aren't targeting the United States, then why aren't we sending troops into Somalia, Yemen, the Palestinian territories and anywhere else a few people pine for a caliphate? (Leaving aside, of course, the rather important question of whether the Haqqani network and LeT have the capability to fulfill such a grandiose vision.)

May 10, 2011

Secret Deals and Pakistan Stability

The US and Pakistan struck a secret deal almost a decade ago permitting a US operation against Osama bin Laden on Pakistani soil similar to last week's raid that killed the al-Qaida leader, the Guardian has learned.

The deal was struck between the military leader General Pervez Musharraf and President George Bush after Bin Laden escaped US forces in the mountains of Tora Bora in late 2001, according to serving and retired Pakistani and US officials.

Under its terms, Pakistan would allow US forces to conduct a unilateral raid inside Pakistan in search of Bin Laden, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the al-Qaida No3. Afterwards, both sides agreed, Pakistan would vociferously protest the incursion. - Declan Walsh

This kind of news is difficult to interpret. It could easily be spin on Pakistan's part - a way to prove they were helping the U.S. even as the furor grows over bin Laden's Abbottabad hideaway.

On the other hand, it could be entirely accurate. And it's easy to see why Pakistan would agree to this kind of deal: their population has a largely negative view of the United States and any country, no matter how well disposed to the U.S., would have a hard time selling military incursions on their territory.

As a practical matter, if the U.S. was presented by Pakistan with this option or nothing, it's probably better than nothing. But this kind of arrangement is really corrosive to U.S.-Pakistani ties and to Pakistan's internal stability. It makes Pakistan's government look weak and duplicitious, which is bad for Pakistan. It also continues to perpetuate anti-Americanism inside Pakistan, which is bad for the U.S.

Should the U.S. Get Tough With Pakistan?

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Anatol Lieven has been a persistent voice in warning the U.S. off taking actions that could potentially destabilize Pakistan, which is why his piece in the National Interest arguing for a harder line is noteworthy:

For while it is entirely true that I have argued that Pakistan is more resilient than it looks, and is not yet a failed or failing state, the United States certainly cannot deliberately try to make it one—unless Pakistan has in effect become an open enemy. Even without the apocalyptic threat of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons or materials falling into the hands of terrorists, a serious fraying of the Pakistani military would lead to anti-aircraft missiles, trained engineers and immense stores of munitions and equipment going astray. That in itself would raise the terrorist threat to the West by an order of magnitude, and absolutely ensure defeat in Afghanistan. For it must be stressed that—provenly in the case of the Afghan Taliban, probably in the case of al-Qaeda—the Pakistani military has given shelter to our enemies, it has not yet actually armed them.

One thing supporters of indefinite nation building in Afghanistan argue is that we have to stay in the country for the sake of Pakistan and that much of our problems with Pakistan stem from the fact that we left Afghanistan once before and now they don't trust the U.S. to stick around for the long haul. But it seems like the longer we've stayed in Afghanistan, the worse relations have gotten with Pakistan. The U.S. doesn't have many realistic levers over Pakistan's behavior and our go-to source of leverage (money) has only gotten us so far.

As Lieven notes (and as I pointed out earlier), it's one thing to support militant groups whose scope is limited to Afghanistan, since, for better or worse, that is a vital Pakistani interest and not something we can do all that much about. Providing safe harbor for an organization that has a demonstrated capacity to launch attacks directly against the U.S. homeland, however, is another story. Unfortunately, so long as we're invested in building up Afghanistan we are going to have to keep relations with Pakistan on a somewhat even keel, no matter what uncomfortable revelations lie in store.

(AP Photo)

U.S. Views on Afghanistan

Rasmussen finds an increased willingness among likely voters to pull troops out of Afghanistan:

A new Rasmussen Reports nation telephone survey finds that 35% of Likely U.S. Voters now favor the immediate withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, the highest level of support to date. Twenty-one percent (21%) more support the establishment of a firm timetable to bring the troops home within a year.

The combined total of 56% is up four points from the beginning of March, up 13 points from 43% last September, and up 19 points from September 2009.

Thirty percent (30%) of voters still oppose the creation of any kind of timetable for withdrawal and 15% remain undecided.

May 9, 2011

Pakistan and Afghanistan

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In an article arguing that the U.S. must not withdraw from Afghanistan following bin Laden's death, Frederick and Kim Kagan make a very odd statement:

Bin Laden’s presence in Pakistan has once again concentrated the minds of Americans on the fact that Pakistan’s leadership has yet to come to consensus about the need to combat and defeat militant Islamist groups within Pakistan’s borders. Nor has the United States developed any real strategy for addressing this challenge.

But isn't this the whole enchilada? We are waging a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan premised on the fact that institutions and individuals favorably disposed to U.S. interests must prevail. Pakistan is also engaged in this counter-insurgency - mostly on the other side.

The Kagans lament the lack of a strategy for Pakistan, while pressing the U.S. to keep "resourcing" the Afghan war. But if you don't have a strategy for ending Pakistan's support for insurgent groups inside Afghanistan, you don't have a strategy to win the war in Afghanistan.

(AP Photo)

Most Americans See Pakistani Complicity

According to a Friday poll from Rasmussen, a majority of Americans think Pakistan knew where bin Laden was:

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 84% of American Adults think it’s at least somewhat likely that high-level officials in the Pakistani government knew where bin Laden was hiding. That includes 57% who say it is Very Likely they knew. Only nine percent (9%) believe it’s not likely that Pakistan knew.

Just 15% of Americans say the United States should continue military and financial aid to Pakistan. Sixty-three percent (63%) say that aid should not continue. Twenty-two percent (22%) are not sure.

May 6, 2011

Bin Laden: Family Guy

The world knows bin Laden as the architect of mass terror, but according to Rediff he was also something of a domestic maestro:

A senior security expert in Islamabad told rediff.com that the police officers who interrogated Osama's 12-year-old daughter and his three wives are marvelling at Osama's ability to manage such a large family so harmoniously under one roof even while hiding from the world and its best spy agencies.

May 5, 2011

Foreign Policy Distractions

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In the course of disparaging the Bush administration's handling of bin Laden at Tora Bora, Jacob Stokes praises President Obama's ability to multitask:

In contrast, President Obama – while managing the uprising in the Middle East, the war in Afghanistan and a government on the brink of shutdown – could have been too distracted to pay attention to what were surely incomplete intelligence reports saying the CIA had located bin Laden. He could have followed the advice of members of Congress and put the U.S. in the lead of the war in Libya, which would have occupied a significant portion of the national security apparatus’s attention. All of those things could have taken President Obama’s eye off the goal of capturing bin Laden. This opportunity could have been squandered.

This doesn't sound all that plausible to me. First, Libya is a fairly large distraction in its own right - it's not an Iraq-style debacle by any means, but it certainly reflects poorly on the administration's decision-making process. (For instance, where was Hillary Clinton yesterday - Islamabad? Nope, she was in Rome, trying to rescue the Libyan intervention.) Second, no matter what was going on, if CIA personnel walk into the Oval Office and say they think they know where bin Laden is living, any president is going to stop what he or she is doing and pay attention.

I think Stokes is a lot closer to the mark to say that casualty aversion was the prime culprit at Tora Bora.

(Photo credit: Pete Souza)

May 4, 2011

Debating Pakistan

Larison agrees that asking Pakistan to account for its behavior with respect to bin Laden is reasonable, but cautions against leaping to conclusions:

What bothers me about the snap judgments about Pakistan’s complicity (as opposed to complicity on the part of a relative few people within Pakistani intelligence) is that they are not informed by any clear evidence of complicity apart from the location of the compound. There is an assumption that complicity simply must be the explanation for why bin Laden was where he was, and there is an added assumption that this implicates a large part of the Pakistani establishment. This is jumping to conclusions at its worst. If there were elements within the ISI that sheltered bin Laden, as I assume there were, that doesn’t prove that they were acting with the knowledge or approval of all Pakistani authorities.

Pew Poll: U.S. Still Divided on Afghanistan

According to a new Pew Research poll following the death of bin Laden:

While the public is more optimistic about success, there is little change in opinion about maintaining U.S. troops in Afghanistan. The public remains divided over whether the U.S. should keep troops in Afghanistan until the situation has stabilized (47%) or remove troops as soon as possible (48%), virtually unchanged from a month ago (44% keep troops, 50% remove troops).

Declaring Victory

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Thomas Mahnkem warns against it:

There will be a temptation among some quarters at home and abroad to declare, "Mission accomplished". Opponents of the war in Afghanistan will cite Bin Laden's death as evidence strengthening the case for reducing U.S. forces in the region. Those who oppose a vigorous internationalist strategy will escalate their calls for the United States to adopt more of an "offshore" role. The Pakistanis will attempt to tout their cooperation with the United States in bringing bin Laden to justice while diverting American attention from such uncomfortable questions as how and why bin Laden was able to live for months or years under the noses of Pakistani military and intelligence officers. Other partners, whose enthusiasm for defeating al Qaeda has been limited, may be perfectly willing to declare victory and go home.

This temptation must be resisted, however. Protracted wars are not decided on the outcome of any individual episode. Rather, they turn on the progressive attrition of the adversary's sources of power. Similarly, this conflict will not end in a single battle or campaign.


Part of what has bedeviled the U.S. in Afghanistan is this conflation of the ideological struggle against the "jihadism" represented by Osama bin Laden with the counter-insurgency against Pashtun militants in Pakistan and Afghanistan. There are connections between the two, obviously, but they are not the same thing.

What I think proponents of "declaring victory" wish to do is wind down the nation building in Afghanistan, but not give up on trying to thwart terrorist threats around the globe. I think the manner in which bin Laden was dispatched makes a decent case for a counter-terrorist approach that relies on intelligence, small bases and precision instead of a full blown effort to rebuild Afghanistan.

(AP Photo)

May 3, 2011

Geographer Predicted bin Laden's Hideout

Great story here:

Could Osama bin Laden have been found faster if the CIA had followed the advice of ecosystem geographers from the University of California, Los Angeles? Probably not, but the predictions of UCLA geographer Thomas Gillespie, who, along with colleague John Agnew and a class of undergraduates, authored a 2009 paper predicting the terrorist’s whereabouts, were none too shabby. According to a probabilistic model they created, there was an 88.9% chance that bin Laden was hiding out in a city less than 300 km from his last known location in Tora Bora: a region that included Abbottabad, Pakistan, where he was killed last night.

That's via Matthew Yglesias who believes the fact that bin Laden was holed up in a swanky compound in a city dispells the myth that terrorists need safe havens:

For one thing, a terrorist in rural Afghanistan is, by definition, not in the United States. It’s also hard to get from rural Afghanistan to the United States. And it’s difficult to communicate with people who aren’t in rural Afghanistan. It’s also, as Gillespie says, relatively likely that people will know what you’re up to. And in the scheme of things, it’s easier to be spotted by spy satellites and the like.

I'd also add that terrorists holed up in remote regions of lawless or poorly governed states are vulnerable to attack - by drones or from the air. We can also collect intelligence on terrorist networks without nation building in Afghanistan.

May 2, 2011

Pakistan: Friend or Foe?

Whenever an allied government doesn’t measure up to what the U.S. expects of it, it is tempting to accuse it of perfidy or betrayal, but that avoids considering whether we are expecting something that the ally can reasonably provide. Libya hawks have taken to bashing Germany for its pacifism, which is another way of saying that allies are supposed to act like satrapies: they are not permitted to make independent judgments about policy questions, nor are they allowed to act in their own interests. Iraq hawks derided Turkey for its opposition to the invasion, and some of them built up entire narratives that portrayed France as our traditional nemesis. Considering how widely loathed our government is in Pakistan, and considering how antagonistic many of our policies are to Pakistani interests, the U.S. has no reason to expect any Pakistani cooperation. For various reasons, we have received some cooperation anyway. Inevitably, that isn’t enough for some people, who seem to expect allied governments to commit a sort of suicide to fulfill our demands. - Daniel Larison

This is a very fair point with respect to Pakistan and their support for the Afghan Taliban, but I don't think it applies to allegations that they sheltered bin Laden or other al-Qaeda members. I think we agree that pushing Pakistan to do something it is almost constitutionally incapable of doing is reckless. Pakistan support for the Afghan Taliban is something that is deemed, for better or worse, a vital Pakistani interest and U.S. bribes and bombs have not really altered that calculus. We can't transform Pakistan into a country that suddenly trusts India and therefore doesn't seek strategic depth in Afghanistan - and efforts to change Pakistani behavior in this regard will naturally run aground, if not destabilize the country worse than it already has.

But what does that have to do with bin Laden and al-Qaeda? Keeping bin Laden secreted away doesn't advance Pakistan's aims vis-a-vis India or Afghanistan, as far as I can tell. And even if the ISI did have some kind of rationale, so what? Ultimately, we have to have some red lines and harboring fugitives responsible for slaughtering Americans on American soil is surely one of them.

Now, it's possible that bin Laden built a walled compound a few hundred yards away from a major Pakistani military institution with no one batting an eye. It's also possible that he managed to evade one of the most intense manhunts in human history without any help from well-placed insiders in the ISI or Pakistani military. (Jeffrey Goldberg makes that case here.) Even if he had that help, it's quite possible that the upper echelons in Pakistan's military (and certainly the civilian government) weren't quite clued in as to what was going on - or weren't very interested in finding out. We can't rule out sheer incompetence, either, given how much of it is routinely on display in our own government.

But it's also quite possible - I would say plausible - that Pakistan is at least partially complicit in sheltering bin Laden. I don't think that's a reason to invade or attack the country - which would be an insane act. But I don't think it's unreasonable to probe this question with more urgency and to demand changes in Pakistan's behavior if their complicity can be proven.

Under Pakistan's Wing?

Steve Coll reflects on the death of bin Laden:

The initial circumstantial evidence suggests... that bin Laden was effectively being housed under Pakistani state control. Pakistan will deny this, it seems safe to predict, and perhaps no convincing evidence will ever surface to prove the case. If I were a prosecutor at the United States Department of Justice, however, I would be tempted to call a grand jury. Who owned the land on which the house was constructed? How was the land acquired, and from whom? Who designed the house, which seems to have been purpose-built to secure bin Laden? Who was the general contractor? Who installed the security systems? Who worked there? Are there witnesses who will now testify as to who visited the house, how often, and for what purpose?

A lot more questions than answers at this point.

Did Pakistan Betray Him?

Interesting thought from Tom Ricks:

What suspicious minds are asking: Why did the Pakistanis give him up? And what did we give in return?

I also think this will strongly up the pressure on the Obama Administration to end its involvement in Afghanistan. Not just politicians but the man on the street is likely to say, Hey, we got him, mission accomplished, let's go home.

If Pakistan did indeed tip the U.S. off to bin Laden's whereabouts, did they do so as a way to ease the U.S. out of Afghanistan? It doesn't sound all that crazy...

A Compound, Not a Cave

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Picking up on Ben's post below, the important subtext of bin Laden's very welcome demise is less the future of al-Qaeda (important as that is) but the future of Pakistan. As Jane Perlez writes:

With Bin Laden’s death, perhaps the central reason for an alliance forged on the ashes of 9/11 has been removed, at a moment when relations between the countries are already at one of their lowest points as their strategic interests diverge over the shape of a post-war Afghanistan.

For nearly a decade, the United States has paid Pakistan more than $1 billion a year for counterterrorism operations whose chief aim was the killing or capture of Bin Laden, who slipped across the border from Afghanistan after the American invasion.

The circumstance of Bin Laden’s death may not only jeopardize that aid, but will also no doubt deepen suspicions that Pakistan has played a double game, and perhaps even knowingly harbored the Qaeda leader.

Perlez goes on to provide important details as to bin Laden's hideaway:

Rather, he was killed in Abbottabad, a city of about 500,000, in a large and highly secured compound that, a resident of the city said, sits virtually adjacent to the grounds of a military academy. In an ironic twist, the academy was visited just last month by the Pakistani military chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, where he proclaimed that Pakistan had “cracked” the forces of terrorism, an assessment that was greeted with skepticism in Washington.

In addition, the city hosts numerous Pakistani forces — three different regiments, and a unit of the Army Medical Corps. According to some reports, the compound and its elaborate walls and security gates may have been built specifically for the Qaeda leader in 2005, hardly an obscure undertaking in a part of the city that the resident described as highly secure.

So in 2005, people start fortifying a compound to repel a ground assault in very close proximity to a major military institution and no one inside Pakistan looks into it? Is that believable?

One can understand the thinking behind Pakistan's support for Afghan Taliban groups, cultivated as an extension of Pakistan's strategic goals in a neighboring territory - but what explains covert assistance to bin Laden, if such assistance was in fact offered (or passively extended)? Was keeping bin Laden alive an effort to keep the U.S. gravy train rolling?

(As a side note, the photo above is via Nicholas Jackson who notes how quickly the bin Laden compound was located on Google Maps.)

Pakistan's Osama Problem

One key point which will be much discussed in the coming weeks is the role Pakistan's authorities played in protecting the location of Osama bin Laden over the past several years. Rather than living in a cave or a remote area, it appears now that bin Laden has been in roughly the same location for multiple years, perhaps stretching back to 2005, when modifications were made to the compound where he was killed.

The question during the entire hunt for bin Laden has always been to what degree Pakistan was merely useless vs. actively undermining our efforts. Now Yahoo's Laura Rozen reports the area where bin Laden was killed is going to spark these questions once again given its population and location:

Obama commended Pakistani officials as he touted the effort to hunt down Bin Laden. But some critics are already pointing out the incongruity of Bin Laden, who had long been thought to be sequestered in far more remote parts of the country, turning up in an affluent suburb of Pakistan's capital - one that is filled with Pakistani military officials, no less.

"Abbottabad has a large military cantonment area and the Army college and exam center are located there," a former U.S. official who has worked in Pakistan told The Envoy. "It is very much off the usual track for foreigners … and I simply do not believe Bin Ladin could hide there unaided by or unknown to the Pakistanis."

It seems noteworthy that in President Obama's remarks on the subject, he thanked Pakistan without expressing anything they actually did to help the process along - and it's clear from the White House briefings tonight on the raid that he did not share intel with them, or indeed with any nation, taking a unilateral path instead. Rozen's source leads us to the question many in the administration and outside it are likely thinking about tonight: who in Pakistan's government knew Osama was there, and how long did they know it?

April 28, 2011

The Endgame Cometh

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Happy Mujahideen Victory Day.

Nineteen years ago, today, a rag-tag group of insurgents overthrew the previously Soviet-supported Afghan government. It’s a national holiday here in Kabul. The roads, usually clogged with traffic and pedestrians, are clear not only because Afghans are staying home to celebrate but also because many international civilians are on lockdown.

A string of high profile attacks on government and military buildings in the past few weeks have cast a pall over the holiday. And a blockbuster prison break this week has only added to tensions.

But in commemorating a day that was precipitated by the withdrawal of Soviet troops three years earlier in 1989, it’s worth looking forward to how the next major foreign military withdrawal from Afghanistan might shape the country.

Lost in the stories of Taliban infiltration of Afghan security forces has been reporting on how Afghans across the country are starting to hedge their bets as U.S. and coalition forces prepare to drawdown their forces this July, a process that should end by 2014.

Taliban are turning themselves in to authorities to be reintegrated into society, sometimes as part of local militias. Ethnic minority groups are beginning to rearm themselves in anticipation of a return of the Pashtun Taliban. And armies of pundits have weighed in on the false hope of talks with the Taliban or are exasperated that a 10-year war has gone on this long without a diplomatic component to compliment the military hardware.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of all this is what exactly happens after 2014. Ahmed Rashid recently commented on Karzai’s request for a “strategic partnership agreement” with the U.S. after 2014:

The Pentagon is keen on this so it can maintain between two and six bases in Afghanistan to keep pressure on al-Qaeda. Most countries in the region – such as Pakistan, China and Russia – will object to an indefinite U.S. military presence, while Iran will see it as a permanent threat.

The New York Times reports that upon hearing talk of a U.S. presence beyond 2014, Iranian, Indian and Russian officials made a mad dash to Kabul. The Times goes on to explain how talk of long-term U.S. bases could sink the burgeoning peace negotiations:

[The strategic partnership agreement] is without doubt a delicate process, and one that comes at a critical time. Afghan officials have expressed concern that the negotiations could scuttle peace talks with the Taliban, now in their early stages, because the insurgents have insisted that foreign forces must leave the country before they will deal. That they are already talking is an indication they are willing to compromise on the timing of a withdrawal – but it is hard to imagine Taliban acceptance of a lasting American presence here.

Discussions of permanents bases also plays into Afghan conspiracy theories that the U.S. is only here to steal Afghanistan’s mineral wealth and to have a permanent base in the region from which to exert influence over the eventual nuclear state of Iran and the current nuclear power of Pakistan, to say nothing of China and Russia.

A Wall Street Journal piece nicely explores the geopolitical posturing that surrounds an Afghan-U.S. strategic partnership:

Pakistan is lobbying Afghanistan’s president against building a long-term strategic partnership with the U.S., urging him instead to look to Pakistan – and its Chinese ally – for help in striking a peace deal with the Taliban and rebuilding the economy, Afghan officials say…

Some U.S. officials said they had heard details of the Kabul meeting, and presumed they were informed about [Pakistan's] entreaties in part, as one official put it, to "raise Afghanistan's asking price" in the partnership talks. That asking price could include high levels of U.S. aid after 2014. The U.S. officials sought to play down the significance of the Pakistani proposal. Such overtures were to be expected at the start of any negotiations, they said; the idea of China taking a leading role in Afghanistan was fanciful at best, they noted.

And yet, Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Afghanistan, has met Karzai three times since the Pakistani overture.

Alim

(AP Photo)

April 25, 2011

Obama's Foreign Policy

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I'm just getting started on Ryan Lizza's big piece on the Obama administration's foreign policy, but this bit jumped out at me from the opening:

One of Donilon’s overriding beliefs, which Obama adopted as his own, was that America needed to rebuild its reputation, extricate itself from the Middle East and Afghanistan, and turn its attention toward Asia and China’s unchecked influence in the region. America was “overweighted” in the former and “underweighted” in the latter, Donilon told me. “We’ve been on a little bit of a Middle East detour over the course of the last ten years,” Kurt Campbell, the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said. “And our future will be dominated utterly and fundamentally by developments in Asia and the Pacific region.”

So what has the administration done during its first years in office? Well, they launched a major effort to rekindle Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, surged tens of thousands of additional troops into Afghanistan (while quietly moving out the timeline for withdrawal to 2014), escalated military strikes in Pakistan and jumped into the middle of Libya's civil war.

For an administration intent on refocusing American foreign policy away from the Middle East and "unwinding" America's wars, they sure seem to have gone about it in a strange way.

(AP Photo)

Peace With the Taliban

Jackson Diehl isn't impressed with the Obama administration's Afghan exit strategy:

The military drawdown appears likely to be accompanied by a new attempt to promote a political settlement between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton promised a “diplomatic surge” in a February speech in which she seemed to soften previous conditions for talks with the Taliban. The administration is said to be quietly encouraging a Turkish initiative to allow the Taliban to open an office in Turkey, which would provide a clear channel for communications.

The idea of a quick political fix is seductive. There’s just one problem: It’s an illusion. Not only is there no chance of striking a workable deal with the Taliban, but the pursuit of one is only likely to make an already difficult political situation in Afghanistan worse.

The idea of some kind of political settlement to the Afghan war has been a hobbyhorse of a number of realists, but I don't see it happening. Unless we're willing to completely cede the field to Pakistan and their Taliban surrogates and call that a "political victory" there really is no political solution that is going to satisfy all parties to the conflict. I think it's immensely naive to argue that the Taliban can be convinced, bribed, threatened or cajoled into fully renouncing al-Qaeda, and even if they did formally break with the group, Afghanistan is a huge, rural country with plenty of places for al-Qaeda to hide even without formal Taliban sanction. Al-Qaeda managed to set up shop in Afghanistan with 100,000 U.S. troops in the country. Presumably they could do so again when U.S. troop numbers dwindle.

However, unlike Diehl, I don't believe the absence of a negotiated settlement is grounds for never leaving Afghanistan. Quite the contrary, it is the best argument for why America's effort is futile and overly ambitious. The basic fact is that the relevant political players in the Afghan war - the Taliban, Pakistan, India - have a much larger stake in the fight than the U.S. does. They have proven over time to be immune to U.S. bribes and resilient in the face of U.S. firepower. Unless we're willing to start a war with Pakistan over the future of the government of Afghanistan, we'd better start thinking about how to combat al-Qaeda terrorism without a sympathetic government in Afghanistan.

April 18, 2011

60 Cups of Tea

Last night 60 Minutes aired an expose on Three Cups of Tea author Greg Mortenson. While acknowledging his promotion of girls’ education in Pakistan and Afghanistan, their report brought into question his “origin story,” financial irregularities within his Central Asia Institute and exactly how many schools his NGO has built.

For those unfamiliar with Three Cups of Tea - recommended reading for the rank and file of both the U.S. military and Oprah’s book club - an Outside Magazine article chronicles Mortenson’s activities in Afghanistan.

The fascinating nexus between book clubs and the military was highlighted in a New York Times piece last summer:

The collaboration [between the US military and Mortenson], which grew in part out of the popularity of “Three Cups of Tea” among military wives who told their husbands to read it, extends to the office of Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Last summer, Admiral Mullen attended the opening of one of Mr. Mortenson’s schools in Pushghar, a remote village in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush mountains.

On the ground here in Afghanistan development workers will confess that Mortenson’s inspirational story reignited their passion and drive for their often frustrating line of work. However, many hold reservations about the efficacy and sustainability - to say nothing of the possible harm - of this “cowboy” approach to development work.

Alim

April 14, 2011

Did the U.S. Just Flip Off Pakistan?

Barely a day after being issued a public warning about CIA activity in Pakistan, the U.S. went ahead and bombed the country anyway. Now, maybe we're back to the tacit understanding whereby Pakistan's leaders publicly denigrate the U.S. and privately allow us to prosecute the drone war. If not, this strike seems deliberately provocative and reckless. It would be one thing if the administration had bin Laden in its sites and had to take the shot (totally justifiable, in my view), but here's how the New York Times described the targets:


The targets of the attack were militants commanded by Maulvi Nazir, a Taliban leader from South Waziristan who is closely allied to the Haqqani network, the main Afghan Taliban group supported by the Pakistani military. American and Pakistani intelligence officials say Mr. Nazir is known to harbor Arabs affiliated with Al Qaeda. The Haqqani network and fighters associated with it are also responsible for many of the attacks against American and Afghan troops in eastern Afghanistan.

The drones struck a double-cabin pickup truck and a motorcycle as they returned from Afghanistan into Pakistan, a Pakistani military official said. Seven fighters were killed and six others were wounded in the attack just south of the village of Angor Adda on the border between the two countries.

Bombing a few Taliban fighters vs. undermining and embarrassing a crucial ally against al-Qaeda. Stoking anti-Americanism in Pakistan is just a monumentally short-sighted thing to do if you want to retain the country's cooperation and ensure that its citizens (and, crucially, expats living in places like the UK) don't fill the ranks of al-Qaeda. But such are the wages of nation building in Afghanistan.

April 12, 2011

Has Obama Lost Pakistan?

One argument that's frequently advanced on behalf of the counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan is that while Afghanistan itself may be of marginal relevance to American strategic interests, Pakistan is another matter, and instability in Afghanistan will eventually bubble over to destablize a nuclear-armed, anti-American Pakistan.

The reality, however, appears to be the opposite: American efforts to stabilize Afghanistan by defeating the Taliban insurgency are actually driving instability in Pakistan. Exhibit A is the use of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal region. Ostensibly a tool to target high level foreign fighters linked to al-Qaeda, the Obama administration has broadened their reach and tempo to hit more Taliban and Pashtun militant targets. Now, Pakistan is calling time:

Pakistan has demanded that the United States steeply reduce the number of Central Intelligence Agency operatives and Special Operations forces working in Pakistan, and that it halt C.I.A. drone strikes aimed at militants in northwest Pakistan. The request was a sign of the near collapse of cooperation between the two testy allies.

Who knows how seriously this will hamper U.S. anti-terror efforts, but it can't be good.

April 8, 2011

U.S. Views on Afghan War

Gallup finds the public mostly split:

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Frank Newport discusses the implications:

At this point, there does not appear to be a groundswell of opposition to U.S. involvement in that country. While the U.S. has been involved in Afghanistan for more than nine years, less than half of Americans say sending U.S. military forces there was a mistake. In contrast, it took less than a year and a half for a majority of Americans to say sending troops to Iraq was a mistake.

Americans also do not appear to be overly concerned about the way things are going in Afghanistan, with about as many saying the war is going well as say it is going badly. This is a more positive assessment than was the case throughout last year and for much of 2009 and 2008.


April 6, 2011

Al-Qaeda Back in Afghanistan?

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The Wall Street Journal has an ominous report on evidence that al-Qaeda is returning to Afghanistan:

In late September, U.S. fighter jets streaked over the cedar-studded slopes of Korengal, the so-called Valley of Death, to strike a target that hadn't been seen for years in Afghanistan: an al Qaeda training camp.

Among the dozens of Arabs killed that day, the U.S.-led coalition said, were two senior al Qaeda members, one Saudi and the other Kuwaiti. Another casualty of the bombing, according to Saudi media and jihadi websites, was one of Saudi Arabia's most wanted militants. The men had come to Afghanistan to impart their skills to a new generation of Afghan and foreign fighters.

Even though the strike was successful, the very fact that it had to be carried out represents a troubling shift in the war. Nine years after a U.S.-led invasion routed almost all of al Qaeda's surviving militants in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden's network is gradually returning.

Over the past six to eight months, al Qaeda has begun setting up training camps, hideouts and operations bases in the remote mountains along Afghanistan's northeastern border with Pakistan, some U.S., Afghan and Taliban officials say. The stepped-up infiltration followed a U.S. pullback from large swatches of the region starting 18 months ago. The areas were deemed strategically irrelevant and left to Afghanistan's uneven security forces, and in some parts, abandoned entirely.

What's notable about this al-Qaeda comeback, such as it is, is that it occurred during the troop surge, when the U.S. was supposedly breaking the Taliban's momentum. So even at the moment of maximum Western troop presence, al-Qaeda is still able to worm its way into vacant corners of the country. Obviously, some analysts will read this and conclude that we must have American forces in every square inch of Afghanistan forever to prevent small al-Qaeda camps from setting up shop, but how realistic and sustainable is that?

And while the return of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan is troublesome, it also makes them more vulnerable. As the WSJ notes, the U.S. has been conducting ground raids and bombing strikes against al-Qaeda targets in the country - something it cannot aggressively do against al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan.

(AP Photo)

April 5, 2011

Why We're Losing in Afghanistan

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Mark Steyn thinks we're losing in Afghanistan because we're not killing enough Afghans:

The reason we're losing this thing is because of a lack of cultural confidence, of which the fetal cringe of this worthless husk out-parodies anything Coward could have concocted. When I'm speaking on this subject, I often get asked to reprise the words I quote in my book, from Gen. Sir Charles Napier in India explaining to the locals his position on suttee -- the tradition of burning widows on the funeral pyres of their husbands. General Napier was impeccably multicultural:
You say that it is your custom to burn widows. Very well. We also have a custom: when men burn a woman alive, we tie a rope around their necks and we hang them. Build your funeral pyre; beside it, my carpenters will build a gallows.You may follow your custom. And then we will follow ours.

In the absence of cultural confidence overseas, we are expending blood and treasure building an Afghanistan fit only for pederasts, tribal heroin cartels, and the blood-soaked savages of Mazar e-Sharif.

Steyn is responding to the admittedly sad spectacle of U.S. senators blaming the Koran-burning pastor rather than the Afghans for the recent bouts of carnage in that country. And he's right about where the fault lies (with the murdering Afghans, not the moron pastor). But the idea that we're losing in Afghanistan because we're unwilling to kill enough Afghans to change their cultural practices is absurd on its face. By this definition, we can only "win" in Afghanistan when Afghans don't go on murderous rampages against foreigners. That's an unreasonable standard and one that's wholly disconnected from the (tenuous) counter-terrorism rationales that still keep large contingents of Western troops in the country.

(AP Photo)

March 30, 2011

Afghanistan's April Showers

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The Persian new year was celebrated in Afghanistan just over a week ago. With it's passing, millions of wood-burning stoves have been relegated to storage and spring has officially arrived. Budding rose bushes and apricot trees dot Kabul courtyards.

But spring also heralds the return of the insurgent fighting season. The retreating cold releases its grip on supply routes to safe-havens across the mountainous Pakistani border, while the increasingly dense foliage provides impressive cover from NATO and U.S. fire.

There is hope, however, in both Washington and Kabul, that this spring will mark a new year that breaks the rhythm of war in Afghanistan. President Barack Obama's 30,000 troop surge, which came into place last fall, along with General David Petraeus' renewed focus on special operations and the continued enlargement of the Afghan National army have secured a handful of strategic districts in the country's restive south for the first time in years. Cricket diplomacy between Pakistan and India could pave the way toward Pakistan playing a more constructive role in negotiations with Afghanistan's Taliban. And fallout from the corruption scandal at Afghanistan's biggest bank may push forward reforms and introduce some semblance of accountability in the Karzai government. Just last fall, six in ten Afghans said the country was moving in the right direction.

Granted, expectations should be tethered. The afghan public is weary of the foreign military presence and gruesome pictures of a U.S. "kill team" do little to allay the fears of civilian casualties, which reached a high water mark last year. Moreover, this past winter proved more violent than most, a disturbing portent for the coming year. Barely a week into the new year, 300 Taliban - yes, 300 - overran an entire district in eastern Afghanistan.

Only a day before the Taliban invasion from the east, Laura King wrote this in the L.A. Times:

In addition, the spring will test a gamble by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization force in eastern Afghanistan, where U.S. troops are being withdrawn from areas once described as crucial bulwarks against Pakistani-based militant groups such as the Haqqani network and the Hezb-i-Islami faction led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
U.S. troops have been "repositioned" away from former battlegrounds such as the Pech and Korangal valleys in Kunar province, where commanders said sophisticated surveillance and "intelligence-driven" raids would prevent a rush of cross-border movement.

Should old acquaintance be forgot, indeed.

Alim

(AP Photo)

March 29, 2011

Rolling Stone and "War Porn"

About a month ago, I shared some serious qualms I had about the veracity of a story by Michael Hastings in Rolling Stone on the PSYOP front. This month, RS is back again with more questionable coverage of the front, as Joshua Foust points out:

Reading the Rolling Stone piece, a reader walks away thinking that the killing of civilians is widespread and not at all limited to the troops associated with the “kill team.” The article paints the killings as the inevitable consequence of low morale and a rejection of counterinsurgency, and worse – it implies that murder is, in some way, a fact of being a soldier.

These sorts of implications, however, are difficult to square with the truth. Attention was first shed on the killings by fellow soldiers disgusted at the “kill team’s” alleged actions. Army rules — and U.S. law — considers such actions grievous crimes and stipulates immediate and harsh punishment for them. While the Army bureaucracy was slow to move — sadly, all too common regardless of the issue, whether an illegal killing, a problem with healthcare or even adapting to a rural insurgency in a war most people had forgotten about — that doesn’t automatically mean there is a cover up. Incompetence is a far more reasonable explanation than malice.

The point is, this is starting to turn into "war porn" - pairing shock video and images designed to create buzz. But the effect is to turn all combat deaths into murder (something that the RS author might believe, but most people don't), and murder exploited to sell magazines. Foust again:

There is a term for the sort of journalism Rolling Stone is engaging in here: war porn. In 2005, George Zornick wrote of the growing trend of many people both in and out of the military treating images of the war — weapons, death, combat and so on — in the same way one would treat pornography. The people posting these images, Zornick explained, “appear to regard the combat photos with sadistic glee, and pathological wisecracks follow almost every post.”

Continue reading "Rolling Stone and "War Porn"" »

Bin Laden on the Move

Syed Saleem Shahzad reports that Osama bin Laden has been quite mobile of late and parses the implications:

After a prolonged lull, the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has launched a series of covert operations in the rugged Hindu Kush mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan following strong tip-offs that al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden has been criss-crossing the area in the past few weeks for high-profile meetings in militant redoubts....

The development has fueled speculation in intelligence circles that al-Qaeda could be planning another major attack along the lines of the September 11, 2001, assault on New York and Washington, and the July 2007 foiled bomb attack in London.

However, extensive investigations by Asia Times Online, including exchanges within al-Qaeda's camps, point in another direction: given the nature of Bin Laden's meetings, this appears to be the beginning of a new era for a broader struggle in which al-Qaeda, through its Laskhar al-Zil (Shadow Army), will try to capitalize on the Arab revolts and the Palestinian struggle and also revitalize and redefine its role in Afghanistan.

The whole piece is worth a read. The upshot appears to be that al-Qaeda number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri has lost an internecine ideological battle and as a result al-Qaeda may be changing strategy. Either way, hopefully a more mobile bin Laden means a more vulnerable one.

March 23, 2011

Nation Building in Afghanistan

Paul Miller makes the case for nation building in Afghanistan:

There are no practical alternatives. Vice President Biden and a growing chorus of others believe we should give up rebuilding Afghanistan and, instead, sustain an indefinite worldwide assassination campaign against al Qaida's senior leaders. His view of the war is myopic, narrow, and troubling. Such a campaign would do nothing to address Pakistan, the drug trade, NATO, the other great powers, or any of our other interests across South Asia. It is also morally troubling -- it amounts to a declaration that we reserve the right to kill anyone we deem to be a terrorist, anywhere in the world, forever. Call it the Biden Doctrine of the Forever War. States should not maintain a state of war indefinitely just because it is too inconvenient to settle the political conditions that led to the war in the first place. War should be the last resort, not the first.

Nation building in Afghanistan is the only pragmatic policy option that will secure the full range of our interests in South Asia and yield an actual end-point to the war, which is why Petraeus is right to be alarmed about the funding levels for our civilians.

I think Miller is right to warn about an open-ended campaign of assassinations against senior al-Qaeda leaders but his case for nation-building doesn't address that at all. What about al-Qaeda leaders operating outside of Afghanistan? The central question with respect to Afghanistan is which war our nation building efforts hope to win - the one against a native Taliban insurgency or the one against global jihadism? We could "win" in Afghanistan and still lose the broader effort. When you're dealing with constrained resources - and an executive branch in Washington seemingly eager to open up new fronts across the world - you have to question the wisdom of putting all our counter-terrorism eggs in one hugely expensive sinkhole called Afghanistan.

Furthermore, it's extremely difficult to see what American policy can do inside Afghanistan to "stabilize" Pakistan, other than to consent to Pakistan's wishes and make Afghanistan its proxy. Pakistan has made it abundantly clear that it will buck American wishes inside Afghanistan, yet proponents of indefinite nation building seem to wave this problem away or insist that somehow chaos in Afghanistan will endanger Pakistan. But that overlooks the rather glaring fact that it is Pakistan that is facilitating the chaos in Afghanistan for its own ends. Nation building proponents can't square that circle.

March 16, 2011

U.S. Opposed to Afghan War

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A new Washington Post/ABC News poll shows that two-thirds of the American public (64 percent) say that the war in Afghanistan is not worth fighting and almost 75 percent believe President Obama should pull "a substantial number" of combat troops out of Afghanistan this summer. On the other hand, 53 percent of those polled believe the president will not withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan this summer.

(AP Photo)

March 8, 2011

Fun Afghanistan Fact of the Day

Courtesy of Ann Marlowe:

Second, plenty of Taliban and al-Qaeda sympathizers and enablers are already in the Afghan government, both in Parliament and in governor and district governor positions appointed by President Karzai. In fact, President Karzai’s choice for speaker of the lower house of Parliament, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, was the man who brought Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan in the first place. On Sunday, the legislators chose an obscure Uzbek Afghan as speaker, an MP from strife-torn Kunduz Province who had previously fought with Hekmatyar’s group Hezb-i-Islami. Not an encouraging selection, but miles ahead of Sayyaf, who’d had the highest vote total on a previous ballot.

Her whole piece, on why it's pointless to negotiate with the Taliban, is worth reading.

March 7, 2011

Americans Want Afghan Pullout

According to a new poll from Rasmussen Reports:

A majority of voters, for the first time, support an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Afghanistan or the creation of a timetable to bring them all home within a year.

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 31% of Likely U.S. Voters now say all troops should be brought home from Afghanistan immediately, while another 21% say a firm timetable should be established to bring all troops home within a year’s time. The combined total of 52% who want the troops home within a year is a nine-point jump from 43% last September. Just 37% felt that way in September 2009.

Only 34% of voters now think there should be no timetable for withdrawal. Fifteen percent (15%) are not sure.

March 3, 2011

The Death of Shahbaz Bhatti

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The New York Times shares footage of Shahbaz Bhatti, the Pakistani minister gunned down this week in the latest violence in the increasingly fractured country. Bhatti, who had recently met with Secretary of State Clinton - was Pakistan's lone Christian minister. In the interview, Bhatti delivered a defiant rebuke to Pakistani radicals:

They want to impose their radical philosophy in Pakistan and whoever stands against their radical philosophy, they threaten them. When I’m leading this campaign against the Shariah laws and for the abolishment of [the] blasphemy law and speaking for the oppressed and marginalized, persecuted Christians and other minorities, these Taliban threaten me.

But I want to share that I believe in Jesus Christ, who has given his own life for us. I know what is the meaning of [the] cross and I’m following … the cross.

I’m ready to die for a cause. I’m living for my community and suffering people and I will die to defend their rights. So these threats and these warnings cannot change my opinion and principles. I will prefer to die for my principles and for the justice of my community rather to compromise.

Keep in mind that nearly all of Pakistan's provinces have an active separatist movement. In the wake of other events across the country, as well as increased violence and antagonism toward more liberal politicians and leaders, I think it is very likely that moderates in the nation will remain on the retreat.

(AP Photo)

A Vital Valley - A Vital War?

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Late February, the New York Times ran an account of how the U.S. military was pulling out the Pech Valley, an area earlier deemed "vital" to America's war efforts against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Now, apparently, not so much. Or in the words of Major General Campbell, the U.S. isn't retreating but "realigning to provide better security for the Afghan people."

Leslie Gelb vents:

I'm not blaming the generals or their key aides who made these strategies. They were all sent to Afghanistan to do their duty for our country as Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama decreed. They were given a task to pacify an Afghanistan that we could not pacify, to prepare Afghans to govern and fight for themselves who turned out to be unwilling to fairly govern or effectively fight. The generals and their aides were given the task of searching for answers, for workable strategies, that didn't exist.

When viewed from the objective of keeping the American homeland safe from terrorist attacks, having 100,000-plus Western forces trying to prop up a ramshackle government in Afghanistan is not the best use of resources.

(AP Photo)

U.S., UK & Canadian Views on Afghan War

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According to a new poll from Angus Reid, more Canadians and Britons oppose the Afghan war than Americans do:

A year ago, a majority of Americans (58%) supported the mission in Afghanistan, while about two-in-five (38%) opposed it.

Now, in a trend that began late last year, respondents are evenly split, with 47 per cent backing the mission, and 46 per cent opposing it. The level of rejection to the Afghan mission is highest in the Northeast and West (both at 49%) and lowest in the South (44%).

For more than a year, a majority of Britons has expressed opposition to the mission in Afghanistan. This month, only 31 per cent of respondents are backing the military operation, while 60 per cent are against it.

This month’s result matches the high level of opposition to the mission, which was recorded in October 2010. Respondents in London (63%) and Scotland (62%) are more likely to reject the military operation.

For the first time since the war began, three-in-five Canadians (63%) voice opposition to the mission in Afghanistan. Support for the military effort has dropped to the lowest level recorded (32%).

This month’s numbers represent a drastic shift from a survey conducted a year ago, where 47 per cent of Canadians backed the war.

Full results here. (pdf)

(AP Photo)

February 23, 2011

Can Pakistan Hang Davis?

The New York Times clarifies the legal issues involved:

If Mr. Davis was listed as a technical staff member for the embassy’s diplomatic mission, then he would be covered by a 1961 treaty that gives diplomats total immunity to criminal prosecution. In that case, Pakistan should be allowed only to expel him. Victims’ families, however, might still be able to sue him for civil damages.

But if Mr. Davis were instead listed as a staff member for the consulate in Lahore, then he would be covered by a 1963 treaty that governs the rights of consular officials and that allows host countries to prosecute them if they commit a “grave crime.”

The longer this drags on, the more difficult it becomes for Zardari's government to extricate itself from the domestic firestorm this case has created.

February 21, 2011

Afghans See Gradual Improvement in Their Lives

According to Gallup, there has been a slow but steady uptick in the number of Afghans who say they are "thriving." Those thriving are still a minority, however:

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The Davis Case Gets Stranger

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The diplomatic standoff between Pakistan and the U.S. over the American Raymond Davis has taken a fairly odd turn. Reports Rediff:

Double murder-accused US official Raymond Davis has been found in possession of top-secret Central Intelligence Agency documents, which point to him or the feared American Task Force 373 (TF373) operating in the region, providing Al Qaeda terrorists with "nuclear fissile material" and "biological agents," according to a report.
And why, you might be asking, would a CIA official be working to give al-Qaeda fissile material? The "report" notes:
Pakistan's ISI stat[ed] that top-secret CIA documents found in Davis's possession point to his, and/or TF373, providing to al Qaeda terrorists "nuclear fissile material" and "biological agents", which they claim are to be used against the United States itself in order to ignite an all-out war in order to re-establish the West's hegemony over a global economy that is warned is just months away from collapse.

How nuking the U.S. would enable it to re-establish hegemony over the global economy is beyond me...

(AP Photo)

February 18, 2011

Pakistan: Friend or Foe?

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The Wall Street Journal reports that ties between the CIA and Pakistan's ISI are at a striking low point:

The state of relations, while never perfect, is now alarming counter-terrorism and military officials, who say close cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence is essential to the campaign against al Qaeda and the war against the Taliban and its allies in Afghanistan.

Behind the falling out is a series of controversial incidents starting late last year, which prompted tit-for-tat accusations that burst into the open with the December outing of the CIA's station chief in Islamabad.

More recently, tensions have risen to new highs over Pakistan's detention of former Special Forces soldier Raymond Davis, a U.S. government contractor in the city of Lahore, for killing two Pakistanis in disputed circumstances. A Pakistani court Thursday ruled to delay by three weeks a hearing on whether Mr. Davis is covered by diplomatic immunity.

Michael Cohen argues that Pakistan isn't really an ally:

Pakistan is one of America's largest foreign aid recipients and one of our supposedly most important allies in the region; just this week the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry traveled to Islamabad to try and resolve the issue - and was rebuffed; and the Obama Administration has steadily escalated the issue even threatening a downgrade in US-Pakistan relations in order to resolve the dispute.

Yet, Pakistan still refuses to release Davis. Indeed the announcement, even after Kerry's visit, that the matter will need another three weeks of consideration is a huge diplomatic slap in the face to the United States and especially this Administration.

Now I understand that the Pakistan government has some issues with anti-US attitudes in the country (clearly through some fault of their own) . . . and I know that Pakistan allows NATO supply trucks to transit the country and it allows US military drones to attack suspected al Qaeda terrorists (as well as those Pakistan Taliban groups that threaten the Pakistani state). But shall we catalog for a moment all the ways in which Pakistan is not just a lousy ally, but is actually undermining US interests.

And the indictment Cohen rolls out is indeed serious, but step back and ask yourself what other country on the planet would consent to having its territory bombed with something approaching impunity by another country?

The question is whether Pakistan would be just as uncooperative if the U.S. wasn't raining down Hellfire missiles in the tribal area - and I'd have to think they would be. Pakistan's stance toward the U.S. in Afghanistan is fundamentally driven by its concerns with India - concerns we obviously can't mollify.

(AP Photo)

February 15, 2011

Social Engineering Is Hard

American officials say privately that corruption in Karzai’s government directly feeds the insurgency. And yet, as my piece in the magazine shows, the American response to the corruption in Karzai’s government has been one of passivity and silence. Meanwhile, American Marines and soldiers are pressing the offensive in the south, fighting and dying on Karzai’s behalf.

On corruption, the American strategy isn’t clear. The American military appears to be succeeding in clearing the Taliban from large swaths of southern Afghanistan. But then what? At some point, the Afghans themselves have to take over—that is, the Afghan government. Without a government that is legitimate—that serves the people—it’s hard to imagine that the hard-won American gains can ever stick. - Dexter Filkins

One thing that's frequently lost in the discussion of corruption in Afghanistan is that the country is surrounded by very corrupt countries. It's literally impossible for the U.S. to stamp it out fully, which is why the efforts have been lackluster or unimpressive. The basic problem for the U.S. in Afghanistan is not that Washington has been inattentive to the country's many problems, it's that we've embarked on a program of state-building that requires infinitely more blood and treasure than we're willing to devote to the task.

[Hat tip: Andrew Sullivan]

February 9, 2011

The Taliban and al-Qaeda

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Michael Cohen isn't happy with Max Boot's brusque treatment of a recent report on the prospects of splitting the Taliban from al-Qaeda:

But the worst part here is Boot's simplistic and unsupported reasoning for why this carefully researched report is wrong. He claims there is no doubt the Taliban and al Qaeda are closely linked - but actually provides no evidence, except the bizarre notion that Taliban thinking remains unchanged over the past ten years. He bemoans the fact that Mullah Omar won't trade away the chit of collaboration with al Qaeda - but why would he do such a thing before any serious negotiations with the US and/or the Karzai government?

By this argument America's enemies are not only incapable of strategic and pragmatic behavior, but should unilaterally disarm and rely on the good graces of the United States and its allies. Lastly, is it really impossible to recognize that the Taliban might have reason to turn on al Qaeda if they are returned to power - especially since the limitations on the use of US force that existed pre-9/11 certainly do not exist today and because al Qaeda would provide almost no benefit to the Taliban. At the very least isn't this a potential cleavage that we should be trying to exploit instead confidently declaring that the relationship between two organization with very different orientations and grievance structures is inviolate for all time?

I think this question of whether the Taliban can be "split" from al-Qaeda is ultimately neither here nor there. Afghanistan and Pakistan are large countries with a lot of mountainous, rural and lawless areas. Even if the "Taliban" formerly forswears ties to al-Qaeda, it's not as if the group can't stick around under the good graces (or intimidation) of another tribe in some out-of-the-way village.

The effort to get some members of the Taliban to say publicly that they won't support al-Qaeda is fine, as far as face-saving methods of extracting U.S. forces go, but who would really believe that? And even if it were true, how could you verify that? Our government doesn't want al-Qaeda operating in the U.S. - but they do. We're talking about small groups of people here, not armed divisions.

(AP Photo)

February 8, 2011

Why Is America Unpopular in Pakistan?

"One year after the launch of the civilian assistance strategy in Pakistan, USAID has not been able to demonstrate measurable progress," said the report, an assessment of the program for the final three months of 2010. "We believe that USAID has an imperative to accumulate, analyze, and report information on the results achieved under its programs."

The Obama administration is hoping the aid program to Pakistan, the second-largest recipient of U.S. civilian aid after Afghanistan, will help stabilize the fragile but strategically important country and boost America's image among ordinary Pakistanis. The program is focusing on funding visible infrastructure projects like bridges, roads and power stations.

But the U.S. strategy has faced a number of obstacles, including an Islamist insurgency that has made it dangerous for U.S. aid personnel to operate in some parts of the country. The U.S. remains deeply unpopular in Pakistan, in part due to a campaign of unmanned Central Intelligence Agency drone strikes against Taliban militants on the border with Afghanistan. The strikes also have killed civilians. - Wall Street Journal

American drone strikes in Pakistan are frequently cited as a cause of anti-Americanism. But are they? In a Pew poll (pdf) conducted over the summer, only 35 percent of Pakistanis had even heard about drone strikes. Not surprisingly, the view of those strikes is overwhelmingly negative. Nevertheless, we have to wrestle with the fact that anti-Americanism in Pakistan runs deeper than the drone strikes and is probably not going to be assuaged with a few billion dollars.

January 18, 2011

Seymour Hersh Fail

Apparently the New Yorker's investigative reporter Seymour Hersh has gone a bit 'round the bend:

He then alleged that Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who headed JSOC before briefly becoming the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and his successor, Vice Adm. William McRaven, as well as many within JSOC, "are all members of, or at least supporters of, Knights of Malta."

Hersh may have been referring to the Sovereign Order of Malta, a Roman Catholic organization commited to "defence of the Faith and assistance to the poor and the suffering," according to its website.

"Many of them are members of Opus Dei," Hersh continued. "They do see what they're doing -- and this is not an atypical attitude among some military -- it's a crusade, literally. They seem themselves as the protectors of the Christians. They're protecting them from the Muslims [as in] the 13th century. And this is their function."

"They have little insignias, these coins they pass among each other, which are crusader coins," he continued. "They have insignia that reflect the whole notion that this is a culture war. … Right now, there’s a tremendous, tremendous amount of anti-Muslim feeling in the military community.”"

While I think some of the "clash of civilizations" sentiment clearly exists, the Malta stuff just sounds loopy.

Hearts and Minds

Max Boot lauds America's counter-insurgency effort:

That is the way good counterinsurgency works. It is a slow, agonizing, costly process, but if skillful soldiers or Marines stick to their mission, they will gradually drive the insurgents away, as the Marines are doing in Sangin.

Boot is right to praise the bravery and skill of U.S. and coalition forces operating in Afghanistan, but the counter-insurgency effort there is not always about winning 'hearts and minds' and we shouldn't lose sight of the strategic goals we're trying to accomplish here.

To that end it's worth examining a pair of photos, courtesy of Paula Broadwell, writing on Thomas Ricks' blog, about a recent mission in Afghanistan:

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According to Broadwell's account, the town was riven with Taliban booby traps and a danger to U.S. troops, so it was more or less leveled. The commander of U.S. forces responsible for the attack goes on to lament that the "reconstruction would consume the remainder of my deployed life."

It's worth reflecting on this dynamic as it relates to the broader question of American strategy in Afghanistan and how best to spend American resources to protect the country from international terrorists. Take the costs of blowing up this Afghan village, add to that the cost of rebuilding this Afghan village, throw in the intangible but no less significant damage to Afghans who used to live there and the risks to coalition forces, then ask whether this and other operations like it are the most important thing we can do to prevent a terrorist attack against U.S. soil or U.S. interests globally. Broadwell's piece did not suggest al-Qaeda members were hiding in the village - indeed the word "al-Qaeda" never appears in her post.

January 17, 2011

U.S. Focused on Domestic Issues

According to a new Gallup poll, Americans rank terrorism as the 7th most important priority for the federal government, behind a host of domestic issues. The war in Afghanistan comes in at number 10. Iraq, a distant 14th.

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January 13, 2011

The "Lessons" of Lebanon

Daniel Larison thinks Grover Norquist's efforts to convince conservatives to give up the war on Afghanistan won't succeed, and isn't impressed with Norquist's analogy to President Reagan's pullout from Lebanon:

If we are having an honest conversation, the first observation I would make is that very few people are going to see the relevance of what the Reagan administration did after blundering into the middle of an Israeli invasion of its neighbor when it comes to thinking about Afghanistan one way or the other. U.S. involvement in Lebanon should never have happened in the first place, as the U.S. had no security interests at stake. Reagan’s recognition and correction of his earlier error were good, but the lesson to learn from Lebanon was that we should never have been involved. Very few people on the right agree that the U.S. should never have become involved in Afghanistan, and it seems to me that almost everyone on the right, including almost all opponents of the war in Iraq, believed that the war in Afghanistan was at least initially justified and appropriate, and almost all of them continued to believe this up until very recently. The Lebanon example doesn’t help get the conversation going, because it isn’t a particularly relevant example for the subject we’re discussing.

I would disagree here and say that it's quite relevant (politically) and quite unhelpful to Norquist's cause. In my understanding of mainstream conservative sentiment on the issue, Reagan made a huge mistake in pulling out of Lebanon in response to Iranian attacks on U.S. marines. In the conventional wisdom that has taken hold among many conservative analysts, the Beirut bombings marked the beginning of the Islamist "war against the West" and Reagan's act of loss-cutting served only to embolden our enemies.

Here's Max Boot:

Norquist seems quite enamored of Ronald Reagan’s pullout from Lebanon after the suicide car-bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. Perhaps he is not aware that this incident was routinely cited — along with the U.S. pullout from Somalia in 1993 — by Osama bin Laden in the 1990s to justify his belief that the U.S. was a “weak horse” that could be attacked with impunity.

In this telling, the Reagan and Clinton administrations should have never left Lebanon and Somalia but instead.... well, it's not quite clear what they should have done, is it? Stay? Until?

Either way, by dragging out the Lebanon example, Norquist is probably undermining his cause among most conservatives, not helping it.

Tea Party Views on Afghanistan

The Afghanistan Study Group has released a new survey of conservative and Tea Party sentiments of the war in Afghansitan.

When given a choice between three options, 66% believe we can either reduce the troop levels in Afghanistan, but continue to fight the war effectively (39%) or think we should leave Afghanistan all together, as soon as possible (27%). Just 24% of conservatives believe we should continue to provide the current level of troops to properly execute the war. 64% of Tea Party supporters think we should either reduce troop levels (37%) or leave Afghanistan (27%) while 28% support maintaining current troop levels. Among conservatives who don’t identify with the Tea Party movement, 70% want a reduction (43%) or elimination (27%) of troops while only 18% favoring continuation of the current level.

A majority of conservatives agree that the United States can dramatically lower the number of troops and money spent in Afghanistan without putting America at risk. 57% say they agree with that statement after hearing about the current number of troops in country and the funding needed to support them. Only a third (34%) do not agree with this statement. Among Tea Party supports 55% agree that we can reduce the number of troops without compromising security while 38% disagree. Among non Tea Party conservatives, 60% agree with this statement while 27% disagree.

Full results here. (pdf)

January 10, 2011

Defining Success in Afghanistan

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Frederick and Kimberly Kagan state their view on what victory looks like:

Success in Afghanistan is the establishment of a political order, security situation, and indigenous security force that is stable, viable, enduring, and able--with greatly reduced international support--to prevent Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorists.

This kind of thing sounds clear enough, but it really falls apart upon closer inspection. What does it mean to not be a "safe haven" for international terrorists? It can't mean that a country can't contain any terrorists - that's an absurd standard. It can't mean that the country can't have any terrorists capable of launching attacks beyond its borders, since that would mean there are literally dozens of terrorist safe havens around the world, including in Norway and the United States, which have produced individuals who traveled abroad to commit acts of terrorism or targeted their home countries for slaughter. Perhaps the authors mean that Afghanistan can't have any terrorist training camps - but given the low-tech approach shown by al-Qaeda of late, it's not clear that they need jungle gym training anymore. But if al-Qaeda is training for larger-scale operations, isn't it more likely that they'd do so in Pakistan or Yemen, where they are safer from large-scale reprisals from American air power?

In other words, this definition of success is not just vague and amorphous but untenable in an age when terrorists are a global menace lured into jihad via the Internet. You can make the case that U.S. policy in Afghanistan should be to train Afghan forces to fight the Taliban so we don't have to (a not unreasonable position), but if we're framing Afghanistan as part of a larger effort against jihadism then the investment in Afghanistan and its governing institutions is disproportionate.

(AP Photo)

January 6, 2011

U.S. Views on Afghan War

Americans have a pessimistic view of the course of the war in Afghanistan, according to a new poll:

The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey shows that just 19% of Likely U.S. Voters think the situation in Afghanistan will get better in the next six months. Forty-one percent (41%) now expect the war in Afghanistan to get worse over the next six months while 28% predict it will stay about the same.
Rasmussen also noted that the war ranked ninth in voter importance, out of a list of ten issues.

January 3, 2011

What's Driving Pakistan's Instability?

With U.S. drone strikes cascading down on Pakistani soil at record levels in 2010 and open talk of American ground incursions into the country, many analysts are sounding the alarm that Pakistan's weak civilian government is being pushed too far. And now, said government has been roiled by the defection of two coalition partners. So has America pushed Pakistan's government to the breaking point? It appears the answer is no:

The ruling coalition headed by the Pakistan Peoples Party has struggled in recent weeks to keep its allies together amid rising criticism the government has failed to improve economic conditions, check corruption and halt growing inflation.

That doesn't mean the U.S. shouldn't be mindful of the pressure it's putting on Pakistan, but for now it seems that political discontent is boiling up around other issues.

January 2, 2011

Permanent Bases in Afghanistan

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Senator Lindsey Graham thinks they're a good idea:

"I think it would be enormously beneficial to the region as well as Afghanistan. We have had air bases all over the world. A couple of air bases in Afghanistan would allow the Afghan security forces an edge against the Taliban in perpetuity. It would be a signal to Pakistan, the Taliban are never going to come back in Afghanistan that it could change their behavior," Graham said.

There is obviously going to be a U.S. security presence in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of most U.S. combat forces. But the issue of trying to use Afghanistan as a kind of strategic anchor in Central Asia is different - and from Sen. Graham's suggestion that such a presence would be "good for the region" we can infer that that's what he's thinking.

To have bases in Afghanistan, you need supply lines into Afghanistan - lines that run through Afghanistan's autocratic, unstable neighbors. The U.S. has established these lines by bribing states like Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. Obviously, since we've been at this for a decade we could presumably continue to funnel taxpayer money in and around Central Asia to sustain longer-term military facilities in Afghanistan, but providing weapons to the Afghan government seems like a less expensive means to ensure they have a qualitative edge over the Taliban.

(AP Photo)

December 30, 2010

Losing Focus

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Anatol Lieven makes a good point here:


However, if American generals genuinely want to increase such raids, then it needs to be stated emphatically that this is not just a lunatic idea, but one that demonstrates how far senior American (and British) commanders have become obsessed with the war in Afghanistan at the expense of the struggle against terrorism as a whole.

If I told you that Country X was involved in a low level civil war and that some al-Qaeda members were aiding, and indeed cooperating with, rebel factions, would the proper U.S. policy response be to invade and occupy the country with 100,000 troops, plus thousands of NATO soldiers and an aid effort that eclipsed the Marshall Plan? Probably not. It's true that the U.S. does not have the luxury of starting from square one in Afghanistan, but if the goal is to protect the American homeland from a terror attack at a reasonable cost in blood and treasure, then you really do have to question the scope of the current U.S. commitment to Afghanistan.

(AP Photo)

December 29, 2010

Where NATO Forces Are

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NATO recently released an updated map showing the distribution of coalition forces in Afghanistan.

December 22, 2010

Carter and Pakistan's Nukes

The Times of India reports on America's earlier effort to curtail nuclear proliferation:

Despite a persistent anxiety over its nuclear programme, the Carter administration failed miserably in efforts to pressurise Pakistan away from fuel enrichment and officials were left "scratching their heads" on how to tackle the problem, newly declassified documents have shown.

The recently declassified US government documents from the Jimmy Carter administration, published on the Internet today by the National Security Archive shed light on the critical period in the late 1970s when US first became aware of Pakistan's nuclear intentions.

The documents show that Pakistani nuclear weapons programme had been a source of anxiety for American policymakers ever since the late 1970s when Washington discovered that metallurgist A Q Khan had stolen blueprints for a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility.

Washington will probably prove equally ineffectual when it comes to stopping Iran's nuclear program.

December 21, 2010

Afghanistan & Germany

Paul Miller puts Afghanistan into perspective:

The missing ingredient is more civilian aid. Secretary Clinton touted that the U.S. mission in Kabul now comprises some 1,100 diplomats and civilian experts, which roughly doubles or triples the presence we had prior to 2009. Add together all the soldiers serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and you have several thousand more. This is still not enough. At its peak, the Allies deployed something like 63,000 people who were directly engaged with rebuilding the government and economy of West Germany after World War II. I know the cases are hardly comparable for a thousand reasons -- but most points of difference say that rebuilding Afghanistan is harder than West Germany, and so it likely needs more help, not less. All the biggest remaining challenges in Afghanistan that we have not moved to address in the last year or so -- corruption, institutional weakness, poor governance -- are civilian, not military in nature. More civilians would be the gamechanger that could change Afghanistan from a half-baked muddle-through to an outright success.

Afghanistan is winnable. We're almost there. The president's policy has many decent elements to it. But it is being sold under a stale, worn, and out-of-date headline and a poor strategic communications strategy. And it does not recognize the depth of Afghanistan's need for civilian assistance. Change that, and we will be able to look back with pride on what the United States and our allies helped achieve in Afghanistan.

Comparing Afghanistan to post-war Germany only underscores the massive difference in stakes between the two efforts. A failure to rebuild Germany after World War II would have had serious repercussions in Europe, and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. A failure to rebuild Afghanistan would have consequences as well, but not nearly on par with that of failure in post-war Germany. Yet we've embarked on a strategy for Afghanistan that is so ambitious that even its advocates concede it's more resource-intense and difficult than the reconstruction of Germany.

But Miller does have a point - for better or worse, the administration has chosen a strategy that requires a massive infusion of American resources but, like the Bush administration before them, have tried to cut corners, all in the name of shielding the vast majority of the American public from the costs of the strategy they've embarked on.

Invading Pakistan

Senior American military commanders in Afghanistan are pushing for an expanded campaign of Special Operations ground raids across the border into Pakistan’s tribal areas, a risky strategy reflecting the growing frustration with Pakistan’s efforts to root out militants there.

The proposal, described by American officials in Washington and Afghanistan, would escalate military activities inside Pakistan, where the movement of American forces has been largely prohibited because of fears of provoking a backlash. - New York Times

I have to believe that this was leaked to pressure Pakistan into acting, otherwise the question becomes - are these raids to be conducted like American drone strikes, with a wink and a nod from the Pakistani government? Or are they to be done irrespective of what the government of Pakistan says? Both scenarios are fraught with the danger of a further destabilized Pakistan, but the later is obviously extremely more dangerous than the former.

The other question is what the U.S. military thinks this will solve. Conducting raids into Pakistan makes some sense if the problem is a lack of Pakistani capacity. If the problem is that Pakistan is sheltering certain militant groups because it views them as a leverage in Afghanistan than attacking their sanctuaries in the tribal region isn't going to change Pakistani policy - it's going to change the location of those sanctuaries.

December 17, 2010

Nation Building Is Hard

The administration has not proved very successful at the non-military elements of power, as the back and forth over how to deal with President Hamid Karzai demonstrates. Given President Obama’s timeline, we should have very aggressive efforts underway to diversify and institutionalize political power in Afghanistan. Instead we have been complicit in widespread electoral fraud -- twice -- and we have put just enough pressure on President Karzai to alienate him without achieving meaningful change in his behavior. - Kori Schake
Naturally, but finding other Afghans with the capacity and desire to lead - much less the capacity and desire to lead in a direction America finds acceptable - is hard. Maybe even impossible before 2014. That's why staking your war aims on some kind of political transformation in the country is foolhardy.

December 16, 2010

Afghanistan and Blowback

Spencer Ackerman thinks the Obama administration's Afghanistan review ducks the question of blow back:

Obama’s summary doesn’t address how to mitigate the provocative effects of the war. Its assessment of the war in Afghanistan is cautious and vague — although, to be sure, this is just the unclassified version of a longer, secret report, so perhaps there’s more detail in the secret version. But the “frail and reversible” progress in Afghanistan — giving the Taliban a bloody nose in Kandahar, training Afghan soldiers and cops — is said to set the stage for starting to draw down NATO combat forces from 2011 to 2014. And that doesn’t mean an end to the war. The summary explicitly points to “NATO’s enduring commitment beyond 2014.” What effect that will have on future Faisal Shahzads goes unaddressed.

It's a good question. On the one hand, continuing to bomb Afghanistan (and Pakistan) runs the risk of generating more ill-will and more recruits for the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda. In this sense, NATO strategy could easily be stuck in a terrible feedback loop (if it isn't already): we bomb insurgent targets (even those strictly affiliated with al-Qaeda), passions are aroused, new fighters join the fray, those fighters are bombed, and around and around we go.

On the other hand, how much can the U.S. really opt out of this feedback loop? Imagine a dramatically scaled back effort that sees the U.S. and NATO not only draw down most of its combat troops from Afghanistan but also limit its drone strikes to very "high value" and hard to reach targets. Presumably this would still enrage future Faisal Shahzads, would it not? Even at a sharply reduced rate, news of drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal area would still leak out to the wider Muslim world.

Mind you, I think the U.S. would be better served scaling back its effort in Afghanistan and reserving drone assassinations for truly high-value al-Qaeda targets. But I think we have to acknowledge honestly that there's a trade-off. One strategy courts higher short-term risks in the hopes of reversing the longer-term radical tide. The other strategy - the one in which the U.S. is currently pursuing - tries to minimize short-term risks arguably at the cost of enhancing the longer term threat. It's not an easy set of trade offs to make.

[Hat tip: Andrew Sullivan]

December 15, 2010

Gelb on Afghanistan

Leslie Gelb identifies the key issue in the administration's review of Afghan policy:

Nonetheless, America’s vital interests in Afghanistan were, once again, taken for granted. U.S. forces have to stay and do most of the fighting until the Taliban and al Qaeda are sufficiently weakened for Afghan troops to take over. But why? Why? Ten years ago, after the 9/11 attacks, Afghanistan was the center of the terrorist threat. Now, it’s one of many homes to terrorists, as was seen by the homegrown terrorist attack in Sweden this week. And the argument that success in Afghanistan is necessary to ward off catastrophe in Pakistan is even more specious. Pakistan will resist or fall to extremists because of what happens in Pakistan, a nation of 180 million people, not because of what happens in Afghanistan.

I would add that it's not only "specious" to make that argument about Pakistan, it's risible. Pakistan is aiding the Afghan insurgency. Pakistan is not worried about instability in Afghanistan leading to their downfall, they're worried about a stable, pro-Indian government taking shape in the country. The notion that we have to continue to fight in Afghanistan, against Pakistani-backed militants, to save Pakistan seems self-evidently absurd.

December 14, 2010

Mission Accomplished

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Kori Schake offers a hats off to Defense Secretary Robert Gates for his efforts on Afghanistan. After reading it, I came away a bit confused. It's clear that Schake thinks Gates is a skilled bureaucratic operator, and obviously any good policy needs skilled bureaucrats to shepherd it through the White House. But nowhere in the encomium is anything about how Gates strategy in the actual war in Afghanistan (not Washington) is faring.

The Gates strategy - to put in place a sustained surge of forces in Afghanistan until 2014 when the Afghans will be able to fight the Taliban on their own - has hardly been proven effective yet. By all means, credit Secretary Gates for seeing his preferred policy outcome prevail in the U.S. but it hasn't prevailed in Afghanistan yet. Nor is there much evidence to suggest that if it does, that the U.S. will commensurately safer from Islamic terrorism than had we pursued a less costly and ambitious plan.

(AP Photo)

December 13, 2010

Despair or Optimism in Afghanistan?

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Max Boot says the president shouldn't listen to the "counsel of despair" coming from weak-willed elites. What I would like to know is how Boot and other proponents of staying the course in Afghanistan care to address this:

General Ashfaq Kiyani, Pakistan's army chief, has launched a diplomatic offensive to persuade the United States, Britain and President Karzai to back the deal which would offer government posts to Taliban leaders prepared to renounce al-Qaeda.

It amounts to a direct challenge to Nato's current strategy to intensify the war against the Taliban-led insurgency in the hope of persuading its "reconcilable elements" to negotiate a peace.

Under General Kiyani's plan however, the insurgency's most feared faction, the "Haqqani Network" could play a role in a new 'broad-based government'.

Boot suggests that the Taliban will be more amenable to peace talks if Petraeus is given more time to bloody them and stabilize Afghanistan. But if Pakistan is sheltering and in some sense directing the insurgency, how can that plan possibly work? Giving Petreaus "more time" isn't suddenly going to change the geopolitics of the dispute or Pakistan's motivations for using Afghanistan as strategic depth against India.

(AP Photo)

Canadians Oppose Prolonged Afghan Stay

Canada is supposed to shift to a "non-combat" role in Afghanistan in 2011, but according to Angus Reid, many Canadians are unhappy with the plan:

While just over a third of Canadians support the country’s military mission in Afghanistan, the decision to keep 950 soldiers in a strictly non-combat role after 2011 has split views across the country, a new Angus Reid Public Opinion poll has found.

In the online survey of a representative national sample of 2,023 Canadian adults, more than half of respondents (56%) oppose the military operation involving Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan, while just over a third (36%) support the mission. Strong opposition to the war remains highest in Quebec (48%) while Albertans (19%) and Atlantic Canadians (18%) are more likely to strongly support the mission.

December 7, 2010

American Views on Afghanistan

Via Angus Reid, a new survey on U.S. views on the Afghan war:

Americans remain divided on their country’s military deployment in Afghanistan, and almost half erroneously assume that more than 2,000 U.S. soldiers have lost their lives in the conflict, a new Angus Reid Public Opinion poll has found....

The proportion of people in the United States who think that engaging the military in Afghanistan was a mistake stands at 38 per cent, six points higher than in April and June. Two-in-five Americans (40%, +3) believe that that the U.S. did the right thing in sending soldiers to Afghanistan.

More than half of respondents (54%, +3) claim that they do not know what war in Afghanistan is all about, whereas 46 per cent (-3) say they do.

See the full results here.

December 3, 2010

The Tangled Web

The United States will agree to a demand by Kyrgyz officials that their impoverished country be given a share of lucrative fuel contracts for a critical transit hub here for troops headed to Afghanistan, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Thursday.

Clinton's announcement, made during a five-hour visit to the fragile Central Asian democracy, appeared designed to assuage growing anger over Pentagon contracts that have been worth about $3 billion over eight years to Mina Corp. and Red Star Enterprises, a secretive business group registered in Gibraltar.

The new arrangement should also please Russia, which is expected to play a big - and profitable - role. Gazpromneft, part of Russia's state-controlled energy giant Gazprom, will probably supply much of the jet fuel.

Moscow has frequently used Gazprom to further its political and strategic goals, but the Obama administration is gambling that its efforts to "reset" relations with Russia - and the prospect of large profits for Gazprom - will help ensure that jet fuel keeps flowing to the U.S. air base in Kyrgyzstan, known as the Manas Transit Center. - Washington Post

Now the specifics of this seem rather pragmatic - if everyone gets to wet their whistle, no one complains. But it's worth pondering the contortions that U.S. policy must endure all so that we can stop under 100 al-Qaeda fighters from maybe someday crossing into Afghanistan.

New Weapon Hits Afghanistan

The Army is deploying its new XM-25 a "smart rifle" in its efforts to pare back the Taliban insurgency:

The Pentagon has rolled out prototypes of its first-ever programmable "smart" grenade launcher, a shoulder-fired weapon that uses microchipped ammunition to target and kill the enemy, even when the enemy is hidden behind walls or other cover....

The gun fires 25mm air-bursting shells up to 2,300 feet, well past the range of most rifles used by today's soldiers, and programs them to explode at a precise distance, allowing troops to neutralise insurgents hiding behind walls, rocks or trenches or inside buildings.

The Army is calling it a "game changer" which is unlikely given that killing the Taliban is something we've been good at for quite some time, with little impact on Afghanistan's overall stability and coherence.

December 1, 2010

Afghanistan & Indian Leadership

Our latest Gallup/RCW top five list looks at the countries who most approve of India's leadership. While the top five countries are clustered in Africa, Afghanistan comes in at number 6 (not in our survey but in the full Gallup survey on India here). It's not surprising, given the nearly $1.2 billion in aid that India has provided to the country after the U.S. invasion, but it is a reminder of why Pakistan, despite being on the receiving end of even more American generosity, is consistently undermining U.S. goals in Afghanistan.

November 29, 2010

U.S. Less Pessimistic About Afghan War

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So says Gallup:

Forty-five percent say things are going well for the U.S. there, the highest percentage since July 2009, and one of the more positive evaluations in the last four years. Still, the majority of 54% believe things are going badly for the U.S....

More generally, 44% of Americans say they approve and 49% disapprove of the way Obama is handling the situation in Afghanistan. That is up from 36% approval in late July/early August, when support for the war dropped after there were leaks of classified military documents detailing some troubling accounts of the U.S. conduct of the war on an Internet site called WikiLeaks. But Obama's Afghanistan approval rating is down slightly from the 48% registered in February, the first measurement after Obama's new Afghanistan policy was announced.

November 27, 2010

The Next WikiLeak

Via Mike Allen:

ADMINISTRATION PREPARES FOR WIKIDUMP OF STATE DEPT. CABLES, possibly Sunday – Could be seven times the October release – Jim Miklaszewski, on “NBC Nightly News”: “U.S. officials tell NBC News that the upcoming document release from the website WikiLeaks contains top secret information so damaging it could threaten Senate ratification of the START nuclear arms control treaty with the Russians. According to the officials, the information contained in classified State Department cables reveals secrets behind the START negotiations and embarrassing claims against Russian leadership – information that could provide ammunition to Republican opponents of the treaty on Capitol Hill. …. There’s also serious concern that some of the leaks could threaten U.S. counterterrorism operations on two fronts, Afghanistan and Yemen. In Afghanistan, where President Hamid Karzai has already come under fire for Afghan corruption and questions about his mental stability, U.S. officials say the secret cables reveal new and even more embarrassing claims about his personality and private life. Perhaps more troublesome, the leaks reportedly include top secret information about U.S. military and intelligence operations against al Qaeda in Yemen and some critical dispatches about Yemen’s President Saleh.”

November 24, 2010

A Taliban Peace

My first reaction to hearing that the Taliban had apparently sent out an imposter to negotiate with NATO over a peace settlement was that it poured a decent amount of cold water over those who think that a "political settlement" is really possible. If the Taliban really wanted to explore a deal, they wouldn't be duping us. Michael Cohen sees it differently:

What is lacking is a recognition that the Taliban (who are certainly bad guys) will likely have a long-term role to play in Afghanistan's future - and that this is something that all sides in the conflict, particularly the US, are going to have to accept. Now in an ideal world, the Taliban wouldn't play much of any role in Afghanistan's future - but we don't live in an ideal world and we are far past the point where it's even possible for the US to dictate the terms of Afghanistan's future. We have neither the time nor the resources nor the inclination nor the knowledge to do such a thing.

I agree with the last part - about time and resources - but I'm not sure putting our faith in a political settlement is really feasible at this point. A political settlement implies that there's going to be some kind of agreed-upon equilibrium in the country, even if that means the Taliban rule over portions of the country. Is that likely, given that we can't even sit down with, you know, actual Taliban? How can you even discuss the contours of post-war settlement if your interlocutors aren't real?

UPDATE: Thinking a bit more about this, it often seems that the term "political settlement" serves the same totemic function for progressives that the word "victory" does for conservatives - an aspirational goal that starts to fall apart the minute it's subjected to serious scrutiny. What's frequently meant by the term political settlement is to have U.S. and NATO forces leave Afghanistan and let the chips fall where they may. But rather than defend that argument, it's couched in terms that make it more palatable to the public.

After all, it's not like both Bush and Obama administrations have not been seeking a political settlement or actively engaging regional stakeholders. It's just that those regional stakeholders have conflicting ideas for what an ideal post-war Afghanistan looks like and so those efforts tend to run aground.

At root, both the case for "victory" and the case for a "political settlement" in Afghanistan rest on a kind of evasiveness about the truly limited ability of the U.S. to orchestrate the fates of millions of people and multiple governments half a world away. Obviously, both outcomes are possible. The U.S. has won military victories before just as it has played a role in forging political settlements between warring parties. But in the case of Afghanistan what we seem to have among elite opinion is a group that wants to stay and a group that wants to leave, and both are groping for whatever arguments buttress that case.

November 19, 2010

Counterinsurgency 101

“Why do you have to blow up so many of our fields and homes?” a farmer from the Arghandab district asked a top NATO general at a recent community meeting.

Although military officials are apologetic in public, they maintain privately that the tactic has a benefit beyond the elimination of insurgent bombs. By making people travel to the district governor’s office to submit a claim for damaged property, “in effect, you’re connecting the government to the people,” the senior officer said. - Washington Post

November 18, 2010

Karzai's Pandering

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John Guardiano thinks that Hamid Karzai's criticisms of U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan isn't terribly significant because Karzai is a "politician pandering to both his domestic political base and his political paymasters in Washington."

I'm not sure how this is supposed to ease people's concerns. In fact, the way in which Mr. Karzai chooses to pander to his domestic base is precisely what's alarming. Notice what Karzai thinks will sell to the Afghans. It's not "I'm hoping Petraeus helps hunt down and destroy the last of the Taliban." It's pointed criticisms of American and NATO forces. Guardiano is right to note that Karzai is simply playing politics, but in this case the politics of Afghanistan cut in favor of trashing the U.S. and NATO. Which is something of a problem.

(AP Photo)

Nation Building in Afghanistan

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Supporters of nation building in Afghanistan frequently argue that such a strategy was never actually tried during the Bush years and that attempting to do strictly "counter-terrorism" operations in the country would just repeat the mistakes of the Bush administration. This defense never struck me as very plausible, because while the Bush administration may have under-resourced their nation building effort, they had more ambitious goals for Afghanistan than simply driving out al-Qaeda.

This is now confirmed by none other than President Bush himself:

In his memoir, one chapter of which is devoted to Afghanistan, Bush writes that "Afghanistan was the ultimate nation building mission. We had liberated the country from a primitive dictatorship, and we had a moral obligation to leave behind something better. We also had a strategic interest in helping the Afghan people build a free society," because "a democratic Afghanistan would be a hopeful alternative to the vision of the extremists."

It's impossible to understand why the U.S. has found it so difficult to achieve 'victory' in either Iraq or Afghanistan without understanding the role that lofty and unachievable goals have played in bogging us down.

(AP Photo)

November 15, 2010

Who's Running Afghanistan?

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Over the weekend, Afghan President Hamid Karzai gave an interview to the Washington Post where he decried American military raids in the country. Today, the Post reports that he's been scolded by General Petraeus:

Gen. David H. Petraeus, the coalition military commander in Afghanistan, warned Afghan officials Sunday that President Hamid Karzai's latest public criticism of U.S. strategy threatens to seriously undermine progress in the war and risks making Petraeus's own position "untenable," according to Afghan and U.S. officials.

Officials said Petraeus expressed "astonishment and disappointment" with Karzai's call, in a Saturday interview with The Washington Post, to "reduce military operations" and end U.S. Special Operations raids in southern Afghanistan that coalition officials said have killed or captured hundreds of Taliban commanders in recent months.

Then there's this, from an unnamed NATO official:

"I think it's [Karzai's] directness that really sticks in the craw," another NATO official said. "He is standing 180 degrees to what is a central tenet of our current campaign plan."

"It's pretty clear that you no longer have a reliable partner in Kabul," the official added. "I think we tried to paper it over with [Karzai's] Washington visit" in May. "But the wheels have becoming looser and looser . . . since that."

What do Western officials expect to happen when they turn things over to Karzai in 2011, 2014 or whenever?

(AP Photo)

November 11, 2010

Musharraf Attempts a Comeback

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There was an interesting event yesterday on Capitol Hill with former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, hosted (oddly) by former Republican Senator Rick Santorum and the Ethics and Public Policy Center. The former general and former coup architect seems hellbent on a return to political leadership, and took the time to, among other things, criticize President Obama for visiting India but not Pakistan on his recent four-nation trip:

"One would have preferred that he should have gone to Pakistan to give due importance to Pakistan, which is fighting extremism and terrorism in a lead role and being a strategic partner with the US on this issue," the Daily Times quoted Musharraf, as saying.

The former President further said that Obama's support of India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would not be viewed favorably in Pakistan.

Musharraf also emphasized that the ongoing drone strikes in Pakistan risk destabilizing the country.

"I don't think Pakistan is the problem, but there is no doubt there is terrorism and extremism. The centre of gravity of all of this is Afghanistan. Pakistan is the victim of all this. We need to see Pakistan sympathetically," Musharraf said.

While he had some other critiques for India, Musharraf saved some of his toughest criticism for the question and answer period, where he bristled at our questions regarding his prior tenure - particularly those questions regarding Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. "Three hundred ISI operatives have died, but we think they are cooperating?" he said, without denying that much if not all of the ISI supports the Taliban. In another DC appearance, he called for slow-playing any restrictions on the radical Islamic group Lashkar-e-Taiba:

"You can't rock the boat so much that the boat capsizes," Musharraf, a military ruler who stepped down in 2008 and is attempting a political comeback, said at the Atlantic Council think-tank in Washington.

"While these things have to be done, allow piecemeal, gradual action through a well thought-out strategy which does not disturb the entire law and order situation in Pakistan," Musharraf said.

Musharraf acknowledged that Lashkar-e-Taiba and like-minded groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad were "involved in terrorism in Pakistan" but said they have been "very popular" for fighting Indian rule in divided Kashmir.

"Since they were going to Kashmir and fighting the Indian army, it went along with the psyche of the people of Pakistan -- with everyone," Musharraf said.

There are certainly countries that promote men like Musharraf, and it's possible he could mount a political comeback - but so few are able to apply authoritarianism correctly, if there is such a thing. If Musharraf has no plans to push back against these internal forces, his usefulness to America seems minor at best. When nearly every Pakistan province currently has an active separatist movement, effectively turning a nation-state into a conglomeration of the ISI and a core group of Pakistani-nationalist elites, it is perhaps time to ask whether Pakistan would be better served by just becoming part of India.

In all seriousness, I also asked what Musharraf thought would happen if the Americans leave Afghanistan as scheduled in 2011. He dodged the question, maintaining that it would be a positive development as long as their goals on the ground were met. He also made sure to refer people to his Facebook page, where he has hundreds of thousands of fans.

(AP Photo)

November 10, 2010

No Plan B

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It's difficult to know what to make of this news:

A White House review of President Obama's Afghanistan strategy next month will judge "how this current approach is working" but will not suggest alternatives if aspects of the policy are found to be failing, a senior administration official said Tuesday.
So if a policy is deemed to be failing in Afghanistan, the administration plans to continue that policy regardless?

(AP Photo)

November 9, 2010

Jacksonians & Afghanistan

Michael Gerson sees "Jacksonian" Republicans making trouble for President Obama's foreign policy:

Even without a developed tea party foreign policy, the center of gravity on Capitol Hill is likely to shift in a Jacksonian direction. Historian Walter Russell Mead describes this potent, populist foreign policy tradition as "an instinct rather than an ideology." Today's Jacksonians believe in a strong military, assertively employed to defend American interests. They are skeptical of international law and international institutions, which are viewed as threats to American sovereignty and freedom of action. Jacksonians are generally dismissive of idealistic global objectives, such as a world free from nuclear weapons. Instead, they are heavily armed realists, convinced that America operates in an irredeemably hostile world. In particular, according to Mead, Jacksonians believe in wars that end with the unconditional surrender of an enemy, instead of "multilateral, limited warfare or peacekeeping operations."

But then he writes:

But the largest test case will be Afghanistan. Here Obama faces a rare challenge. His base of support for the Afghan War lies mainly in the opposing party, making Republican attitudes toward the war decisive. As Obama's July 2011 deadline for beginning the withdrawal of American troops approaches, any hint of civilian-military divisions on strategy could dramatically erode Republican support. Jacksonians like to win wars. But if Obama appears reluctant, they could easily turn against a war the president does not seem determined to win.

This doesn't make sense. In the prior graf, Gerson insists Jacksonians don't like "multilateral, limited warfare or peacekeeping operations." That's precisely what we're doing in Afghanistan. If anything, a spike in Jacksonian sentiment would lead to an erosion in support for an open-ended commitment to nation-building in Afghanistan, which is what the conservative defense establishment believes is necessary to secure American interests.

Indeed, a Jacksonian turn in the GOP would probably horrify Gerson who, along with his former boss, President Bush, is a purveyor of "idealistic global objectives" such as ridding the world of tyranny.

Afghanistan: View from the Ground

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The Asia Foundation has released a comprehensive survey of Afghan public opinion. Some key findings:


In 2010, 47% of respondents say that the country is moving in the right direction.

Insecurity (including attacks, violence and terrorism) is also identifed as the biggest problem in Afghanistan by over a third of respondents (37%), particularly in the South East (51%), West (43%) and South West (42%).

Unemployment remains the second biggest problem, mentioned by 28% of respondents. Corruption is identified by 27% of respondents making it the third biggest problem in 2010, and marking a significant increase from 2009 when it was mentioned by 17%. A poor economy
(11%), lack of education (11%) and poverty (10%) also continue to be identified amongst Afghanistan’s biggest problems.

Support for the Government’s approach for negotiation and reintegration of armed opposition groups is significantly higher in 2010 than in 2009. Eighty three percent of respondents support the government’s attempts to address the security situation through negotiation and reconciliation with armed anti-government elements, compared to 71% in 2009. Support is highest in the East (89%), South East (85%) and North West (85%) and lowest in the Central/Hazarajat region (78%).

Full survey here. (pdf)

November 3, 2010

Will Congress Support America's Wars?

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Kori Schake believes the Obama administration will find at least some support for its war policies in the newly empowered GOP:

But the president is not going to carry liberal Democrats on the wars whether or not he sticks to his politically-driven 2011 drawdown. "Ending combat operations" in Iraq has not been the improvement in security the president promised, as Tuesday's bombings sadly illustrate, and the president can ill afford such an outcome in "the good war." Liberal disaffection was less a problem for Democrats than the stampede of independents to the right; moderating his timeline to achieve the objectives of the war would likely appeal to them.

I'm not so sure that's the case. The war in Iraq has been deeply unpopular with a majority of Americans for years now, including independents. Support for the war in Afghanistan is similarly declining and there's no indication that independents would welcome a presidential commitment to never leave the country victory.

Indeed, while the conservative defense establishment remains enthusiastic about the prospect of transferring more American wealth to Hamid Karzai and his various hangers-on, any serious effort to repair the American balance sheet will have to take a cold, hard look at the scope of the commitments to Iraq and Afghanistan. Perhaps that's why the GOP's Pledge to America eschewed any high-sounding rhetoric about winning in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(AP Photo)

October 27, 2010

Ask Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs is hosting a Q&A with their editor Gideon Rose on Afghanistan and his new book: How Wars End. If you'd like to submit a question to Rose, you can email us at: info-at-realclearworld.com with "Foreign Affairs Q&A" in the subject. We'll select the best questions to send along to Foreign Affairs.

October 26, 2010

Most Corrupt Countries in the World

Transparency International has released their 2010 corruption perception index. The most corrupt country in the world is Somalia, followed by Myanmar, Afghanistan and Iraq. That doesn't exactly reflect well on U.S. efforts. Incidentally, the U.S. is tied for 22nd with Belgium. And the least corrupt country: it's a three-way tie between Denmark, New Zealand and Singapore.

British Views on Afghan War

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As with Canada, support for the Afghanistan war in the United Kingdom is cratering, with opposition to the war reaching its highest point in a new Angus Reid survey:

This month, 32 per cent of respondents (down one point since August) support the military operation involving UK soldiers in Afghanistan, while 60 per cent are opposed (up three points).

Three-in-ten Britons (60%, +6) believe the country made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan. Half of respondents (50%, +4) claim to have a clear idea of what the war in Afghanistan is about.

When asked about what they believe will be the most likely outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan, only eight per cent of Britons predict a clear victory by U.S. and allied forces over the Taliban, and 31 per cent foresee a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and allied strength that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government.

In addition, one-in-five respondents (20%) expect a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and allied weakness that gives the Taliban a significant role in the Afghan government, and 11 per cent believe the Taliban will ultimately defeat the U.S. and allied forces.

Full results here. (pdf)

(AP Photo)

October 25, 2010

Canadian Views on Afghanistan

According to Angus Reid, Canadian support for the mission in Afghanistan has reached a new low:

In the online survey of a representative national sample of 1,009 Canadian adults, just over a third of respondents (35%, -4 since August) support the military operation involving Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan—the lowest level recorded over the past two years. More than half of respondents (55%, +2) oppose the war.

The level of “strong opposition” to the war outranks the level of “strong support” by a 3-to-1 margin (34% to 11%). Practically half of Quebecers (49%) say they “strongly oppose” the operation.

Almost half of Canadians (47%, -4) think Canada made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan, while one third (32%, -6) believe it was the right thing to do. The only area where a plurality of respondents stands by Canada’s decision is Alberta (43% to 38%). Across the country, 53 percent of respondents feel that they have a clear idea of what the war in Afghanistan is all about.

There was little fluctuation on the question related to the outcome of the war. More than a quarter of respondents (27%) expect to see a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and NATO strength that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government.

Only six per cent foresee a clear victory by U.S. and NATO forces over the Taliban, 15 per cent believe that the Taliban will play a significant role in Afghanistan after the war is over, and the same proportion (15%) think that U.S. and NATO forces will ultimately be defeated.

Full results here. (pdf)

October 19, 2010

Obama's Pakistan Charm Offensive

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Looks like we won't be "shorting" Pakistan anytime soon:

As Pakistani civilian and military leaders arrive here this week for high-level meetings, the Obama administration will begin trying to mend a relationship badly damaged by the American military’s tough new stance in the region.

Among the sweeteners on the table will be a multiyear security pact with Pakistan, complete with more reliable military aid — something the Pakistani military has long sought to complement the five-year, $7.5 billion package of nonmilitary aid approved by Congress last year. The administration will also discuss how to channel money to help Pakistan rebuild after its ruinous flood.

But the American gestures come at a time of fraying patience on the part of the Obama administration, and they will carry a familiar warning, a senior American official said: if Pakistan does not intensify its efforts to crack down on militants hiding out in the tribal areas of North Waziristan, or if another terrorist plot against the United States were to emanate from Pakistani soil, the administration would find it hard to persuade Congress or the American public to keep supporting the country.

As with concerns that America is going to "abandon" Europe because of its defense cuts, this is an empty threat. As long as bin Laden and the rump elements of al-Qaeda's leadership are in Pakistan and as long as the U.S. is working to stabilize Afghanistan, we are going to need to have some kind of working relationship with Pakistan that involves transferring American tax dollars to its military. I suppose we need to engage in a song and dance about this, but it's not going to change the basic reality of the situation.

(AP Photo)

October 18, 2010

The Great Game 2.0

I'm not going to pretend to be an expert on the foreign policy of Imperial Britain in the 19th and early 20th centuries, but what little I know of it makes me dubious of this argument from Thomas Barnett and, by extension, Robert Kaplan:

Where do Afghanistan and Pakistan fit into this "new Great Game," as Kaplan dubs it? They stand between, on the one hand, India and China and, on the other, all the energy that pair of rising behemoths needs to access in the Persian Gulf and Central Asia. So the current effort in Afghanistan is not a case of America imposing globalization's connectivity on places where it was never meant to go. Instead, it represents -- like in Iraq -- another situation where the U.S. is making dangerous places just safe enough for Asian powers to access much-needed energy and mineral resources.

As I understood it, Britain waged its "Great Game" against Russia for influence in Central Asia and the outskirts of the Ottaman Empire because Britain wanted to protect the trade routes it had between England and India. In other words, there was a clear strategic rationale for why Britain played the Great Game and the aim was to benefit Britain. Barnett argues that the U.S. should continue nation building in Afghanistan on behalf of India and China. But what's in it for the United States?

Barnett argues that we'd be a "stabilizer" between two rising powers, but one has to wonder how much of a role Western troops fighting and dying in Afghanistan should really play in that balancing effort.

The Benefits of Off-Shore Balancing

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By Robert Pape

Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago specializing in international security affairs. He currently serves as Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism. This analysis first appeared on the CPOST blog.

Kori Schake, a valuable participant in our Capitol Hill conference on “Cutting the Fuse,” raises a number of important issues with the policy of off-shore balancing. I am delighted to respond and believe our exchange is an example of thoughtful thinking about how to move beyond the War on Terror.

Schake is right that U.S. policy makers are well-meaning; sending our ground troops overseas to advance our interests. But she overlooks how our ground forces often - and inadvertently - produce the opposite of what they intend: more anti-American terrorists than they kill. In 2000, before the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, there were 20 suicide attacks around the world and one (against the USS Cole) was anti-American. In the last 12 months, by comparison, 300 suicide attacks have occurred and over 270 were anti-American. We simply must face the reality - no matter how well-intentioned, our current war on terror is not serving American interests.

Schake is also right that, once we know that nearly all suicide terrorism occurs in response to military occupations by democracies, it is perfectly reasonable to ask "why some occupations and not others?" And, this has been a core element of my research, as readers will see in Chapter 1 of Cutting the Fuse and in my 2008 article in the American Political Science Review, among other publications.

In a nutshell, two factors matter.

The first is social distance between occupier and occupied, because the wider the social distance, the more the occupied community may fear losing its way of life. Although other differences may matter, research shows that occupations are especially likely to escalate to suicide terrorism when there is a difference between the predominant religion of the occupier and the predominant relation of the occupied.

Religious difference matters not because some religions are predisposed to suicide attack - indeed, there are religious differences even in purely secular suicide attack campaigns, such as the LTTE (Hindu) against the Sinhalese (Buddhists).

Rather, religious differences matter because it enables terrorist leaders to claim that the occupier is motivated by a religious agenda that can scare both secular and religious members of a local community – which is why bin Laden never misses an opportunity to describe U.S. occupiers as “Crusaders” – motivated by a Christian agenda to convert Muslims to Christianity, steal Muslim oil and resources, and change the local population’s way of life whether they liked it or not.

This first factor of religious difference explains why some occupations escalate to suicide terrorism, but not others – not only in recent times, but also in the past – such as why the Japanese started kamikaze attacks in October 1944 to defend their home islands from U.S. occupation, while the Germans did not.

The second factor is prior rebellion. Suicide terrorism is typically a strategy of last resort, often used by weak actors when other, non-suicide methods of resistance to occupation fail. This is why we see suicide attack campaigns so often evolve from ordinary terrorist or guerrilla campaigns, as in the cases of Israel and Palestine, the PKK in Turkey, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, etc. So, if the South Koreans ever began to resist American military presence in a serious way, this would be more worrisome than it may at first appear.

On the next issue she raises, Schake is simply wrong that “an offshore balancing approach means that we will not be engaged with military forces on the ground.” As readers will see in throughout my book, working with local allies is a core element of off-shore balancing. And, America has used the strategy of off-shore balancing to great benefit numerous times and often in concert with local allies - in the Persian Gulf in the 1970s and 1980s, in 1990 to kick Saddam out of Kuwait and in 2001 to topple the Taliban (it controlled 90 percent of Afghanistan and 50 U.S. troops, U.S. air and naval power, and U.S. economic and political support for the Northern Alliance kicked them and al-Qaeda out of the country!).

Finally, I agree that replacing mass boots with mass drones would be a mistake - since vast numbers of air strikes could inflict more than enough collateral damage to incite terrorism in response - which is exactly what Cutting the Fuse explains, and it's also why off-shore balancing means responding with stand-off military forces against significant size terrorist camps like Tarnak Farms (a military base larger than the Pentagon), and not every third ranking cadre in individual houses in Quetta, where more selective or even non-military means may well be more effective.

I hope Ms. Schake will have an opportunity to read Cutting the Fuse and to consider the research behind it. Governor Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton - both heads of the 9/11 Commission - have, as did Thomas Schelling (Nobel laureate in Economics) and Adm. Gary Roughhead (the current Chief of Naval Operations). They too raised the issues Schake did (and more), and found convincing answers in the book.

(AP Photo)

If Not Off-Shore Balancing, Then What?

Daniel Larison picks up on the question of American policy and terrorism, arguing that Robert Pape's preferred "off-shore" strategy won't be very effective at quelling radicalism:

Long-term occupation is one form of this, but we would be foolish to think that we can routinely bomb another country without generating the same violent reaction. Instead of trying to force withdrawal, terrorist attacks would have the cessation of attacks as their goal. It is one thing to argue that we should not have a military presence in Afghanistan because it feeds the instability and violence the government is presumably trying to reduce, but it is quite another to claim that the U.S. can remove its forces from a country, reserve the right to continue attacking it at will, and that this still counts as a real withdrawal. The trouble here is that Pape seems not to have taken his own claims about the causes of terrorism as seriously as he should, which has given Schake an opportunity to dismiss his important and valid claims along with his more questionable recommendations.

I think this correct and there seems to be confirmation of this fact in the Pakistani tribal regions where the U.S. is essentially conducting the kind of covert battle that Pape seems to endorse for Afghanistan. But this raises an important question: if a large-footprint occupation is out and if a counter-terrorist campaign of the kind being waged in Pakistan is deemed just as radicalizing, what's left?

October 16, 2010

U.S. Views on Afghanistan

Via Rasmussen Reports:

A plurality of voters nationwide continues to believe the U.S. situation in Afghanistan will get worse in the next six months.

A new Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of Likely Voters finds that 46% feel this way, while only 22% believe the situation will get better. Another 22% think the situation will remain about the same as it is now.

These figures have improved slightly from last month, when only 18% felt the situation would get better and 48% thought the opposite.

Twenty-seven percent (27%) of voters believe all U.S. troops should be brought home from Afghanistan immediately, a finding that has remained largely unchanged since last November.

Although combat in Iraq officially ended, a plurality (37%) thinks that, over the next six months, the situation there will get worse. Twenty-eight percent (28%) think it will get better, and nearly as many (26%) think the situation will stay the same as it is now.

October 11, 2010

Where Are the Pakistan Hawks?

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There's been a growing realization in the U.S. that Pakistan is ultimately not going to change what it views as its fundamental national interests to suit Washington's desire to shore-up a (relatively) Taliban-free Afghanistan. This leaves the U.S. with two basic options. The first is to change the tone of its relationship with Pakistan, by threatening or actually cutting off U.S. aid and perhaps even using military force more overtly in the tribal region. This option - as outlined here a bit by Steven Metz - essentially argues that Pakistan better start fearing the U.S. more than India.

The second option would be to accept that some Pakistan/Taliban influence inside Afghanistan is inevitable and cut some kind of deal with the Taliban, which appears to be what the administration is doing.

The odd thing to note about this is how so few self-styled hawks have thus far come out in favor of the first option. During the Iraq war, we frequently heard demands to bomb Iran to disrupt its support for terrorists attacking U.S. troops. But Pakistani support for lethal insurgent groups in Afghanistan is similarly pervasive.

Indeed, there's a vast disconnect between how self-styled hawks treat Iran and Pakistan. Up and down the line Pakistan has been the more egregious transgressor on the things hawks say they care about: from developing nuclear weapons, proliferating nuclear weapons, harboring, training and sponsoring Islamist terrorist networks, supporting (however indirectly) attacks on U.S. troops in Afghanistan, undermining America's regional goals, attacking a democratic ally, to enduring bouts of military dictatorship and on and on. Yet when it comes time for threats and bellicosity, the hawks get positively nuanced when dealing with Pakistan.

Mind you, that's not a bad thing. It's just a bit odd.

October 7, 2010

Will Obama Get Tough on Pakistan?

Tom Ricks thinks the administration's patience has run dry and that a "rollup of ISI agents in Afghanistan" will commence soon. The telltale signs:

This would be done quietly, if possible, so the public signs would be reactions such as the kidnapping of Indian officials in Afghanistan, or bombing the Indian embassy again....

Shorting Pakistan is kind of a no-brainer: In the long one, which is the better ally to have, India or Pakistan?

Yes, but if Pakistan is uncooperative now, how much less so will they be after they're shorted?

Progress and Muslim Women in Afghanistan

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It was on this day in 2001 that the United States and Britain launched Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, which seems as proper a time as any to note an interesting contrast concerning our continuing conversation about the moderation of the Muslim world. This contrast comes from the Council on Foreign Relations transcript of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's remarks last week, where he repeated some of his prior calls for a movement of the moderates. But what stood out to me is this interesting story, which he notes in passing:

Malaysia is also a country that can play our part in terms of providing some leadership role in global affairs. For example, as part and parcel of the new engagement with the United States, we have decided that we should contribute in a positive way by being present in Afghanistan, because Malaysia has -- or Malaysia is one of the very few countries in the world that has something unique that other countries don't have: We can provide female Muslim doctors. That is much needed in Afghanistan, a society like Afghanistan.

So I promised President Obama that I would do it. And on the invitation of the Afghanistan government, as this is part of our help to reconstruct Afghanistan, in two weeks' time, the doctors will be in Afghanistan.

This is obviously a laudable step for Malaysia and the women involved. It's also a positive sign in terms of paired U.S.-Malaysian security interests in Afghanistan (though of course, the medical mission is headed there at the request of the Afghan government), which will hopefully continue. Najib spoke to several writers during his time in New York, including myself, and while a longer piece will come shortly concerning his responses to several questions on security and economic policy, his remarks on this mission are worth sharing in full:

I committed to agreeing that we should have a presence in Afghanistan, and the advance party is already in Afghanistan -- the main body will be there by the middle of October, because we had to construct accommodations for them.

We decided to be part of the reconstruction in Afghanistan, specifically sending a medical team, because we have one thing very few countries in the world can provide: Muslim women doctors.

In a very conservative society there, the women would rather be treated by Muslim women doctors, and Malaysia is one of the very few countries that can provide this. We'll be sending one doctor, one dentist, and five medical orderlies now and more as part of a larger contingent. And that's a very good start I think...

There's a need for us to be part of the global community in addressing these concerns, and this is the advantage of where Malaysia is positioned, being a moderate Muslim nation, to lend support to a variety of global initiatives.

This is, indeed, a good start. Yet at the same time, it's a sign of how much the Muslim world in general lags behind the rest of the world when it comes to the plight of women. Contrast the plight of Muslim women in Afghanistan - an area where some small progress was made in the past several years, and much is now at risk - with the experience of women of the same faith in Malaysia, according to Najib's answer to Brooks Entwistle of Goldman Sachs:

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Brooks Entwistle, Goldman Sachs, based in India, in Mumbai. We as a firm were doing for many years in Malaysia; in fact, just opened a KL office, which we're delighted about.

My question today is about the role of women. You mentioned doctors from Malaysia to Afghanistan. There was a very interesting piece this week in the Herald Tribune on women leadership in Islamic finance and chairing some of the major banks. And I'd ask you just to comment further on that topic, but just more specifically the role of women in other leadership roles in Malaysia, and how that can play a leadership role in the Muslim world.

NAJIB: I would consider Malaysia in the forefront. In fact, the male species feels rather threatened in Malaysia now. If you look in terms of the entrance to university, 62 percent of undergraduates are women in Malaysia. I don't think any other Muslim or even non-Muslim country has that kind of record.

And major financial and economic ministries and agencies are held by women in Malaysia. Of course, the governor of central bank, our economic union, the top echelon of the Ministry of Finance, Treasury, they are all women. So women play a big part in Malaysia.

And in fact, we want more women as part of the labor force in Malaysia, I think, and also a greater role for women in Malaysia. And we have been wanting to have 30 percent of women to hold strategic and decision-making positions in the public and private sector. I hope we can -- we can achieve that in the near future.

The fact that Malaysia is at the forefront of women's rights in the Muslim world is of course a good thing for them. Yet one hopes that other notes of progress can be achieved under other Islamic regimes - and hopefully through softer methods, without the cost in lives and treasure of prolonged military engagement. The day when Afghanistan has no need for Malaysia's Muslim women doctors, because they have plenty of their own, will be a good one for all involved.

(AP Photo)

October 6, 2010

Dealing with Pakistan

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Max Boot wrestles with the Pakistan challenge:

The Obama administration has gotten slightly more muscular in its approach by stepping up drone strikes — a good idea. But at the same time, the president has made it harder to woo Pakistan because he has given credence to the notion that we are on our way out of Afghanistan. If that’s in fact the case — and I don’t believe it is — then Pakistan has no choice but to look after its own interests, and in the view of the Pakistani military, that means supporting jihadist proxy forces such as the Taliban. There is probably no way to wean the Pakistanis entirely off this strategy in the foreseeable future, but at least if Obama were to clarify his muddled rhetoric regarding a deadline for withdrawal and make it clear that the U.S. is in the region for the long term, he may change the incentive structure for the Pakistani officer corps and make it more palatable for them to take tougher action against terrorist groups, secure in the knowledge that we will not leave them in the lurch.

I think this overlooks a critical issue. It's not just America's wavering long-term commitment to Afghanistan that's making Pakistan hedge its bets with the Taliban - it's India's investment inside Afghanistan ($1.2 billion and counting). In fact, the more the U.S. stays and (in theory) stabilizes the country, the more hospitable Afghanistan will become to increased Indian investment and influence. And if past is prologue, Pakistan is not going look kindly on that development as it will be perceived as encirclement.

The length of time the U.S. stays, or says it will stay, inside Afghanistan isn't really going to matter much. The only way you can change Pakistan's calculus with respect to Afghanistan is to change their calculus with respect to India. And good luck with that.

(AP Photo)

Drones and Radicalization

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Glenn Greenwald argues that U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan are counter-productive, approvingly noting a Jim White post claiming that "Drone Strikes Provoke Terrorists Who Provoke More Drone Strikes." Greenwald writes:

What a surprise: bombing Muslims more and more causes more and more Muslims to want to bomb the countries responsible. That, of course, has long been the perverse "logic" driving the War on Terror. The very idea that we're going to reduce Terrorism by more intensively bombing more Muslim countries is one of the most patently absurd, self-contradicting premises that exists. It's exactly like announcing that the cure for lung cancer is to quadruple the number of cigarettes one smokes each day. But that's been the core premise (at least the stated one) of our foreign policy for the last decade: we're going to stop Terrorism by doing more and more of exactly the things that cause it (and see this very good Economist article on the ease with which drones allow a nation's leaders to pretend to its citizenry that they are not really at war -- as we're doing with Pakistan).

I think this is a bit glib, but the New America Foundation recently conducted an extensive poll in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) where U.S. drone strikes occur and the findings do corroborate this dynamic, to a degree. What they found is that FATA residents overwhelmingly opposed U.S. military action and supported attacks against U.S. troops in Afghanistan. But the majority were not supportive of the Taliban or al-Qaeda and indeed supported the Pakistani army's attacks on both groups. (which, presumably, involve bombings and killings). A large majority of FATA residents also said that suicide attacks against Pakistani police and army were never justified.

But the terror threat is more diffuse and complex than angered Pakistanis emerging from the ruin of their bombed-out homes in the tribal area to seek revenge against the West. Is Islamic solidarity really sufficient to explain why an Algerian, for instance, would wish to slaughter civilians in Europe on behalf of Pakistani tribesman?

(AP Photo)

September 27, 2010

Is Petraeus Making Blowback Respectable?

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One of the arguments that runs through the Obama administration's Afghan strategy debate (as recounted by Bob Woodward) is the idea, advanced by the U.S. military, that killing Afghans in pursuit of al-Qaeda and the Taliban is counterproductive without a broader effort to assuage their grievances and improve their country :

At the Nov. 11 meeting in which Obama expressed his frustration, Petraeus cited the war game as evidence that the hybrid option would not work.

It would alienate the Afghan people whom U.S. forces should be protecting, he said. "You start going out tromping around, disrupting the enemy, and you're making a lot of enemies. . . . So what have you accomplished?"

This makes sense. If you're just dropping bombs and assassinating people in a country without regard for much else, they're going to be resentful and seek retaliation. But why is this understanding never advanced to the strategic level? The terrorist threat to the U.S. is global. If we're so solicitous of Afghan civilians that we're willing to risk over 100,000 U.S. and NATO troops and invest billions of dollars into the country to guard against blow back, shouldn't we be considering the ramifications of U.S. policies elsewhere?

(AP Photo)

Drones Keeping Pakistanis Awake

According to a report in the China-owned Xinhau newspaper, Pakistanis living in the tribal zone have begun taking sedatives to help them sleep through all the drone attacks. Like so much about the quasi-secretive drone campaign, it's hard to tell if this is true or not.... but it doesn't sound surprising.

September 24, 2010

Thought for the Day

Trying to occupy and govern foreign societies that are rife with internal divisions, where there is a well-founded hatred of foreign intruders, wouldn't be easy for anyone. Indeed, trying to create a political system there based on our historical experience rather than theirs has got to be one of more ambitious -- if not utterly misguided -- objectives that Washington could have picked....

The solution is not to retreat into isolationism and cede the initiative to others. Rather, the solution is to remind ourselves what American power is good for, and avoid taking on tasks for which it is ill-suited. The United States is very good at deterring large-scale aggression, and thus good at ensuring stability in key regions. (That assumes, of course, that we aren't using that same power to destabilize certain regions on purpose). We are sometimes good at brokering peace deals -- as in Northern Ireland and the Balkans -- when we use our power judiciously and fairly. And we've often done a pretty fair job -- in concert with others -- at encouraging intelligent liberalization of the world economy. The United States is not very good at governing foreign societies, especially when the local inhabitants don't want us there and when we have little understanding of how they work. And if we keep trying to do this sort of thing, we're likely to look inept far more often than we look effective. - Stephen Walt

September 23, 2010

What About Victory in Afghanistan?

The leaked copy of the GOP's "Pledge to America" has absolutely nothing to say about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, much less any of the usual boilerplate about victory. Curious, no?

September 22, 2010

Absorbing Terrorist Attacks

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Marc Theissen is outraged that President Obama reportedly said that the U.S. could "absorb a terrorist attack."

These are stunningly complacent words from the man responsible for stopping such a terrorist attack. Obama uttered them last July, after America suffered two near-misses—the failed attacks on Christmas Day and in Times Square. Rather than serving as a wake-up call and giving the president a sense of urgency, these attacks seem to have given the president a sense of resignation. He is effectively saying: an attack is inevitable, we’ll do our best to prevent it, but if we get hit again—even on the scale of 9/11—it’s really no big deal.

In fact, it would be a big deal, particularly to the people who would bear the burden of “absorbing” another attack—the victims and their families. Obama’s statement is unimaginably cavalier about the deaths of nearly 3,000 people, and disturbingly resigned to the prospect of thousands more perishing in our midst.

First, what President Obama said seems correct. The U.S. can absorb a conventional terrorist attack and continue to function (a WMD attack would be a different story, but fortunately those are much harder to pull off). It's not as if President Obama is suggesting an attack is a good thing or that we should encourage them. In a free society, it's impossible - impossible - to stop every last individuals or small groups of people from committing acts of terrorism. Pretending otherwise, as Theissen appears to, is not only naive but infantile.

Now, the other point is whether this means the administration is "complacent" and "resigned" to future terrorist strikes. If one defines counter-terrorism as consisting of a set of policies beyond torturing people enhanced interrogation, I think it's hard to argue that they are. There's been an expedited drone war in Pakistan, a surge of troops into Afghanistan, and an uptick in not-so-covert support to Yemen and Somalia. One would not embark on those policies if they took a blase attitude about the threat from al-Qaeda.

(AP Photo)

Afghanistan and the War at Home

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Everyone's aflutter over the new Bob Woodward tome documenting rifts in the Obama administration's war cabinet over the war in Afghanistan. In the early write-ups it appears that key members of the administration had serious misgivings about the counter-insurgency strategy championed by the military and many outside experts. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Ben Connable explains what is necessary for the U.S. to stabilize Afghanistan, and reading it, you understand the misgivings of folks like Holbrooke and Eikenberry:

If the United States seeks stability in Afghanistan, its strategy will have to deal with these realities. There can be no shortcuts; although it is possible to quickly defeat insurgents, dealing with root causes, a multitude of combatants, and havens will take time. And it will be expensive: the costs of such an effort are incalculable, since it is impossible to predict how long the violence in any insurgency will drag on.

Nevertheless, a careful study of insurgencies over the last 50 years suggests that what is needed in Afghanistan now is the patient application of a traditional counterinsurgency campaign for years to come. If done well, a long-term campaign could lead to a stable Afghanistan that is so inhospitable to the major Afghan insurgent groups that they wither into irrelevance or are forced to the bargaining table. Enduring stability in Afghanistan and a consequent shift in popular support for the government could, on balance, negate the strength the Taliban continues to draw from its sanctuary in Pakistan. And although a successful counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan will not ultimately solve the problem of terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan, neither do any of the other proposed policy options.

In other words, no one knows how to dry up terrorist sanctuaries in Pakistan. But even with a stable Afghanistan, secure safe havens in Pakistan will allow al-Qaeda to strike at American targets, even if fitfully and largely unsuccessfully. It seems to me that if we can't safeguard the U.S. from terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan no matter what we do in Afghanistan, than we should not pursue a strategy with the highest costs associated with it.

September 20, 2010

U.S. Leadership Looking Up in Asia

Via Gallup, it seems the Obama administration has made some modest strides in bolstering America's image in Asia:

Approval of U.S. leadership in Asia has seen its share of ups and downs over the last two years as the Bush era ended and the Obama era began. So far in 2010, approval ratings remain higher than they were in 2008 in 10 out of the 18 countries surveyed. Approval increased most in Australia and New Zealand and declined most in Vietnam, Indonesia, and India, where residents are now significantly more uncertain...

In fact, in many other countries in the region where approval is lowest -- Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Indonesia -- about half or more of respondents do not have an opinion about U.S. leadership, but those who do are more likely to approve than disapprove. The number of respondents who express uncertainty about U.S. leadership has increased significantly since 2008 in India, Vietnam, Nepal, and Indonesia.

And where is approval for U.S. leadership the lowest? Pakistan and Afghanistan.

September 15, 2010

A Musharraf Come Back?

The Lede reports that Pakistan's former president is contemplating a comeback. Probably just what the embattled country does not need at the moment.

September 14, 2010

U.S. Views on Afghan Withdrawal

Via Rasmussen:

Twenty-seven percent (27%) of voters believe all U.S. troops should be brought home from Afghanistan immediately, a finding that has remained largely unchanged since last November.

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey shows that 16% more think a firm timetable should be established for bringing the troops home within a year. Forty-six percent (46%) oppose a firm timetable of any kind.

Defending the Afghanistan Study Group

Justin Logan thinks the critics of the Afghanistan Study Group are missing the point:

I am forced to conclude that neither Foust nor Exum understands what strategy is. It is not, pace Foust, induced by piling up mounds of granular operational and tactical detail and then seeing what one can shape out of the pile. Instead, those engaged in strategy must attempt to discern and state clearly the interests at stake (in this case those the United States has in Afghanistan or the region more broadly) and then to attempt to connect the complex chain of ends, ways, and means in order to explain how best to pursue those interests. I thought the report was fairly clear on the task force’s views on America’s interests and in proposing to bring America’s exertions better into line with its interests. Thoughtful critiques would engage either on the grounds that the authors have misconstrued (a) America’s interests, (b) how best to pursue them, or (c) both.

Update: Foust responds to his critics here.

September 13, 2010

Boots on the (Afghan) Ground

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Via Andrew Sullivan, Joshua Foust joins the chorus crying foul on the Afghanistan Study Group report. I haven't finished reading the report yet, but many of the concerns Foust raises strike me as valid, so his take-down is well worth a look. This bit, though, I'm not so sure about:

[T]he best way to ensure Afghanistan does not fall into chaos is to leave the country as stable as possible. Reducing it to a Special Forces and Drone targetting range, which the group recommends, is just as unsustainable in the long run as the current counterinsurgency effort. Maintaining an active drone program to preemptively bomb any new al Qaeda camps that might spring up will be difficult if not impossible without a massive human intelligence network to support it—and that HUMINT network cannot be maintained without a significant U.S. military and intelligence presence in the country (which is difficult to do if 80% of the force is withdrawn over the next 18 months, as ASG suggest).

By all accounts, the U.S. is running a fairly aggressive drone campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban inside Pakistan without anywhere near the same number of troops on the ground that we currently have in Afghanistan. If we don't need 100,000-plus coalition troops inside Pakistan to wage an effective drone war against al-Qaeda there, why do we need them in Afghanistan?

(AP Photo)

Bad Options in Afghanistan

Max Boot is alarmed at the feckless second guessing of the Afghanistan Study Group's recommendations for an alternative strategy for the war. Boot writes:

The Taliban are a determined, well-armed insurgency group and they see no reason to reach a power-sharing deal, no matter what “regional and global stakeholders” say. Of course, there is not a hint of how key stakeholders such as Iran and Pakistan, which support the Taliban, can be convinced to cut them off. Instead, there is a blind hope that somehow “economic development” will ameliorate Afghanistan’s woes in the face of abundant evidence that the economic aid provided since 2001 has instead made the situation worse in many respects, by fueling out-of-control corruption.

This of course raises all kinds of red flags about any strategy for Afghanistan. I mean, do COIN advocates have a plausible strategy for getting Pakistan to cut the Taliban loose?

If At First You Don't Succeed

A report in the Indian paper Rediff details how Pakistan asked the Bush administration not to overthrow the Taliban following 9/11 and tried to avoid capturing bin Laden themselves so as to "avoid the fallout" -

The ISI's proclivity with Taliban and Al Qaeda is well known. The recently released wikileaks and now these documents extracted from National Security Archive Electronic Briefing speak volumes about the deep running alliance.

Ironically, nine years down the line, Pakistan is again pushing hard to reconcile with the Taliban, and this time, the US and NATO are supporting it.

September 10, 2010

Afghans Less Confident About Election

Gallup's latest isn't surprising:

Afghans' increasing lack of confidence in the honesty of their elections, along with major security concerns, could keep some from voting next week in the country's second parliamentary elections. Gallup surveys show the percentage of Afghans who do not trust their electoral process spiraled from 49% just after last year's fraud-marred presidential election to 67% earlier this year.

September 9, 2010

Goal Shifting in Afghanistan

Paul Pillar puts it succinctly:

The counterinsurgency, with its goals of defeating the Afghan Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan, has come to be treated as if it were an end in itself. It is not an end in itself. It is the result of a nine-year-long mission creep that has accompanied a deterioration of security conditions in Afghanistan, which in turn has accompanied the nine-year military presence there. It represents a major displacement from the original reason for a military intervention in 2001, which was to roust Al Qaeda from its Afghan home and to oust from power its then-allies in the Taliban.

September 7, 2010

Afghan Literacy

Not so much:

The U.S. military is mounting a massive effort to help teach Afghan soldiers and police to read after concluding that literacy is “the essential enabler” to the local security forces’ success.

“How do you expect a soldier to account for their weapon if they can’t even read the serial number?” said Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, head of the NATO-led effort to train the Afghan national security forces.

“It’s really challenging for some people to fully appreciate just how illiterate most of this population is,” Caldwell said. “It doesn’t mean they don’t have street sense and they’re not smart in many ways. But they don’t have the education … to look at a series of numbers and be able to read it.”

The literacy rate for incoming Afghan army and police recruits is about 14 percent to 18 percent, Caldwell said.

Is anyone teaching the Taliban how to read?

Playing into Bin Laden's Hands

Upset that President Obama wants to curtail America's costly and open-ended commitment to nation building and counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, Marc Thiessen invokes a letter from bin Laden outlining his strategy for bleeding America in a long insurgency, to argue in favor of.... staying and bleeding:

The talk of withdrawal was damaging, but this pivot to domestic priorities was the most dangerous part of Obama's speech -- because what our enemies heard was that their strategy to defeat America is working. In a letter to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, uncovered by coalition forces in 2002, Osama bin Laden explained that the way to get the United States to quit Afghanistan is to convince Americans "that their government [will] bring them more losses, in finances and casualties." As this message takes hold, bin Laden told Mullah Omar, it will create "pressure from the American people on the American government to stop their campaign against Afghanistan." Bin Laden calls this his "bleed until bankruptcy" strategy, and he has expressed confidence it will work, because the Taliban and al-Qaeda possess something that President Obama clearly lacks -- strategic patience. As bin Laden explained a 2004 video, time is on his side: "We . . . bled Russia for 10 years, until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat. . . . So we are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. Allah willing, and nothing is too great for Allah." What bin Laden heard last Tuesday was that the "bleed until bankruptcy" approach is having its intended effect. America, bin Laden heard, has tired of the costs of war and is beginning to pull back -- first from Iraq and eventually from Afghanistan -- so we can focus on rescuing our teetering economy.

I am assuming Thiessen is citing this account of al-Qaeda files discovered in Afghanistan shortly after the Taliban fell. From that, it's clear that the U.S. played rather directly into bin Laden's hand (particularly in Iraq) - getting itself stuck in large, conventional ground wars with insurgent forces that dragged on for years. We played to their strengths, and not ours. And, as bin Laden predicted, it has been costly. Even if you don't accept the $3 trillion-plus figure floated by Joseph Stiglitz over the weekend, the costs in blood and treasure have been steep.

Look, I'm no Sun Tzu, but usually when your enemies express a desire for you to do X, shouldn't you avoid doing X?

September 6, 2010

The Long War

In the course of arguing why Osama bin Laden remains relevant, Peter Bergen draws attention to some conflicting currents in America's counter-terrorism strategy:

Al Qaeda and like-minded groups have attracted dozens of U.S. citizens and residents as foot soldiers. According to a count by Andrew Lebovich of the New America Foundation, in 2009 at least 43 American citizens or residents aligned with Sunni militant groups or their ideology were charged with terrorism crimes in the United States or elsewhere, the highest number in any year since 9/11. So far in 2010, at least 18 have been similarly charged or convicted.

And then:

While bin Laden himself may have vanished like a wraith, intelligence about other militant leaders in the Pakistani tribal areas has markedly improved in the past couple of years. In 2007 there were just three drone strikes reported there; in 2008 there were 34; the Obama administration has already authorized more than 100. Those drones have killed at least a dozen mid and upper-level leaders of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.

While I think we need to be careful about drawing too tight a casual link between the uptick in U.S. military activity in Pakistan and the increase in American citizens signing up for jihadism, this phenomena should give us pause. The U.S. has been waging large scale military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq for approaching a decade. If the pattern continues into the next, will more and more Americans become seduced by bin Laden's siren song?

August 31, 2010

Gas Attacks in Afghanistan

I don't believe that the fate of Afghan women should be used as a moral cudgel against those who object to the current U.S. strategy. That said, this is disgusting:

Blood tests have confirmed that a series of mysterious mass sickenings at girls’ schools across the country over the last two years were caused by a powerful poison gas, Afghan officials said Tuesday.

The sickenings had long been officially dismissed as episodes of mass hysteria, caused by the frequency of arson and acid attacks directed at schoolgirls by the Taliban and other extremists who oppose their education.

How the gas was delivered — and even whether the poisonings were deliberate — remained a mystery, the officials emphasized. There have been no fatalities, and no one has ever claimed responsibility for the episodes. But the cases have been reported only in girls’ schools, or in mixed schools during hours set aside only for girls.

August 20, 2010

British Support for Afghan War Falls

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According to Angus Reid only 33 percent of UK citizens support the war in Afghanistan while 57 percent oppose it. Support for the mission has fallen since June, when 38 percent of British respondents said they supported the effort. Among the other findings:

A majority of Britons (54 percent) believe the country made a mistake in sending military forces to Afghanistan. Less than half of respondents (46 percent) claim to have a clear idea of what the war in Afghanistan is about.

When asked about what they think will be the most likely outcome of the conflict in Afghanistan, only seven per cent of Britons predict a clear victory by U.S. and allied forces over the Taliban, and 31 percent foresee a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and allied strength that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government.

In addition, 19 percent of respondents expect a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and allied weakness that gives the Taliban a significant role in the Afghan government, and 10 per cent believe the Taliban will defeat the U.S. and allied forces.

Angus Reid released a similar survey of U.S. public opinion on the war yesterday.

(AP Photo)

August 19, 2010

Surge Lessons for Afghanistan

If the purpose of the surge was to create a space for political reconciliation and a reduction in sectarian violence, which would in turn lead to the creation of a strong and stable government in Iraq that was capable of balancing against Iran and otherwise serve as a bulwark in the region, and if neither of these things have happened, then how can we call the surge a success? And if the surge is not the great success that the advocates of the surge would have you believe, then how much confidence should we have in their advice as it pertains to Afghanistan? - Christopher Preble

General Petraeus conceded on Meet the Press that the success of the Iraq surge has yet to be determined, which doesn't exactly augur well for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. And again, it goes back to the fundamental question: what does the U.S. buy if the surge "succeeds" in Afghanistan? Are we demonstrably safer from international terrorism? Will the gains be worth the costs?

U.S. Support for Afghan War Falls

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According to a new poll from Angus Reid, 47 percent of Americans support the mission in Afghanistan, down from 54 percent in February of this year. More than half (52 percent) of respondents said they had no "clear idea" what the war was about and 65 percent are not confident that President Obama will "finish the job."

(AP Photo)

August 13, 2010

The Football

Last summer, I met with a special ops officer who compared America’s relationship with Pakistan to the recurring “Peanuts” gag in which Lucy offers to hold a football so that Charlie Brown can kick it. “Every time Charlie Brown thinks she’s going to hold the football still, and each and every time, she pulls it away just as he’s about to kick,” he said. Shaking his head incredulously, he added: “And then he just lines up to try and kick it again and again.” That some observers, including myself, had begun to believe that Pakistan had reformed its behavior in early 2010 now seems preposterous. - Nicholas Schmidle
The U.S. military has stopped lobbying Pakistan to help root out one of the biggest militant threats to coalition forces in Afghanistan, U.S. officials say, acknowledging that the failure to win better help from Islamabad threatens to damage a linchpin of their Afghan strategy.

Until recently, the U.S. had been pressing Islamabad to launch major operations against the Haqqani network, a militant group connected to al Qaeda that controls a key border region where U.S. defense and intelligence officials believe Osama bin Laden has hidden.

The group has been implicated in the Dec. 30 bombing of a CIA base in Khost, a January assault on Afghan government ministries and a luxury hotel in Kabul, and in the killing of five United Nations staffers in last year's raid on a U.N. guesthouse.

But military officials have decided that pressing Pakistan for help against the group—as much as it is needed—is counterproductive. - Barnes, Gorman & Wright

On the bright side, when you stop trying to kick the football, you won't look the fool.

August 12, 2010

Canadians Oppose Afghan Mission

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A new poll from Angus Reid shows that a majority of Canadians (53 percent) oppose the mission in Afghanistan. That's down from 47 percent from a similar survey taken in February of this year.

Among the poll's other findings: 43 percent of Canadians think it was a mistake to send troops to Afghanistan in the first place, while 44 percent don't have a clear idea of what the war is about. Canadians don't have much faith in President Obama to "finish the job" (only 32 percent think he will).

(AP Photo)

August 10, 2010

Afghans, Pakistanis See Terror Fight Lagging

According to Gallup, neither Afghans or Pakistanis have a high view of their country's efforts against terrorism:

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Pakistanis aren't much happier: 44 percent of adults say Afghanistan isn't doing enough to control cross-border terrorism while 41 percent say their own country's efforts fall short.

August 3, 2010

American Views of Afghan Draw Down

A fresh poll from Zogby International tackles President Obama's Afghan policy:

A plurality of likely voters (45%) say President Obama should carry through on his plan to begin troop withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2011, with 35% saying he should not.

In the same Zogby Interactive poll of 2,389 likely voters conducted from July 27-29, 2010, 32% say the military operations to defeat the Taliban and strengthen the Afghan government are going poorly. A combined 20% give positive grades (2% excellent, 17% good) to these military operations, and 44% rate them as fair.

They also asked voters about military spending: 36 percent felt the U.S. spent too much, 30 percent said too little, and 24 percent said just right.

American Views of Afghan War

New polling from Gallup indicates that a majority of Americans (62 percent) think the war is going very or moderately badly. Americans are also questioning whether we should have invaded in the first place:

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I think it's less a question of whether we should have attacked al-Qaeda in Afghanistan after 9/11 (obviously we should have) but whether after we had successfully driven them out, it was a good idea to stick around and try to defend the institutions of a new Afghan state.

July 30, 2010

Why We're Failing in Afghanistan

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Max Boot sums it up in a nutshell:

Devine’s argument appears, on the surface, to be more hardheaded, but actually, it is almost as unrealistic — and not incompatible with Kristof’s fantasy, as I bet Kristof imagines that his “schools for all” option could be supplemented by Special Operations and CIA actions to keep the Taliban in check. Such operations worked well in the past, as Devine notes, when the CIA was helping the mujahideen resist Soviet rule and then again in 2001, when it was helping the Northern Alliance overthrow the Taliban. But there is a fundamental disparity between those situations and the one we face today. It’s much easier for a covert force to overthrow a government, especially an unpopular government like the Soviet-backed regime or the Taliban. Altogether more difficult is imposing the rule of law, extending the authority of a new government, and stamping out a tenacious insurgency. Those are the challenges that we face today in Afghanistan, and they can’t be accomplished by a handful of special operators. They require large troop numbers, and because the Afghan National Army still lacks adequate capacity to police the country, its efforts must be supplemented for the short-term by the U.S. and its NATO allies. [Emphasis mine]
Did you read anything in there about preventing al-Qaeda attacks on the American homeland? Neither did I. The Boot recipe for waging a huge counter-insurgency is only marginally related to our ability to stop al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a base from which to train and plot attacks against America (and even preventing al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan would not help us against al-Qaeda attacks originating in any number of countries). Devine's argument (unfortunately behind the WSJ's firewall) calls for a mission that is targeted at the proper ends - keeping al Qaeda off balance. That does not require any of the steps Boot prescribes. Waging a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan is not only far too ambitious, it's also basically irrelevant to our security needs.

(AP Photo)

The View from Pakistan

Pew Research has released a wide-ranging survey of attitudes in Pakistan. Some highlights:

* One in five have a positive view of President Zardari

* 51 percent are concerned about an extremist takeover of the country

* Pakistanis feel less threatened by al Qaeda (38 percent vs. 61 percent in 2009) and the Taliban (54 percent in 2010 vs. 73 percent in 2009)

* Pakistanis have negative views of both organizations - 65 percent hold an unfavorable view of the Taliban and 53 percent hold a dim view of al Qaeda.

* It's a different story with Lashkar e-Taiba, with just 35 percent of Pakistanis expressing a negative view of the group. "One-in-four Pakistanis express a positive assessment, while 40% offer no opinion," Pew noted.

* Pakistani views of the U.S. are poor. Notes Pew: "Along with Turks and Egyptians, Pakistanis give the U.S. its lowest ratings among the 22 nations included in the spring 2010 Pew Global Attitudes survey -- in all three countries, only 17% have a favorable view of the U.S. Roughly six-in-ten (59%) Pakistanis describe the U.S. as an enemy, while just 11% say it is a partner. And President Barack Obama is unpopular -- only 8% of Pakistanis express confidence that he will do the right thing in world affairs, his lowest rating among the 22 nations."

July 28, 2010

David Cameron on Pakistan

The British Prime Minister continues his making friends and influencing people tour:

David Cameron today sparked a furious diplomatic row with Islamabad after accusing elements of the Pakistani state of promoting the export of terrorism.

In the strongest British criticism of Pakistan so far, the prime minister warned Islamabad it could no longer "look both ways" by tolerating terrorism while demanding respect as a democracy.

But in an angry response, Pakistan's high commissioner to Britain accused Cameron of damaging the prospects for regional peace, and criticised him for believing allegations in the Wikileaks documents published in the Guardian earlier this week.

I doubt publicly brow-beating Pakistan over their not-so-covert support for militant networks is going to work, but then again, will anything?

July 27, 2010

WikiLeaks and the COIN Consensus

Andrew Exum, writing in the pages of today's New York Times, shrugs at the WikiLeaks brouhaha:

ANYONE who has spent the past two days reading through the 92,000 military field reports and other documents made public by the whistle-blower site WikiLeaks may be forgiven for wondering what all the fuss is about. I’m a researcher who studies Afghanistan and have no regular access to classified information, yet I have seen nothing in the documents that has either surprised me or told me anything of significance. I suspect that’s the case even for someone who reads only a third of the articles on Afghanistan in his local newspaper. [Emphasis added - KS]

But is this really the case? "Move along, nothing to see here" certainly appears to be the consensus from the media and the policy community, but this is an incredibly small (albeit vocal) sample size of Americans. Broader survey data paints a slightly different picture of the American public's war understanding - one which is more confused, critical and mixed about the U.S. mission and prospects in Afghanistan.

I agree with Exum that much of the information revealed in the leaks was common knowledge to the commentariat and the think tankers, but I wonder if the same can be said so unequivocally of the greater public. Would support for the war radically change if, for instance, the American public better understood the Pakistani intelligence community's relationship with a co-conspirator in the 9/11 attacks? What about that aid package Washington just handed to Islamabad?

Exum would have us all believe that the WikiLeaks disclosures are both ho-hum and irresponsible journalism. Both may be true, but if there's been any kind of journalistic failure here it began not with WikiLeaks, but with the pundits and policy makers who have failed to enhance public understanding of the war. There was no need for such debate and education however, because a bipartisan consensus had already congealed around a counterinsurgency strategy.

Exum accuses WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange of being an activist with an agenda, which is no doubt true. But is Assange really the only one with an agenda here, or does his agenda simply not sit well will the COINdinistas?

July 26, 2010

WikiLeaks Observations

First the interesting, from Londonstani:

I think there is much more to this whole episode than whether or not you knew civilians were being killed in Afghanistan and former ISI officials were giving advice to insurgents in Afghanistan. This is about public opinion. Measuring what the public thinks and predicting how it might react to events is an imprecise science (much like the related fields of economics and sociology). But it's still very real. You might not know how it works but you can feel its effects when governments start clamping down on banks, launch military campaigns or pull troops out and come home.

And when it comes to public opinion, lots of vagaries start making a huge difference - like how you found out. When George Galloway suggested that British MPs were greedy, people rolled their eyes, nodded or smiled. The general thought was, "yeah. But they are politicians, what do you expect?" However, once the British MPs expenses scandal hit the headlines with details of taxpayers coughing up for duckhouses and flatscreen televisions, the result was a national political crisis.

We'll follow subsequent polling on U.S. sentiment toward Afghanistan, but I wonder: is this, as Andrew Bast wrote today, a "Pentagon Papers" moment? I lean towards "no," but we'll see.

Now the debatable, from Stephen Hayes:

Taken together, and added to what we know about support for al Qaeda and its affiliates from the regimes in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere, these reports should deal a fatal blow to the stubborn claims that the jihadists at war with us operate without the backing of states. Unlikely.

So, which state is supporting the Pakistani Taliban's efforts to overthrow the Zardari government?

That aside, I think this is a bit of red herring. There are terrorists organization that are state proxies (Hezbollah) and there are terrorist organizations that take aid and comfort where they can get it but don't exist for the purpose of perpetuating the policies of a single state (al Qaeda). This strikes me as an important distinction and not one we should casually discard.

WikiLeaks and 'Unrefined' Intel

With the release of what purports to be some several tens of thousands of intelligence documents from Afghanistan, the commentariat is atwitter with the possibility that people normally excluded from the intelligence process have been granted an all access pass to the inner sanctum. While I have not yet been able to read the reports due to a clogged WikiLeaks portal, most of these rules are precisely what was taught to me and what I taught to intelligence professionals throughout the military.

1) While 90K seems like a lot, it is only about 50 reports a day over a five year period. Many individual intel teams will generate that many reports on a busy day, and it only represents a very small fraction of the total intake of intel across Afghanistan. With so few reports it is possible that these reports were cherry picked, but even without deliberate selection bias, this is hardly an accurate picture.

2) Context is everything. There are literally dozens of things that a good analyst must take into consideration before giving credence to any report. Is the source honest? Is the source well informed? Are there other confirming reports? Does this really reveal anything? Human intelligence is notoriously easy to fake, and the more well known a person is the more likely you are to get reports on that person, usually false. Similarly, if people know that you suspect someone, they are often very willing to fabricate information to confirm your suspicion. Many times sources are just looking to get paid. For this reason single reports are basically useless. In fact, any source has to be evaluated over time, and against other intelligence. Without a lot of experience and access to broad spectrum information it is very difficult to evaluate intelligence.

3) Intelligence is perishable. Things change. If you tried to get a picture of someone based upon their Facebook page from the past five years, and assumed that it was all current across the entire time, you would likely be surprised by the number of twenty-somethings who were really into Britney Spears. Drawing conclusions in 2010 from links made across five years is hazardous at best.

4) People have agendas. Sources, WikiLeaks, the analysts (including me) all have things they are trying to accomplish. You do not and will not know their motives. But every level has filtered the information how they want. In the case of these leaked documents, the information has been filtered at least four times: the original source, the reporting officer, the leaking person and WikiLeaks. In at least two of those cases we know that part of the agenda is in opposition to the U.S. war effort, but we still have no idea how that filtered the information. More obviously, most readers will not read the actual documents, and will rely on people who claim to have read the documents and are writing for other media.

5) Just because something is secret does not mean it is important. The U.S. could probably declassify 90 percent of the things that are currently classified as 'secret' without hurting the mission one bit, because that information is either not true or unimportant. People keep secrets for all kinds of stupid and not stupid reasons, but that does not intrinsically mean it has any value.

If you want more information on the U.S. intelligence procedures as followed by the U.S. Military, refer to FM 2-0 (pdf).

David Benson has spent the last ten years in the intelligence community both in the U.S. and abroad, including seven years with the Army, and three years as a civilian contractor with a DoD Intelligence agency.

Pakistan, Iran and the Limits of American Power

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As Laura Rozen notes, there doesn't appear to be much in the WikiLeaks document dump that should surprise people who have been keeping up with the news on the Afghan war. Nevertheless, it serves to further confirm what the London School of Economics Study alleged earlier this year: that Pakistan is complicit in the Taliban insurgency and is actively undermining American goals in Afghanistan even while it receives billions of dollars in taxpayer money.

The revelations about Pakistan are interesting insofar as they highlight the contrast with U.S. policy on Iran. Both countries are supporting terrorist groups that have killed Americans. I would argue that Pakistan's support for terrorism is significantly more serious than Iran's because: 1. Pakistan's terror affiliates have the proven capacity and intention of striking the American homeland and killing American civilians; 2. Pakistan is facilitating the protection of the lead architects of 9/11. Nevertheless, Iran is no slouch when it comes to funding or arming terror groups.

Yet as the U.S. showers Pakistan with money and military hardware, it seeks to sanction and isolate Iran. And here's the rub: neither approach has been very effective. This is bad news for those who seek to engage Iran: the engagement with Pakistan has not convinced important constituencies in that country to cut ties with the Taliban or surrender their vision of Afghanistan as "strategic depth." It's also bad news for those who seek to get tough with Pakistan: getting tough with Iran hasn't changed Iranian behavior either.

I think a case can be made that engagement has moved Pakistan further toward U.S. goals than isolation, sanctions and belligerent threats have worked to move Iran toward U.S. goals. But the lack of progress on both fronts should serve as a reminder that there is a great distance to travel between being powerful and getting your way.

(AP Photo)

July 25, 2010

Where Is al-Qaeda Safest?

Describing Pakistan's lawless tribal belt near Afghanistan as the "global headquarters" of Al-Qaeda, top American military commander Mike Mullen has said the US believed that the terror network's chief Osama bin Laden and his deputy Aiman al-Zawahiri are in this country.

The presence of these terrorist leaders in the region is a reason why "a principal part of the overall Af-Pak strategy is focussed on elimination of safe havens" for them, Mullen told reporters in Islamabad last night.

His comments came days after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton ruffled feathers in Islamabad by making a similar statement. - Hindustan Times

One recurring fear that advocates of a counter-insurgency in Afghanistan invoke to press their case is that if the U.S. changes its strategy, al Qaeda will pull up stakes from Pakistan and move into Afghanistan to reclaim their former safe haven. This doesn't make much sense on the face of it: Pakistan seems like a much safer place for al Qaeda's leadership to reside than Afghanistan. Could you imagine the top U.S. diplomat and military leader waxing so ineffectual if bin Laden was in a country we could attack with impunity?

July 23, 2010

Karzai's Job Approval Sinking

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According to Gallup, Hamid Karzai's approvals are slipping:

At 44%, more Afghans approve of Karzai's individual leadership than they do the nation's leadership in general. However, his approval is down from 2009, and a majority (52%) disapproves for the first time. Karzai enjoyed majority approval throughout 2009, despite the election controversy last fall. His fellow citizens are more divided now, as they were in late 2008.

Things aren't looking so good for the U.S. either:

Afghans' approval of their country's leadership fell to 33% in April -- the lowest measured since 2008. More Afghans now approve of the job performance of U.S. leadership (43%) than they do their own.

July 19, 2010

Afghan Poll: Mixed Picture

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A new poll from the International Council on Security and Development found some mixed results from the Afghan people:

ICOS field research reveals a relationship gap between NATO-ISAF and the Afghan communities they are intended to protect. For instance 75% of interviewees believe that foreigners disrespect their religion and traditions; 74% believe that working with foreign forces is wrong; and 68% believe that NATO-ISAF does not protect them. 55% of interviewees believe that the international community is in Afghanistan for its own benefit, to destroy or occupy the country, or to destroy Islam.

These results are troubling, and demonstrate the mistrust and resentment felt towards the international presence in Afghanistan. Of those interviewed, 70% believe that recent military actions in their area were bad for the Afghan people, whilst 59% opposed further operations in Kandahar. According to interviewees, the Afghan government is also responsible by failing to provide good governance. 70% of respondents believe that local officials make money from drug trafficking, and an astonishing 64% state that government administrators in their area were connected to the Taliban insurgency.


On the flip side, the survey also found that 55 percent of those interviewed thought that NATO was winning in Afghanistan. Also:

Despite the 2009 presidential elections, which were marked by fraud, 40% of Afghan respondents stated that democracy was important to them, and 72% would prefer their children to grow up under an elected government rather than the Taliban.

There is some progress in women‟s rights, with 57% of interviewees supporting girls education. The field research also reveals that respondents have strong social and economic aspirations – the most popular uses for $5000USD would be establishing or expanding a business, and marriage.

The interviews also indicate that negativity is not directed solely against the international coalition, but also to other outside parties. 62% of the interviewees believe Pakistan played a negative role in their country and 56% felt negative about Iran‟s influence in Afghanistan.

(AP Photo)

July 15, 2010

U.S. Views on Afghanistan

From a recent CBS News poll:

Today, the poll finds, 62 percent of Americans say the war is going badly, up from 49 percent in May. Just 31 percent say the war in Afghanistan is going well.

Nine years into the war, 33 percent of Americans say they do not want large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for another year. Twenty-three percent of Americans say they are willing to have troops stay there for one or two more years.

Just 35 percent are willing to have troops stay longer than two years.

Most Americans -- 54 percent -- think the U.S. should set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Forty-one percent disagree.


July 13, 2010

U.S. Views on Afghan War

Gallup offers some new polling data on U.S. views of Afghanistan and of General Petraeus:

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Frank Newport offers his analysis:

Gallup finds both good news and bad news for Gen. Petraeus in this July 8-11 poll. He takes his new job as commander of U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan with a remarkably positive image among Americans who know who he is. At the same time, Petraeus now faces the additional challenge of commanding a mission that the majority of Americans say is going badly. Americans' views of the situation in Iraq improved during and after Petraeus' tenure as commander in that country. The degree to which Petraeus will be able to shift Americans' perceptions of the war in Afghanistan in similar fashion will have important consequences in many arenas, including the politics of the war in the U.S.

I think this last line is the key to understanding the surge, which is why I don't believe we can say definitively yet whether it has worked or not. The key metric is less what it does in Afghanistan, but the impression it leaves in Washington.

July 2, 2010

A Turning Point?

This week has brought two interesting revelations from the GOP in terms of foreign policy. The first was Representative Bachmann's claim that she didn't want to "bind the United States into a global economy." (Perhaps she's a secret devotee of Juche?)

The second, and more consequential, is this riff from Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele on the war in Afghanistan:

At a Republican Party fundraiser in Connecticut on Thursday, Steele declared that the war in Afghanistan "was a war of Obama's choosing" that America had not "actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in," in a response to an attendee's question about the resignation of Gen. Stanley McChrystal -- which Steele called "very comical."

"The McChrystal incident, to me, was very comical. And I think it's a reflection of the frustration that a lot of our military leaders have with this Administration and their prosecution of the war in Afghanistan," said Steele. "Keep in mind again, federal candidates, this was a war of Obama's choosing. This is not something the United States had actively prosecuted or wanted to engage in."

I highly doubt this presages a shift in the Republican attitude toward the war. But nevertheless, there is no intrinsically conservative/limited government argument for engaging in a multi-billion dollar social engineering scheme in the Hindu Kush. If the general public turns further south on the effort, will this line of argument gain greater traction among Republicans?.

July 1, 2010

U.S. Puts Number on Al Qaeda

The New York Times reports:

Michael E. Leiter, one of the country’s top counterterrorism officials, said Wednesday that American intelligence officials now estimated that there were somewhat “more than 300” Qaeda leaders and fighters hiding in Pakistan’s tribal areas, a rare public assessment of the strength of the terrorist group that is the central target of President Obama’s war strategy.

Taken together with the recent estimate by the C.I.A. director, Leon E. Panetta, that there are about 50 to 100 Qaeda operatives now in Afghanistan, American intelligence agencies believe that there are most likely fewer than 500 members of the group in a region where the United States has poured nearly 100,000 troops.

And it's not like these 100,000 troops are dedicated to finding and rooting out the 500 odd al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan. Instead, they're hunting down mid-level Pashtun Taliban commanders and attempting to extend the writ of the government in Kabul.

June 30, 2010

What Does Pakistan Want?

The Council on Foreign Relations has a good interview up with their Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia, Daniel Markey. Here's Markey on Pakistan's goals inside Afghanistan:


The Pakistanis would want to see an Afghanistan run by a collection of individuals who are at least sympathetic to Pakistan and who are committed to not seeing much in the way of Indian influence in Afghanistan. You really do have to trace this back to Pakistani concerns about being confronted on both eastern and western borders by India. Some of that is a bit obsessive, but that's certainly the way the Pakistanis have perceived developments in Afghanistan. They have seen a rising amount of Indian influence and a potential that they would be squeezed by both sides. So they want to make sure that they have preponderant and certainly dominant interests and influence in Kabul into the future. They will probably not be satisfied with anything short of that.

As Markey notes, the way the Pakistanis see their interests protected is by nurturing militant groups that have sheltered international terrorists in the past and would presumably do so again in the future. There's not much our counter-insurgency can do about that, unless we can combine it with a diplomatic effort to change Pakistan's strategic outlook.

What's a Life Worth?

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Both Matthew Yglesias and Ross Douthat raise an issue that's been under-discussed with respect to Afghanistan, and that's the issue of saving face. Yglesias writes that it was "churlish" of him to point out that the Iraq surge had failed based on the objectives laid out for it because it made Washington feel good about leaving the country. Similarly, Douthat claims that the objective of a counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is to "make it easier for leading U.S. policymakers to embrace a real withdrawal" - irrespective of obtaining any strategic objectives in the country.

There have been countless incidents in war when military commanders and/or their civilian leaders have made decisions that they knew would cost lives but were nonetheless essential to victory. There are also countless incidents when rulers sent armies off on fatal missions simply to assuage their imperial or monarchical vanity.

The U.S. has to think long and hard about where the current Afghan counter-insurgency falls on this continuum. It's one thing to risk the lives of American and Western soldiers because there is absolutely no other choice to safeguard our security. It's quite another to do so to make Washington's political establishment feel good about itself.

(AP Photo)

Wars Cost Money

We see once again that there is no substitute for a clear-headed commander in chief. Petraeus was successful in Iraq because he had the right strategy and a president who supported him fully. Had Petraeus not been given Ambassador Crocker to work with and had he not been given a wholehearted and, yes, open-ended commitment from the commander in chief, he might very well have failed.

Petraeus could have said to Obama that he wouldn’t take the job given the timeline — and he still could resign if it remains firmly in place. But at least for now he has chosen to operate with the ball and chain around his ankle. - Jennifer Rubin, 6/30/2010

War is a horrid prospect, as is the potential for massive loss of life – but not as horrid as that of a nuclear-armed Iran. Obama’s willingness to leave Israel to fend for itself or, worse, interfere with its ability to do so is not merely a betrayal of our democratic ally; it is an abdication of American responsibility that will resonate for years to come, signaling that the U.S. is no longer the guarantor of the West’s security. - Jennifer Rubin, 6/29/2010

An open-ended commitment to do whatever it takes in Afghanistan irrespective of the costs and the initiation of a new war against Iran. And yet Rubin appears to be worried about American debt.

Australians Call for Afghan Exit

Via Angus Reid, more deterioration in Western support for the Afghan mission:

The proportion of people in Australia who want to end their country’s commitment in Afghanistan has risen considerably, according to a poll by Essential Media Communications. 61 per cent of respondents think Australia should withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, up 11 points since March 2009.

On the contrary, 24 per cent of respondents say the Australian troops should stay in Afghanistan.

Australia has roughly 1,500 troops inside Afghanistan.

June 29, 2010

Americans Favor Afghan Timetable

According to Gallup:

A majority of Americans (58%) favor President Barack Obama's timetable that calls for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan beginning in July 2011. Most of the 38% of Americans who are opposed reject the idea of setting any timetable rather than setting one with an earlier or later date.

A further 7 percent want out sooner, while 1 percent think it should start later. As for President Obama's handling of the war:


The poll finds 50% saying Obama is doing a "very good" or "good" job, while 44% believe he is doing a "very poor" or "poor" job. Democrats give Obama high marks on Afghanistan, while Republicans mostly say he is doing a poor job.

A new Angus Reid poll also found support for President Obama's decision to junk General McChrystal: 53 percent supported the decision, 28 percent disapproved and 18 percent were unsure. Full results here. (pdf)

June 28, 2010

Over Invest?

The Bush administration made a decision back in 2002 not to over-invest in Afghanistan, to settle for very limited goals and to focus instead on Iraq. Candidate Obama fiercely opposed the Iraq war and called instead for a big new recommitment to Afghanistan.

Once elected president, Obama hesitated for months as he pondered whether to fulfill his pledges on Afghanistan. That delay suggests to me that the original commitment had been made for campaign purposes, and did not reflect a serious analysis of the costs and benefits of a big Afghan counterinsurgency.

Whatever Obama’s motives, the results of his long-pondered policy have been disappointing to everybody — and a sharp reminder of the reasons that president Bush opted against nation-building in Afghanistan. - David Frum, June 2010



President Bush today embraced a major American role in rebuilding Afghanistan, calling for a plan he compared to the one Gen. George C. Marshall devised for Europe after World War II, and vowed to keep the United States engaged in Afghanistan "until the mission is done."

Speaking before cadets at the Virginia Military Institute, Mr. Bush warned that military force alone could not bring "true peace" to Afghanistan, and that stability would come only after the war-ravaged country reconstructed its roads, health care system, schools and businesses — just as Europe and Japan did after 1945. - James Dao, New York Times, April 2002.


Efficiency in the War on Terror


This seems rather inefficient:

A key tenet of this policy, as Obama has reiterated frequently, is to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda.”

The U.S. has committed nearly 100,000 troops to the mission in Afghanistan. ABC This Week host Jake Tapper asked CIA Director Leon Panetta how big is the al Qaeda threat that the soldiers are combating:

TAPPER: How many Al Qaeda, do you think, are in Afghanistan?

PANETTA: I think the estimate on the number of Al Qaeda is actually relatively small. I think at most, we’re looking at 50 to 100, maybe less. It’s in that vicinity. There’s no question that the main location of Al Qaeda is in the tribal areas of Pakistan.

The 100,000 U.S. forces that have been tasked to dismantle the 100 or so al Qaeda members — a ratio of 1000:1 — is complicated by the fact that we are also engaged in operations going after the Taliban leadership.

If you broaden the definition of who constitutes a threat to the U.S. to include the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban, I think that ratio looks a lot less absurd. But it still doesn't change the fact that the locus of the terrorist threat to the United States is in Pakistan. And all we're doing in Afghanistan is abetting a massive theft of American (and international) taxpayer dollars.

June 25, 2010

Afghan Straw Men

Max Boot thinks Andrew Sullivan's whacking at a straw man by bemoaning the fact that surge boosters want us in Afghanistan forever. Writes Boot:

I hope Andrew is right — not because I or anyone else is in favor of perpetually occupying Afghanistan (talk about a straw man!) — but because the only way to prevail is to show the will to stay in the long run.

Then he conveniently declines to specify what the long run is. But why? If Boot thinks the way to leave Afghanistan is to never say we're going to leave could he at least proffer a guess as to when the U.S. will have achieved its goals in the country sufficient enough to stop transferring American wealth and risking American and NATO lives in the country?

I do understand Boot's frustration - President Obama's time line was a mistake, reflecting a muddle between trying to reassure Americans that they won't be handing over their wealth and soldiers to Afghanistan en-perpetuity, while nevertheless committing to a counter-insurgency strategy that requires patience, manpower and resources. It would behoove the administration to move decisively in one direction.

Paging Richard Armitage

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The New York Times has a devastating article detailing how Pakistan is seeking to integrate the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani network into a power-sharing deal with the Afghan government:

Though encouraged by Washington, the thaw heightens the risk that the United States will find itself cut out of what amounts to a separate peace between the Afghans and Pakistanis, and one that does not necessarily guarantee Washington’s prime objective in the war: denying Al Qaeda a haven.

It also provides another indication of how Pakistan, ostensibly an American ally, has worked many opposing sides in the war to safeguard its ultimate interest in having an Afghanistan that is pliable and free of the influence of its main strategic obsession, its more powerful neighbor, India.

The Haqqani network has long been Pakistan’s crucial anti-India asset and has remained virtually untouched by Pakistani forces in their redoubt inside Pakistan, in the tribal areas on the Afghan border, even as the Americans have pressed Pakistan for an offensive against it.

General Kayani has resisted the American pleas, saying his troops are too busy fighting the Pakistani Taliban in other parts of the tribal areas.

But there have long been suspicions among Afghan, American and other Western officials that the Pakistanis were holding the Haqqanis in reserve for just such a moment, as a lever to shape the outcome of the war in its favor.

Your tax dollars at work.

Pakistani officials cite the Obama administration's timetable as one of the reason's they're cutting their own deals, but seeing as they've been playing a double game with the U.S. since 2001, it's difficult to credit that. Short of making Afghanistan the 51st state or radically transforming India-Pakistan relations, there's little evidence that the U.S. could stay inside Afghanistan long enough to make Pakistan fundamentally reorient their strategic interests. It would take a blockbuster peace deal with India and years worth of mutual trust-building before Pakistan stopped viewing India as a threat and Afghanistan as an essential strategic bulwark.

That leads to the question of what other levers, if any, the U.S. can use to influence Pakistan behavior in the short term. One is tempted, after reading this news, to dust off the Richard Armitage playbook and explain to Pakistan that they will be held responsible for any future attacks by al Qaeda that originate inside any area of Afghanistan controlled by the Haqqani network.

June 23, 2010

Did Bush Fail in Afghanistan?

Following up on Kevin's post, one element that seems to be missing from the discussion about the surge in Afghanistan is the nature of Afghanistan before the U.S. intervention. Kevin highlights this quote from Foreign Policy's Blake Hounshell:

For years, the U.S. more or less tried Vice President Joe Biden's preferred approach of keeping a light footprint and limiting U.S. military operations to going after bad guys, while de-emphasizing nation building. That didn't work either. So I think it's worth giving COIN more time to succeed, whether or not McChrystal is the man implementing it.

I think it's worth asking what the metrics are here. Hounshell asserts that the Bush/Biden approach didn't work - so what didn't it do? Did al Qaeda establish training camps inside Afghanistan and use it as a launch pad for international terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland? No. Did the Taliban capture Kabul, re-institute sharia across the country and lay out the welcome mat for bin Laden & company? No. Did it end the country's thirty year civil war, Pakistan's cultivation of militant networks inside Afghanistan or usher in liberal democracy? No. It didn't do that either.

There is plenty to fault with the Bush administration's approach to Afghanistan - especially the decision to shift intelligence assets out of the country in 2002 to focus on Iraq. As Kevin said, they struck an untenable straddle of "occupation lite" - pretending that we were going to patch the whole country up while devoting patently insufficient resources to the task. But that said, the entire purpose of the Afghan war was to drive al Qaeda out and make sure they didn't come back. And in that respect, Bush can rightly claim "mission accomplished."

Moreover, he did that while simultaneously drawing U.S. intelligence assets and high-level military, political and diplomatic attention away from Afghanistan. That suggests to me that if President Obama refrains from any further wars and occupations in the Middle East, he should be able to ensure that Afghanistan is not al Qaeda Central at a modest expense.

The over-arching problem, it seems to me, is that Washington cannot really publicly reconcile itself to the fact that it is going to leave Afghanistan much the way it found it: at war with itself. Even if the current COIN strategy succeeds, it will simply transfer the onus for fighting onto a better trained Afghan National Army. Either scenario - COIN or counter-terrorism - ends with an Afghanistan that is still rife with conflict.


McChrystal and the COINdinistas

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Analyzing the potential outcomes of Gen. Stanley McChrystal's termination, COINdinista extraordinaire Andrew Exum concludes that:

In the end, your opinion on whether or not Gen. McChrystal should be dismissed might come down to whether or not you think the current strategy is the correct one for the war in Afghanistan. My own prediction is that Gen. McChrystal will be retained. As much as critics of counterinsurgency like to blame Gen. McChrystal (and nefarious think-tankers, of course) for the current strategy, the reality is that the civilian decision-makers in the Obama Administration conducted two high-level reviews in 2009 and twice arrived at a national strategy focused on conducting counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. I suspect the president will not replace the man he has put in charge of executing that strategy with just 12 months to go before we begin a withdrawal.

I suspect Exum is probably correct, but I don't know that one's position on COIN must necessarily determine their verdict on the general. Frankly, I read the Rolling Stone piece, and I found most of the stuff - while no doubt in violation of some military etiquette regulations - to be somewhat benign; the kind of water cooler griping that goes on inside every organization. Of course McChrystal erred in his media judgment, and I'm agnostic really on his fate, but I don't know, as Exum notes, if firing him makes sense while the country is so invested in his strategy.

And that's really the problem here. As Spencer Ackerman rightly points out, there's a kind of irony to this whole hubbub: while there's plenty of debate to be had over McChrystal, we mustn't expect too much debate over McChrystal's strategy. The White House has already reiterated its commitment to COIN in Afghanistan, and that, to me, is the end of the story. Though I take more of a realisty position on the war there, I don't know that demanding my pound of flesh makes much of a difference here.

Exum mistakenly assumes that anti-COIN = anti-McChrystal, but I think any critic of COIN would expect these kinds of internal flareups and frustrations when one country attempts to occupy and subsequently engineer the society of another. Power struggles; civilian vs. military personnel; arguments with the host government; bruised egos and hurt feelings over leaked memos and misplaced quotes; etc. This stuff seems par for the course.

Were there an actual debate about options in Afghanistan, then maybe you'd see more of an analytical uprising from the anti-COIN camp, but that debate had already been settled by COIN advocates long ago. Take this argument from Blake Hounshell, for example:

The thing is, though, it's not as if there is a viable alternative strategy out there. For years, the U.S. more or less tried Vice President Joe Biden's preferred approach of keeping a light footprint and limiting U.S. military operations to going after bad guys, while de-emphasizing nation building. That didn't work either. So I think it's worth giving COIN more time to succeed, whether or not McChrystal is the man implementing it.

There are actually a multitude of options in Afghanistan, but none of them will ever appear viable so long as we cling to an amorphous definition of "victory" there. To my recollection, what the Bush administration did in Afghanistan was not at all "light footprint," but rather, under-resourced occupation. They wanted to keep troop casualties low, but they also wanted to pacify the country. They pushed for elections, but then provided no sustainable security arrangement to actually guarantee a democratic Kabul's legitimacy.

This policy - which even the Bush administration would later scrutinize - is not what Biden had proposed last fall. His suggestion was to contain Afghan radicalism, draw down forces and continue drone strikes on militant targets throughout the greater Af-Pak region. If you support such a strategy (as I do, albeit reluctantly), then you certainly aren't concerned about dressing Afghanistan up as a functional democracy, because it clearly isn't one.

But critics can't live in a counterfactual dream world where the White House actually engages the public in a serious debate over the War on Terror, because that moment has passed. While we all question the job security of one general, we should at least, in fairness, congratulate the COINdinistas for what appears to be a vise-like grip on U.S. foreign policy thinking.

(AP Photo)

Surges & Costs

Things are very fluid on the General McChrystal front at the moment but this suggestion from Bill Kristol strikes me as emblematic of much of what has gone wrong with the debate over Afghanistan:

If Gen. McChrystal does step down, there are undoubtedly many able general officers who could replace him. Here’s one unconventional suggestion, though: Ask Gen. David Petraeus to give up his CENTCOM post and take command of the war in Afghanistan. President Obama should also accept the resignations on the civilian side of special envoy Richard Holbrooke and ambassador Karl Eikenberry; he could then ask Ryan Crocker to come out of retirement to head up the currently dysfunctional civilian effort.

And what will happen? Will Afghanistan suddenly grow governing institutions where none currently existed (Iraq, however dysfunctional and tyrannical under Saddam, had institutions)? Will Pakistan suddenly decide to abandon the Taliban? Will spending hundreds of billions of dollars and committing U.S. soldiers to Afghanistan for another five-plus years make a significant dent in the global jihadist movement?

It seems to me the debate over Afghanistan has become fundamentally unmoored from any discussion of the global terrorist threat. Take all the money, manpower and focus that surge boosters propose to devote to Afghanistan for "however long it takes" until we "win" a very, very modest victory and ask yourself whether that effort and those resources couldn't have a more significant impact on the terror threat if used in a different manner.

June 22, 2010

Bribing Warlords

Dexter Filkins writes that the U.S. taxpayer is "inadvertently" funding warlords in Afghanistan:


At the heart of the problem, the investigation found, is that the American military pays trucking companies to move its supplies across Afghanistan — and leaves it up to the trucking companies to protect themselves. The trucking companies in turn pay warlords and commanders to provide security.

These subcontracts, the investigation found, are handed out without any oversight from the Department of Defense, despite clear instructions from Congress that the department provide such oversight. The report states that military officers in Kabul had little idea whom the trucking companies were paying to provide security or how much they spent for it, and had rarely if ever inspected a convoy to find out.

So we're bribing incentivizing warlords to let trucks navigate the country. Could we do the same to keep al Qaeda from setting up terrorist camps?

June 21, 2010

Victory in Afghanistan

Far too much commentary on Afghanistan proclaims a desire to "win" without saying what that actually means. The Center for a New American Security's John Nagl, however, lays out what a win for the U.S. looks like:


Success there - defined as an Afghanistan that does not provide a haven for terror or destabilize the region and is able to secure itself with minimal outside assistance - remains a vital national interest of the United States.

And although winning in Afghanistan would not by itself defeat Al Qaeda and associated terror movements, it would strike a hard blow against our enemies, while losing the war there would be cataclysmic: It would strengthen our enemies and lead to the loss of many more innocent lives around the globe.

Later in the piece, Nagl says that such a victory can be achieve in five years. Yet the article, and many like it, elides the crucial questions - how "hard" a blow against our enemies would such a victory in Afghanistan deliver? And would it be worth the cost?

Afghan Diplomacy

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Earlier last week, the London School of Economics released a report documenting Pakistan's extensive ties to the Taliban and related militant groups giving America grief in Afghanistan. The revelations - which weren't exactly news but were nonetheless significant - underscored the problematic nature of the American mission in Afghanistan. Despite years of cajoling, threatening, and bribing, the U.S. has been unable to stop Pakistan from nurturing Islamic militants in Afghanistan as a "hedge" against India. And so long as Pakistan keeps hedging, it will be impossible to keep the Taliban out of Afghanistan.

Peter Feaver, formerly of the Bush administration's national security council, offers his thoughts on a diplomatic gambit that could salvage Washington's position in Afghanistan:

But the thing Pakistan cares about almost as much as (and perhaps more than) a nuclear deal is the Indian file. For nine years we have tried to get Pakistan to see in Afghanistan what we see, a dangerous problem of safe-havens for militant Islamist terrorist networks. Instead, when Pakistan looks at Afghanistan, it sees India -- that is, a possible two-front conflict in which India conducts mischief in Pakistan's backyard. That is why so much of Pakistan's efforts in Afghanistan have been counterproductive. Maybe it is time to leverage that largely unfounded but deeply entrenched view. Maybe it is time to offer them some help on specific asks they have on their India file: say further restrictions on Indian activity in Afghanistan (even though it is benign), or perhaps reinvigorated efforts to deal with environmental and water resource issues related to the Kashmir, or perhaps reinvigorating regional confidence building measures with an expanded U.S.-sponsored Track II dialogue on conventional war doctrine.
Feaver goes on to suggest that the U.S. should be prepared to support an Indian seat on the UN Security Council, loosen technology transfers and offer "confidential assurances" regarding a rising China.

Considering past U.S. efforts with India and Pakistan, it's unlikely that such an approach could work (and Feaver acknowledges as much). Nevertheless, it may be worth trying - it's difficult to see the U.S. escaping from the morass of Afghanistan without attempting to reach a modus vivendi with India and Pakistan over an end-state in that country.

Relatedly, Michael Cohen passes along this piece in Orbis (pdf) detailing what a scaled down "counter-terrorism" approach to Afghanistan would look like in practice.

(AP Photo)

Canadian Support for Afghanistan Slips

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While U.S. support for the war in Afghanistan has held fairly steady since late 2009, Angus Reid found a fairly steep drop in Canadian support since February:


Fewer adults in Canada are supportive of the military mission in Afghanistan, according to a poll by Angus Reid Public Opinion. 59 per cent of respondents oppose the operation involving Canadian soldiers, up 10 points since February.

Angus Reid also found that the strongest opposition to the war was in Quebec, while Alberta was the most supportive area of the country. Additionally, 48 percent of Canadians thought the country made a mistake in committing troops to Afghanistan and 31 percent expressed confidence that the Obama administration will "finish the job."

Complete results here. (pdf)

June 18, 2010

U.S. Views on the Afghan War

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While elite angst over Afghanistan is percolating, Angus Reid found that public opinion regarding the war remains relatively unchanged since December 2009: 50 percent of respondents in a survey supported the war, up from 49 percent in December 2009.

Some other findings:

* 50 percent of respondents said they have no clear idea what the war in Afghanistan is about

* 60 percent have no confidence in the Obama administration to finish the job

* 52 percent feel the government has provided too little information to the American people about the war.

Full results here. (pdf)

(AP Photo)

June 17, 2010

All it Would Take Is a Speech

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What would it take to find the "willpower" to win in Afghanistan? A good speech, says Max Boot:

All it would take would be a speech from the president saying something like this: ”I was wrong about trying to set a timeline for American withdrawal. I wanted to inject fresh vigor into our military and diplomatic efforts. But I now realize that my talk about starting to pull American troops out next summer has been misinterpreted; it has caused some in the region to doubt our resolve. So let me be clear. We will stay as long as necessary to defeat the cruel evil of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated extremists. I now pledge that, to paraphrase another young Democratic president, we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty in Afghanistan.”

Boom. With a few gutsy words like that, President Obama could instantly change assumptions about our willpower. That’s all it would take, because in all likelihood the Democratic Party would fall in behind him — or at least not challenge him too aggressively. Republicans, for their part, would enthusiastically support him as they have whenever he has increased our commitment to Afghanistan.

Michael Cohen scratches his head:

There is a great deal about Max Boot's analysis that makes me wonder - but his refusal to ever consider public opinion or the historical lack of political will among countless democracies to fight overseas conflicts is perhaps the most perplexing. Consistently we have seen that lack of popular support can undermine the support for long, drawn-out conflicts - as was the case in Vietnam, Algeria, Iraq and to a lesser extent Malaya, Kenya, South Lebanon to name a few examples. And even in countries that weren't democracies this has been the case. Even in one of the examples that Boot cites - the Iraq War - he ignores the fact that stubborn adherence to a failing war cost Republicans control of Congress and the White House.

Why Boot never factors in the role of political will and seems to believe - against all evidence to the contrary - that it can simply be manufactured by "resolute" leaders is beyond my meager ability to comprehend.

That makes two of us.

UPDATE: Although I did enjoy the "let me be clear" part in Boot's Obama speech.

June 16, 2010

Timelines Aren't the Problem

As more and more angst begins to surface about the trajectory of the U.S./NATO counter-insurgency effort in Afghanistan, there's a real danger in missing the point. The administration's stated time line for withdrawal is a problem, but it is not the problem. (It's also worth noting that the administration has repeatedly insisted that the draw down only begins in July 2011 and is "conditions-based.") The fundamental problem is the nature of the outcome the U.S. is trying to achieve in the country.

Surge boosters in particular are hiding behind the announced time line as a way to mask their own analytical failure to enunciate achievable goals at acceptable costs.

Anthony Cordesman offers a caveat-laced case for the war, and in doing so reveals the basic strategic problem facing the U.S.:


The fact is, the strategic case for staying in Afghanistan is uncertain and essentially too close to call. The main reason is instead tactical. We are already there. We have major capabilities in place. If we can demonstrate that the war can be won at reasonable additional cost in dollars and blood, it makes sense to persist. But, only if we can demonstrate we can win and show that the additional cost has reasonable limits. Containment and alternative uses of the same resources are very real options, and would probably be more attractive ones if we could somehow “zero base” history. The reality is, however, that nations rarely get to choose the ideal ground in making strategic decisions. They are prisoners of their past actions, and so are we. [Emphasis mine]

This is true for al Qaeda of course, but much less so. We are laboring in Afghanistan as much, if not more, for prestige than for any kind of major victory against al Qaeda, which has already demonstrated the ability to not only set up shop elsewhere, but to reach into the United States via the Internet for recruits.

Support for Afghan War in UK

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Support for the Afghan war in the United Kingdom has seen a slight uptick in June, according to Angus Reid: 38 percent support the war, up from 32 percent in April. However 55 percent oppose the war.

While Britons may object to the war, a new poll from Ipsos Mori suggests the war is not high on the list of their concerns. When asked what they saw as the most important issue facing Britain, "defence/foreign affairs/international terrorism" placed 7th with just 3 percent. Full results here. (pdf)

(AP Photo)

June 15, 2010

How Long Should We Stay in Afghanistan?

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When President Obama announced his Afghan strategy at West Point, many commentators argued that the July 2011 draw down date was a mistake. Peter Feaver cites it again in a recent post outlining the various mistakes the administration has made with respect to its Afghan strategy, all in the service of "slowing down the domestic clock" so the United States can stay in Afghan for an unspecified length of time sufficient to achieve an unspecified goal at an unspecified cost.

As I've said, I've come around to the view that announcing the withdrawal date was a mistake as it is ultimately undermining our position there. But the question needs to be asked of those who support a robust counter-insurgency: how long do you want to stay and how much do you want to spend? Is there any time duration and any amount of money (let alone American and NATO casualties) that you would consider excessive to the goal of preventing al Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a future base of operations?

The more the bloom comes off the Iraqi rose, I suspect these questions are going to be posed more persistently to supporters of the Afghan Surge.

(AP Photo)

June 14, 2010

Blood for Rocks?

Did someone say exit strategy? The New York Times is reporting that the U.S. has found massive deposits of untapped mineral wealth in Afghanistan valued at almost $1 trillion:

The previously unknown deposits — including huge veins of iron, copper, cobalt, gold and critical industrial metals like lithium — are so big and include so many minerals that are essential to modern industry that Afghanistan could eventually be transformed into one of the most important mining centers in the world, the United States officials believe.

An internal Pentagon memo, for example, states that Afghanistan could become the “Saudi Arabia of lithium,” a key raw material in the manufacture of batteries for laptops and BlackBerrys.

The vast scale of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth was discovered by a small team of Pentagon officials and American geologists. The Afghan government and President Hamid Karzai were recently briefed, American officials said.

While it could take many years to develop a mining industry, the potential is so great that officials and executives in the industry believe it could attract heavy investment even before mines are profitable, providing the possibility of jobs that could distract from generations of war.

Lisa Reisman at MetalMiner isn't impressed:

Undoubtedly, we’d probably all agree that we’d like to see Afghanistan move its economy away from its primary source of revenue (opium traffic), stabilize its government and turn itself back to a country without the Taliban. But call me a cynic I think the enthusiasm for these findings is grossly overdone. If we (America) as a country won’t deal with Bolivia for its lithium, how in the world do we expect to help create the physical infrastructure (roads, rails, etc) the political infrastructure – if a central structure is even possible in Afghanistan (e.g. security, a rule of law, quasi-non-corrupt leaders) and religious infrastructure (e.g. the removal of the Taliban) required to help Afghanistan transform its “drug resistant” (pun intended) ways to take advantage of these finds?

RCW contributor Daniel McGroarty has lots to say about the value of strategic and Rare Earth minerals.


UPDATE:
Michael Cohen thinks it's a joke:

But even if this is true, so what? How many years would it take to put in place an infrastructure to develop and mine these natural resources? And if you think Afghanistan is corrupt now (only Somalia is worse!) imagine how it will look after this? Congo has tons of natural resources; so does Angola. How's that working out for them?

There is nothing in this story that changes the fundamental incoherence of the current mission in Afghanistan. There is nothing here that will change the dynamics on the ground in Afghanistan and the reality of a corrupt, illegitimate Afghan government, an adaptable insurgent force and a June 2011 deadline for the commencement of US troop withdrawals.

The only thing this story shows is the desperation of the Pentagon in planting pie-in-the-sky news stories about Afghanistan and trying to salvage the lost cause that is our current mission there.

Blake Hounshell also smells something of a rat.

June 9, 2010

Nation Building in Kandahar

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Rod Nordland details American efforts to nation build in Kandahar, Afghanistan:

Minister of Defense Abdul Rahim Wardak said the new approach was adopted after officials considered the mistakes made in Marja and the much larger scale of Kandahar.

“We have learned lessons, also, which we will apply in the future,” he said in an interview this week. “About Kandahar, it is a different type operation, it is not like Marja, it is not going to be that kinetic.” (Kinetic is military jargon to describe fighting.)

Instead, the emphasis has been placed on strengthening provincial reconstruction teams, once run by Canadians, with American employees — from the embassy, the Agency for International Development and the Department of Agriculture — in six crucial districts around Kandahar.

The Kandahar civilian operation increased to 110 Americans from 8 last year, with 50 more on their way this summer, United States officials say. They are providing subsidized seeds and tools, carrying out cash-for-work programs and even hiring employees for Afghan government offices here....

A key to being able to do that is the steady increase of troops from the United States and other NATO nations for protection.

Until 2009, a Canadian battle group of 1,300 troops was responsible for all of Kandahar and could do little more than keep the Taliban from taking the city — while leaving the insurgents free to operate in the surrounding districts. Canadian civilians working on provincial reconstruction rarely left their base.

Since last year, the United States Army has brought in the Second Stryker Brigade, a battalion of the 82nd Airborne, parts of the Fourth Infantry Division and a cavalry squadron, for the crucial outlying districts, as well as a military police battalion in the city of Kandahar itself.

“The military presence bought us the political space and oxygen this fall to start putting projects in to remedy grievances in the districts and more recently in the city itself,” said an American official, speaking on the condition of anonymity in line with United States Embassy policy.


What is going to happen to this when the administration starts drawing down troops in 2011? At the time the Afghan strategy was announced, I was on the fence about the virtues of a withdrawal timeline, but it increasingly looks untenable. If you're going to commit to nation building and using tens of thousands of American troops to protect Afghan civilians while you jump-start reconstruction, then time-stamping an arbitrary withdrawal is counter-productive. It would be better, in my view, not to commit to nation building as a counter-terrorism strategy, but the administration seems to have fixed on the worst of both worlds: it won't effectively nation build but will nonetheless risk American and NATO lives and siphon American taxpayer dollars into an effort it has already disavowed.

(AP Photo)

June 7, 2010

Yemen as Terrorist Epicenter

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As the U.S. struggles to stabilize Afghanistan, the Times of London reports that counter-terrorism officials are increasingly worried about Yemen:

If there is one country that is giving US counter-terrorism officials the greatest concern in terms of its burgeoning al-Qaeda training camps and the number of new holy warriors intent on carrying out attacks on Western targets, it is Yemen.

The country has become the base for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The organisation has set up training camps and appears intent on recruiting foreign nationals with the passports and visas necessary to board aircraft bound for the US and its allies. Inside the White House, the Pentagon and the US intelligence agencies the fear is that Yemen is more likely to produce a successful suicide mission within the US than perhaps any other country.

Even if the U.S. succeeds in stabilizing Afghanistan (and if you have hope on that score, do read Dexter Filkins' expose of Afghan corruption in the NY Times) al Qaeda and its affiliates are already taking root in other countries - just as many predicted. And what will the U.S. do? Will Yemen become another front in the Drone War?

(AP Photo)

June 5, 2010

CIA Voices Drone Doubts

Earlier in the week, the United Nations called on the U.S. to halt the CIA-led drone assault in Pakistan (but not the use of drones by the U.S. military, which they viewed as more accountable). Now comes a report that mid-level CIA officers are concerned about the drone program as well:


CIA officers "are very upset" with the drone strike policy, Addicott said. "They'll do what the boss says, but they view it as a harmful exercise. They say we're largely killing rank and file Pakistani Taliban, and they are the ones who are agitated by the campaign."

Because the drone strikes kill innocent civilians and bystanders along with leaders from far away, they "infuriate the Muslim male", said Addicott, thus making them more willing to join the movement. The men in Pakistan's tribal region "view Americans as cowards and weasels", he said....

The complaints by CIA operatives about the drone strikes' blowback effect reported by Addicott are identical to warnings by military and intelligence officials reported in April 2009 by Jonathan Landay of McClatchy newspapers. Landay quoted an intelligence official with deep involvement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as saying al-Qaeda and the Taliban had used the strikes in propaganda to "portray Americans as cowards who are afraid to face their enemies and risk death".

The official called the operations "a major catalyst" for the jihadi movement in Pakistan.

The decision to expand the use of drones from "high level al Qaeda figures" to members of the Pakistani Taliban has been defended on the grounds that the two groups are too closely intertwined to make a clear distinction and as a favor to Pakistan, which views the Pakistani (but not Afghan) Taliban as a clear threat.

I tend to view drone strikes as the "least worst" option, especially when compared to a full blown counter-insurgency (which isn't an option in Pakistan anyway). But we may need to be more selective in our targeting. It will be a cold comfort to knock off senior al Qaeda leaders if we wind up destabilizing Pakistan as a result.

June 4, 2010

Our Own Worst Enemy

Thomas Barnett on the failures of the Obama administration's approach to Afghanistan:

Iraq was a governed space before we got there--a brutal regime no doubt, but a governed space, meaning the capacity was there.

The same simply wasn't true of Afghanistan.

We didn't do right by the country for seven years, and now we're trying to cram-course the entire place in a matter of months. Why? Oldest reason in the book: our leadership fears our public.

The damage we do to the "nation" of Afghanistan--along with the region--is one thing. The damage will do to ourselves globally is another.

It's clear that the Obama administration's Afghan surge is a face-saving effort - an attempt to restore enough security so that we can declare victory and "transition" to simply arming our favored thugs to ward off the nastier Taliban. Had we pursued such a strategy from the start, the U.S. would not be facing a huge loss of global credibility. But rather than set a very, very low bar in Afghanistan, we hailed it as the Marshal Plan 2.0.

May 28, 2010

A Losing Strategy

Counter-terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has a real eye-opener on al Qaeda in the current issue of the National Interest. The piece really casts doubt on the wisdom of waging a huge counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Hoffman notes how al Qaeda is getting increasingly better at reaching into the U.S. to find and radicalize individuals to carry out attacks. While we focus on one theater - first Iraq, then Afghanistan - al Qaeda retains resiliency by keeping a global footprint. The administration's touting of drone strikes is also misguided, Hoffman writes:

The operable assumption, like the infamous body counts that masqueraded as progress during the Vietnam War in the 1960s, is that we can kill our way to victory. Long ago, David Galula, a French army officer and arguably still today the world’s preeminent expert on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, wrote about the fallacy of a strategy that relies primarily on decapitation. In Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958, first published by the RAND Corporation in 1963, Galula explains how the capture in 1957 of the top-five leaders of the Algerian National Liberation Front, the terrorist-cum-guerrilla group that the French battled for eight long years before giving up in exhaustion, “had little effect on the direction of the rebellion, because the movement was too loosely organized to crumble under such a blow.” Half a century later, he could just as easily be talking about al-Qaeda...

The above examples are not meant to imply that killing and capturing terrorists should not be a top priority in any war on terrorism. Only that such measures—without accompanying or attendant efforts to stanch the flow of new recruits into a terrorist organization—amount to a tactical holding operation at best. That is not the genuinely game-changing strategic reversal that attrition of terrorist leaders in tandem with concerted counter-radicalization efforts to hamper recruitment can ultimately achieve.

Unfortunately, while Hoffman acknowledges the need to stem the supply of recruits, there aren't many specifics about how that should actually be done. What Hoffman does make clear is that reforming the Karzai kleptocracy is not going to impede al Qaeda to any great extent.

May 27, 2010

Poll: Kashmiri Attitudes

According to the UK think tank Chatham House, there has been no "systematic attempt" to judge the attitudes of Kashmiris on either side of the line of control between India and Pakistan. It's remarkable, when you think about it, given the international implications of the conflict post 9/11. Now, Kings College and Ipsos Mori, under the auspices of the Qadhafi Foundation for Charity Associations & Development have undertaken a comprehensive study of Kashmir opinion. Some of the findings:

Independence: In aggregate 44 percent in AJK and 43 percent in J&K said they would vote for independence. However, while this is the most popular option overall, not only does it fail to carry an overall majority, on the Indian side of the LoC it is heavily polarised. In the Kashmir Valley Division, commonly regarded as the core region of Kashmiri identity and of demands for its political recognition, support for independence runs at between 74 percent and 95 percent. In contrast, across Jammu Division it is under one percent. In Leh it is thirty percent and Kargil twenty percent.

Joining India: Twenty-one percent overall said they would vote to join India. However, only one percent on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control said they would vote for this, compared with 28 percent on the Indian side. In the Vale of Kashmir support for joining India was much lower, down to just two percent in Baramula. Only in Jammu and Ladakh Divisions was there majority support for joining India, rising to as high as eighty percent in Kargil.

Joining Pakistan: Fifteen percent overall said they would vote to join Pakistan. Fifty percent of the population on the Pakistani side of the LoC said they would choose to join Pakistan, compared with two percent in J&K, on the Indian side of the LoC. Badgam, in the Kashmir Valley Division, had the highest percentage vote for joining Pakistan at seven percent.

One conclusion is clear: a plebiscite along the lines envisaged in the UN resolutions of 1948-49 is extremely unlikely to offer a solution today.

You can read the whole report here.

May 24, 2010

Poll: American Views on the Afghan War

Via Rasmussen:

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that only 41% of Likely U.S. Voters now believe it is possible for the United States to win the nearly nine-year-old war in Afghanistan. Thirty-six percent (36%) disagree and say it is not possible for America to win the war. Another 23% are not sure.

Just before President Obama announced his new strategy for the war last December, only 39% thought a U.S. victory was possible, while 36% disagreed. But confidence that America can win jumped to 51% after the president’s highly-publicized strategy was declared. But support began to decline after that.

In fact, 48% now say ending the war in Afghanistan is a more important goal than winning it. Forty-two percent (42%) place more importance on winning the war. Voters have been almost evenly divided on this question for months.

May 17, 2010

Fighting the Afghan War, Soviet-Style

John Bolton is skeptical about nation building in Afghanistan. I think there's plenty of reason to be, but I can't quite understand the conclusion he draws:


But we cannot withdraw from the conflict just because the Afghans may not be meeting our standards. Leaving due to Afghan government failures, of which there are and will be many, would jeopardise our strategic objectives, frustrating the very reasons for intervening after 9/11 in the first place: preventing terrorists from re-establishing Afghanistan as a base, or using it to destabilise Pakistan and seize control of Islamabad’s nuclear weapons.

We must achieve these objectives — which means essentially destroying the Taleban — whether or not the Afghan government shapes up. That is the right metric, not nation building. This is a hard truth, but realistic unless you are prepared to risk a nuclear Taleban.

But how does one "destroy" the Taliban? Does Bolton know who they all are? Where they all are? And would bringing the necessary firepower to bear on the problem, while ignoring the depredations of the Karzai regime, make the Afghans more or less accommodating to foreign forces? As the U.S. wages a total war campaign against the Pashtuns, do fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan get more or less restive? Karzai has, on numerous occasions, blasted NATO for civilian casualties. Presumably under the Bolton doctrine, those casualties increase while our concern for what Karzai (or any Afghan) has to say decreases. Does that seem like a stable mix?

At least advocates of nation building have a coherent view: the Taliban can't be defeated in a conventional sense so the Afghan state has to be reconstructed to the degree that they can wage the insurgency on their own, while winning over an increasingly larger percentage of the population base. If you're skeptical that this approach is worth the costs, the answer isn't to go on a Soviet-style rampage in an ill-defined attempt to "defeat" an enemy deeply enmeshed in Afghan society. It's to leave and figure out a more cost-effective means of keeping al Qaeda (remember them?) from reconstituting in large numbers.

Winning in Afghanistan

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John Nagl defends the war in Afghanistan:


While winning in Afghanistan would not by itself defeat al-Qaeda and associated terror movements, losing in Afghanistan would materially strengthen them at the cost of many more innocent lives around the globe. And there are encouraging signs indicating that the war in Afghanistan can be won—if the international community remains committed to the fight.

Here's how Nagl defines victory:

The development of an Afghan government that is able to provide a modicum of security and governance for its people is necessary to ensure that the international community's security interests will be preserved without a continued major international troop presence. To achieve this objective, the coalition and its Afghan partners must build a state that reconciles a degree of centralised governance with the traditional tribal and religious power structures that hold sway outside Kabul. Achieving these minimal goals will require continued support for an increasingly capable Afghan army and much more effort in building a police force that can earn the trust of the people, as well as a greater Afghan commitment to good governance and to providing for the needs of the people wherever they live.

All of that presumes a degree of human and government capital that simply may not exist. It also presumes that the international community can in fact create the right balance between a strong central government and one that gives the "traditional" power structures outside Kabul their due. Nagl calls these "minimal goals" but they sound rather difficult to me.

(AP Photo)

May 12, 2010

Times Square & Counterinsurgency

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Faisal Shahzad, the would-be car bomber of Times Square, is the poster child for why the massive counter-insurgency inside Afghanistan is a dubious counter-terrorism strategy. Shahzad was reportedly lured to radicalism by the preachings of Anwar al-Awlaki, which he consumed over the Internet. It's true that he traveled to Pakistan, where he was presumably taught how to build his crude car bomb. But does anyone believe that sufficiently motivated individuals (or groups) can't get up to speed with how to kill large numbers of people without traveling to Pakistan? Obviously, they can.

Even if Pakistan played a role in the radicalization of Shahzad, it's difficult to see how American strategy in Kabul can mitigate that. Indeed, under no conceivable scenario does a functioning government in Kabul stop Shahzad - or future Shahzads - from hatching and attempting to execute murderous schemes.

(AP Photo)

May 10, 2010

Plan B: Freedom?

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Looking back on President Obama's Cairo speech, George Packer wonders if the so-called freedom agenda has become too cynically applied:

this Administration will devote its energy to repairing relations with foreign governments, and will not risk them for the sake of human rights. Where the stakes are low, as in the West African nation of Guinea, the Administration speaks out against atrocities, with positive effect; but where there’s a strategic interest, as in Ethiopia, which has jailed dozens of journalists and opposition politicians, the policy is mainly accommodation.
What if people around the world want more than a humble adjustment in America’s tone and behavior? What if American overtures to nasty regimes fail, because those regimes have a different view of their own survival? Then the President will have to devise a fallback strategy—preferably one that answers the desires of the people who applauded in Cairo, and doesn’t leave another generation cynical about American promises. [Emphasis added. - KS]

But isn't part of the problem that the so-called freedom agenda has become a de facto, as Packer puts it, "fallback strategy"? If the United States should learn anything from the previous administration, shouldn't it be that using the rhetoric of freedom as window dressing or, even worse, a "fallback" for policy failures only corrupts and sullies the very word itself?

For want of an actual freedom agenda, the American president is often asked to speak out against every petty despot and dictatorship around the world. But the United States cannot, I hope it goes without saying, invade and occupy every undemocratic country allegedly in need of liberation. Were it even effective - which, even in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, would be a rather untenable claim - it's simply not sustainable.

I believe a big part of the problem is the way in which we measure success and failure in American foreign policy. If, getting back to Packer, it's the American president's job to combat global cynicism, then we are in a lot of trouble. I think sequence matters, and if the United States wants to address freedom it should first start with basic human needs such as health. George W. Bush - for everything he got wrong about Iraq and Afghanistan - seemed to understand this in the case of Africa.

It might also be helpful to retain the moral high ground while discussing a sustainable freedom agenda. Which, for example, is more likely to engender global cynicism: the American president's failure to speak out against Ethiopia, or Americans publicly debating whether or not a U.S. citizen deserves his Miranda rights simply because he's a Muslim?

(AP Photo)

May 7, 2010

The Hawkish Divergence on Iran and Pakistan

Barely a day goes by without a prominent journalist, magazine, blogger or defense analyst warning - often in very stark tones - about the danger from Iran. And while Iran is obviously a national security issue, I'm struck by the huge disparity between the focus and intensity on Iran vs. Pakistan. By almost every measure, Pakistan is a more serious threat to the U.S. and to the lives of American citizens than Iran, yet receives a fraction of the attention. Nearly every claim made regarding Iran can be made with respect to Pakistan, in spades:

* Supports terrorism? Check. Only Pakistan's terrorists have the demonstrated intention, and reach, to hit the American homeland.

* Developed a nuclear weapon. Check. Something Iran has yet to do.

* Proliferated nuclear technology. Check. Again, Iran has a lot of catching up to do here.

* Trafficked nuclear know-how to terrorist groups. Check. For all the hysteria about Iran's potential to pass nuclear know-how to terrorists groups, Pakistani nuclear scientists have met with bin Laden, who is clearly more of a threat to the U.S. than Hezbollah or Hamas.

True, Pakistan is not run by "mullahs" but it has been a bona fide military dictatorship shot through with Islamist sympathizers, when not under the weak and often corrupt rule of civilians. Unlike Iran, Pakistan has repeatedly engaged in open, conventional war with its neighbor. Iran fought one major war - which it did not start.

Iran's leaders may be openly hostile to the U.S., whereas Pakistan's are more than happy to pocket taxpayer dollars in return for uneven cooperation. But if opinion polls are to be trusted, Pakistanis have deeply unfavorable views of the U.S. Perhaps this explains why Pakistanis - not Iranians - are frequently implicated in anti-American terror plots.

If you had to wager which terrorist group was going to get its hand on a nuclear weapon (and from which country they'd procure it), I'd say the safe money, by far, would be a Sunni jihadist group based in Pakistan and not a Shiite terror group in Iran.

And yet, each day brings thunderous cries to bomb Iran or scathing blasts against the Obama administration for fecklessness regarding Iran's nuclear program. And very, very little about Pakistan. Why?

I can think of three reasons. One, Iran occupies a strategic location that Pakistan does not, so you could make the case that proximity to oil trumps a propensity to kill American civilians. Second, you could argue that because Iran-the-state is overtly hostile to the U.S. in a way that the Pakistani state is not that it merits an extra dose of hawkishness. Third, it requires less intellectual rigor and delivers greater partisan advantage to be an Iran hawk. It's easy to get to the administration's right on Iran and condense your option down to a sound-bite: "bomb Iran." Pakistan is infinitely more complex - both in terms of the policy and the politics. It's hard to get to the administration's right on Pakistan when they've stepped up drone attacks at a quicker pace than their predecessor. So it's better to just ignore it. (And I don't think even the most enthusiastic hawks would call for a wide ranging bombing campaign against Pakistan.)

During the 1990s, neoconservatives spent an awful lot of energy agitating for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein all while the real threat to the American homeland - al Qaeda - passed completely under their (and everyone's) radar. Now, all the intellectual energy is being devoted to Iran, when far more Americans are likely to be killed as a result of events in Pakistan. Of course, given the track record, I guess we should take comfort that they're not offering up suggestions for Pakistan. But still, this disparity is something to ponder.

April 26, 2010

Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement

Washington, DC readers should be sure to check out an event this Wednesday at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on political reconciliation in Afghanistan. Gilles Dorronsoro, a visiting scholar at the Endowment who just returned from the country, will be discussing his trip and the likelihood of a unity government in Kabul.

Interested readers may register to attend Wednesday's event here.

April 22, 2010

Poll: Americans Less Anxious About Foreign Policy

A new poll conducted by Public Agenda has found the American public less anxious about foreign policy than it's been in four years:

The Foreign Policy Anxiety Indicator stands at 122, a 10-point drop since 2008 and the lowest level since Public Agenda introduced this measure in 2006. The Confidence in Foreign Policy Index, produced by Public Agenda in collaboration with Foreign Affairs, uses a set of tracking questions to measure Americans' comfort level with the nation's foreign policy, much the same way the Consumer Confidence Index measures the public's satisfaction with the economy.

The Anxiety Indicator is measured on a 200-point scale, with 100 serving as a neutral midpoint, neither anxious nor confident. A score of 50 or below would indicate a period of complacency. Above the "redline" of 150 would be anxiety shading into real fear and a withdrawal of public confidence in U.S. policy.

Digging into the numbers, the survey found a partisan divide with Republicans evincing more anxiety about our foreign policy than either Democrats or Independents. Despite the overall mood of relative calm, Public Agenda found that most Americans still see the world as a dangerous place. "The number who say the world is becoming 'more dangerous for the United States and the American people' is virtually the same was it was two years ago: 72 percent, compared with 73 percent in 2008," the survey noted.

Despite America's improved image internationally, 50 percent of those surveyed by Public Agenda said U.S. relations with the rest of the world were on the "wrong track." Only 39 percent said they were on the right track.

Americans were also polled on Afghanistan. Forty eight percent said that our safety from terrorism did not depend on our success there vs. 40 percent who believed it did.

April 21, 2010

Poll: American Support for Afghan War

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Angus Reid has a new poll out measuring American sentiment toward the war in Afghanistan:

This month, 51 per cent of respondents (down three points since February) say they support the military operation involving American soldiers in Afghanistan, while 39 per cent are opposed (up one point).

Two-in-five Americans (43%) believe the country did the right thing in sending military forces to Afghanistan, while three-in-ten (31%) think it made a mistake.

Overall, 52 per cent of respondents say they have a clear idea of what the war in Afghanistan is about.

When The War is Over

When asked about what they think will be the most likely outcome of the war in Afghanistan, the findings show little fluctuation since February. One-in-four Americans (25%,) expect a clear victory by U.S. and allied forces over the Taliban, and 26 per cent foresee a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and allied strength that gives the Taliban a small role in the Afghan government.

Significantly fewer respondents foresee either a negotiated settlement from a position of U.S. and allied weakness that gives the Taliban a significant role in the Afghan government (9%) or a military defeat of U.S. and allied forces by the Taliban (4%).

As for whether people have confidence in the administration, Angus Reid found greater skepticism:

Only 33 per cent of respondents (-2) are very or moderately confident that the Obama Administration will be able “finish the job” in Afghanistan, while a majority (53%, +1) are not too confident or not confident at all.

April 12, 2010

Could the Karzai-Obama Spat Pay Dividends?

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To add to Kevin's post on the Karzai-Obama spat, it seems to me that there's a third interpretation of the recent feud that falls somewhere between "President Obama's being naive and irresponsible" and "President Karzai's an out of control drug addict." That is that the spat is good for all parties. It's good for the U.S., because it sends a warning to Afghan officials that American aid is not a given and that there must be some movement toward meeting Washington's expectations with respect to corruption and governance. I largely sympathize with the idea that these messages should mostly be conveyed behind closed doors, but there's another important constituency that needs to hear Obama's message: the American taxpayer.

It seems perverse for the U.S. to take the position that Afghanistan has an open-ended claim on American blood and treasure irrespective of how its leaders behave (it's perverse stance in good times, too). A public scolding at a minimum assures Americans that the president is mindful that resources are limited and not to be doled out lightly.

It's good for Karzai, too, because it establishes his nationalist bona fides and demonstrates to the Afghan people that he's not a Western stooge - a position that, perhaps more than corruption, would undermine his legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.

This is obviously an optimistic reading of events and it could very well turn out that either Obama is being reckless in publicly spanking Karzai or that Karzai is out of control - or that both men are just groping their way blindly toward an unseen end-game.

(AP Photo)

Karzai, Blind Squirrels and Blithering Idiots

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Responding to Sarah Palin's defense of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Andrew Exum writes:

Oh, and by the way, if you think using leverage to affect the political choices made by the Afghan leadership is not a good thing right now, then you are a) Liz Cheney, b) Sarah Palin, c) a blithering idiot or d) some combination of the previous options.

Well, then I suppose I'll take "c) blithering idiot" for $1,000, Andrew.

However, keeping my blithering idiocy in mind, I wonder if Exum could perhaps clarify what he means by "using leverage." I don't think anyone - not even Governor Palin, for that matter - is arguing that Karzai should be exempt from any and all forms of diplomatic pressure. What she and other critics of the Obama administration's handling of Karzai seem to be taking exception to is the very public belittling of the man.

Larison suggests that Karzai's latter-day defenders are simply adding this to a continuum of mostly hollow attacks on Obama's foreign policy. I'm sympathetic to this argument, and he's probably right, but so what? Obviously, the president is going to make policy mistakes, and if your fallback position is to simply attack everything that he does, eventually, you're going to get one right! Blind squirrel ---> nut.

But if the United States is truly invested in securing and nurturing Afghanistan's fragile young democracy, what then is the point in publicly humiliating the democratically elected-ish leader of said investment? There's nothing wrong with pressuring Karzai behind closed doors; publicly equivocating when asked if Karzai is even a U.S. ally is another matter entirely.

If he is an ally, well then the answer should be simple. If he isn't, then what the hell are we doing in Afghanistan? As a critic of the Afghan surge, Karzai's legitimacy never really mattered as much to me as did eradicating al-Qaeda's presence in the region - and we're doing that. Exum, on the other hand, supports a prolonged military presence in Afghanistan, and yet, for some reason, also supports publicly undermining the democratically elected-ish leader of the country.

American legitimacy in Afghanistan is pegged to the legitimacy of Karzai and the Afghan government. Should it come as a surprise then when Karzai chooses to do photo ops with Ahmadinejad and, even more absurdly, threatens to join the Taliban after Washington publicly exposes him to be a contrivance or puppet of the West? Such marching orders place him in a rather untenable spot, no?

I don't know the answers to all of these questions, but I'm just a blithering idiot . . . or perhaps Liz Cheney. Is it too late to change my answer?

(AP Photo)

April 8, 2010

Karzai and the Afghan Muddle

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Wayne White offers his thoughts on Hamid Karzai:

What transpires in Kabul all too often is over-emphasized, with foreign actors frequently consumed by developments there that will have less bearing than one may think on what is happening throughout the countryside, where much that happens in Kabul is commonly little known or understood. More importantly, Karzai himself is falling into a related pattern of believing that the more he can control events affecting the ruling elite, the more he can guarantee ultimate triumph for himself in the overall equation. In fact, in doing so, he probably has damaged further his own ultimate prospects as well as those of the mission. This also was characteristic of Diem and Thieu.

Unfortunately, I doubt there are ways of redefining the mission or shifting our concentration of effort that can reduce significantly the negative impact of corrosive political behavior on the part of Karzai, his many cronies, as well as other Afghan politicians raised in a similar milieu. Our inevitable association with him one way or another--and his dominance over the Kabul political scene--will continue to cast a shadow upon the overall US, Allied and Afghan government effort to create a situation in which a withdrawal is possible that would leave behind a stable, positive political order--perhaps regardless of the withdrawal timelines chosen.

I think the constant harping on Karzai underscores the problematic nature of conflating a narrow mission of beating back al Qaeda - which has largely been driven out of the country anyway - with creating a stable Afghanistan. The administration insists you can't have one without the other, but at what point does stability in Afghanistan cease to be worth the price?

And that's why I think we ultimately will have to either "redefine the mission" or declare mission accomplished in 2011, irrespective of the political stability in Kabul. At the end of the day, do we really want Afghanistan to have an open claim on American resources?

(In that vein, Michael Cohen argues that it's all the fault of the mythology of the Iraq surge. Counter-insurgency has been seen to be a huge success there and so it's simply been exported to Afghanistan, when in fact it may be the wrong strategy for that country - and may not have been as decisive as we think in Iraq, either).

(AP Photo)

April 6, 2010

Karzai on a Bender?

Peter Galbraith (who is no disinterested observer) suggests rather casually that Afghan President Hamid Karzai is on drugs:

Visit msnbc.com for breaking news, world news, and news about the economy

Great!

April 3, 2010

Karzai & the Problem of Staying Forever

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Charlie Rose had a fascinating interview with Michele Flournoy - the whole thing is worth watching in full but the talk about Pakistan was interesting. Rose noted the recent successes against the Taliban and the apparent turn in Pakistan towards cooperating more fully with the U.S. Flournoy chalked to it up to the U.S. successfully persuading Pakistan that the U.S. was in Af-Pak for the long haul.

This a theme her boss, Secretary Gates, has harped on frequently, citing his experience with Afghanistan in the 1980s. The thinking is simple enough: Pakistan will hedge its bets (i.e. support the Taliban) if it thinks the U.S. is going to bail on the region like it supposedly did after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan.

Flournoy noted that the administration had convinced Pakistan that even as the U.S. military role shifts and is ultimately reduced inside Afghanistan, it remains committed to the country for the long-term.

Which brings us to Mr. Hamid Karzai. On Thursday, Karzai unleashed a blistering tirade against the United States (he's later sought to clarify his remarks to his U.S. paymasters) but his little exegesis on U.S. imperialism is a good reminder that American commitments to stay "engaged" for the long haul are going to run up against Karzai and the local Afghan talent we're banking on to run the place.

None of this would be a problem if we were taking a very limited, cost-effective approach to keeping al Qaeda from reorganizing large-scale training camps in the country. But with tens of thousands of U.S. and NATO troops in the country committed to waging a "population-centric" counter-insurgency, we've set our sights a lot higher. That means Karzai and the quality of his governance is going to matter a lot more. And so far, it seems like that's going to be an increasingly serious problem for the administration's strategy.

(AP Photo)

March 31, 2010

Global Goods

At least someone's getting rich:

China has significant economic interests in Afghanistan, though its contribution to Afghan reconstruction has been well behind Western nations. The state-owned China Metallurgical Group intends to contribute US$3 billion towards the development of Afghanistan's Anyak copper mine, 30km South of Kabul.

If the mine contains the 11.3 million tonnes of copper expected by the Afghan Government, the site has the potential to deliver over US$80 billion to China based on current copper prices. The vast bulk of the military forces providing security in Logar province, where the Anyak mine is located, are American.

March 30, 2010

Palin for Pakistan?

Londonstani pokes fun at the governor.

March 29, 2010

Surge Wars: Obama vs. Bush

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Stephen Walt hopes that Obama is going to follow Bush's Iraq surge script in Afghanistan:

First, announce an escalation of the U.S. effort (aka a "surge"), but set a rough deadline for it and quietly put new emphasis on "political reconciliation." (Done). Next, bombard the media with lots of evidence of progress, such as Taliban "strongholds" seized, al Qaeda leaders killed or captured, Taliban leaders arrested in Pakistan, etc., so that people think the surge is working. (Now underway). Third, arrange a diplomatic settlement that requires the phased withdrawal of U.S./ISAF troops, even if their departure is on a rather lengthy timetable. The Iraqi equivalent was the Status of Forces agreement negotiated by the Bush administration in the fall of 2008; in Afghanistan, it would probably entail some sort of negotiation between the Karzai government, the Taliban, and various other warlords (whether by a loya jirga) or some other device (Maybe underway too?). Finally, start removing the "surged" forces more-or-less on schedule-and ahead of the 2012 election cycle-so that you can claim to have avoided the quagmire that critics warned about back in 2009 (Remains to be seen).

I think this overlooks a critical component that distinguishes an Obama surge from Bush's Iraq surge. In the latter, there was an entire corps of pundits and former administration officials heavily invested in portraying the Iraq surge as a victory. Even before President Bush left office, they were proclaiming the early security gains of the Iraq surge as a historic victory. Since the gains have held, they've gone into overdrive.

In Afghanistan, there's no one to declare victory for Obama. Conservative supporters of the president's Afghan surge are on record opposing a 2011 draw-down. It's safe to assume that the country will remain violent and unstable enough in 2011 for them to renew and strengthen their opposition to any large-scale draw-down, especially since it will dovetail with the larger election-year critique of Obama as craven appeaser. And Obama doesn't have much, if any, support for an Afghan surge to his left. That leaves the administration to make the case that they've "won" in Afghanistan by their lonesome.

And 2012 works against Obama in another way. One reason I suspect that Iraq war supporters proclaimed victory with such reckless abandon was the calculation that any ensuing violence could be dumped in Obama's lap. The bigger the proclaimed victory, the harder the partisan hit Obama would take if Iraq's sectarian tensions once again erupted. At the next election cycle, the Obama administration has no one to "hand off" Afghanistan to but (it hopes) itself.

(AP Photo)

March 18, 2010

Iran Supplying the Taliban

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U.S. officials occasionally claim that Iran is backing the Taliban (or elements within the Taliban) to bloody the U.S. in Afghanistan. Now it seems further proof is emerging:

Channel 4 News can reveal the Taliban insurgency against British and American forces is being supported by Iranian weapons smuggled over the border including mines, mortars and plastic explosives.

The exclusive images and documents show, for the first time, the full extent of Iranian support for the Taliban in the shape of tonnes of weapons of the type being used against UK troops in Helmand province.

That's via a somewhat skeptical Joshua Foust who observes:

So at least based on what they have posted online, it doesn’t seem like a slam-dunk case, to borrow a troubled phrase. It is a narrative that plays to American and British assumptions of Iranian perfidy, but despite the cache of weapons on display it doesn’t directly implicate the Iranian government in any of the smuggling—any more than the Taliban operating in Waziristan directly implicates the Pakistani government (that is to say: neither government is monolithic and certainly has factions that behave semi-autonomously). If, however, the Channel 4 documents actually involve official Iranian government in shipping arms to the Taliban as part of a deliberate strategy to “bog down” the U.S., then it would be the first time concrete evidence of their involvement has been shown. And if that actually happens, then we have a rather big deal on our hands.

I'm not sure how big a deal it because it doesn't appear to be anything new (at least from the perspective of U.S. commanders in the region, who have been suggesting as much for a while now). But I think it does raise an important question about the outlook of the Iranian regime (or the faction that's shipping arms to the Taliban). Specifically, Foust notes that supporting the Taliban cuts against a number of Iranian interests and undermines the substantial investment that Iran has made inside Afghanistan. If they are willing to undermine those interests to kill a few U.S. and NATO soldiers and preoccupy America, what does this tell us about their cost/benefit analysis?

Second, the revelation, if true, underscores the problematic nature of our position in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union stationed large numbers of troops in the country, the U.S. had a very low cost way to inflict damage on them. By staying inside Afghanistan to wage a state-wide counter-insurgency, we are quite possibly affording Iran the same opportunity. If we can achieve our counter-terrorism objectives from a few remote airfields in Pakistan and some office buildings in Virginia, does it really serve our interests to be so directly exposed to this kind of proxy violence?

(AP Photo)

CIA: al Qaeda on the Ropes

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CIA Director Leon Panetta gave an interview to the Washington Post claiming that the "secret war" of drone assaults in Pakistan is having a major impact on al Qaeda:

So profound is al-Qaeda's disarray that one of its lieutenants, in a recently intercepted message, pleaded with bin Laden to come to the group's rescue and provide some leadership, Panetta said. He credited improved coordination with Pakistan's government and what he called "the most aggressive operation that CIA has been involved in in our history," offering a near-acknowledgment of what is officially a secret war.

"Those operations are seriously disrupting al-Qaeda," Panetta said. "It's pretty clear from all the intelligence we are getting that they are having a very difficult time putting together any kind of command and control, that they are scrambling. And that we really do have them on the run."

Obviously the CIA has a vested interest in claiming success, but the headlines of late certainly seem to corroborate the program's effectiveness. Which again begs the question of why we're investing a considerable amount of blood and treasure trying to build a state from scratch in Afghanistan if our counter-terrorism objectives are being met more effectively over the border.

(AP Photo)

Pakistan, Afghan Views on Counter-Terrorism

Gallup reports that both Afghans and Pakistanis take a dim view of their governments' efforts to combat terrorism:

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Next door, the views are not much better:

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March 16, 2010

Glassman and Pape at New America

There are two great events happening today at the New America Foundation, and we have 'em both live right here at RealClearWorld.

The first event, starting at 12:15 pm EST, will be a discussion with former Undersecretary of State James Glassman on "the role strategic communications can play in helping the United States in Iran."

The second event, set to kick off at 3:30 pm EST, will be a discussion with Professor Robert Pape on the rise of suicide terrorism in Afghanistan.

Steve Clemons will be moderating the day's events, and you can watch them both at either The Washington Note or right here on The Compass following the jump:

Continue reading "Glassman and Pape at New America" »

A Set Back for the Taliban, or Karzai?

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The arrest of Taliban Number 2 Mullah Baradar was hailed in the U.S. as a major success in the war against the Taliban. But, according to this AP story, it looks like Hamid Karzai doesn't see it that way:

The detention of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar — second in the Taliban only to one-eyed Mullah Mohammed Omar — has raised new questions about whether the U.S. is willing to back peace discussions with leaders who harbored the terrorists behind the Sept. 11 attacks.

Karzai "was very angry" when he heard that the Pakistanis had picked up Baradar with an assist from U.S. intelligence, the adviser said. Besides the ongoing talks, he said Baradar had "given a green light" to participating in a three-day peace jirga that Karzai is hosting next month

.

This raises the question of whether Pakistan's increased willingness to move against the Afghan Taliban is really an effort to sandbag the Karzai government's reconciliation efforts. The report also notes that there's a divergence between the American and British position on reconciliation, with the British pushing it more aggressively.

One of the problems with nation building is that if you're disinclined to make the country a semi-permanent ward of the United States, local stakeholders are going to cut the deals they need to make to survive and those deals may work against American interests. So it really comes down to a question of whether it's better to stay in Afghanistan for a few more decades or accommodate ourselves to a less-than-ideal outcome with respect to integrating the Taliban back into the government (if they even can be, it's not a sure thing). So what's the return on investment if we stay in Afghanistan for thirty years?

(AP Photo)

March 12, 2010

Taliban Growing More Unpopular in Pakistan

A new Gallup poll offers some more glimmers of good news from Pakistan (despite today's horrific carnage):

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More intriguing:

The Taliban lost support in every region of Pakistan. But nowhere are they more unpopular than in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), ground zero for a full-scale military offensive against the Taliban last May. In November-December 2009, 1% of NWFP residents said the Taliban have a positive influence, down from 11% in June. The percentage saying the Taliban's influence is positive in Baluchistan, which abuts South Waziristan, dropped from 26% to 5%.

March 11, 2010

Who's Bearing the Brunt of Afghan War Casualties?

Steve Coll crunches the numbers:

Using Afghan-war fatality figures from ICasualties.org and population estimates as of July, 2009 from the C.I.A. World Factbook, and rounding up numbers, I took out my calculator this morning and came up with the following ratios of deaths-per-population among coalition countries that have fought in the Afghan war, since 2001, starting with the most burdened:

Denmark, 1 per 177,000 (31 deaths)
Estonia, 1 per 186,000 (7 deaths)
United Kingdom, 1 per 224,000 (272 deaths)
Canada, 1 per 236,000 (140 deaths)
United States, 1 per 302,000 (1017 deaths)
Latvia, 1 per 733,000 (3 deaths)
Netherlands, 1 per 810,000 (21 deaths)

Worst.Year.Ever.

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Danielle Pletka laments the end of American civilization as we know it:

Consider that the president’s own staff can’t gin up a single special relationship with a foreign leader and that the once “special relationship” with the United Kingdom is in tatters (note the latest contretemps over Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s bizarre intervention on the Falkland Islands); that neither China nor Russia will back the United States’s push for sanctions against Iran; that Iran, it seems, doesn’t want to “sit down” with the Obama administration and chat; that the “peace process” the president was determined to revive is limping pathetically, in no small amount due to missteps by the United States; that one of the key new relationships of the 21st century (advanced by the hated George W. Bush)—with India—is a total mess; that the hope kindled in the Arab world after Obama’s famous Cairo speech has dimmed; that hostility to America’s AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrooke is the only point of agreement between Delhi, Islamabad, and Kabul; that there isn’t a foreign ministry in Europe with a good word to say about working with the Obama White House; that there is a narrative afoot that began with the Obama apologia tour last year and will not go away: America is in decline.

Too many of these problems can be sourced back to the arrogance of the president and his top advisers. Many of Obama’s foreign policy soldiers are serious, keen, and experienced, but even they are afraid to speak to foreigners, to meet with Congress, or to trespass on the policy making politburo in the White House’s West Wing. Our allies are afraid of American retreat and our enemies are encouraged by that fear. George Bush was excoriated for suggesting that the nations of the world are either with us or against us. But there is something worse than that Manichean simplicity. Barack Obama doesn’t care whether they’re with us or against us.

And that's in just one year! Imagine how much he'll have ruined by 2012!

Needless to say, I find all of this to be a bit exaggerated, and even a bit disingenuous. Keep in mind that many once thought it cute or tough to alienate and insult allies; designating them as 'old' and 'new' Europe, for instance. When the Bush administration ruffled feathers it was decisive leadership; when Obama does it it's the collapse of Western society as we know it. Pick your hyperbole, I suppose.

After eight years in office, did President Bush actually leave us with a clear policy on ever-emerging China? How about the so-called road map for peace? How'd that work out? Did President Bush manage to halt Iranian nuclear enrichment, or did he simply leave Iran in a stronger geopolitical position vis-à-vis Iraq and Afghanistan?

Pletka attributes many of these perceived failings to "arrogance." But it has been well documented that the previous administration was also stubborn, resistant to consultation and set in its ways. How then, if Ms. Pletka is indeed correct, has this changed with administrations?

Pletka scoffs at the president's insistence that policy is "really hard," but he's right - as was George W. Bush when he said it. Perhaps, just perhaps, the problem isn't what our presidents have failed to do, but what we expect them to do in an increasingly multipolar, or even nonpolar world?

(AP Photo)

March 1, 2010

A Victory over the Pakistani Taliban?

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The Times says that Pakistan has put the hurt on its home-grown Taliban menace in the tribal area:

Significant leaders of the Pakistani Taleban have been killed or captured in an onslaught of frontier ground and air attacks, a Pakistani general has told The Times.

“The militant command and control centres and their caches have been dismantled or captured,” said Major-General Tariq Khan, one of the country’s most experienced commanders in the frontier war with the Taleban. “The kind of hits the leadership has taken, the casualties they have taken, the TTP [Pakistani Taleban] is no longer significant,” he said. “It has ended as a cohesive force. It doesn’t exist any more as an umbrella organisation that can influence militancy anywhere.”

Given that the Pakistani Taliban are a huge menace to Pakistani society, it wouldn't make much sense for Khan to engage in empty boasting (whereas such claims made about the Afghan Taliban would have to be taken with huge grains of salt). But still, it seems a bit premature. Insurgent groups can remobilize under the radar, and how much infrastructure do the Pakistani Taliban need to carry off terrorist attacks in Pakistan's cities? Still, certainly encouraging news.

But what of al Qaeda, which is thought to be hiding in the tribal zone?

General Khan said: “There was some Arab influence in terms of resources and money. We haven’t found a dedicated al-Qaeda command-and- control centre. My commandant in Bajaur . . . says it’s like a pinch of flour in a bag of salt — you get the flavour but can’t catch the individuals.”

(AP Photo)

Can Great Powers Fix Afghanistan?

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The Lowy Institute's Michael Wesley thinks they can:

But Central Asia's southern tier has benefited from no such clear thinking. Beijing's support for Pakistan has kept India strategically bottled up under the Himalayas for decades, while Indo-Pakistani hostility has led Islamabad to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan. India's response has been to try to deny that strategic depth, and China has every reason to try to block the recent countermove by New Delhi into Afghanistan. This is a complex and dangerous dynamic made chronically unstable by its cyclical structure.

To avoid the worst possible outcome, all three rivals must be engaged in the process of building a stable Afghanistan – and collectively guaranteeing it. The most realistic route is to actively involve the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the future of Afghanistan while broadening that organisation to include India and Pakistan. This solution ties the stability of the northern and southern tiers of Central Asia to each other, thereby broadening the stakes of those involved. The one hope and one fear that bind China and Russia together are also remarkably relevant to the SCO's proposed new members.

The attractive feature of this solution is that it puts the regional powers (i.e. the major stakeholders), and not the U.S., in the driver's seat. It's unrealistic to expect a permanent U.S. presence in Afghanistan or a permanent American subsidy for Pakistan (although Egypt has been enjoying theirs for quite a while). The notion that America doesn't have an "attention span" is an obnoxious way of saying that the treasury is not an infinite well upon which other nations have an open-ended claim.

A regional solution that ties the major powers into some kind of institutional framework for stabilizing Afghanistan seems like a good alternative, especially since none of the stakeholders save Pakistan have much interest in seeing a Taliban restoration. (Of course, whether such a gambit is workable is another matter.)

(AP Photo)

Not Your Father's Taliban

Meet the new Taliban: more virgins, less killing.

February 23, 2010

The Reason for Foreign Policy Minimalism

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It's an oft-recounted story but one that appears to need frequent retelling. In the immediate aftermath of the worst terrorist massacre in this country's history, U.S. forces swept into Afghanistan and quickly pushed the Taliban and al Qaeda into neighboring Pakistan. Having failed to kill the leader of either the Taliban or al Qaeda, and unsure about the relative strength of the group following initial combat, the Bush administration nonetheless shifted its focus, intelligence assets and diplomatic attention to launching a war against Saddam Hussein.

Throughout the years of that conflict, the Bush administration spent most of its energy and attention trying to fix the mess it had made in Baghdad, all the while the Taliban crept back into Afghanistan, ramping up its insurgency. It's not that the Bush administration wanted an insurgency in Afghanistan to rear its head - but it had a much more pressing problem (entirely of its own making) in Iraq.

Now the Obama administration faces the opposite problem. Iraq is relatively stable, Afghanistan is a mess. So naturally, the administration is focusing on Afghanistan. But it's not like things in Iraq are on a sure-fire path to success and we're hearing an increasing number of warnings that the Obama administration is "ignoring" Iraq. Some of this is just partisan positioning - so that if Iraq falls apart, the surge advocates who spent so much time trumpeting victory have an easy scapegoat when the wheels come off. But some of it, like Peter Feaver's post here, seems born of a genuine desire not to see a hard fought stability vanish in Iraq.

And it is a legitimate and important question: what should America's relationship be with Iraq? But implicit in many of the voices raising this question is the assumption that America must take an active role in shaping Iraq's political evolution.

Unfortunately, the government has only so many hands on deck and not many of them possess the unique skills and ability to micro-manage the political evolution of Iraq to our liking. If such a capacity was available in the United States, one wonders why it was not pressed into service in the years circa 2003 - 2008. But more importantly, this underscores a very important and what I took to be conservative maxim that the government should not endeavor to do too much.

(AP Photo)

Conflicted U.S. Views on Afghanistan

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It has been a good few weeks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the arrests of major Taliban figures and the start of the Obama administration's troop surge. Angus Reid finds more Americans are optimistic about the mission:

More adults in the United States are now in favour of the ongoing military operation in Afghanistan, according to a poll by Angus Reid Public Opinion. 54 per cent of respondents support the mission involving American soldiers, up five points since December.

In addition, 52 per cent of respondents think the federal government has provided too little information about the war in Afghanistan.

Rassmussen has picked up a different vibe:


A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that 47% of voters now believe it is possible for the United States to win the war in Afghanistan. That’s down from a high of 51% in early December following President Obama’s announcement of his new strategy for the war. Just prior to that speech, however, only 39% thought a U.S. victory was possible.

Thirty percent (30%) now say a victory is not possible and 23% are not sure.

Personally, I'm in the slightly more optimistic camp now that it appears that Pakistan is finally taking the fight to the Afghan Taliban. If Pakistan is genuinely cooperating in squelching the Afghan Taliban threat (instead of nurturing it), it means the U.S. could actually leave Afghanistan sooner rather than later.

(AP Photo)

February 22, 2010

Targets and Tactics

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Max Boot writes:

Funny how no one seriously objects when U.S. Predators carry out similar hits on al-Qaeda operatives but the whole world is in uproar when the Israelis target members of Hamas — an organization that is morally indistinguishable from al-Qaeda. The Dubai uproar only highlights once again the double standard to which Israel is constantly subjected. But Israel cannot and should not use that double standard as an excuse to avoid taking vital action in its self-defense. The leaders of terrorist organizations are legitimate military targets, and Israel should spare itself the agonizing and hand-wringing over this targeted killing.

Daniel Larison pounces:

As atrocious and appalling as their past and present conduct is, Hamas still retains in much of the non-American West some minimal legitimacy as a major faction in Palestinian politics. Hamas and Al Qaeda may be morally indistinguishable, but politically they have very different standings in the eyes of many other states. Israel’s major regional ally Turkey has a ruling party that is somewhat sympathetic to Hamas, while it is resolutely hostile to Al Qaeda and its affiliates. These are rather obvious political distinctions that Boot ought to understand, and the Israeli government must also understand these things. It is pointless to pretend that these distinctions don’t exist and to complain that the different reactions to drone strikes and the Dubai assassination prove a double standard. Whether or not there should be a double standard, Israel’s government has to take for granted that there is one. If Israel’s patron and the global superpower can get away with something, however misguided it may be, it does not always follow that it can act with the same impunity.

Well put, but let me take it a step further and dismiss the notion that any double standard exists at all in this case. It's a convenient rhetorical crutch I suppose to scream hypocrisy every time a critique is made of Israeli behavior, but this time around it just doesn't pass muster.

Since he doesn't say, I'm left to assume Mr. Boot means predator strikes in Pakistan, and not Afghanistan. These strikes are the product of U.S.-Pakistani coordination spanning two administrations and two regimes in both Washington and Islamabad, respectively. The predators are likely based inside Pakistan, and the strikes are carried out with approval - albeit quiet and reluctant - from Islamabad.

Larison disapproves of the drone strikes, and I certainly won't deny him that right. Personally, I consider them the least bad alternative to a bad policy of prolonged regional occupation. If we're going to maintain a military presence in the region, then we should be targeting specific al-Qaeda-Taliban operatives and taking them out with limited civilian casualties. The drones accomplish this, which is why Pakistani concerns have been less about the civilian casualties involved and more about who gets to pull the trigger.

And there certainly has been debate in the West over these attacks, both public and private ones within the administration itself. Moreover, I cannot think of one pro-drone argument in the last two years that didn't involve a kind of resigned acceptance of the program's relative effectiveness. Who are these predator pom-pom wavers Boot alludes to? Name names, please.

One could go on at length about the differences between drones and Dubai, but let me try to sum it up in one word: sovereignty. What actually makes the drones controversial is the political backlash they create for our allies in Pakistan. Our presence in the country is a shadowy one, and the cost/benefit balance is rather sensitive. Washington views Pakistan as an important ally in an important war, and thus can't do too much to create domestic tensions for said ally. But these are considerations made in conjunction with that government, just as the strikes are ultimately approved and enabled by that government. Just imagine how much harder it would be if Western operatives went into Pakistan, unapproved, and carried out such strikes. The backlash would be both tremendous and justified. Now imagine how the UAE must feel.

The targets in each case may be "morally indistinguishable," but the tactics are not, and that's why Israel - if responsible - is in the wrong here.

(AP Photo)

February 17, 2010

What the Mullah Baradar Arrest Means

Cato's Malou Innocent writes that while important, the arrest of Taliban second in command Mullah Baradar will only bear fruit if the U.S. can ease tensions between Pakistan and India. Steve Coll suggests that the Obama administration just might be having success there:

I would guess at a more subtle motivation, one that might suggest a favorable pattern now emerging in the Obama Administration’s and Central Command’s approach to Pakistan’s role in the Afghan conflict. Over the last few months, by multiple means, the United States and its allies have been seeking to persuade Pakistan that it can best achieve its legitimate security goals in Afghanistan through political negotiations, rather than through the promotion of endless (and futile) Taliban guerrilla violence—and that the United States will respect and accommodate Pakistan’s agenda in such talks. Pakistan’s support for the Afghan Taliban, especially in recent years, was always best understood as a military lever to promote political accommodations of Pakistan in Kabul. Baradar, however, has defiantly refused to participate in such political strategies, as he indicated in an e-mail interview he gave to Newsweek last year. The more the Taliban’s leaders enjoying sanctuary in Karachi or Quetta refuse to lash themselves to Pakistani political strategy, the more vulnerable they become to a knock on the door in the middle of the night.

I admit I was skeptical that the Obama administration's efforts to ease Pakistan and India tensions would work (at least if the U.S. tried to press hard on the Kashmir issue). And while it's still too soon to tell if it has, I'm hoping to be proved wrong.

UPDATE:
Dan Twining raises some less optimistic interpretations:

What if Washington has cut a quiet deal with Pakistan's military high command, granting them a disproportionate role in determining Afghanistan's future in return for help facilitating the withdrawal of Western forces? In return for Pakistani cooperation over the next 18 months -- including Pakistani military offensives against violent extremists in its tribal regions, joint intelligence operations like the one that netted Mullah Baradar, delivering elements of the Afghan Taliban for serious talks on reconciliation with the Afghan government, and continued Western use of Pakistani territory to supply Western forces fighting in Afghanistan -- one could imagine a private U.S. understanding with Pakistani armed forces commander General Kayani that, once Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistan can enjoy a free hand to resume its special relationship with the country's post-Karzai leadership in its continued quest for strategic depth against India.

February 12, 2010

Charlie Wilson's Legacy

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Charlie Wilson, the Texas Congressman who spurred the U.S. to step up aid to Afghan Mujahadeen during the Soviet invasion, has passed away. Many people are hailing his life and his supposed prescience that the U.S. should have stayed committed to Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat.

Joshua Foust wrestles with his legacy and wonders whether the U.S. would have been better off not getting involved in Afghanistan in the first place. It's an interesting argument. Clearly a lot hinges on the question of how decisive Afghanistan was to the fall of the Soviet Union. Very decisive, and I think the case for U.S. aid is strong. Not very decisive, and the case collapses. I'm not sure how big a role it played. So to you, wise readers, was Afghanistan instrumental in destroying the Evil Empire?

(AP Photo)

February 10, 2010

Hanson vs. Bacevich

A few weeks ago Andrew Bacevich wrote a piece for the American Conservative arguing that the U.S. hasn't had a stellar track record when it comes to winning wars since 1945. Today in the National Review, Victor Davis Hanson argues that, to the contrary, the U.S. has succeeded in winning the same wars Bacevich dubbed defeats and is in fact winning the war on terrorism. You can read both and decide which is the more persuasive take, but I part company with Hanson as he edges toward drawing parallels with contemporary experience:

In other words, while particular wars in any age may not end in victory or defeat for either side, the concept of such finality is very much possible for either, given their shared human nature. In short, if a war is stalemated, it is usually because both sides, wisely or stupidly, come to believe victory is not worth the commensurate costs in blood and treasure — not because victory itself is an anachronism.

Hanson believes our goals are sufficiently modest that we can win in Iraq and Afghanistan:

In the latter two instances, we are fighting second wars in which victory is defined as ensuring the survival of successive consensual systems under the countries’ elected governments.

So far, we are winning both. Victory is definable: when these states are able to stay autonomous largely through their own efforts — with the understanding that Europe, for 65 years, and South Korea, for 60, have both required American military support to ensure their independence.


There are a few things wrong with this assertion. The first is that the goal of sustaining consensual governments is ancillary to the core purpose of both wars: which is to safeguard the U.S. from acts of Islamic terrorism. If we "won" by Hanson's definition in either country, but suffered further assaults from terrorists based elsewhere or saw no significant diminution of the terrorist threat worldwide, it would be difficult to justify the enormous expenditures in either theater. (Hanson later says as much.)

But notice what else is wrong here. In both the cases of South Korea and Europe, the U.S. role was to provide defense against external enemies, not internal ones. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is laboring to defend countries from mostly indigenous insurgencies, not external, nation state enemies. That transforms the role the U.S. is expected to play in both countries significantly. Given this difference, the lessons from past conventional wars don't offer much guidance. And you can see how it leads one astray:

That there was no visible German opposition to Hitler in 1939 and no visible support for him in April 1945 was due both to overwhelming Allied power and to the knowledge that a magnanimous reconstruction was possible. That we will be unmerciful to radical Islam and quite benevolent to those who reject it — that is the proper message.

The U.S. and its allies killed an estimated 6-to-8 million Germans (of which perhaps as many as 2 million were civilians) and completely, purposefully devastated entire cities in a campaign of total war to break the will of the German state. I would love to know why Hanson thinks this is a proper prescription for "radical Islam" which consists of scattered cells of terrorists throughout the globe, in possession of no country to speak of (except Iran, only we're not at war with Iran and not even those commentators who think we are at war with Iran wouldn't - I hope - advocate the wholesale slaughter of Iranian civilians to collapse the regime). We can indeed be "unmerciful" toward these terror cells, killing them wherever we find them, but that is only one element in a successful strategy.

Consider what has just occurred in Pakistan over the past few months. In August, the U.S. killed the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud. A few weeks ago, we killed his successor. Now the AP reports that there's a mad scramble among the Pakastani Taliban as people vie to take his place.

I don't know about you, but if my previous bosses kept getting whacked, angling for the job wouldn't be a top priority, and yet there is no apparently no shortage of people who want the job. (Ditto Hamas, which, while not as visible after Israeli assassinations still manages to fill its leadership ranks.) I think it's necessary to kill these people, but it's not sufficient, as insurgencies are fueled by a number of factors and overwhelming military force isn't enough to bring them to heel. And it would be positively insane and counter-productive to embrace a "total war" ethos with respect to an insurgency (especially a global one).

UPDATE: To see what metrics would be appropriate in judging a counter-insurgency see Tom Ricks and David Kilcullen.

February 8, 2010

Video of the Day

It looks like Sherman was right:

It is apparent to me that Al Jazeera is attempting to paint the U.S. in a negative light with this video. While U.S. soldiers are in vehicles, who do you suppose delivered (and secured) those supplies? Nevertheless, this video highlights the Catch-22 that many Afghans feel they are in now.

For more videos on issues around the world, check out the Real Clear World Video page.

February 3, 2010

Afghan Views of the U.S.

With the U.S. and the UK poised to launch a major offensive against the Taliban, Gallup's Julie Ray and Rajesh Srinivasan have released some polling on Afghan's attitude toward the U.S. over 2009:

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The authors conclude:


In the most recent survey, Afghans' opinions of the United States, as a nation, were the lowest Gallup has measured to date. Asked to rate the extent of their favorability on a 5-point scale, where 1 is very unfavorable and 5 is very favorable, a majority of Afghans (52%) rated the United States very (24%) or somewhat unfavorable (28%).

Keep in mind that these polls were taken at what we can only hope was the height of the Taliban insurgency. If coalition forces are able to suppress the insurgency, I would expect Afghan views of the U.S. to improve.

January 29, 2010

Video of the Day

The plan to 'reintegrate' the Taliban with money may seem like a new idea, but some are skeptical of its potential effectiveness:

The logic behind aid for current Taliban fighters is roughly the same as that behind foreign aid: we give you money to meet your needs, and you do not support our enemies. Underlying this is the assumption that these groups are actually somewhat autonomous and independent. If it works, 300 million is actually a fairly cheap price to make Afghanistan calmer.

For more videos, be sure to check the RCW video page.

Was Colin Powell Right About the Taliban?

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In Oct. 2001, Colin Powell floated the idea of negotiating with "moderate" elements in the Taliban to form a new Afghan government when Mullah Omar was run out of Kabul.

Conservatives hated the idea at the time. Far better to stay in Afghanistan for a decade and try to rebuild the country along Western-approved lines while transforming its people. And who knows, maybe that idea was completely untenable and wouldn't have facilitated a smoother American exit from Afghanistan than the nation building approach embraced by the Bush administration.

But now it turns out that an effort is underway to bring the Taliban on board, with the endorsement of both Secretary Gates and General McChrystal. The difference now, of course, is that we're in a dramatically weaker position now than we were in 2001. And the Taliban? Much stronger.

(AP Photo)

Tony Blair's 9/11 Defense

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Appearing before the Chilcot Inquiry, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair defended his decision to join the U.S. invasion of Iraq:


Looking greyer than when he was in office, Blair told the inquiry that the British and American view changed "dramatically" after 9/11.

"Here's what changed for me: the whole calculus of risk," he said. "The point about this terrorist act was over 3,000 people had been killed, an absolutely horrific event. But if these people, inspired by this religious fanaticism, could have killed 30,000, they would have [done].

Blair went on to argue that Saddam's WMD program was an intolerable risk after 9/11. This is a fairly common line of argument regarding Iraq but it doesn't hold up logically. What 9/11 demonstrated was precisely the opposite - that no state would dare run the risk of attacking the United States directly, or providing aid to a terrorist group with the purpose of striking such a blow. The only government al Qaeda could count on for any official support was the Taliban and to call them a government is a fairly charitable description.

Al Qaeda proved to be such a lethal menace precisely because it had no state sponsor and no territorial vulnerability. The idea that 9/11 proved that deterrence was futile is erroneous, if anything, 9/11 confirmed that deterrence is still a viable concept, at least when dealing with states.

But there is also an element of the absurd in pointing to Iraq as a potential source of WMD for al Qaeda. Shortly after 9/11, we learned that Pakistani nuclear scientists had met with bin Laden. We learned further that Pakistan's chief nuclear engineer had created an extensive black market peddling nuclear material and blueprints for constructing nuclear weapons. We knew for a fact that Pakistan was a nuclear weapons state, while no one seriously believed that Saddam had a nascent, let alone functional, nuclear program.

If there was any state where one could make a plausible claim about the potential for WMD to be slipped to al Qaeda, it would have been Pakistan, not Iraq.

(AP Photo)

January 28, 2010

Afghan Strategy in Focus

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With world leaders meeting in London today to hash out a unified approach to Afghanistan, the Daily Telegraph's Con Coughlin thinks the strategy is doable:

Given that most of the support for the Taliban comes from Pashtun tribesmen, who previously dominated the country’s political institutions, the challenge it to persuade the more moderate Pashtun leaders to switch their support from the Taliban to the democratic process. One of the objectives of today’s conference is to raise the funds to pay “compensation” to those Taliban elders who can be persuaded to renounce the fight.
Dexter Filkins reports today that we have won over a major Pashtun tribe:
The leaders of one of the largest Pashtun tribes in a Taliban stronghold said Wednesday that they had agreed to support the American-backed government, battle insurgents and burn down the home of any Afghan who harbored Taliban guerrillas.

All it cost was $1 million in "development aid" routed directly to the tribe instead of the Afghan government.

(AP Photo)


January 27, 2010

Off Shore vs. Counter-Insurgency

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The Washington Post reports:


U.S. military teams and intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with Yemeni troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people, among them six of 15 top leaders of a regional al-Qaeda affiliate, according to senior administration officials.

The operations, approved by President Obama and begun six weeks ago, involve several dozen troops from the U.S. military's clandestine Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), whose main mission is tracking and killing suspected terrorists. The American advisers do not take part in raids in Yemen, but help plan missions, develop tactics and provide weapons and munitions. Highly sensitive intelligence is being shared with the Yemeni forces, including electronic and video surveillance, as well as three-dimensional terrain maps and detailed analysis of the al-Qaeda network.

This is, in rough outline, what George Will, Robert Pape and others had advocated for Afghanistan as an alternative to nation building. I guess we're going to get a real life experiment in which is the most effective.

(AP Photo)

January 26, 2010

The Eikenberry Cables

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The New York Times has gotten its hands on the cables that U.S. Amb. to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry sent to the Obama administration warning them off a full scale counter-insurgency. You can read the cables here. He cites the weakness of President Karzai and the lack of an Afghan ruling class with a coherent national identity as reasons for skepticism, among others.

Will these things change dramatically between now and 2011?

(AP Photo)

January 23, 2010

Are We Pushing Pakistan Too Hard?

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On Dec. 30, an al Qaeda terrorist walked into a CIA base in the Afghan city of Khost and blew himself up, killing 7 CIA agents and a member of Jordan's intelligence service. Shortly thereafter, the perpetraitor of the attack was shown in a video with the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud.

It looks like the CIA is pissed:

Since the suicide bombing that took the lives of seven Americans in Afghanistan on Dec. 30, the Central Intelligence Agency has struck back against militants in Pakistan with the most intensive series of missile strikes from drone aircraft since the covert program began.

Beginning the day after the attack on a C.I.A. base in Khost, Afghanistan, the agency has carried out 11 strikes that have killed about 90 people suspected of being militants, according to Pakistani news reports, which make almost no mention of civilian casualties. The assault has included strikes on a mud fortress in North Waziristan on Jan. 6 that killed 17 people and a volley of missiles on a compound in South Waziristan last Sunday that killed at least 20.

Personally, if you're going to wage a war on terrorism, drone attacks seem preferable to nation building. Even if we rebuilt Afghanistan, we've seen clearly al Qaeda's capacity to reconstitute itself in another country (Yemen) and actually launch a (thankfully failed) attack on the U.S. On the whole, a limited use of drone attacks against high-level al Qaeda targets seems a viable alternative to decades-long state building. Still, the drone strikes are not without risk, especially since they range a lot further than high-level al Qaeda terrorists:

If the United States expands the drone strikes beyond the lawless tribal areas to neighboring Baluchistan, as is under discussion, the backlash “might even spark a social revolution in Pakistan,” Mr. Arquilla said.

So far the reaction in Pakistan to the increased drone strikes has been muted. Last week, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani of Pakistan told Richard C. Holbrooke, the administration’s senior diplomat for Afghanistan and Pakistan, that the drones undermined the larger war effort. But the issue was not at the top of the agenda as it was a year ago.

Hasan Askari Rizvi, a military analyst in Lahore, said public opposition had been declining because the campaign was viewed as a success. Yet one Pakistani general, who supports the drone strikes as a tactic for keeping militants off balance, questioned the long-term impact.

“Has the situation stabilized in the past two years?” asked the general, speaking on condition of anonymity. “Are the tribal areas more stable?” Yes, he said, Baitullah Mehsud, founder of the Pakistani Taliban, was killed by a missile last August. “But he’s been replaced and the number of fighters is increasing,” the general said.

The number of terrorist attacks inside Pakistan have increased too, with the Taliban taking the fight into the heart of Pakistan. Drone strikes are intended to cripple al Qaeda, but if they cripple the Pakistani state along the way and precipitate some kind of collapse of the government, that could potentially be a far worse situation than a low level guerrilla war against the Karzia government in Afghanistan.

It doesn't appear to be the case the Zardari government is collapsing under the weight of drone strikes (corruption is another story). But it's clear they're unhappy, as this Times story recounting Secretary Gates' recent trip makes clear.

(AP Photo)

January 22, 2010

Power From Which Gun Barrel

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According to the Washington Post, Karl Eikenberry, U.S. Ambassador in Afghanistan is pushing back against a plan from the military that would arm local Afghan militias:

Eikenberry's unease about the program as it was structured by the military also reflects a broader difference of opinion at the highest levels of the U.S. military and diplomatic headquarters in Kabul about new approaches to combating the Taliban insurgency. While military commanders are eager to experiment with decentralized grass-roots initiatives that work around the ponderous Afghan bureaucracy in Kabul, civilian officials think it is more important to wait until they have the central government's support, something they regard as essential to sustaining the programs.

Eikenberry's concerns are valid - if you look at the unease surrounding how a similar program has progressed in Iraq, there's a real concern that a failure to integrate armed groups into the central government ultimately lays the ground work for a civil war, or fragmentation (see here too). The Post pieces also notes that we don't really have good intelligence regarding the allegiances of these local groups. The U.S. could be sucked unwittingly into siding with unsavory characters in their local disputes.

But on the other hand, Eikenberry's objections are predicated on shoring up the central government, and there are plenty of people who think we need a more decentralized approach to the country. Arming friendly tribes may work to undermine Karzai, but if they can effectively keep the Taliban at bay, they may pave the way for a faster U.S. exit.

(AP Photo)

January 18, 2010

Taliban Attack Kabul

Reuters caught some extraordinary video here:


January 14, 2010

Afghan Optimism Improves

The BBC reports:

Most Afghans are increasingly optimistic about the state of their country, a poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC News and Germany's ARD shows.

Of more than 1,500 Afghans questioned, 70% said they believed Afghanistan was going in the right direction - a big jump from 40% a year ago.

Of those questioned, 68% now back the presence of US troops in Afghanistan, compared with 63% a year ago.

For Nato troops, including UK forces, support has risen from 59% to 62%.

Given that Western counter-insurgency efforts rise and fall on the outlook of the Afghan people, this is good news. Let's hope these positive trends continue.

January 12, 2010

How Does This End?

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The Cable's Josh Rogin passes along a report from the State Department that warns that Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria could be the next terrorist safe haven:

As the United States widens its understanding of the terrorism threat to include countries like Yemen and Somalia, its neighbor across the Gulf of Aden, the State Department inspector general's office is warning about another potential breeding ground for insurgents: Nigeria.

Of course, the underwear bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab hailed from there, but his case is seen as an aberration because he grew up in the most advantageous of circumstances. But according to a new report made public Monday, Nigeria is at risk of becoming the same type of breeding ground for violent extremism that America is now battling in so many other places around the globe.

As many people have said repeatedly, you could break the back of al Qaeda in Af-Pak and still have a global terrorism problem on your hands.

Perhaps more importantly, as Matthew Yglesias intimates, we've now defined our national security interests in such a way that we cannot feel secure in the world so long as their are pockets of insecurity anywhere. That is not a rational view of defense but paranoia. Unfortunately, it's a view promoted as assiduously by progressives - including the Obama administration - as neoconservatives.

It's also worth asking just how much more expensive it would be to eschew global nation building and instead invest the money in developing an energy economy that does not rely overwhelmingly on petroleum.Having influence over the Middle East is great and all, but in a world where the U.S. economy wouldn't grind to a halt without oil, I don't see a lot of downsides to letting China enjoy the fun of wielding influence in the region.

(AP Photos)

January 11, 2010

Kabuli Conversations

The number of journalists at a typical Kabul dinner party is only surpassed by the number of story suggestions proffered to said journalists. Still being a newcomer, these pitches are most appreciated.

One such story idea was to delve into the world of Afghan conspiracy theories.

Conversations between Westerner and Afghan can quickly devolve into the foreigner refuting accusations that their home government, still clinging to imperial designs, are fighting the Taliban insurgency with one hand while supporting it with the other. Dig deeper and one learns that, despite horrendous losses in both blood and treasure, Western forces are, in fact, actively working against themselves to keep Afghanistan in a state of instability.

Unfortunately rumors of Western forces paying off the Taliban help to connect the conspiracy dots. And in some instances these allegations aren’t that far off. From this point of departure it isn’t difficult to follow how an illiterate society—where hearsay is the primary conduit of information— that (through its own painful experiences) has developed a understandable distrust of government can make the necessary leap in logic to conclude that the only reason that after eight years of war the American army of bunker busters and stealth fighters hasn’t bombed a bunch of Islamist hillbillies from their mountain redoubt is not simply because they’ve chosen against it but that they are actually arming and protecting Mr. Mullah Omar, commander of the Taliban faithful.

From here conversations veer towards motivations: what on earth does could justify such high economic, political and moral costs? The answer is usually: Realpolitik and serious cash. In the know Afghans will explain that an unstable Afghanistan—nestled tightly between Iran, Russia, China and Pakistan—provides the perfect pretext to station troops in a region of extreme strategic importance. Along with an opportunity for power projection, Afghanistan also offers mineral wealth. And when hard pressed, the perennial fallback of a war against Islam comes in handy.

At this point the speaker usually lets out a deep sigh before confiding "at least when the Soviets came to fight a war they weren't pretending to be our friends."

Alim Remtulla

Applying COIN to the Global War on Terrorism

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In an interview with Der Spiegel, General Stanley McChrystal lays out the general theme of counter-insurgency:

At the end of the day, a counter-insurgency is decided by people's perceptions and by how people feel. I think any war like this is not a battle between material. It's not about destroying the enemy's cities. It's not even about destroying their army, their fighters. You have to weaken the insurgency. But it's really about convincing the people that they want it to stop and they ultimately will. The most effective way for us to operate is to be really good and effective partners with our Afghan counterparts, because it's not a technical problem, it's a human problem.

I think McChrystal is correct here. But what's troubling is that Washington has not extrapolated this understanding to the global war on terrorism. After all, al Qaeda is reportedly in 60 countries. The failed Christmas Day bomber was a Nigerian, schooled in London and equipped in Yemen. The threat we face is global in nature and while we've embraced counter-insurgency doctrine in one theater, we seem to be indifferent to its precepts in others:


For now, however, the U.S. has chosen to meet the global threat of Islamic radicalism with what some would dub (in the Afghan context) a "narrow counter-terrorism" approach. We use intelligence to pick off al-Qaeda operatives on the battlefield, or police and investigative work to derail plots already set in motion, while mostly ignoring the psychological and political milieu from which radicalization occurs. To date, though, such an approach has been fairly effective. Terrorists have managed to kill scores in Europe (Madrid and London) but have yet to reprise a 9/11-scale atrocity inside the United States.

While al-Qaeda is infamously known for spacing its attacks out over several years, it has also been faced with unprecedented pressure since 9/11. U.S. and allied efforts may have permanently crippled al-Qaeda's ability to launch mass casualty attacks on American interests. (Of course, if that's true, it would severely undermine the counter-insurgent's case for a stepped up commitment to Afghanistan). On the other hand, we may simply be in a lull before the next massacre.

Unfortunately, we won't know until it's too late.

What we do know is that technology will only advance, allowing smaller groups of individuals to perpetrate ever more lethal attacks. The Internet ensures that even if physical safe havens such as Afghanistan become inhospitable, like-minded holy warriors can still find support and perhaps technical training in "virtual safe havens." We know too that while targeted military action and investigative work can yield tactical successes, America could well remain behind the strategic curve if broad swaths of the Middle East or pockets of Western Europe's Muslim community remains sympathetic to bin Laden's narrative.

Ironically - while there is a broad cross-section of elite opinion willing to countenance a truly massive investment in Afghanistan to win ordinary Afghans away from the Taliban - there is scant discussion, much less the political will, to embark on a strategic reorientation of America's Middle East policy and apply some basic precepts of counter-insurgency to that wellspring of jihadism.

(AP Photos)

January 1, 2010

A Virtual Safe Haven

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The New York Times' Eric Schmitt and Eric Lipton examine the role of charismatic Imams using the Internet to lure Muslims to the jihadist cause:


American military and law enforcement authorities said Thursday that the man accused in the bombing attempt, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, most likely had contacts with the cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, whom investigators have also named as having exchanged e-mail messages with Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, an American Army psychiatrist charged with killing 13 people in a shooting rampage in November at Fort Hood, Tex.

Speaking in eloquent, often colloquial, English, Mr. Awlaki and other Internet imams from the Middle East to Britain offer a televangelist’s persuasive message of faith, purpose and a way forward, for both the young and as yet uncommitted, as well as for the most devout worshipers ready to take the next step, to jihad, officials say.

“People across the spectrum of radicalism can gravitate to them, if they’re just dipping their toe in or they’re hard core,” said Jarret Brachman, author of “Global Jihadism: Theory and Practice” (Routledge, 2008) and a consultant to the United States government about terrorism. “The most important thing they do is take very complex ideological thoughts and make them simple, with clear guidelines on how to follow Islamic law.”


The events of the last two weeks - both the Christmas bomb plot and the emergence of Yemen as a terror safe haven (and a reminder of London's role in the radicalization process), have cast the argument that it's vital to state-build in Afghanistan to defend the U.S. from jihadist terrorism in a new, and unflattering, light. At a minimum, it puts the question of just how many of our counter-terrorism eggs we need to be putting in the AfPak basket vs. other theaters.

(AP Photos)

December 29, 2009

The Good, the Bad and the Central

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Max Boot discusses Yemen and its place in the greater War on Terror:

We cannot ignore the terrorist threat emanating from Yemen or other states but nor should we use this undoubted danger as an excuse to lose the war of the moment–the one NATO troops are fighting in Afghanistan. Winning the “war on terror” will require prevailing on multiple battlefields–Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, and a host of other countries, including, for that matter, Western Europe and the United States. The methods and techniques we will use in each place have to be tailored to the individual circumstances. Few countries will require the kind of massive troop presence needed in Afghanistan or Iraq. In most places we will fight on a lesser scale, using Special Forces and security assistance programs. But because a lower-profile presence may work elsewhere doesn’t mean that it will work in Afghanistan–or would have worked in Iraq. We know this because the Bush administration already tried the small-footprint strategy in Afghanistan. It is this strategy that allowed the Taliban to recover so much ground lost after 9/11–territory that can only be retaken by an influx of additional Western troops. There is no reason why we can’t fight and prevail in Afghanistan even as we are fighting in different ways in different countries.[emphasis added]

The point on the Bush strategy in Afghanistan is simply inaccurate. What Boot calls a "small-footprint strategy" was in fact a rather ambitious, rhetoric-laden, albeit poorly resourced nation building agenda (we all remember the purple and blue fingers, right?). The goals didn't match the muscle, requiring a "reduction in objectives" by the Obama administration, as Richard Haass put it. In other words, President Bush spoke boisterously while carrying a tiny, tiny stick.

But Boot never explains why Afghanistan is such a vital front in the War on Terrorism, nor does he explain what Iraq has to do with that war at all. And why the Taliban--along with roughly 100 al-Qaeda operatives in the Af-Pak region--require a heavier troop presence than other threats (such as al-Shabaab in Somalia, for example) remains unclear to me.

I agree with Boot that the "good war, bad war" stuff is no good, and migrating the designation from one front to the next for political expedience is irresponsible. The real question--one I feel Boot never properly addresses--is why we even need a central front in order to conduct this war.

He writes that "one of the key advantages gained by our presence in Afghanistan is that it makes it easier to target terrorist lairs in Pakistan." But presence and escalation are clearly two different things, and targeting said "lairs" does not require the latter--as was demonstrated two weeks ago in Yemen.

(AP Photo)

December 27, 2009

Is Yemen Tomorrow's War?

Very likely, says Sen. Joseph Lieberman. Spencer Ackerman pounces:


What are the local dynamics in Yemen that a military strike would impact? What would the goals of such strikes be? What are the underlying political effects that have allowed al-Qaeda to establish itself in Yemen? What measures short of war might be better targeted to addressing those conditions? These are just a few of the many prior questions that have to be answered before such a thing is considered. Instead, Lieberman just gets to go on Fox and monger away, unchallenged. Such is life.

Good questions all, but I think this war of tomorrow idea deserves some further unpacking. To me, targeted assaults on al-Qaeda operatives--alongside agreeable host governments--makes for a good counter-terrorism strategy. My question: if this is a sufficient tactic for dealing with one al-Qaeda safe haven, why then does another require costly occupation?

I hope Senator Lieberman will elaborate on what preemptive action would look like in Yemen. Favoring a reserved and targeted war there would seemingly undercut his support for escalation and occupation in Afghanistan, but no one ever accused U.S. senators of consistency.

December 22, 2009

Tora Bora, Ctd.

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Peter Feaver makes a good point:

My problem with the Tora Bora critique -- both its generalized form and the particular form advanced by Glasser -- is that it conveniently forgets that the reason bin Laden was "trapped" in Tora Bora in the first place is that Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks and CIA Director George Tenet defied both the conventional war plans and the conventional wisdom to mount the very light-footprint campaign that Glasser et al. are complaining about. If Rumsfeld and Franks and Tenet had used the conventional warplan that involved a heavy U.S. ground presence instead of the rapidly deployable light-footprint that Glasser denounces, the invasion of Afghanistan would have happened some time in 2002, if then. If Rumsfeld and Franks and Tenet had listened to the conventional wisdom during the early weeks when the light-footprint approach appeared to be faltering, they would have abandoned the Afghan effort long before the battle in Tora Bora.

I don't think this is a completely accurate rendering of the situation - the Senate Foreign Relations report says there were adequate troops inside Afghanistan to trap bin Laden but we simply choose not to send them into the mountains.

Still, Feaver's point strikes me as valid. We'd have never even gotten close to bin Laden if we didn't use the unconventional approach employed by Rumsfeld and Franks. And while we're playing hypotheticals, here's another one - what if we had listened to Rumsfeld even more closely and pulled our troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq shortly after invading both countries, instead of sticking around to nation build? How much worse off would we be, especially in Afghanistan?

(AP Photos)

December 21, 2009

Is the U.S. Repeating Cold War Mistakes?

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One of the most intense debates during the early years of the Cold War was the extent to which "indigenous" communist movements were really that, or whether the Kremlin was a global puppet master, manipulating everything. Many in the U.S. at the time tended see communism as a monolith and the Kremlin as the hidden hand, secretly directing events. The reality was more nuanced. The Kremlin did extend its influence into other states, but it couldn't control all of them (see Ukraine and China, for instance). Just because a country "went communist" did not ipso-facto mean that it would take its marching orders from Moscow.

One of the consequences of the U.S. viewing communism as a monolith was the tendency to plunge the U.S. into a series of damaging, even catastrophic, interventions that didn't really reduce Soviet power but did take a bite out of U.S. strength. When we viewed global communism through more sophisticated eyes, we were able to pry apart China and Russia and begin to shore up our position after Vietnam.

No historical analogy is perfect, but we seem to be in a similar dynamic with respect to al Qaeda and "Islamic terrorism" more generally. After 9/11, there was a lot of talk about a broad-based war on terrorism that would tackle not just al Qaeda but groups like Hamas and Hezbollah and states like Iran and Iraq which were seen to facilitate terrorism (but not, of course, the states actually responsible for whipping up the Sunni jihadist whirlwind - Saudi Arabia and Pakistan). It was an undifferentiated lump and we would vanquish it all.

Two wars later, we have an administration that appears eager to scale back the conceptual framework of the war on terrorism into something more bite-sized. But even if the Obama administration would like to pare back to the more discrete goal of defeating "al Qaeda," the job has been made more difficult by the emergence of "like-minded" terrorists with only a tenuous connection to the "core" group inside Pakistan.

This poses a particular problem, I think, for U.S. policy towards Somalia and Yemen. Both are war-torn countries dealing with some insurgent elements that have links to al Qaeda. Do these groups share al Qaeda's core goals of bloodying the U.S. so we'll withdraw support for Arab autocrats? Will these individuals facilitate attacks against American targets in North Africa and beyond? And - most importantly - is that a threat worth taking military action against when weighed against other risks?

These seem like the kind of questions we need to be addressing before stuff like this:

The United States provided firepower, intelligence and other support to the government of Yemen as it carried out raids this week to strike at suspected hide-outs of Al Qaeda within its borders, according to officials familiar with the operations.

Those raids, the AFP reports, killed 49 civilians.

There are good reasons for using force against terrorist targets, and if the New York Times' report is to be believed, those targeted in the Yemen attack had fled Pakistan and so could plausibly be linked to the "core" al Qaeda threat which we are rightly concerned about. But the military is a blunt instrument and given the roiling instability in both Yemen and Somalia, it would be nice if the administration offered some kind of serious defense of its actions rather than just waving a hand and saying "al Qaeda," as if that's sufficient. Particularly because it seems intent on advertising its role in this attack.

(AP Photos)

December 17, 2009

How Do Americans Really Feel About Afghanistan

Steve Kroft on 60 Minutes claimed that "most Americans" have soured on Afghanistan. Not so says Frank Newport:

Nothing like a good polling smack-down to get the heart racing.

Box Cutters and SkyGrabbers

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The WSJ has an embarrassing report today on how Iraqi insurgents have been hacking America's multi-million dollar Predator drones--and for under $26:

Militants in Iraq have used $26 off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, potentially providing them with information they need to evade or monitor U.S. military operations.

Senior defense and intelligence officials said Iranian-backed insurgents intercepted the video feeds by taking advantage of an unprotected communications link in some of the remotely flown planes' systems. Shiite fighters in Iraq used software programs such as SkyGrabber -- available for as little as $25.95 on the Internet -- to regularly capture drone video feeds, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter.

[...]

The militants use programs such as SkyGrabber, from Russian company SkySoftware. Andrew Solonikov, one of the software's developers, said he was unaware that his software could be used to intercept drone feeds. "It was developed to intercept music, photos, video, programs and other content that other users download from the Internet -- no military data or other commercial data, only free legal content," he said by email from Russia.

My sense is that this will get exaggerated and blown out of reasonable proportion by some, but setting aside the painfully foolish system security--no encryption???--this screw up reveals a more salient point, and brings to mind an old cliche: where there's a will there's a way.

Whether it's box cutters or file "intercepting" software, this, in my view, once again challenges the notion that a preponderance of troops and treasure exhausted in one part of the world is the right way to fight an allegedly global war on terrorism. There will always be fringe elements who hate the United States and wish us harm, but trying to pick them off continent-by-continent makes far less sense to me than diverting resources toward cyber-security, not to mention biological weapons security and regulation.

(AP Photos)

December 15, 2009

Obama's Afghan Timetable Doesn't Compute

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David Ignatius reports:

As one of the selling points of the plan to send an additional 30,000 troops into Afghanistan, rather than the full 40,000 troops Gen. Stanley McCrystal requested, the president's aides touted the idea that the extra forces would be sent in the next six months, rather than over the full year that McChrystal originally thought necessary.

But a top military planner says the actual timetable will be closer to what McChrystal proposed.

I asked Lt Gen. David Rodriquez, the No. 2 US commander here, in a briefing tonight how long the deployment of the extra 30,000 would take. He answered that "it will happen between nine and eleven months," starting in January 2010. Which means that some troops might not arrive until November 2010.

The next month after that, December 2010, is when Obama plans to assess how well the troops are doing -- so he can decide how many to pull out when the withdrawal begins in July 2011.

I am up in the air on the issue of whether timetables do more harm than good, but this is another matter. It strains credulity to believe that we can know whether the surge is working after one month.

The Blast Heard Around Kabul

Kabul awoke to yet another bomb blast this morning and, from the looks of it, it was a big one:

Arriving at the blast site roughly six hours after detonation, it was a scene of security officers corralling municipal workers, journalists and curious Afghan onlookers (I being continuously mistaken for the latter) amongst the wreckage, while they themselves tried to take in the enormity of the blast.

In the crowd, an old man announced that we were all "clinging to Bush's testicles" and that from our "fancy cars, only cared about this life and have no regard for the next," before a security official angrily chased him away.  Something could have been lost in the translation.

A steady exodus of foreigners from the Heetal hotel passed by car or on foot, rolling their suitcases through the debris.  A few stopped to pose for a parting shot in front of the collapsed buildings.

The blast crater, said to be a meter deep and two meters wide, had been filled with rubble (see second video).  The black SUV carrying the payload was reportedly hurled through the air by the explosion.  The soft-shelled SUVs in the vicinity were reduced to charred and twisted metal.   The armored variety remaining surprisingly intact:

Violence in Kabul has been steady since this summer's elections but there are concerning reports that while the Taliban were once knocking on the gates of Kabul, they are now banging on its very doors.

In striking one of Kabul's most affluent districts, their message is clear: anyone benefiting from the government's corrupt practices is fair game and cannot hide behind their check points and blast walls. Unfortunately, those actually caught in the blast were most likely guards and domestic staff.

President Karzai's former vice president, Ahmed Zia Massoud, whose house was damaged in the attack is thought to have been the intended target.  Fittingly, the president himself was convening a conference on fighting corruption at the time of the attack.

Tackling corruption will no doubt deflate the Taliban cause, but after eight years of war and borrowing best practices from confederate insurgents in Iraq, Pakistan and elsewhere, the tide will not turn on de-greased palms alone.

Alim Remtulla

Polling the Obama Doctrine

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Rasmussen digs beneath the president's Nobel speech:

Fifty percent (50%) of U.S. voters agree with President Obama that Afghanistan is a "just" war.

A new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey finds that only 24% disagree with the president’s declaration about Afghanistan in his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize last week. Another 27% are undecided.

Similarly, 52% think the president was right when he said, “The belief that peace is desirable is rarely enough to achieve it.” Twenty percent (20%) take issue with Obama’s remark, but 29% are not sure if he’s right or not.

Surprising how many people are undecided about the justness of the Afghan war. No matter where you sit on the questions of tactics, it seems obvious to me that war was and is justified, even if the strategy the administration settled on may not be the optimal one.

(AP Photos)

December 14, 2009

Why Are We in Afghanistan?

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Joe Klein offers an answer:

Let's start with a fact: the Indian Embassy in Kabul has suffered major, lethal bomb attacks twice in the past two years. There is little question in the intelligence community that these attacks were staged by terrorist allies of the Pakistani Army. The Pakistanis are absolutely convinced that if the U.S. leaves Afghanistan, India will jump in, supporting the non-Pashtun elements in the country--indeed, India was a supporter of the Northern Alliance's guerrilla war against the Taliban in the 1990s (although, it must be said, the Pakistanis have a rather exaggerated sense of Indian involvement).

Why is this a problem we should care about? Because India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons. Because tensions between the two countries would escalate dramatically if we were to abandon the region. And, most important, because our departure would empower the more radical elements of the Pakistani military and intelligence services--not merely in their support of the Taliban, but also, potentially, in their ability to stage an Islamist coup d'etat. This is the worst scenario imaginable: a nuclear Pakistan, with allies of Osama Bin Laden controlling the trigger.

I think it's obvious that along the spectrum of "bad to worse" we could still progress a lot further toward "worse" in Pakistan, as Klein argues. But there are several problems with this analysis. First, Pakistan and India have had nuclear weapons before the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. They have fought wars before the U.S. arrived and indeed, were on the brink of fighting another shortly after we invaded Afghanistan. There is nothing about our presence there that ensures peace and nothing about our departure that guarantees war. Moreover, Pakistan and India have been quietly working on a peace deal for years now, work that began, I believe, without American supervision or goading.

The second point, about an Islamist coup-d'etat is also dubious. Not that such an event couldn't occur, obviously it could. But I'm not sure why 100,000 troops inside Afghanistan is preventing that. They're not providing palace security for Zardari. If anything, constant U.S. drone attacks in the tribal zone and the incessant, public brow-beating of Pakistani officials by Americans to take the war to their own citizens could just as easily inspire a coup against a government seen as overly solicitous to America.

It's also worth stepping back and turning the problem around: if I understand Klein correctly, our strategic decisions are essentially hostage to what a few Islamist Pakistani military officers may or may not do with respect to the Afghan Taliban and their own government. Under that logic, we can never leave. And it's also worth noting that despite our massive presence in the region, Pakistan is not behaving itself:

Demands by the United States for Pakistan to crack down on the strongest Taliban warrior in Afghanistan, Siraj Haqqani, whose fighters pose the biggest threat to American forces, have been rebuffed by the Pakistani military, according to Pakistani military officials and diplomats.

The regional dynamics are clearly working against us. Where I part company with Klein is with the notion that we can fix them.

(AP Photos)


Al Qaeda Moves to Yemen

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Terrorism experts frequently cite al Qaeda's long-standing home in Afghanistan as a key argument for why it's essential to conduct armed state building there. Peter Bergen wrote that:

Another common critique of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is that there are numerous potential safe havens in the world; if Al Qaeda were facing defeat in Afghanistan, wouldn't it simply relocate to a more permissive venue? Those who raise this point are essentially talking about two things: on the one hand, the prospect of Al Qaeda moving somewhere far away like Somalia or Yemen; on the other hand, the reality that, no matter what we do to stabilize Afghanistan, its neighbor Pakistan will always be off-limits to American invasion and therefore available as a haven for Al Qaeda.

The point about Somalia and Yemen is unconvincing. Jihadists based there have shown no ability to hit targets anywhere but in their immediate neighborhoods. Many years after September 11, there is scant evidence that any senior Al Qaeda leaders have relocated to either place. For its part, Somalia is probably too anarchic, and possibly too African as well, for the largely middle-class Arab membership of Al Qaeda. In theory, of course, it's always possible that Al Qaeda could pick up and move elsewhere. But, with the exception of a few years in the 1990s, Al Qaeda has now been based in Afghanistan and Pakistan for a generation. This is the region where its leaders feel comfortable, where they have put down roots. If they didn't leave even after the United States conquered Afghanistan in late 2001, it seems unlikely that they will in the future.

But this doesn't seem to be holding up that well. The Boston Globe reports that al Qaeda is indeed moving to Yemen:

As the United States steps up the hunt for Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, some of the terrorist network’s veteran operatives are leaving the region and flocking to Yemen, where an escalating civil war is turning the nearly lawless Arab nation into an attractive alternative as a base of operations, according to US and foreign government officials.

Citing intelligence reports and intercepted communications, officials said they believe dozens of battle-hardened followers of Osama bin Laden have recently traveled to Saudi Arabia’s poor southern neighbor, joining other Al Qaeda sympathizers there who are attempting to make the remote mountainous province of Ma’rib, west of the capital of Sana, a new sanctuary.

A senior defense official said US military and intelligence officials, who have armed drones and special operations forces based in nearby Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, are devising new ways to combat the threat, but declined to provide details.

“There is, indeed, concern about the establishment of Al Qaeda elements in Yemen,’’ said the official, who is directly involved in counterterrorism operations in the Middle East.

Al Qaeda operatives in Yemen have been implicated in a series of recent bombings that killed tourists and damaged oil facilities, and are tightening their grip by assassinating local officials in key villages. Others have been captured in recent days trying to smuggle dozens of suicide vests from Yemen into Saudi Arabia, according to a Saudi government official who declined to be identified when discussing intelligence matters.

If counter-insurgency and armed state building is going to be the U.S. template for counter-terrorism, we're going to need a much, much bigger army.

(AP Photos)

December 11, 2009

Poll: Lack of Confidence in NATO

Rasmussen says the U.S. public isn't keen on the Atlantic alliance:


Just thirty-three percent (33%) of U.S. voters are at least somewhat confident that NATO will do all it can to help the United States win in Afghanistan, according to a new Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey. That figure includes five percent (5%) who are very confident.

Sixty-one percent (61%) of voters lack confidence in our NATO allies, with 45% who are not very confident and 16% who are not at all confident that they will help us win the war in Afghanistan.

NATO hasn't exactly covered itself in glory in Afghanistan, so these numbers don't strike me as that surprising.

December 10, 2009

President Obama's Impossible Troop Straddle

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It was evident during his campaign that Barack Obama was going to be a fairly conventional figure when it came to U.S. foreign policy (despite the hysteria from some quarters). And so he has found himself in an uncomfortable straddle - professing a desire to bring troops home from Iraq and, in 2011, from Afghanistan in accordance with a sizable segment of popular opinion and the majority of his Democratic base. Yet the conventional wisdom of which his administration is firmly embedded views extended deployments in both countries as vital to securing American interests.

There's really only one way to square this circle, and that is to bring the costs of both missions down to where the U.S. presence is seen merely as stabilizing force, as it is in Korea. This really seems like what the administration is hoping will happen - that the U.S. will be able to transition its role while Iraq and Afghanistan emerge from their internal violence, while at the same time retaining a military toe-hold in each country to project power regionally.

The U.S. applied a similar strategy in the late 1940s as Western Europe and Asia were collectively attempting to pull themselves out of the ruins of World War. The only difference, of course, is that Western Europe and Asia were vital centers of industry and American commercial activity which fought wars against external, nation state aggressors. In Iraq and Afghanistan, neither of those conditions apply. We're going to be investing an awful lot of time and effort into nations and regions which, at the end of the day, just aren't that relevant.

(AP Photos)

December 7, 2009

The Woman Who Wants Us Out, Ctd.

A reader responds to a reader responding to me. Got it? Good. On Malalai Joya, this reader writes:

The fact that she decries US troops, despite the fact that it was US troops that put her into power in the first place, is merely a stronger version of Hamid Karazi's frequent condemnation of US bombings. To me, that suggests that she is a demagogue exploiting a salient issue, not at all a heroine.

[...]

Westerners are looking for anybody to latch onto, any hero that appears to validate their existence, so as to claim progress and victory. But that is a foolhardy endeavor, as we don't have to end up being governed by these "heroes" and "heroines" that we praise.

Third-world nations do not need strong personalities and famous leaders. It suffered from them for far too long. It instead needs good institution-building, to ensure its very survival. The United States should not throw money in the hopes of listening to soundbites from Afghani politicians and feeling "good" about themselves. The United States should throw money in the hopes that, in the future, Afghanistan still functions, so that the vast majority of AFGHANS, the ones we don't see in the news or blogs, live in peace.

December 6, 2009

On Not Leaving Afghanistan

As I and others pointed out after the president's speech, using the term "vital national interest" to describe Afghanistan didn't exactly jibe with the notion that we would be walking away from the country in 18 months. And lo and behold, we're not:


"We will have 100,000 forces, troops there,” Mr. Gates said on ABC’s “This Week,” “and they are not leaving in July of 2011. Some, handful, or some small number, or whatever the conditions permit, will begin to withdraw at that time.”

“I don’t consider this an exit strategy,” he continued, “This is a transition.” He said it would begin in less-contested parts of Afghanistan before expanding to the most obdurate Taliban strongholds, largely in the south and east.

The White House used appearances on the Sunday talk programs to convey that the deadline would mark the start, not the end, of troop withdrawal. “2011 is not a cliff, it’s a ramp,” Gen. James L. Jones, the national security adviser, said.

Wherever one stands on the issue of the efficacy of timelines, it's pretty clear that the administration is actively walking back the idea that responsibility for Afghanistan is going to be handed over to Afghans any time soon.

(AP Photos)

Eye on the Prize

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Fareed Zakaria makes a key point:

It also means concentrating on the centers of global power, not the periphery. Throughout history great nations have lost their way by getting bogged down in imperial missions far from home that crippled their will, strength, and focus. (Even when they won: Britain prevailed in the Boer War, but it broke the back of the empire.) It's important to remember that in the coming century it will be America's dominant position in Asia—its role as the balancer in the Pacific—that will be pivotal to its role as a global superpower, not whatever happens in the mountains of Afghanistan.

This is very true, but as Iran proceeds toward nuclear weapons there will be numerous voices telling us how vital it is to focus on the Middle East, and use American power to contain a potentially hegemonic Iran. This would be a mistake - our 60 year history of trying to do this with the Saudis and later the Israelis have brought us a considerable amount of grief, particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of transnational terrorism. But with a fragile world economy coming out of a deep recession, any movement of oil prices is likely to figure front and center in the mind of politicians - long term considerations be damned.

(AP Photos)

December 4, 2009

The Woman Who Wants Us Out, Ctd.

A reader responds to my post on Malalai Joya:

I admire the guts of this young woman and believe it will eventually be the women of Islam who prove to be its salvation.

However, having left Afghanistan at 4 and not returning until she was 20, in 1998, it appears she spent the period of the Taliban's reign of terror in Iran and Pakistan. Ironically, the world would never have heard of Malalai Joya had the US not invaded Afghanistan and created an opportunity for her to even serve in its legislature.

The Afghan region has been in a state, in varying degrees, of perpetual tribal war for centuries and it is easy to understand its people know no other state of affairs. The reality, though, is Afghan existence is mostly defined by raw power from the barrel of a gun.

I don't have a great deal of confidence in American success there, but I am willing for us to make the effort to buy enough time to hopefully allow more Joyas to step forward and blossom. To reasonably compare any current statistical evidence on crime and security to the earlier Taliban era is preposterous. One would have to assume the Taliban actually kept those records and kept them accurately.

I fear Joya is making the Hobbesian choice of native, dictatorial power over a gamble for a better environment in the future, even if it is provided temporarily by a foreign power. If she believes the withdrawal of all coalition forces and an immediate return to local determination is the best solution, she is indeed living in a world of "bellum universale" and "jus non retinendum".

I wish her and her countrymen the best of all luck.

Al Qaeda Kills a Lot of Muslims

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Not exactly news, I know, but with Stephen Walt tallying up the number of Muslims felled by the U.S. over the past 30 years, it's also worth noting al Qaeda's body count:

Few would deny that Muslims too are victims of Islamist terror. But a new study by the Combating Terrorism Center in the US has shown that an overwhelming majority of al-Qaida victims are, in fact, co-religionists....

... Between 2004 and 2008, for example, al-Qaida claimed responsibility for 313 attacks, resulting in the deaths of 3,010 people. And even though these attacks include terrorist incidents in the West -- in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 -- only 12 percent of those killed (371 deaths) were Westerners.

That's from a report from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Read the whole thing here (pdf).

(AP Photos)

The 1% Consensus

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I found Fareed Zakaria's interview this week with CNN on Afghanistan and President Obama's military escalation rather interesting. The entire interview is worth a read, but Zakaria made what I thought was an especially salient point on Pakistan:

CNN: Do you think the president was justified in raising the specter of nuclear disaster in connection with terrorism and Pakistan?

Zakaria: I used to believe that the Pakistani nuclear weapons were secure and the Pakistani army was strong enough to maintain control over them, but I have seen recent reports, including one from Bruce Riedel who is advising the president on this which cast doubt on the security of nuclear command and control, the security of the weapons themselves.

So yes, reluctantly I would have to say the president was right to raise the specter of some possible collapse of parts of the Pakistani state which could put the nuclear weapons in the wrong hands. I think it's remote, but ... you want to do what you can to minimize the chances of a remote but very bad outcome.

This reminds me of Vice President Cheney's now famous "1% chance" line on the possibility of al-Qaeda acquiring nuclear capability via Pakistan. "It's not about our analysis," said Cheney at the time, but "our response."

This was obviously the guiding doctrine for the Bush administration, but what's interesting is how the very same doctrine, if reluctantly, has found consensus within the Obama administration as well. Zakaria admits to a reluctant acceptance of this, and we heard much of that same reluctance in the President's speech this week.

It is fascinating however--all of the back and forth sniping notwithstanding--to see the same driving paranoia bind the previous and current administrations together. While data indicates that most Pakistanis, prompted in part by drone attacks inside their borders, view the United States as the problem--not the Taliban.

Yet a nuclear al-Qaeda/Taliban consumes our imaginations. To paraphrase the former Vice President, it's not the analysis of such a possibility that matters, but our preparedness to react to that possibility in preponderant fashion. In an age where asymmetric warfare meets nuclear know-how, paranoia may be the new norm. Whereas past enemies fighting with conventional means could be 'contained,' today's enemies must be assumed at their worst, and dealt with in apparently equal fashion.

(AP Photos)

December 3, 2009

The Woman Who Wants Us Out

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Afghan politician and women's rights activist Malalai Joya on Western forces in Afghanistan:

Torture, drug trafficking, the continued rule of warlords and fundamentalists–these are the only things that this war has brought Afghans. Today, our people are being victimized by two enemies: the occupation forces bombing us from the sky, and the warlords and their Taliban brothers-in-creed.

If the troops withdraw, it will be easier for Afghans to fight one enemy and to determine our own future. It is the duty of the Afghan people to work for freedom and democracy; these values can never be donated to us by the very foreign powers who–after nearly three decades of funding various fundamentalists are arming warlords and other criminals–are responsible for many of the problems Afghanistan faces today.

While I don't agree with everything Joya has to say, I think her words in this case are worth consideration; especially as we debate women's rights as a byproduct of war.

I understand the temptation to morph the Afghan war into a cause for liberalism and humanitarianism, and the likelihood will only increase now that a liberal president has assumed the role of caretaker over the conflict. And we've seen this before from previous progressive administrations, as Wilson's Latin America policy comes to mind. The temptation to be global evangelists of just about anything can sometimes be too attractive when you possess the means to act on that temptation.

But why we went to war and what we can do with war are two different things, and we should be mindful not to let the latter have too much influence over broader policy ambitions. Making Afghanistan the central front in women's liberation makes no more sense than making Afghanistan the central front in the War on Terrorism--both are in fact global struggles requiring global solutions.

(h/t Andrew Sullivan)

December 2, 2009

Next in Line at the Graveyard?

Max Boot asks for moratorium on the Soviet analogies:

The whole mindset of the Red Army veterans is highly conventional — employing helicopter assault forces and tanks. That works against a conventional army; it doesn’t work against guerrillas. McChrystal realizes that, which is why he’s trying a different strategy — the same one that has been vindicated in counterinsurgencies from Malaya to, more recently, Colombia and Iraq. Anyone who offers a mindless Soviet analogy to suggest that we are doomed to failure in the supposed “graveyard of empires” — and I have heard many such arguments in the past few days — should ponder the profound differences between the Soviets’ tactics and those of NATO. There is no comparison.

Pomp and Circumspect

Fred Barnes writes:

I had hoped Obama would declare that nothing will deter him, as commander-in-chief, from prevailing in Afghanistan. But it turns out a lot of things might deter him. He listed a few of them: the cost of the war, its length (if more than 18 months from January 2010), the failure of Afghans to step up to the task sufficiently. He hedged.

Americans and our allies were looking for more, I believe. To have rallied the country and the world, Obama needed to indicate he would lead a fight to win in Afghanistan, with the help of allies if possible, but with the armed forces of the U.S. alone if necessary. He didn’t say anything like that. He didn’t come close.

The heavy emphasis placed by some on lofty rhetoric never ceases to amaze me. President Obama's predecessor was fond of the stuff, but it never accounted for much on the battle field. As we've now come to learn, the rhetoric President Bush applied to Afghanistan rarely matched strategic application on the ground. And as for Iraq, well, we know what lofty rhetoric and pageantry got us there.

I may disagree somewhat with the President's escalation plan, but I can at least appreciate his coupling of that plan with some sober rhetoric and reality on the ground.

The American Order and Afghanistan

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Andrew Sullivan thinks that President Obama is seeking to "unwind the American empire" with his new strategy in Afghanistan:

How best to unwind the empire? By giving McChrystal what he wants and giving him a couple of years to deliver tangible results.

While I think this is the narrow goal of the president's surge strategy, I think it's wrong to characterize this as some kind of broader repudiation of America's strategic posture. Quite the contrary. In his speech, President Obama explicitly situated the surge in Afghanistan as a piece with past American efforts to sustain international security:

Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs. We have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents. We have spent our revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies. We have joined with others to develop an architecture of institutions - from the United Nations to NATO to the World Bank - that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings.

We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made mistakes. But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global security for over six decades - a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, markets open, billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress, and advancing frontiers of human liberty.

In other words, far from repudiating an "imperial" foreign policy, President Obama is positioning the surge within the continuum of America's post World War II role as global leader.

Only this time, instead of the economically and strategically vital areas of Europe and Asia, and instead of facing a superpower threat, we're going to attempt to micromanage a tribal dispute in the mountains of a country that has never been, and likely will never be, a pivotal international power.

And we do not simply because we face a legitimate security threat from international terrorism, but because we now have such an extravagant idea of what is necessary to keep America safe. President Obama:

What we have fought for - and what we continue to fight for - is a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples' children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.

President Obama is not the first president to express such a universalist sentiment. And it's difficult to tell if this was included as a sop to his critics who accuse him of being a monster realist, or a genuine statement of strategic purpose. Either way, it doesn't seem to signal an unwinding of anything.

(AP Photos)

Betting on COIN

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Thinking a bit further about the strategy the president laid out in his speech last night, it seems to place a mighty heavy bet that the U.S. military can duplicate in Afghanistan the success it enjoyed in Iraq. The strategy strikes me as modest: calm things down so we can leave with the patina of victory. If the longer term trends in Afghanistan turn south, the fault will lay with the Afghans, who failed to take advantage of the opportunity afforded them by allied military forces.

This worked fairly well in Iraq. The politics inside Iraq are still a mess, and an appallingly high number of Iraqis are still being slaughtered, but we can plausibly and rightfully say that if Iraq can't get its act together now, no amount of American military power inside the country could right the ship.

Obama is gambling that a similar dynamic will take hold in Afghanistan. We'll do our best, and then it's up to them. This doesn't exactly jibe with the contention that Afghanistan is a "vital national interest" but given the circumstances, perhaps this was the only bet available. I sure hope it works.

(AP Photos)

December 1, 2009

Obama Speech Reaction

“As Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.” - President Obama.

There is an elemental tension between having a short "time bound" surge - as one senior administration official put it in a conference call with bloggers after the speech - and the urgent requirement to pour in additional U.S. forces now.

The official went on to say that the administration explicitly rejected a "10 year nation building" strategy, in addition to leaving now or standing pat.

But if the situation is as urgent and portentous as the administration says it is today, and conditions aren't measurably improved in 18 months, I don't see how you could leave. If it would be irresponsible and wrong today to do anything other than surge, what could possibly change in 18 months? The administration may reject the "10 year nation building" strategy, but the rhetoric it has used to justify the current strategy sets them on a clear path towards such a commitment.

A Band-Aid on Bush's War

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I think there's something getting repeatedly lost in the hand-wringing and keyword-tallying going on in preparation for tonight's speech by President Obama. While I'm sure we'll hear a great deal this evening about "benchmarks," and victory and the Taliban, I suspect we'll hear very little about the War on Terrorism. There are some fundamental questions that have not been answered by escalation proponents, and I doubt we'll get those answers tonight when the President takes to the podium at West Point.

Specifically, how is allocating 100,000 troops to Afghanistan--at a roughly estimated cost of $1 million per troop per year, if not more--a justifiable strategy for isolating and killing an al-Qaeda leadership believed to be weak and on the wane in the region. How does escalation in Afghanistan defeat al-Qaeda in Yemen, or the Maghreb?

And in his failure to address broader questions about America's long war on terrorism, President Obama has simply opted for the politically safer option of applying bandages to President Bush's Afghan war strategy. This may assuage the President's critics, but it does little to address greater concerns about terrorism and American security.

Rather than a departing from the Bush doctrine, Obama has simply wed himself to it--or worse--clings to it for dear life.

I'll be 'tweeting' (yes, that's apparently a verb) the speech once it begins, please feel free to follow along.

(AP Photos)

Afghanisan & the Logic of Escalation

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I think Alex Massie has it right:


...I guess one ought to have an official "What I Think About Obama’s Escalation in Afghanistan post". And the truth is that I don't know. Don't know whether Obama's new strategy will work, don't know if it is wise or enough or too much or just about right. And I'm intensely suspicious of anyone who celebrates it and, most especially, those who immediately claim that it's insufficient, reckless, half-hearted or whatever. Because (almost) none of us have a clue, really, and pretending that we do does no-one any good.

What may be said, with all due caution, is that the administration is doing its best to make the best of a bad situation. It seems quite possible to me, even probable, that there is no solution to the matrix of problems we face in Afghanistan. If there were someone might have found it by now.


Well said. My biggest concern is that the logic of denying the Taliban and al Qaeda a propaganda win only increases after the president's commitment ofmore troops. If we discover that a population centric counter-insurgency with 100,000-plus allied troops does not do the trick, it will be that much harder to switch tactics and pursue an off-shore counter-terrorism approach. The logic of saving face after putting more of our blood and treasure on the line will only shift further in the direction of further escalation if sufficient progress can't be shown after 18 months.

(AP Photos)

Breaking Developments

This is it. President Obama will announce his new Afghan strategy tonight. Analysts and pundits will learn which of their thinking falls most closely inline with the president’s on such issues as troop deployment, a time line for withdrawal, the training of the Afghan army and police force, and how best to tackle corruption in the Karzai regime.

The President is also aware that force alone will not render Afghanistan more secure. Winning the necessary hearts and minds as part of a victorious counterinsurgency operation also requires a thoughtful development strategy to ensure that any success is both lasting and durable. How will President Obama weigh-in on the development issue?

In my brief few weeks here in Kabul I’ve somehow managed to ensconce myself within development community. While we haven’t yet had the opportunity to discuss what they’d hope to hear from President Obama’s new strategy, I have noticed a pall of frustration that follows their every move, not an uncommon phenomenon here in Kabul.

When their accomplishments are not overshadowed by the unrelenting news of IEDs, corruption and opium, they are undermined by bureaucratic ineptitude. Within a few hours of arriving I was forwarded an article by Rajiv Chandrasekaran--no stranger to good intentions gone awry from his time reporting in Baghdad’s greenzone with the Washington Post--that summed up the aggravations of development work here in Afghanistan.

Worse still, some of their early accomplishments have begun to unravel in the deteriorating security environment

Of the journalists I’ve spoken to, most would love to spend more time covering development success stories but with bureaus already stretched thin, finite column inches for foreign news and development projects that, in a 24 hour news cycle, progress at a glacial pace, it’s rare to find media outlets that are both willing and able.

I would be remiss, however, to not highlight the few positive development stories that did breakthrough: here, here and particularly here.

Like President Obama’s stimulus plan, where we’ll never know exactly how many jobs it saved or created and how much worse the recession would have been in its absence, it’s difficult to gauge how worse off things here in Afghanistan would be, despite all the missteps and backsliding, without the emphasis on development work to complement the security strategy. As the President lays out his grand Afghan plan, it will be worthwhile to see what, if any, mention will be made on development to ensure that a third comprehensive review will not be necessary.

Alim Remtulla

November 30, 2009

Advice for the President's Afghanistan Speech

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Tom Donnelly offers some:

The message he must communicate is beyond pure reason. The troop numbers, the strategic rationale and the policy direction matter more as indicators of temperament than as elements of an argument. The question of commitment was less pressing six months ago when Gen. Stanley McChrystal, trumpets across Washington blaring, was sent to take command in Afghanistan. But now it can no longer be avoided. The current moment is a test of the president’s “courage d’esprit,” of his determination.

The trouble is, the president is speaking to multiple audiences. There is a constituency - called the American people - who are as much interested in hearing how the war ends than in Churchill 2.0. There is Pakistan, which we are told wants to hear that we'll never leave, ever, so they'll stop backing the Afghan Taliban. There are the Afghans themselves - some of whom want a reassurance that the U.S. will not bug out on them and others who want a reassurance that the U.S. is not bent on permanently occupying them. You can signal resolve to one party and undermine your message to the other.

The broader problem is that this question of resolve is a red herring. What if Obama resolutely declares that American interests will be better served with an off-shore approach? I suspect Donnelly would not be pleased with such a display.

But more broadly, the president is one man. In a democratic society, there is going to be a loud, public clash of views on the subject of whether we need to stay in Afghanistan for decades or whether we should switch our strategy. By the very nature of our society, it is impossible to signal "resolve" when it comes to a mission that is as ambiguous as Afghanistan has become. There will always be powerful voices - in Washington, in the media, etc. - who can dissent and by dissenting, dilute a unified message. If the Taliban are paying attention, they'll surely pick up on that dissent no matter how resolute President Obama becomes. Unless you want to silence that dissent, there's no way a democratic debate cannot ultimately serve as fodder for enemy propaganda.

That's not to say it's impossible for a democratic society to convey an image of resolve. You could signal unity of purpose and seriousness about the war by instituting conscription and putting the economy into a war-footing, as we did during World War II (great stimulus prospects there as well). Both moves would certainly put the world on notice that America was serious about the business in Afghanistan.

(AP Photos)

Losing Bin Laden

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The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has a new report out (pdf) on the failure to kill or capture Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora in December 2001. In it, the Committee notes:


There were enough U.S. troops in or near Afghanistan to execute the classic sweep-and-block maneuver required to attack bin Laden and try to prevent his escape. It would have been a dangerous fight across treacherous terrain, and the injection of more U.S. troops and the resulting casualties would have contradicted the risk-averse, ‘‘light footprint’’ model formulated by Rumsfeld and Franks. But commanders on the scene and elsewhere in Afghanistan argued that the risks were worth the reward.

This jibes with other accounts that suggested that a fear of casualties stayed the American hand at Tora Bora. Which is very strange, when you think about it. After all, Secretary Rumsfeld, President Bush et. al. countenanced a much, much riskier danger in invading Iraq. Why they wouldn't put a far lower number of American lives at risk to nab bin Laden escapes me.

(AP Photos)

November 28, 2009

Butchering Sacred Cows

It’s Eid in Kabul.The city has shut down. Locals head to mosque, then home to their families. American expats are celebrating Thanksgiving; the rest of us are simply enjoying a long weekend. When the two groups do cross paths, Afghan kids have been know to light firecrackers behind the feet of unsuspecting Westerners before running off giggling, leaving the foreigner, shocked and alarmed, to quickly search for cover from what can only be assumed to be incoming fire.

At the Indonesian embassy Rock 'n' Roll classics are butchered by way of karaoke. Outside, cows and goats are ritualistically slaughtered for the holiday.

Indonesia, home to the world's largest Muslim population, is one of the few countries that has maintained a diplomatic presence in Kabul throughout Afghanistan’s turbulent past.

Situated next to the embattled Indian embassy, the Indonesians don’t need to be reminded of the importance of upholding the appearance of neutrality in Afghanistan’s pugnacious politics. Picking up stray body parts off the embassy tennis courts leaves a powerful impression.

But like the Indians, the Indonesians know all too well the threat of Islamic terrorism and can ill-afford to remain completely impartial on the topic of Afghanistan. For the moment, however, there are painfully fresh kebabs and a harmonized "More Than Words" guitar sing-along to contend with.

Alim Remtulla

November 26, 2009

Kabul's Bristling Bureaucracy

My second week has been spent trying to navigate Kabul's bureaucracy. What I thought was a six month visa, purchased at the accordant price, now appears to be valid for only one. I have two weeks to exit the country.

Working strictly from hearsay, the only apparent source of information here in Kabul, I can now either fly to Dubai and brave the lines at the embassy, armed with a convincing yarn on why I am deserving of the scarce commodity that is the six month multiple entry visa. Alternatively, I can work towards finding a trusted Afghan fixer who can work the system and, for a modest fee, secure any visa.

Most firms here have dedicated staff to resolve such issues. As a freelancer I'm left to rely on the kindness of others or fend for myself. From what I've gathered a successful freelance journalist cannot be above the transparent calling-in of favors or even the forging of official documents.

On a recent mission to scour the streets of Kabul for a cheap iPhone, my companion, an Afghan of few words and gentle features, explained that Kafkaesque bureaucracy is nothing new to this country. Under the Taliban he was forced to wear a beard of at least eight centimeters. Erring on the side of caution he kept it at ten. Looking back at pictures as a bearded 29 year old, he thinks the facial hair added at least ten years. For the first two months the beard constantly itches but then you get used to it, he says. Sleeping was difficult though, the whiskers tickling at your face and neck. Now clean-shaven and baby-faced, he doesn’t plan to sport a beard until at least 50. Apparently a gray beard in Afghanistan is license to make your own rules.

Alim Remtulla

November 24, 2009

From AfPak to Somalia

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This news today surely puts this news about the president's decision to pour 34,000 additional U.S. troops into Afghanistan into sharper relief:

Federal officials on Monday unsealed terrorism-related charges against men they say were key actors in a recruitment effort that led roughly 20 young Americans to join a violent insurgent group in Somalia with ties to Al Qaeda.

With eight new suspects charged Monday, the authorities have implicated 14 people in the case, one of the most extensive domestic terrorism investigations since the Sept. 11 attacks. Some of them have been arrested; others are at large, including several believed to be still fighting with the Somali group, Al Shabaab.

The case represents the largest group of American citizens suspected of joining an extremist movement affiliated with Al Qaeda, senior officials said. Many of the recruits had come to America as young refugees fleeing a brutal civil war, only to settle in a gang-ridden enclave of Minneapolis.

A fully resourced counter-insurgency in Afghanistan would do nothing to avert this kind of problem. It's not that we should ignore Afghanistan. But the idea that we need to put all our resources into a single basket in the name of counter-terrorism sure seems counter-productive.

(AP Photos)

November 23, 2009

Afghanistan and the Articles of Confederation

Greg noted recent efforts to arm local leaders to fight the Taliban and recently, George Gavrilis at Foreign Policy called for a less centralized state in Afghanistan along the Tajikistan model. Indeed, it is likely that the problem with Afghanistan is actually the government's structure.

Right now Afghanistan has something it never has had in the past: a strong central government. That means that the stakes are very high both internally and externally for those who control the government. However, by empowering and arming local leaders, we might be able to successfully create a system which is at least externally stable.

Put another way, the United States currently has a strong central government because the first system, the Articles of Confederation was viewed as too weak to prevent a takeover by the British or the French. However, in the case of Afghanistan, we are playing the role of the British and the French. It may well behoove us to encourage a more decentralized model wherein the Taliban do control some territory, but not enough that they are externally a threat. Western air power and special forces could intervene as needed if the balance ever tipped too far towards the Taliban, without requiring the troop commitment we have now.

Such a solution would not turn Afghanistan into the Colorado of the Himalayas that American politicians hope for, but it would probably be much more sustainable in the long term, and it may allow the U.S. to contain Salafist threats in the region.

Questions for FPI, Ctd.

Adding to Greg's excellent points from earlier regarding the Foreign Policy Initiative's recently published fact sheet on Afghanistan, I too noticed a couple of curiously absent items from their analysis: cost and scope.

On the first point, FPI make no mention of the financial costs entailed in the Afghan mission--estimated somewhere between $750,000 and $1 million per person based off the proposed surge total of 40K--or how an indefinite presence in Afghanistan will affect American spending options both at home and abroad.

This leads directly into mission scope. Absent any kind of endgame or "Mission Accomplished" benchmarks, this fact sheet merely outlines the indefinite occupation of one particular country. If the greater War on Terrorism can be fought and won on this front alone, then what does that say about known al-Qaeda havens such as Yemen and Somalia? Max Boot, who's cited in the brief, writes in the pages of Commentary Magazine that "pure" counterterrorism:

is the strategy that Israel has used against Hamas and Hezbollah. The result is that Hamas controls Gaza, and Hezbollah controls southern Lebanon. It is the strategy that the U.S. has employed in Somalia since our forces pulled out in 1994. The result is that the country is utterly chaotic and lawless, and an Islamic fundamentalist group called the Shabab, which has close links to al-Qaeda, is gaining strength. Most pertinently, it is also the strategy the U.S. has used for years in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

So if our strategy to defeat al-Qaeda is insufficient in Somalia, why aren't we planning indefinite counterinsurgency in that country as well? In the brief, FPI argues that the All Volunteer U.S. military is stronger than it has been in years, and any complaints about it being overburdened are "no truer now" than they were when voiced in reference to Iraq. Does this argument apply only to a War on Terrorism based in Afghanistan, or does it give the United States the flexibility to fight al-Qaeda as needed on other continents?

If, as FPI claims, 60,000 troops slated for redeployment from Iraq next summer will help plug in the holes of a revamped Afghan presence, where then would the troops come from to properly fight al-Qaeda elsewhere? If Fred Kagan--cited multiple times throughout this fact sheet-- is correct, and a "small-footprint counterterrorism strategy" can't work in Afghanistan, why is it acceptable in other terrorist hotbeds?

To believe this fact sheet is to believe that the so-called Global War on Terrorism isn't all that global after all--it in fact leapfrogs from mission to mission, conveniently enough, alongside American forces. Wherever we go, there's your war. Whereas Iraq was once the "central front" in the War on Terrorism, now--in accordance with an Iraq withdrawal I suspect most of the analysts listed in this brief likely opposed--it is imperative that we shift those resources toward Afghanistan. The so-called central front appears to be one step ahead of us.

For FPI's facts to add up, Afghanistan must now remain the one and only central front, and al-Qaeda must remain America's only serious enemy. Both notions strike me as terribly shortsighted.

Questions for FPI

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The Foreign Policy Initiative has circulated what it dubs the Case for a Fully Resourced Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan, where they attempt to rebut assertions raised by skeptics of nation building there. Well worth a look.

There are, however, some rather important questions that are left untouched. They are:

* Would a fully resourced counter-insurgency prevent or seriously reduce terror attacks against the United States from Islamic radicals? If we "win" in Afghanistan, would the Fort Hood shooting not have occurred? Would radicals in London not have hatched a plot to bomb transatlantic airliners?

* If counter-insurgency is the American template for beating Islamic terrorism, will it be applied in Somalia, particularly if al Qaeda flees there?

* Why does Afghanistan warrant such an out-sized claim on American resources, given that al Qaeda's ability to launch mass-casualty terrorist attacks has been severely diminished? Are America's other foreign policy priorities - including relations with China, Russia and India - less significant than the battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan?

* How many terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland have been thwarted by U.S. troops operating inside Afghanistan, and how many have been thwarted by intelligence operatives outside the country?

* And finally, why should we believe that Pakistan would be at risk if we were to withdraw from Afghanistan? Doesn't Pakistan, to this day, cultivate the Afghan Taliban for its own ends?

Inquiring minds want to know.

(AP Photos)

November 22, 2009

An Afghan Awakening?

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Dexter Filkins reports on U.S. efforts to aid some Afghan tribes who have turned against the Taliban:

American and Afghan officials have begun helping a number of anti-Taliban militias that have independently taken up arms against insurgents in several parts of Afghanistan, prompting hopes of a large-scale tribal rebellion against the Taliban.

The emergence of the militias, which took some leaders in Kabul by surprise, has so encouraged the American and Afghan officials that they are planning to spur the growth of similar armed groups across the Taliban heartland in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

The American and Afghan officials say they are hoping the plan, called the Community Defense Initiative, will bring together thousands of gunmen to protect their neighborhoods from Taliban insurgents. Already there are hundreds of Afghans who are acting on their own against the Taliban, officials say.

I know several Afghan experts were wary about an "arm the tribes" strategy. But if the tribes, which Filkins says are already well armed, want to turn their guns on the Taliban, it seems smart to give them some ammo.

(AP Photos)

November 20, 2009

Back to the Stone Age?

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In making the case for an extended American commitment in Afghanistan, the New Yorker's Steve Coll argued that the U.S. must prevent the restoration of the Taliban-led "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" which held sway over the country in the late 1990s. Unfortunately, as Eli Lake reports today, it seems that elements within Pakistan's intelligence service have another idea:


Mullah Mohammed Omar, the one-eyed leader of the Afghan Taliban, has fled a Pakistani city on the border with Afghanistan and found refuge from potential U.S. attacks in the teeming Pakistani port city of Karachi with the assistance of Pakistan's intelligence service, three current and former U.S. intelligence officials said.

If one steps outside the debate over how many troops to send into Afghanistan, there is a broader discussion of how to turn the regional dynamics around in such a way as to favor a successful outcome for the U.S. inside Afghanistan. The biggest question mark has always been how to ensure that Pakistan doesn't nurture Taliban elements in Afghanistan as a hedge against India and an American departure. Unfortunately, no one seems to have solved this particular puzzle.

First, we had the Bush administration's initial response after 9/11, which was to threaten a military reprisal against Pakistan if they didn't quickly reorient their position toward the Taliban. That was quickly followed up with generous financial support directed at the Pakistani military. Neither really worked. The Obama administration, together with Sens. Kerry and Lugar, have decided to spread the money further afield, to Pakistan's civilian government and civil society.

Maybe this tack will work, but it will do so over time. And it will take a major, decades-long commitment on the part of the U.S. inside Afghanistan - not simply to combat the insurgency but to convince Pakistan that we're never leaving and they won't need to cultivate Afghanistan for "strategic depth." We would, in effect, have to make Afghanistan a perpetual ward of the United States.

Needless to say, none of that is cheap. Nor is it going to keep us secure from Islamic radicalism, as the Fort Hood massacre demonstrates.

(AP Photos)

November 17, 2009

Losing Afghanistan

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Steve Coll ponders the implication of an American failure in Afghanistan:

As I’ve argued, in my view, a purpose of American policy in Afghanistan ought to be to prevent a second coercive Taliban revolution in that country, not only because it would bring misery to Afghans (and, not incidentally, Afghan women) but because it would jeopardize American interests, such as our security against Al Qaeda’s ambitions and our (understandable) desire to see nuclear-armed Pakistan free itself from the threat of revolutionary Islamist insurgents. So, then, a definition of failure would be a redux of Taliban revolution in Afghanistan—a revolution that took control of traditional Taliban strongholds such as Kandahar and Khost, and that perhaps succeeded in Kabul as well. Such an outcome is conceivable if the Obama Administration does not discover the will and intelligence to craft a successful political-military strategy to prevent the Afghan Taliban from achieving its announced goals, which essentially involve the restoration of the Afghan state they presided over during the nineteen-nineties, which was formally known as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

He then goes on to list a variety of potential outcomes, none of them cheery. But I want to focus for a minute on the definition of failure above. I think, as a baseline statement of American goals in Afghanistan, the prevention of this kind of restoration seems reasonable. But it's worth noting how - and how quickly - the original Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan collapsed. It took roughly 300 special forces, CIA paramilitary, U.S. airpower, and the Northern Alliance to run them out of town in a few weeks.

In other words, we didn't need 100,000 troops to shut down the Taliban in 2001 when they ran the place. I'm hard pressed to see why we'd need 100,000 to keep them away.

(AP Photos)

Kabuli Impressions

I'm approaching my first week here in Kabul. It's been filled with all the expected first impressions of a foreign conflict zone: the layers of military security and precautionary protocol; the motley crew of bacchanalian expats, myself among them; romantic notions of Afghanistan's storied past, rugged terrain, defiant people.

Coming from a nugget of truth, cliches serve as a shorthand and ought not be dismissed outright. But it's still worth being mindful not to slip into these the well-trodden pitfalls without at least of bit of resistance.

This week's evenings have been spent meeting dozens of aid workers, diplomats and journalists, and a few elusive security contractors. The days on learning how to navigate the city enough to feed myself and exerting mental energy on figuring out exactly how I'm supposed to make rent. It's going to take some time to understand exactly what's going on here, how things function, and who's who.

While still getting settled, events continue without me. A military convoy was bombed Friday morning (a friend said he heard his windows rattle), only a few days ahead of President Karzai's inauguration this week. I'm told most of the city will be even more locked down than usual for the event. Offices will be closed, roadblocks will choke the city, foreign staff's mobility will be restricted to a few secured locations and curfews are to be tightened.

Still without a press pass, I'll likely be doing the same.

Alim Remtulla

November 16, 2009

It's Not Like It's Important

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This line from David Broder on the Afghanistan debate sure caught my eye:

It is evident from the length of this deliberative process and from the flood of leaks that have emerged from Kabul and Washington that the perfect course of action does not exist. Given that reality, the urgent necessity is to make a decision -- whether or not it is right.

I don't think anyone's seriously holding out for "perfect" here and, obviously, the president can't postpone a decision forever. But there is no urgency here. The U.S. has "neglected" Afghanistan since Iraq war planning began - a few more weeks along the present course won't be decisive one way or another.

(AP Photos)

November 13, 2009

Do We Need Al-Qaeda?

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Gustavo de Las Casas argues that the world is better off with an Al-Qaeda organization that is not dead, but instead just constantly held on life support. He writes:

It is tempting to draw up an organizational chart of al Qaeda and think that if the important nodes can be identified and destroyed, the rest of the network will follow. But if al Qaeda is shut down and its middle management decimated, eager fanatics around the globe would no longer gravitate toward a centralized base. Their alternative? To form their own no-name networks and band up with any other al Qaeda survivors. Killing off al Qaeda would do little to reduce Islamist terrorism. It would only make the world of terrorism more chaotic....we should take full advantage of the simple fact that the net which unites the worst Islamist terrorists also snares them.

Hopefully, this debate is happening in the upper echelons of the White House, because if Las Casas's logic is correct, then it's time for the U.S. and NATO to leave Afghanistan. If the preference is for weak jihadi groups rather than dead ones, then Af-Pak may have now earned the stamp "Mission Accomplished," at least on the basis of defeating Al-Qaeda.

If the logic is incorrect, then a surge in troops in Af-Pak may be necessary as a means of procuring total elimination of Al-Qaeda.

But now for a second question -- is elimination of Al-Qaeda even possible?

November 12, 2009

Why Afghanistan, Ctd.

Michael Cohen hits a home run:

Of course, as Spencer notes, it would also be nice if a single person in the Administration were advocating for troop reductions - or perhaps making the case that our presence in Afghanistan actually bolsters the insurgency and harms US interests. Instead the template seems to me more troops and a counter-insurgency approach. With the military furiously pushing both - and leaking that view to the major dailies on a daily basis - I suppose this shouldn't come as a huge surprise, but it doesn't make it any less depressing.

November 11, 2009

Why Afghanistan?

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My thoughts in today's NY Daily News on the Afghan debate:

But to escalate the war at the consult of generals and advisers cuts a vital participant out of this critical decision in American history: the American people. And while the current health care debate warranted district-by-district town hall debates and presidential stump speeches, this equally crucial decision has been mostly reserved for the administration and its detractors.

We can expect little more from Congress. In a recent interview with CNN, Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) - fresh off a diplomatic intervention in Afghanistan - echoed the President's concerns over an excessive troop commitment in the region. Kerry was quick, however, to include the essential asterisk of any American official bound by the long war. "Obviously," remarked Kerry, "if you exhibit weakness or indecision, or if the United States were to suddenly pull out of here, it would be disastrous in terms of the message that it sends. Nobody is talking about that. That's not what's on the table here."

But whether or not such an amorphous "message" - coupled with an equally vague global audience - would be misinterpreted is debatable. Weakness, after all, is relative. But in American civic culture, among the pundit class at least, no such nuance exists.

This leaves the solitary executive to set the agenda and "lead," thus exposing a contradiction in the modern American presidency: Surrounded by a small army of experts and advisers, and deemed "too important for politics," American foreign policy - unlike its domestic counterpart - is ultimately thrust upon one man.

Cornered into acting, these men have often confused convulsive action for progress. The two are deathly dissimilar.

President Obama will likely announce his intentions later this week to send more U.S. forces to Afghanistan. The number being bandied about is 30,000. His supporters will praise the move, while his critics will probably condemn anything short of 40,000. And with that, we have the apparent margin for debate on American involvement in Afghanistan: 40,000 will lead to certain victory, while anything less equals capitulation and appeasement.

The "liberty of the world," after all, is at stake in Afghanistan. But how supporting Afghan "liberty"--or, more precisely, an undemocratic and corrupt regime in Kabul--is somehow in logical sequence with the greater War on Terrorism eludes me.

Why, for example, are we not debating a greater presence in southern Yemen, where al-Qaeda remains active and deadly? Moreover, if a reserved and withdrawn tactic is acceptable in Yemen, why is this not the case in Afghanistan?

At what point do we join alongside the Pakistani army in its mission to clean out South Waziristan? When will we take Iranian concerns of al-Qaeda activity in Baluchestan seriously?

If America is at war then it seems about time that Americans decide the context and the future of that war. Why Afghanistan--which for eight years had warranted little attention or time from Washington until now--is suddenly a vital front in the fight against Islamic extremism is a question in need of an answer.

(AP Photos)

November 8, 2009

Fort Hood and Afghanistan

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All the facts are still to emerge from the Fort Hood massacre, but thus far the incident does seem to highlight one of the problematic arguments surrounding a surge into Afghanistan, and that is the need to eliminate terrorist "safe havens." While the threat from a centralized, save-haven operating, terrorist organization is no doubt real, free-floating radicals (assuming, as it looks increasingly likely, the Fort Hood shooter was one) seem much more dangerous, if only because they're inside the country already and can operate under the radar more effectively.

Given that we're operating in Afghanistan under the broad rubric of preventing mass-casualty terror attacks from occurring on American soil again, the attack on Fort Hood should raise the question of how much we need to invest in a single theater in what is obviously a global campaign.

(AP Photos)

November 6, 2009

Debating Afghanistan

RAND held a policy forum on Afghanistan recently, culling a wide range of expert opinion from Frederick Kagan, Stephen Walt, Steve Coll, Zbigniew Brzezinski and more. Definitely one of the more engaging four hour (!) discussions you're likely to see on the subject.

October 27, 2009

Making Ourselves at Home

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James Shinn laments the lack of American patience in Afghanistan:


The average counterinsurgency war lasts a decade and a half; the successful British campaign in Malaya in the 1950s, for example, took 12 years. Even if Gen. McChrystal gets the 40,000 additional troops he has requested, there is unlikely to be short-term progress in meeting any of the security "metrics" that opponents of the war in Afghanistan will try to insert into the defense appropriations for carrying out the president's strategy.

What the White House says—or doesn't say—about a long-term commitment is hugely important. Americans are famously impatient, and there is cruel wisdom in the oft-quoted Taliban boast that "NATO has all the watches, but we have all the time." Most Afghans are sitting on the fence, waiting to see who wins. Our allies are nervously looking for the exits, and the Pakistanis and the Iranians are hedging their bets in case the U.S. decides to pull the plug.

This underscores the difficulty in trying to wage counter-insurgencies. The notion that the "Taliban have the time" is really another way of saying that the Taliban live there and we don't. A strategy that's based on running out the Arabs and other Central Asians who are a part of al Qaeda is one thing (a thing, mind you, we have already accomplished in Afghanistan and have limited ability to do in Pakistan without significant Pakistani help).

Trying to overcome this basic "problem" has been the task of empires through the centuries.

A counter-insurgency strategy that takes years to unfold may well succeed, provided we set the bar for "success" very, very low (as we have done in Iraq). But it doesn't change the fact that a foreign policy based on inserting ourselves into the minutia of governing other people outside of our constitutional system is inherently difficult, if not impossible.

(AP Photos)

October 26, 2009

So How Strong Are the Taliban?

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I confess I don't understand this:

Yet victory by the West and its Afghan allies remains eminently achievable: the Taliban enjoys very little popular support and lacks the kind of superpower patron that enabled the Afghan mujahadeen in the 1980s to defeat the occupying Soviet Army and the Vietnamese communists to outlast American forces in Southeast Asia a decade earlier.

This is a post from Dan Twining under the headline "The Future of the West, and the World it Made, is at Stake in Afghanistan."

So the Taliban - with no superpower patron and little popular support can nonetheless threaten to destroy the entire Western World?

(AP Photos)

October 25, 2009

Will Terror Change Pakistan?

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In the New York Times, Salmoon Masood reports that Pakistan's capital city is changing under the relentless assault from the Taliban and allied militants:


But a new normal is evolving here, which some find as disturbing as the attacks themselves. Grim news, killings and scenes of devastation are now all too frequent and give terrorism a strange, disturbing sense of familiarity.

“Maybe we’re desensitized,” Ms. Tahir said. “Or maybe we’re just sick of living like this for the last few years and just can’t take it anymore. Now I check the news like I check a game for the score.”

“It is sad,” she said.

It's hard to make any sweeping conclusion from a single blog post. But you still have to wonder if these changes Masood relays are going to re-orient Pakistan politically. For years now, public opinion polling has revealed a Pakistani population that is consistently skeptical of American leadership and intentions, in addition to being hostile to the Taliban. Will the rash of terrorist attacks change ordinary Pakistanis minds about American intentions for the better (or perhaps even for the worse as they blame the U.S. for the entire mess)?

October 22, 2009

What's the Problem with Pre-9/11 Afghanistan?

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As someone who has been a skeptic of claims that America needs to embark on a costly program of armed state building in Afghanistan, it's worth mentioning that I found the counter-arguments by Steve Coll here and Peter Bergen here to be rather persuasive in favor of a redoubled commitment.

That said, I'm still not quite convinced and this line from Max Boot reminded me why. Boot argues for a surge in Afghanistan, noting that:

It’s a painful process, but what choice do we have unless we want to risk Afghanistan reverting to its pre-9/11 state?

One of the main reasons that "pre 9/11 Afghanistan" is now considered such a problem is because we did not appreciate the magnitude of the al Qaeda threat then. Michael Scheuer, former head of the bin Laden unit at the C.I.A. has said that on ten occasions, the C.I.A. had actionable intelligence on the whereabouts of bin Laden but the Clinton administration refused to act - reasoning that the costs of attempting to kill or capture bin Laden at those moments outweighed the gains.

Today, with drone strikes occurring at an unprecedented pace, that simply would not be the case. If this administration, or any future administration, had a solid lead on a senior al Qaeda figure they would be much less hesitant to pull the trigger.

And return for a moment back to the Afghanistan of the 1990s and imagine that a more aggressive U.S. takes all ten shots it was offered by intelligence officials. Imagine it is able to land a cruise missile on top of bin Laden, al Zawahiri and Khalid Sheik Mohammad. With them dead, it's difficult to imagine 9/11 even occurring.

In other words, one of the major problems stemming from "pre 9/11 Afghanistan" is not simply that it was a host-state for al Qaeda, but that it was a host state and we did next to nothing about it.

Presumably, given eight years of military occupation, the U.S. has a slightly better feel for Afghanistan and a more extensive intelligence network than it did during the 1990s. And presumably we are going to continue to view the establishment of al Qaeda camps as an urgent threat. Presumably (although I do not know for a fact) a Hellfire launched from a Predator Drone is a more accurate weapon than sea and air-fired cruise missiles, which were the weapon of choice in the 1990s. Those two (or three) factors alone ensure that no matter how bad Afghanistan gets, we're still considerably ahead of the game than we were in the 1990s. Or am I missing something?

(AP Photos)

October 19, 2009

Karzai Digs In

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The Times is reporting that Hamid Karzai won't play nice:

President Karzai is refusing to accept the result of a UN-led probe into vote-rigging in Afghanistan's presidential election and a senior aide said today that the crisis had reached a "deadlock".

Mohammad Moin Marastyal, an Afghan MP and leading member of Mr Karzai’s campaign team. said that the UN-backed Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) had twisted the facts in a deliberate attempt to trigger a run-off vote.

“Effort has been made to lower Karzai’s vote to below 50 per cent," Mr Marastyal said. "Now we are in a deadlock.”

One of the consequences of Western governments proclaiming from the roof-tops that there is no greater foreign policy issue than Afghanistan is the impression in the minds of Afghan leaders that, corrupt or not, the West is not going to bail on them. Karzai, at least, certainly isn't acting as if his government is desperately in need of international support.

(AP Photos)

October 16, 2009

Corruption in Afghanistan

With news that there may indeed be a runoff in Afghanistan it seems like a good time to observe that we may be unduly emphasizing the corruption issue. Yes, Afghanistan is corrupt. But as Amb. James Dobbins observed in our interview, the standard has to be a relative, not absolute one. The key metric for Afghanistan is stability. The real question is the degree to which corruption in Afghanistan is actually destabilizing.

October 15, 2009

Nation Building in Pakistan

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To understand the magnitude of the challenge Washington is creating for itself with Afghanistan and Pakistan, it's instructive to read Dan Twining:

Third and relatedly, America must sustain a long-term commitment to Pakistan and its region across the political-economic-military spectrum to change some of the intractable ground realities that lead Pakistani leaders to define their interests in ways inimical to those of the United States. Chris Brose and I have detailed the outlines of such an approach here. The goal of such a strategy would be to gradually reorient Pakistan's definition of national security away from its current manifestation -- supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and terrorism against India, for instance -- policies destructive to its neighbors, to us, and to itself. This would be a slow, systematic, and evolutionary -- not revolutionary -- approach to changing the strategic context of Pakistani decision-making and so nudging Pakistan in a direction more favorable to the interests of the United States -- and the welfare of the Pakistani people.

In other words, for the U.S. to succeed, we have to commit to a sustained, large-scale military presence in the region with an active involvement in Pakistan's domestic and external politics. Why do we think this will work? Just look at the reaction to the Kerry-Lugar bill - a well intentioned and, according to Twining, well conceived bill to provide aid to Pakistan nonetheless created a major row between the two countries. If Pakistan is going to get pissed off when we offer them $7.5 billion dollars, how are they going to feel when they hear American officials talking about how we're going to wade into their affairs and set about changing their national interests?

(AP Photos)

Italy Paying Bribes to the Taliban

Quite a shocking story in the Times today:

When ten French soldiers were killed last year in an ambush by Afghan insurgents in what had seemed a relatively peaceful area, the French public were horrified.

Their revulsion increased with the news that many of the dead soldiers had been mutilated — and with the publication of photographs showing the militants triumphantly sporting their victims’ flak jackets and weapons. The French had been in charge of the Sarobi area, east of Kabul, for only a month, taking over from the Italians; it was one of the biggest single losses of life by Nato forces in Afghanistan.

What the grieving nation did not know was that in the months before the French soldiers arrived in mid-2008, the Italian secret service had been paying tens of thousands of dollars to Taleban commanders and local warlords to keep the area quiet, The Times has learnt. The clandestine payments, whose existence was hidden from the incoming French forces, were disclosed by Western military officials.

US intelligence officials were flabbergasted when they found out through intercepted telephone conversations that the Italians had also been buying off militants, notably in Herat province in the far west. In June 2008, several weeks before the ambush, the US Ambassador in Rome made a démarche, or diplomatic protest, to the Berlusconi Government over allegations concerning the tactic.

Because the Italians kept their bribes secret as they handed off command to the French, the French had no idea that the area was more dangerous than it appeared, leading to an assault that left 10 soldiers dead.

It's looking increasingly likely that NATO is going to emerge from Afghanistan as a deeply dysfunctional alliance.

October 13, 2009

The Taliban's YouTube Page

Typically it's al Qaeda who's been associated with media savvy, but it appears that Taliban are trying to get into the act with their very own YouTube channel - Istiqlal Media. As Wired's Adam Rawnsley observes this is all slightly behind the Web 2.0 curve but it does raise a disturbing question of whether this move means they're seeking to broaden their appeal.

October 8, 2009

Pakistan Rebuffs Billions

It's not everyday someone offers you $7.5 billion, but Pakistan doesn't seem quite pleased with the terms of a proposed U.S. aid package:

Although President Obama has praised the $7.5 billion, five-year aid program -- approved by Congress last week -- Pakistani officials have objected to provisions that require U.S. monitoring of everything from how they spend the money to the way the military promotes senior officers.

Their criticism threatens to complicate the administration's efforts in the region, where Pakistan's assistance is seen as crucial to the war in Afghanistan.

One of the outrages, apparently, is a U.S. demand that Pakistan sever its ties with the Taliban - a sensible suggestion given that that support can make or break U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Which underscores an important point: you can add all the U.S. troops you want to conduct the most culturally sensitive counter-insurgency in the world and if Pakistan wants to keep using the Taliban as a strategic hedge, how far are you really going to get?

McChrystal Wanted 50,000 More Troops

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CBS News is reporting that General mcChrystal's original number for an Afghan troop surge was 50,000 not the 40,000 he has now settled on.

Given the magnitude of performing a wide ranging counter-insurgency/nation building campaign in Afghanistan, I think even 50,000 is far too low, particularly if the quality of Afghan forces is spotty.

The bigger question, as always, is what's the point? I think Stephen Walt frames the problem correctly:


Imagine that the situation in Afghanistan were exactly what it is today -- a corrupt government in Kabul with dubious legitimacy, the Taliban gaining strength, al Qaeda's leaders still hiding out in northwest Pakistan, etc. -- except that the U.S. military wasn't there. And then ask yourself: would you be in favor of sending 100,000 or so American soldiers to fight and die there?

My views on this subject are clear, so feel free to discount what follows. But I doubt we would be having a serious debate about sending a large number of troops to Afghanistan if we weren't there already. Instead, we would be treating Afghanistan the same way we treat most failed states. We'd express our concern, offer modest amounts of humanitarian assistance, we'd let the U.N. do its best, and if we thought al Qaeda was operating there, we'd go after them with special forces and Predators or other military assets. Just look at how we are currently dealing with Somalia or Yemen or Sudan and you get an idea of how we would be dealing with Afghanistan if were we not there already.

I'm very leery of Vietnam analogies, but I think there's a similar dynamic at work insofar as America's material resources and strength are being put on the line for a series of intangibles - denying al Qaeda a public relations win, preserving America's prestige, etc. Yes, there is a security threat on the table, but the existence of that threat does not lead in a straight line to 100,000-plus troops occupying Afghanistan indefinitely.

(AP Photos)

October 7, 2009

Afghanistan, Eight Years On

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By Jeffrey Dressler

This week marks the eighth anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Yet, eight years on, the Obama administration is reconsidering first principles for the war effort, despite articulating its goals for the region earlier this year. In March 2009, President Obama said his goals were, “…to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” That was and should still be the current definition of success. According to General Stanley McChrystal, the commander that President Obama appointed to lead the war effort, “…success is achievable and demands a revised implementation strategy, commitment and resolve, and increased unity of effort.” The strategy is counterinsurgency; the unity of effort can and will be addressed. The commitment and resolve to succeed is the final element, and thus, we await the President’s decision.

While the Obama administration takes the time to evaluate General McChrystal’s suggested counterinsurgency strategy, others in the fold have also weighed in. In the past month, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have both hinted that more troops and more time would be required to succeed in Afghanistan. Perhaps the most significant question for President Obama at this juncture is whether or not his definition of success has changed, and if so, why? Is redefining success a viable option?

According to General McChrystal, the answer is no. Redefining success encompasses a host of options, all of which would require fewer troops and resources. However, the fundamental assumption that anything short of disrupting, dismantling and defeating the insurgency in Afghanistan to prevent the re‐establishment of safe havens for al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups could possibly constitute success is a flawed assumption.

One option that has been vigorously argued for is a counterterrorism strategy that seeks to scale back the American military presence in Afghanistan in order to focus on al Qaeda in Pakistan. The assumption is that Special Forces, or at the very least, Predator UAVs and missiles would be able to strike high-priority targets from afar, or “over-the-horizon” as it is commonly referred. However, this is easier said than done. Identifying key targets requires timely intelligence from a host of intelligence-gathering assets, something that would be increasingly difficult without boots on the ground. Not to mention the fact that this intelligence will be even harder to come by when civilian casualties swell –a likely consequence of an “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism approach. In short, “you have to navigate from where you are, not where you wish to be. A strategy that does not leave Afghanistan in a stable position is probably a short-sided strategy,” the General said.

Another option is maintaining the current force structure with an increased emphasis on expanding the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The thinking goes that increasing the size and capability of the ANSF will allow them to slowly take over for coalition forces and precipitate the withdrawal of combat forces sooner rather than later. However, you can’t transition to the ANSF a security environment that they won’t be able to manage. Casualties will continue to mount and the insurgency will continue to make gains. Furthermore, increasing the capability of the ANSF requires training, not simply within the safety of fortified training centers, but in combat with coalition trainers and mentors. This is where the most valuable training takes place. There is no viable substitute for combating the insurgency head on and taking back the initiative. “The status quo will lead to failure if we wait for the ANSF to grow,” according to the General’s assessment. Although increasing the size and capability of the ANSF is absolutely critical, it in itself is not an exit strategy.

Then there is the option put forth by General McChrystal: increasing combat forces to resource a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign, while providing the necessary resources and conditions for expanding the ANSF. This will require redefining “both the fight itself and what we need for the fight,” the General concluded. Most of all, this option will require the commitment and resolve of the United States and coalition forces to weather the tough times ahead in pursuit of the ultimate objective. Indeed, as the saying goes, “we may have all the clocks, but the enemy has all the time.” The definition of success that President Obama put forth in March of 2009 is an appropriate and achievable objective –provided the U.S. and its international partners are still committed to victory in a war that enters its eighth year.

---------------
Jeffrey Dressler is a Research Analyst at The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) in Washington D.C. and author of the recent report, “Securing Helmand: Understanding and Responding to the Enemy.”

(AP Photos)

The Value of Propaganda

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Secretary Gates is reportedly worried about what an American draw down in Afghanistan would do to al Qaeda's spin machine:

Speaking alongside Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at a George Washington University forum moderated by CNN’s Christiane Amanpour and GWU professor Frank Sesno, Gates plead agnosticism as to whether al-Qaeda would move its headquarters from Pakistan to Afghanistan but said “what’s more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers al Qaeda.”

The Afghanistan-Pakistan border area, Gates said, represents the “modern epicenter of jihad.” A place “where the Mujahedeen defeated the other superpower,” and in his estimation of the Taliban’s thinking, “they now have the opportunity to defeat a second superpower.”

Defining al-Qaeda as both an ideology and an organization, Gates said their ability to successfully “challenge not only the United States, but NATO — 42 nations and so on” on such a symbolically important battlefield would represent “a hugely empowering message” for an organization whose narrative has suffered much in the eight years since 9/11.

Justin Logan is not convinced:


That is to say, Gates is being a bit too postmodern for my tastes here. We have interests. We should make clear that we will defend them. Then, we should defend them. But to say that we’re so concerned about lending al Qaeda a propaganda victory that we can’t leave Afghanistan is a bridge too far. There will always be somebody to declare victory for al Qaeda, whether we leave Afghanistan next year or 20 years from now. Staying until you feel comfortable no one can claim a moral victory as we depart is a recipe for staying forever.

A good point, but I wonder about this. If I've read my Justin Logan correctly in the past, he's very concerned about al Qaeda propaganda - at least the propaganda that singles out U.S. policy in the Middle East as a major driver of Islamic terrorism. If we're going to be solicitous of that propaganda message, why overlook the one Gates fears?

(AP Photos)

October 6, 2009

The Key to Winning Afghanistan

Leslie Gelb makes the obvious point: the key to winning in Afghanistan is the Afghans.

This is a point that's understandably overshadowed by discussions of whether or not to inject more Americans into combat, but we overlook it at our peril.

October 5, 2009

What's Your Problem?

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Frontline is running a documentary on the War in Afghanistan. In it, they interview Andrew Exum (of Abu Muqawama fame). Here's a snippet of the Q&A:

One of the very difficult lessons that the military, and also the American people, have learned in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that you can't just throw the military at the problem and expect that things will be solved, especially not in political wars. If the problem is governance, if the problem is a lack of essential services being provided to a population, then the military can't solve that.

So you have to utilize other instruments of national power, whether it be the State Department, whether it be USAID [United States Agency for International Development], whether it be instruments that aren't national power but maybe non-governmental organizations, international organizations. ...

I think this is pretty indicative of why we're in the situation we're in. The problem of Afghanistan is no doubt poor governance, the lack of services, the lack of security, the lack of literacy, drugs, etc., etc. And indeed, for most of those problems, the military isn't the right answer. But this is also not the problem - in the sense that this has nothing to do with transnational terrorism of the type that led us into Afghanistan in the first place. We could shore up governance, provide services and security, and open schools in Afghanistan and we'd still have a major international terrorist problem on our hands.

(AP Photos)

October 2, 2009

Poll: Afghan Views on a U.S. Troop Surge

Gallup surveyed Afghan opinion earlier in the year after President Obama announced the first influx of forces:

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Gallup also broke down the polling by ethnicity:

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September 30, 2009

The Lessons of the Philippines

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It's not on the public radar, but the U.S. has been waging another counter-insurgency while the Afghanistan and Iraq wars were raging. It's occurring in the Philippines and Wired's Nathan Hodge takes note of the recent death of two American servicemen there, while adding:

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines has only around 600 personnel, and they are limited to training missions — like the ordnance-disposal exercise pictured here — and civil affairs projects. It’s the traditional foreign internal defense approach: The military of the Philippines has to take the initiative, with behind-the-scenes support from U.S. advisors.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military is used to taking the lead — albeit in very different circumstances. But as the experience in the Philippines suggests, there are ways to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign without a large foreign force.

I'm not an expert on the Philippines, but it seems to me the major reason why the U.S. can take such a low key approach is that the country has a solid institutional infrastructure already in place. The U.S. is not so much building capacity as improving it. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. was forced (or is forcing itself) to start from scratch.

(AP Photos)

September 29, 2009

Al Qaeda in Yemen

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The WSJ reports on Yemen's deteriorating situation:

Arab and Western officials worry that al Qaeda is securing a stronghold in Yemen, where the government's focus on quelling a rebel insurgency is allowing the terror group to strengthen its ability to destabilize neighbors in East Africa and the Mideast.

Yemen's government, which has long struggled to assert control over the country's far-flung tribes and Islamic militant groups, launched a new offensive this summer against rebels living near its northern border with Saudi Arabia. The fighting, now in its seventh week, has shaken a fragile humanitarian situation. United Nations officials warned recently that food aid in the region is running low.

This is in a nutshell the problem with the notion, advanced yesterday by Max Boot, that we need a "comprehensive counterinsurgency" campaign in Afghanistan to stop that country from potentially becoming an al Qaeda safe haven. Is such a program going to be replicated wherever al Qaeda takes root? And if not, why do it in Afghanistan?

(AP Photos)

September 28, 2009

Debating the Long War

Gary Schmitt sets after Andrew Bacevich:

However, the larger point is that Bacevich and other conservative critics, like George Will, are standing on unsound ground when they argue that the transformative goal of the Long War is utopian. It might be long and it might be difficult but, if anything, the evidence so far suggests that the establishment of decent democratic regimes is possible in all kinds of regions and in countries with diverse cultural histories. That hardly means that failure in the Long War isn’t possible; but to hear Bacevich and others tell it, is inevitable.

I think this fundamentally misreads what the so-called long war is about. The circumstance America confronts today vis-a-vis the Arab world is completely different than the one the U.S. faced vis-a-vis the captive nations of the Soviet Empire. Then, the U.S. stood for democracy and against the tyranny imposed by the Soviet Union. Today, the U.S. stands with the oppressors in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, etc. against their own citizens.

Perhaps Schmitt believes this is a mistake and that we should renounce our current Middle Eastern allies and embark on a truly radical program of restructuring our relationship with those autocracies. But I somehow doubt it. The long-war, as presently conceived by Schmitt and others, blithely overlooks the fact that America's real enemies are bubbling forth from the nations ostensibly allied with the United States (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia). Instead, it focuses on old geopolitical hobbyhorses like Iran and before that, Iraq.

Not a utopian program, perhaps, but certainly not a wise one either.

[Hat tip: Justin Logan]
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It's Not About Afghanistan

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One would think that with recent terror plots revealed in Dallas and New York the discussion about what to do in Afghanistan would be grounded in the reality of the wider campaign against Islamic terrorism. Neither plot traced back to Afghanistan. If either had succeed, scores of Americans would be dead. Yet somehow this is all basically irrelevant to those arguing for a surge into Afghanistan. Take Max Boot:

We do not have to create "Jeffersonian democracy" in Afghanistan. But we do have to keep it from becoming a terrorist haven. The only way to achieve that minimal objective is with a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy. If Obama blinks now, he will be doing grave damage not only to U.S. security but to his own credibility.

Note to Boot: Afghanistan is not now a terrorist haven. And, as noted above, we still have a terrorist problem. If we follow Boot's advice, we will expend billions of dollars and risk thousands of lives and still have a serious transnational threat to deal with. This is a completely unsustainable and untenable counter-terrorism strategy. There are several countries that could become "terrorist havens." There terrorists plotting in Western Europe and there are terrorists inside the United States. The idea that we have to embark on a "comprehensive strategy" inside Afghanistan seems to surrender all of our flexibility to al Qaeda and its fellow travelers - who have already picked up and move elsewhere, while the U.S., at the behest of Boot and fellow surge boosters, is proving to the world that it is incapable of being similarly nimble.

(AP Photos)

September 24, 2009

Is A Withdrawal Immoral?

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Writing in the Atlantic, D.B. Grady puts the Afghanistan exit strategy crowd on notice:

George Will is right: Afghanistan doesn't matter. Not to our security or our coffers. It is a humanitarian operation and nation building at its most distilled, and the United States will never recoup the blood spilled or riches depleted.

But the 58% of Americans opposed to the war, opposed to a continued U.S. presence there, should have a clear-eyed view of what that means. It means condemning thousands to death, and hundreds of thousands to worse. When the Taliban returns to Kandahar and women are properly, in their view, denied any and all access to medical care and education, it should not be a surprise. It should not be a shocking revelation when homosexuals are stoned to death for the crime of existing. It's not an insidious Taliban secret to be later revealed; it is their modus operandi. The United States will not have caused it, but it will have been a party to it. We will have known something terrible was about to happen, and we will have let it. That's a lesson we learned in Vietnam, too.

By this logic, the U.S. is forever morally culpable for every act of semi-predictable violence around the globe. That's an impossible standard and one which most people - as judged by the polling Grady cites - rightly reject. It's also worth noting that even in the "ideal" outcome, Afghanistan would almost certainly remain a violent place. President Karzai signed a law that allowed men to rape their wives and control when they left the house. He backed down in the face of intense pressure, but it's not hard to imagine similar legal outrages occurring in the future, particularly if we "win" and leave Afghanistan to its own devices.

Grady goes onto write this rather eye-opening sentence, emphasis mine:

But assuming American defeat, assuming the surrender of Afghan internal affairs to the Afghan people, assuming that the neoconservative ideal followed Irving Kristol to the grave, what would Afghanistan look like to the average Afghan villager?

It takes a peculiar view of American and Afghan sovereignty to suggest that Afghanistan's internal affairs are something that we would "surrender" to them rather than being something that is rightfully theirs.

September 21, 2009

Destroying al Qaeda

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A lot of people in counter-insurgency circles seem to pooh-pooh the idea that drone strikes are an effective means to combat terrorism. But the AP reports today that they are having success:

Recent targeted attacks that killed militants in Somalia, Indonesia and Pakistan have chipped away at al-Qaeda's power base, sapping the terrorist network of key leaders and experienced operatives.

Intelligence officials said Friday that the military strikes have reduced al-Qaeda's core leadership to only a handful of men and have diminished its ability to train fighters, forcing al-Qaeda to turn to its global affiliates for survival.

The killings of Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan in Somalia, Noordin Muhammed Top in Indonesia and Baitullah Mehsud in Pakistan – all in recent weeks – have been the latest blow.

A U.S. counterterrorism official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the deaths deal "a major near-term blow to their respective militant groups."

This year, U.S. forces have stepped up strikes against militants in terrorist hubs. The U.S. national intelligence director, Dennis Blair, said this week that such strikes have been possible because of a greater understanding of al-Qaeda.

Now, these strikes do run the very real and dangerous risk of alienating local populations, but so does dropping 100,000 foreign troops into their midst. And unlike those troops, the drones are expendable.

(AP Photos)

Can Obama Say No to General McChrystal?

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General McChrystal's request for more troops is in. The Washington Post reports:

McChrystal said he thinks the way to meet the president's relatively narrow objective of denying al-Qaeda's return to Afghanistan involves a wide-ranging U.S. and NATO effort to protect civilians from insurgents by improving the Afghan government's effectiveness. That means not only more troops, but also a far more aggressive program to train Afghan security forces, promote good local governance, root out corruption, reform the justice sector, pursue narcotics traffickers, increase reconstruction activities and change the way U.S. troops interact with the Afghan population.

The numbers floated in the press range from 10,000 to 45,000 additional soldiers. None of this is surprising. Nation building is a manpower intensive exercise. But how much of our combat power do we really want tied down in Afghanistan?

And let's assume for a minute that the General is correct in his assumptions - that in order to achieve narrow objectives we must expend enormous amounts of resources. What does that say for America's counter-terrorism strategy in the long run? Is this kind of effort to be duplicated wherever al Qaeda can potentially take root?

Leaving aside these questions, it seems politically President Obama is now in a very tight spot. While we generally acknowledge that it's the civilian arm of the government that sets U.S. strategy, publicly rejecting the advice of military commanders isn't something that a Democrat will do lightly. It's an issue tailor made for demagoguery.

(AP Photos)

September 16, 2009

The Afghan Debate (or Clash of the Open Letters)

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The National Security Network has a nice rundown of the back-and-forth between liberals, realists and neoconservatives over Afghanistan. This jumped out at me:

Unfortunately, largely absent from the debate is a credible voice among the conservative opposition in Congress, which is now dominated by neoconservative thinking. After bungling the war on Afghanistan in favor of Iraq, neoconservatives have little credibility. Their calls for a massive, never-ending military commitment that will somehow turn Afghanistan into a democratic Valhalla reflect the same misguided thinking and over-militarized approach that we saw over the last eight years.

I'm not sure how you can characterized the opposition's approach as "overly militarized" when the Obama administration sent more troops into Afghanistan and is having an open debate in the press over whether to send even more. Whatever else counter-insurgency is, it is a military concept (albeit one that includes a number of civilian instruments). That's about as "militarized" as you can get, no?

Moving to another heated battlefield, we have the clash of the open Afghanistan letters. The first volley, fired by neoconservatives (and Sarah Palin) is available here, urging President Obama not to accept defeat in Afghanistan and to surge whatever forces are needed into the country. Now comes this letter from the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, advising the president to focus on killing al Qaeda and not state building in Afghanistan.

With all this as context I think there's a pretty clear danger that the Obama administration is going to be caught in a dangerous muddle. They clearly believe that building some kind of capable Afghan state is in our interest, they have an increasingly vocal military urging additional troops, and they have a fairly influential assortment of pundits urging a full-bore counter-insurgency effort (with all the rhetorical restraint and nuance for which they are justly famous). On the other hand, Democrats are clearly loosing patience, public support is eroding and realists (including, reportedly, Defense Secretary Gates) inside the administration and without are airing concerns. The temptation must surely be to split the difference: wage a counter-insurgency with the newly arrived forces we have, but not add anymore and risk provoking a wider domestic backlash.

That, I think, is the worst of all possible outcomes. It's public knowledge that nation building and counter-insurgency requires large numbers of troops - far, far more than we have now in Afghanistan. If we are going to attempt such an exercise, better to do it right. And if we're not, then we should reorient our strategy with haste.

(AP Photos)

Karzai's Vote Theft

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The Times has the staggering toll:


One in three votes cast for President Karzai in Afghanistan's presidential elections were faked, with the official body overseeing the ballot condoning the massive fraud, EU election observers said today.

Around 1.1 million votes in favour of Mr Karzai met Afghanistan's electoral fraud criteria, as well as 300,000 cast for Abdullah Abdullah, Mr Karzai's main rival. A futher 100,000 suspect votes were cast for other candidates.

The EU team accused Afghanistan's Independent Election Commission of ignoring its own rules on identifying and eliminating suspect votes, and thus of sanctioning the fraud.

If the suspect votes had been excluded, Mr Karzai's total share of the vote would fall to 47 per cent and a second round run off in the presidential election would be triggered, the observers found.

This is where the proponents of victory need to clarify their position. Are we in this for a stable Afghanistan, even if it is ruled by a corrupt and illegitimate clique? Or are we in this to change the fundamental nature of Afghanistan's governing institutions? There are worse things than a corrupt-but-stable Afghanistan, but such an outcome would almost certainly leave the country ripe for the sort of Taliban-style takeover that occurred in the 1990s. On the other hand, given how rife the country is with corruption, can we realistically achieve anything better?

(AP Photos)

How Important Are Terrorist Safe Havens?

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Former CIA official Paul Pillar says not so much:

Consider: The preparations most important to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks took place not in training camps in Afghanistan but, rather, in apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and flight schools in the United States.

In the past couple of decades, international terrorist groups have thrived by exploiting globalization and information technology, which has lessened their dependence on physical havens.

By utilizing networks such as the Internet, terrorists' organizations have become more network-like, not beholden to any one headquarters. A significant jihadist terrorist threat to the United States persists, but that does not mean it will consist of attacks instigated and commanded from a South Asian haven, or that it will require a haven at all. Al-Qaeda's role in that threat is now less one of commander than of ideological lodestar, and for that role a haven is almost meaningless.

Much of the debate in Afghanistan gets caught up in a false choice: that we either engage in a costly nation building experiment in Afghanistan or surrender to the emergence of al Qaeda "safe havens." Everyone agrees that safe havens are bad and that the U.S. should make eliminating them a top priority. But that doesn't lead directly to the conclusion that we should therefore rebuild Afghanistan.

And if we're truly worried about safe havens, what about this:

Jaish-e-Mohammad ("army of Mohammad"), which is linked to a series of atrocities including an attack on the Indian parliament and the beheading of the American journalist Daniel Pearl, has walled off a 4.5 acre compound just outside the town of Bahawalpur.

Pakistani authorities have turned a blind eye to the new base, in the far south of Punjab province, even though it is believed to have been built to serve as a radical madrassah - Islamic school - or some kind of training camp.

To the extent that Pakistan "turns a blind eye" to massive Islamist compounds being built on their soil, no amount of nation building in Afghanistan is going to protect America.

(AP Photos)

September 14, 2009

The Folly of Drawing a Conclusion from Iraq

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In the Wall Street Journal, Senators Linsey Graham, Joseph Lieberman and John McCain argue for a troop surge in Afghanistan:

Yet an increasing number of commentators, including some of the very same individuals who opposed the surge in Iraq and called for withdrawal there, now declare Afghanistan essentially unwinnable. Had their view prevailed with respect to Iraq in 2006 and 2007, the consequences of our failure there would have been catastrophic.

Similarly, the ramifications of an American defeat in Afghanistan would not only be a devastating setback for our nation in what is now the central front in the global war on terror, but would inevitably further destabilize neighboring, nuclear Pakistan. Those who advocate such a course were wrong about Iraq, and they are wrong about Afghanistan.

I don't understand how the Senators can draw any conclusions from Iraq. Consider this from General David Petraeus:

"In fact, typically, I think historically, counter-insurgency operations have gone at least nine or 10 years."

If you date the beginning of American counter-insurgency in Iraq in 2006, you'll see we're not even at the halfway point. Looking at the news emerging from Iraq of late, is it so difficult to imagine scenarios which lead to a sharp uptick in violence? The "lessons" we learn from Iraq in 2012 or 2016 may be quite different from the ones we think we know in 2009.

(AP Photos)

Afghanistan: Changing Cultures Is Hard

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Fareed Zakaria suggests that we pay off Afghans to keep al Qaeda at bay. Earlier this month, Kimberly Martin said this is precisely what the British attempted to do. And they failed miserably.

Indeed, this is what we tried to do shortly after 9/11. We paid Afghans to go hunt bin Laden. They took our money and then let him get away. It's not too difficult to imagine such a thing happening over and over.

And this gets to the central problem with any "Af-Pak" strategy: changing cultures is hard. Changing people's beliefs, interests, and loyalties is hard. Social engineering is hard.

That we have come to believe that such a practice is vital to our security says more about our pervasive sense of our security needs, I think, than about the objective situation.

(AP Photos)

September 12, 2009

Who Learned What From 9/11

It's hard to know what to make of this assertion by Fouad Ajami:

The impulse that took America from Kabul to Baghdad had been on the mark. Those were not Afghans who had struck American soil on 9/11. They were Arabs. Their terrorism came out of the pathologies of Arab political life. Their financiers were Arabs, and so were those crowds in Cairo and Nablus and Amman that had winked at the terror and had seen those attacks as America getting its comeuppance on that terrible day. Kabul had not sufficed as a return address in that twilight war; it was important to take the war into the Arab world itself, and the despot in Baghdad had drawn the short straw. He had been brazen and defiant at a time of genuine American concern, and a lesson was made of him.

While I think Ajami is correct to emphasize the Arab origin of 9/11 (something the current nation builders in Afghanistan would do well to remember) it still made no sense for Iraq to become the object of our "instruction." The "pathologies" that bred al Qaeda germinated in America's allies in the region - not our ostensible enemies like Iran and Iraq. After 9/11, a proper strategy would have internalized this understanding and repositioned our relationship with countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Instead, we simply proceeded with the geopolitical hobbyhorses of the 1990s.

September 10, 2009

When America Will Risk Casualties

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A major element of the new counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan is the idea that American lives must be sacrificed for the sake of securing the people of Afghanistan. The U.S. is committing tens of thousands of soldiers to such a mission and already, the death toll is rising.

Flash back to November 2001.U.S. forces have pushed bin Laden and al Qaeda into the mountains of Tora Bora. According to reports at the time and since, Washington declined to risk the lives of U.S. soldiers to stage an assault on bin Laden fearing excessive casualties in the rocky and inhospitable terrain. Instead, they relied on air power and bribes to Afghan warlords. Both failed. Bin Laden escaped.

It's difficult for me to understand why the U.S. would not risk its own soldiers to attempt to kill bin Laden, who had just facilitated the slaughter of 3,000 Americans, but will risk tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers to protect the Afghans from their fellow Afghans.

(AP Photos)

September 8, 2009

What the British Conviction Tells Us About Terrorism

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The high-profile conviction of three bombers in Britain who had planned to down several trans-Atlantic airliners in the most serious attack since 9/11 has helped throw a few questions surrounding the proposed nation building mission in Afghanistan into sharp relief. Here's what we know:

1. The bomb-makers traveled to, and sought guidance from, terrorists in Pakistan. This definitely lends support to the notion that al Qaeda needs a "safe haven" if it wants to launch spectacular attacks against Western targets. Unfortunately, that safe haven presently exists in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.

2. The plot was disrupted via intercepts and police work conducted in London and Washington. The relative security of Afghanistan - its governing institutions, the security of its population, the strength of the Taliban - was irrelevant. The plot unfolded in the United Kingdom and Pakistan.

3. The attackers cited Western policies toward the Muslim word and their religious faith as the reasons for their assault. Suggesting once again that a heavily militarized presence in the Muslim world is, at a minimum, fodder for jihadist propaganda and, at worse, a catalyst to terrorism.

So the question becomes: how do any of the proposed outcomes for Afghanistan make this plot less likely to occur? What outcomes in Afghanistan prevent these British jihadists from hatching and attempting to conduct this terrorist plot?

(AP Photos)

Why Afghanistan?

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The New York Times ran a short piece detailing why nation building in Afghanistan is vital to counter-terrorism:

But most specialists on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, inside and outside the government, say terrorism cannot be confronted from a comfortable distance, such as by airstrikes or proxy forces alone. It may take years to turn Afghanistan into a place that is hostile to Al Qaeda, they say, but it may be the only way to keep the United States safe in the long term. Many agree with the classified strategy for a troop buildup that Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, has presented to Mr. Obama and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in recent days. [emphasis mine]

I'm struggling to understand why people believe this. First, Afghanistan is already hostile to al Qaeda - as al Qaeda is no longer in Afghanistan. Second, is Afghanistan the only place in the world where terrorists can congregate? Once we've taken Afghanistan off the chessboard, radical Islamic terrorists are defeated? Really? Does anyone seriously believe that?

(AP Photos)

September 5, 2009

Why Would al Qaeda Return to Afghanistan?

One point that's being over-looked is the question of whether al Qaeda would want to return to Afghanistan if the U.S. left and the Taliban somehow took over the joint again. Consider: however hunted the top leadership of al Qaeda is in Pakistan, they are protected by the Pakistani government from a full-blown American boots-on-the-ground effort to capture and kill them. America must rely on drones, its own intelligence and the good will of Pakistan to take whatever shots it can at al Qaeda.

Were they to return to Afghanistan, could the Taliban afford the same protection? Not even close. There's nothing stopping the U.S. from invading or aggressively bombing Afghanistan at will. The same cannot be said of Pakistan. Therefore it seems that even if Kabul were to once again fall to the Taliban (an outcome that is nowhere near a certainty even if the U.S. reduces its footprint) al Qaeda would be better served staying put in Pakistan. Or am I missing something?

British Bribes, Afghan Tribes

Kimberly Martin suggests that it's a bad idea to try to bribe Afghanistan's tribes and thus repeat the mistakes the British made a century ago:

The plan draws on the ideas of David Kilcullen, formerly the senior counterinsurgency adviser to Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq. He recommends that in any tribal situation, the trick is to recruit community leaders who are local power-brokers, able to enforce consistent rules in their communities — in other words, new official maliks. The plan will pay militia members $150 a month for their services. A new Afghan directorate will take over the payments from the United States

At a tactical level this plan may allow the U.S. to compete against the Taliban for immediate influence. But its long-range political consequences sound disturbingly familiar. An outside state gathers intelligence to decide who is powerful and then pays them, making their power even greater. The power-brokers use the funds for patronage. The state continues the payments after the outside power leaves, perhaps eventually being blackmailed to do so. This creates an artificial hierarchy. Resentment grows among those cut out of the deal. Radical Islam may look like an attractive alternative to those not favored.

Mr. Kilcullen helped design the “Awakening Plan” in Iraq, where the U.S. military paid Sunni sheiks to use their militias on behalf of the Iraqi government instead of Al Qaeda. As U.S. forces withdraw, those militias are being integrated into Iraqi security forces. The process is plagued with difficulties, including accusations that Awakening leaders are being targeted for arrest by Shiite officials. Amid resurgent violence in Baghdad, it is premature to declare the plan a long-term success.

Furthermore, Afghanistan is not Iraq. As the RAND analyst Nora Bensahel notes, powerful Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province approached the Americans for protection from Al Qaeda, not the other way around. The sheiks did not want their existing local political control usurped by brutal and predatory outsiders.

Martin concludes that only training the Afghan National Army and using large number of U.S. troops to provide protection will suffice. By doing so, we will supplant the tribal structure, or at least not have to pick-and-choose which tribes we'll co-opt.

Which sounds plausible, as far as it goes. But, again, where is the cost-benefit? Martin suggests, correctly, that we need "tens of thousands" of U.S. and allied soldiers to defend the Afghans from the Taliban. Ok. For how long? At what cost? Which other foreign policy priorities get demoted because the U.S. military, in addition to defending the United States, is now defending Afghans too? Where does the money come from?

Also missing from Martin's analysis is the viability of the Afghan National Army if the "Afghanistan" it purports to defend is actually an appendage of the Karzai family and connected drug kingpins and warlords. Are we nurturing this institution so that it can stage a coup?

What Are Afghanistan's Metrics?

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Jennifer Rubin says critics of the war in Afghanistan "have an obligation to step forward with a credible alternative for waging that war or with a scenario by which we could avoid a calamity in Pakistan without victory in Afghanistan."

Well, wait. Shouldn't the proponents of nation building in Afghanistan provide evidence that the stability of Pakistan would indeed be in danger should the United States reduce its military footprint? Rubin sites an op-ed in the WSJ from Frederick Kagan arguing that we have to nation build in Afghanistan for the sake of Pakistani stability. But none of what Kagan writes seems to point toward a complete breakdown of Pakistan. Here's what we know:

1. Pakistani territory is home to a sizable Taliban presence which, despite a stepped up insurgency, has been unable to overthrow the government. Indeed, the Pakistani government continues to support the Taliban (at least Afghan elements of the movement) as a hedge.

2. For all of Washington's professed worry about Pakistan, it seems Pakistan is at least equally if not more concerned with India. Shouldn't that count for something in our calculus?

3. When Afghanistan collapsed in the 1990s, as Kagan argues, Pakistan itself didn't collapse from the instability. It stepped in and propped up its favored side. Those ties continue to this day. Why such a thing wouldn't happen again is never really addressed.

Again, what the proponents of nation building in Afghanistan have to address is how building a stable Afghanistan, with all the costs that entails, prevents international jihadists from launching terrorist attacks against the United States. That is the metric for this mission.

(AP Photos)

September 3, 2009

A Syringe Half-full or Half-empty?

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A small victory in the war on drugs? A sign of a significant strategic victory in Afghanistan? Really? Maybe.

Afghanistan exports over 90% of the world's heroin product and the opium market constitutes, by some estimates, about 50% of Afghanistan's GDP. Yet, recent news in The Economist may herald a welcome change:


OPIUM poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has fallen by a fifth since 2008 to 123,000 hectares, according to the UN's annual survey released on Wednesday September 2nd. The biggest reason for cheer is Helmand province, where cultivation has decreased dramatically from 103,590 hectares to 68,833 hectares. Opium production has dropped less, by 10% to 6,900 tonnes, because farmers are extracting more opium per bulb. This is still far above the annual global demand of 5,000 tonnes, and oversupply and lower market penetration in Europe have pushed opium prices to their lowest levels in ten years.

However, these new gains constitute a significant strategic victory only if at least three other conditions are met:

1) The war against Afghan cannabis production and the Taliban's illegal trade in gemstones and timber turns a corner.

2) Afghan drug cartels are decommissioned permanently.

3) New opium markets do not appear or simply reemerge elsewhere (i.e.Iraq and Myanmar).

If those conditions are not met, then it's tough to argue that the Taliban have been weakened in any significant way, let alone that a gain has been made in the war on drugs.

(AP Photos)

September 2, 2009

An Afghan Warlord's Journey

The Wall Street Journal has a must-read piece today on Ghulam Yahya, an Afghan warlord who was aligned with the West and the Karzai government but flipped over to the Taliban.

Why Drones, Not Nation Building, Could Work in Afghanistan

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Some commentators - Christian Brose, Joshua Foust, among others- pushing for a prolonged nation building campaign in Afghanistan argue that the alternative approach would fail to secure America's interests. That alternative approach was sketched out by George Will in his column yesterday:


"...do only what can be done from offshore, using intelligence, drones, cruise missiles, airstrikes and small potent Special Forces units..."

We're told this won't work because it didn't work in the 1990s and, in Joshua Foust's words, we need massive amounts of troops on the ground to get the right human intelligence. Brose goes onto suggest that the U.S. had been following Will's advice up till now with little success. To which one must ask - oh really? Is al Qaeda operating out of Afghanistan right now?

But the more specific point that a variant of Will's policy - targeted military action but no nation building - was found wanting in the 1990s, I think is also flawed for several reasons.

First, we did not have an armed Predator Drone in the 1990s. As the 9/11 Commission reported, there was a debate in the late Clinton/early Bush administrations whether to deploy one, but it became bogged down on the question of which agency would be responsible for pulling the trigger. Instead, we relied on cruise missiles fired from ships at sea. And we only did that on three occasions. Contrast that with the tempo of operations in Pakistan, where we've launched 53 attacks since the beginning of last year.

Today, with the drones operating in Pakistan, we're "decimating" al Qaeda's senior leadership. And how many U.S. soldiers are on the ground in Pakistan's tribal areas collecting human intelligence?

Second, the U.S. had very little grasp of Afghanistan in the 1990s. Whatever else comes from our post 9/11 experience there, we at least now have better information as to the forces and factions at work. We will have many more intelligence assets in the country than we had during the 1990s. That will almost certainly make an "off-shore" strategy more effective.

It's true that Will's favored approach won't cleanse Afghanistan of its Pashtun guerrillas or transform its society into a beacon of Central Asian stability. And I think it's true that a long term strategy of relentlessly bombing Pakistan and Afghanistan is counter-productive. But if that's the case, then the U.S. would be better served by focusing its energies on the ideological engines of international jihadism. And those are not in Afghanistan.

September 1, 2009

What Will's Critics Can't Say

The Internets are alight with responses to George Will's column on the folly of persisting in Afghanistan. Yet nothing I've read to date has adequately addressed the core issue: how a supposed "victory" in Afghanistan does anything to al Qaeda.

It's a very simple question that the war's supporters can't seem to answer: what does a "victory" in Afghanistan do to the international jihadist movement? Does it stop the princes in the Persian Gulf from funding shady Islamic charities that pump money into jihadists groups? Does it stop European, or American-born citizens from deciding they want to blow themselves up? Does it impact the security of the al Qaeda leadership inside Pakistan? Does it prevent al Qaeda from establishing itself elsewhere - in Somalia, Sudan or Yemen?

If all of that would flow from rebuilding Afghanistan, at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars and thousands of more lives, that would be one thing. But can anyone plausibly make such a claim?

Anyone? Wehner? Kristol?


Why We Need More Troops in Afghanistan

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I'm deeply skeptical that nation building in Afghanistan is worth the costs. That said, if the Obama administration is going to try it, it makes no sense to do so with fewer forces.

A consistent theme with the American adventures in both Iraq and Afghanistan has been a persistent unwillingness to match ends with means. In both cases, we have insisted on post war outcomes that completely outmatched our ability to bring them about. Nation building is a manpower intensive exercise. For Iraq, the estimates called for a rotating troop base of 2.5 million - or 1 million more than we had in the entire armed services (including the Air Force and Navy) at the time of the invasion. In other words, even if we had heeded the advice of General Shinseki and poured 300,000 troops into the country, it would have almost certainly not been enough to bring about the outcomes desired by the Bush administration at the outset of the invasion.

None of this is seriously grappled with because, as we know with our domestic budget, Washington does not behave as if it lives in a world of limited resources or constraints on its behavior.

The Obama administration is poised to make a similar mistake in Afghanistan. The U.S. would need somewhere in the neighborhood of 300-400,000 troops to properly police the restive "Pashtun belt." Right now, we have roughly 68,000 troops. Even with NATO forces and the Afghan military (which is not nearly as proficient as Western forces), we still fall short. If we are to protect the Afghan population, root out drug lords, reform their government, and battle an insurgency, then we need to add far more troops into the country.

(AP Photos)

August 29, 2009

Will Obama Remove Karzai?

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Looks like our man in Kabul isn't behaving himself. According to Helen Cooper in the New York Times:

Administration officials have made no secret of their growing disenchantment with Mr. Karzai, who is viewed by the West as having so compromised himself to try to get elected — including striking deals with accused drug dealers and warlords for political gain — that he will be a hindrance to international efforts to get the country on track after the election.

But Mr. Karzai, in a feat of political shrewdness that has surprised some in the Obama administration, has managed to turn that disenchantment to an advantage, portraying himself at home as the only political candidate willing to stand up to the dictates of the United States, according to Western officials.

That Mr. Karzai is capitalizing on anti-Western sentiment shouldn't surprise anyone, least of all the Obama administration. After all, their commanding general in Afghanistan has said explicitly in his orders to his troops that Afghans resent foreign forces on their soil. This is a gold-plated opportunity for Karzai to do some populist posturing.

This posturing, however, presents an obvious quandary for the administration. Mr. Karzai is in power because of the U.S. His government is sustained by tax payer dollars and protected by the lives of American servicemen and women. Naturally, they're going to expect a level of obedience gratitude. If it's not forthcoming, there will almost certainly be voices inside and outside the administration that will begin calling for his ouster. The longer the vote count continues and the more accusations of fraud surface, the easier it will be for the administration to rationalize a move against Karzai.

(AP Photos)

August 28, 2009

Saving Pakistan From Itself

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One of the central arguments behind the Obama administration's expanded commitment to Afghanistan is that failure to nation build will ultimately endanger Pakistan. Such arguments look a tad strained in light of today's news:

Despite strenuous entreaties by top U.S. officials, Pakistan has abandoned plans to mount a military offensive against the terrorist group responsible for a two-year campaign of suicide bombings across the country. Although the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has been in disarray since an Aug. 5 missile strike from a CIA-operated drone killed its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani military has concluded that a ground attack on its strongholds in South Waziristan would be too difficult...

...U.S. counterterrorism officials worry that a failure to capitalize on the post-Baitullah confusion within the TTP will allow its new leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, to consolidate his position and reorganize the organization. Officials in Washington say special envoy Richard Holbrooke and NATO commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal have both pressed the Pakistanis to strike while the iron is hot. But after initial promises to launch a ground offensive in South Waziristan, the Pakistanis have backed off.


You would think that at a certain point, Pakistan's unwillingness to follow orders from Washington would cast the partnership, and our concerns for Pakistan's security, in a different light.

(Richard Holbrooke meets with Pakistan's Foreign Minister. AP Photos)

Debating Afghanistan

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Joshua Foust at Registan argues that the over-riding strategic rationale for nation building in Afghanistan is to prevent India and Pakistan from coming to blows:

And lest anyone think it is appropriate to write off the India-Pakistan conflict as somebody else’s problem, it is never somebody else’s problem when nuclear weapons are involved. As Jari Lindholm reminded, India and Pakistan have come a hair’s breadth from nuclear conflict twice over Kashmir. And like it or not, it is a compelling and vital American interest to prevent nuclear conflict in South Asia—which makes “fixing” Afghanistan in some way also a vital American interest.
I'm not sure how far this really takes us when you consider that India and Pakistan have been fighting over Kashmir for six decades. Nuclear weapons have changed the potential lethality of that fight, and arguably heightened America's interest in seeing it resolved, but the underlying causes of the dispute long predates the introduction of nuclear weapons. If a solution was not forthcoming before the introduction of nuclear weapons, I'm not sure there's one to be found now, particularly if we're focusing on Afghanistan, which is at best tangential to the core problem in India-Pakistan relations. It's difficult to see how the dynamics of the Kashmir conflict change even if Afghanistan were somehow magically taken off the table.

It's also worth noting that the U.S. was able to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan with diplomacy when they edged toward a nuclear stand-off in 2002. It was one of the unheralded diplomatic successes of the Bush administration. Why wouldn't said diplomacy work as a model for navigating potential India-Pakistan flare ups vs. pouring billions of dollars and thousands of lives into Afghanistan?

And while it's true that the risks of a war between Pakistan and India are greater with nuclear weapons, those weapons could just as easily sharpen the minds of leaders on both sides about the potential costs of a war. The balance of terror isn't an ideal scenario, but it has so far restrained both parties from launching a nuclear salvo.

Foust continues:

When it comes to Pakistan, the big danger is not in a Taliban takeover, or even in the Taliban seizure of nuclear weapons—I have never believed that the ISI could be that monumentally stupid (though they are incredibly stupid for letting things get this far out of hand). The big danger, as it has been since 1999, is that insurgents, bored or underutilized in Afghanistan, will spark another confrontation between India and Pakistan, and that that confrontation will spillover into nuclear conflict.

Isn't the problem here Pakistan itself? It's pretty clear that irrespective of the state of things in Afghanistan, it is the Pakistani military that is driving, or at least enabling, terrorist violence against India. Denying insurgents a safe haven in Afghanistan doesn't help much if the Pakistani military remains committed to fighting India with terrorist proxies. There are a lot of places inside Pakistan where insurgents can train.

Stepping back, I think Foust is over-stating the nature of America's interests. Nation building in Afghanistan to ease Pakistani-India tensions is a very convoluted way of saying that U.S. soldiers need to be cannon fodder for the Taliban so that these insurgents don't get "bored" and turn their guns on India. That doesn't strike me as a wise use of American power, nor the best way to help Pakistan and India reach some workable accommodation over Kashmir.

UPDATE: Michael Cohen makes a similar point at Democracy Arsenal:

I really don't see why American troops have to be put in harm's way because a blow-up in Afghanistan might turn into a full-fledged India-Pakistan war. Why would the United States willingly hold itself and its soldiers hostage to an unresolved regional conflict? And are there really no other options - for example, diplomatic - for preventing such a war than "fixing" Afghanistan?

But there is something else about this argument that troubles me. Josh alleges that the big danger is if insurgents bored from the Afghanistan fight will try to spark a confrontation between India and Pakistan. I'm not clear as to why Afghan Taliban would in the wake of a US withdrawal want to get involved with the fight for Kashmir (did that happen from 1996-2001?) but the bigger question is that didn't jihadist terror groups already try to spark that conflict last November in the Mumbai attacks that killed 173 people? Not to minimize those horrific attacks, but even though the jihadists behind the Mumbai attacks were based in Pakistan - and probably backed by the ISI - it didn't spark a military escalation between the two countries. What would be different if we left Afghanistan?

But I will say one thing, if THIS is the rationale for saying I can understand "why even the war supporters cannot articulate them." I seriously doubt most Americans believe that we should be fighting a war in Afghanistan so that India and Pakistan don't fight one in the future.

(An anti-American rally in Peshawar, Pakistan. AP Photos)

August 27, 2009

Aimless in Afghanistan

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The New York Times' C.J. Chivers says that counter-insurgency instructions handed out to officers in Afghanistan will stress that the aim of the U.S. military is to convince the Afghans that they should side with the government:

The mission, the commander says, is to protect the Afghans. The war will be won not by destroying the enemy, but by persuading the people. The international forces will have succeeded when the government of Afghanistan is supported by the population.

Again, this is a very far cry from stopping a terrorist attack against the United States. We're now using our military to protect Afghans and to convince them that their government - which Chivers' paper informs us is riddled with corrupt drug lords - is a force for good in their lives.

Spencer Ackerman adds some more context to General McChrystal's counter-insurgency strategy for Afghanistan:

He demands that his troops think about how they’d feel if a foreign army operated in their hometowns. A section called “playing into their hands” compares a unit that lumbers toward an engagement with an insurgent group to a bull chasing a matador’s cape. Civilian casualties “sow the seeds of our own demise.” Parables offered as sidebars urge commanders to respond to rocket attacks with school supplies.

That first sentence is important because it underscores the basic trouble with the mission as it is currently conceived. Countries almost never want to be occupied by a foreign military power. Do we have any idea how many school supplies it will take to change that?

(AP Photos)

August 20, 2009

Defining Success in Afghanistan

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Peter Bergen takes issue with Stephen Walt's bleak view of nation building in Afghanistan:

The implication of Walt's objection to the ramped-up Obama strategy in Afghanistan is that the U.S. should either do less in Afghanistan, or even just get out altogether. But America has already gone down this road. Twice. In 1989 the U.S. closed its embassy in Kabul and then effectively zeroed out aid to one of the poorest countries in the world; meanwhile Afghanistan was racked by a civil war, which spawned the Taliban who then gave safe haven to al Qaeda.

Then in the winter of 2001 the Bush administration overthrew the Taliban, and because of its aversion to nation-building rebuilt the country on the cheap and quickly got distracted by the war in Iraq. Into the resulting vacuum stepped a resurgent Taliban. This time the movement of religious warriors was much more closely aligned with al Qaeda.

So the U.S. has already tried the Do Nothing approach and the Do It Light approach in Afghanistan, the results of which are well known. The Obama administration is now attempting a Do It Seriously approach, which has a real chance of success.

OK. But what if we succeed? Does that mean there's no more al Qaeda? That international terrorism directed at the U.S. or Western targets is finished?

It's not hard to envision a scenario where the U.S. turns back the Taliban insurgency and drives it into Pakistan. Let's further envision Richard Holbrooke manages to convince Pakistan to divert more resources toward fighting the Taliban, and we manage to grind them further inside Pakistan. A couple of lucky drone strikes and we kill bin Laden and a few of his senior deputies. That's all good, so far. But presumably at this point, those with a stake in waging jihad against the West are going to get wise to the situation and try to escape. Some can't get out, but others do. There's no shortage of places for them to go, and Pakistan would be all too willing to let them leave. Then what?

Does the next state where al Qaeda takes root get subjected to "Do It Seriously?"

(AP Photos)

Great Powers & Failed States

The Wall Street Journal reports that India is burrowing into Afghanistan:

After shunning Afghanistan during the Taliban regime, India has become a major donor and new friend to the country's democratic government -- even if its growing presence here riles archrival Pakistan.

From wells and toilets to power plants and satellite transmitters, India is seeding Afghanistan with a vast array of projects. The $1.2 billion in pledged assistance includes projects both vital to Afghanistan's economy, such as a completed road link to Iran's border, and symbolic of its democratic aspirations, such as the construction of a new parliament building in Kabul. The Indian government is also paying to bring scores of bureaucrats to India, as it cultivates a new generation of Afghan officialdom.

This leads Justin Logan to wonder just how the Obama administration - and the boosters of counter-insurgency theory - propose to deal with this situation:

Eventually–although in fairness, God only knows when–we’re going to leave Afghanistan. When that happens, India and Pakistan are still going to live in the neighborhood. They’d each prefer to have lots of influence in Afghanistan, and to preclude the other from having too much. Accordingly, they’re both trying to set up structures and relationships that would, in the ideal scenario, let them control Afghanistan. In a less-than-ideal scenario, they’d like enough influence to undermine the other’s control of the country. Until you grasp that nettle, you’re really just fumbling around in the dark.

Find a solution for that in your COIN manual.

This problem - they live there, we don't - is not one that's possible to solve.

More broadly, I think the WSJ article underscores a point that Jakub Grygiel made in the American Interest: the real danger of failed states is not their ability to breed international problems like terrorism or drug trafficking, but that they tempt other powers to step into the vacuum, thus heightening the chances of great power conflict.

The War in Afghanistan Through the Years

The Council on Foreign Relations has put together a nice interactive timeline of America's war in Afghanistan.

Would the Taliban Follow Us Home?

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Stephen Walt raises a number of good questions about whether Afghanistan would revert back to an al Qaeda safe haven if the U.S. withdrew. His fifth point seems the most salient:


Fifth, as well-informed critics have already observed, the primary motivation for extremist organizations like the Taliban and Al Qaeda is their opposition to what they regard as unwarranted outside interference in their own societies. Increasing the U.S. military presence and engaging in various forms of social engineering is as likely to reinforce such motivations as it is to eliminate them. Obama is hoping that a different strategy will eventually undercut support for the Taliban and strengthen the central government, but it is still an open question whether more American involvement will have positive or negative effects. If we are in fact making things worse, then we may be encouraging precisely the outcome we are trying to avoid.

How much of the American effort in Afghanistan is dedicated to fighting people who are fighting us simply because we're there? Clearly, al Qaeda elements inside Pakistan have a clear desire and demonstrated capacity to strike into the West (although that's been diminished since 9/11) but can the same be said of the Taliban?

(AP Photos)

Afghanistan Votes

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Incumbent President Hamid Karzai casts his ballot. (AP Photos)

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Afghan women crowd into a polling station. (AP Photos)

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Afghans wait in line to cast their ballot. (AP Photos)

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Donkeys laden with election supplies head to a polling station in Panjshir Province. (AP Photos)

August 18, 2009

Secretary Clinton on Afghanistan Elections

The State Department released a statement on the forthcoming Afghan elections:

In three days’ time, the Afghan people will go to the polls to elect a President and new Provincial Councils. This election day will not be without its challenges, but the Afghan people have seen unparalleled campaigning, debate and dialogue in their country. Presidential candidates have debated each other in public and travelled throughout the country to talk to voters. The Afghan media and Afghan leaders have made politics accessible to Afghans in new ways. The Afghan people should be commended for their courage in conducting this election despite the stresses of wartime, and we and the international community are proud to support them.

The United States of America remains impartial in this election. We do not support or oppose any particular candidate. Like the Afghan people we want to see credible, secure and inclusive elections that all will judge legitimate. We hope that, from top to bottom, every effort will be taken to make election day secure, to eliminate fraud, and to address any complaints fairly and quickly.

It will be several days before we have preliminary results and we hope initial reports will refrain from speculation until results are announced. Final results could take several weeks. We call on candidates and their supporters to behave responsibly before and after the elections.

Finally, we look forward to working with whomever the Afghan people select as their leaders for the next five years. We trust that the next President, as well as provincial council members also being elected at this time, will work for the interests of all the people of Afghanistan.

August 15, 2009

Gates on Pakistan: We'll Never Leave You

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Responding to recent polling on Pakistani attitudes toward terrorism and the United States, Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested that America must convince Pakistan that we'll never leave Afghanistan:

“First of all, one of the reasons that the Pakistanis have concerns about us is that we walked away from them twice,” Gates said during a Pentagon news conference. The United States left Pakistan after the Soviets left Afghanistan, and later in the 1990s cut off military contacts with Pakistan in response to Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

“So, our military-to-military relations were significantly interrupted,” Gates said. “I think that the Pakistanis, with some legitimacy, question how long are we prepared to stay there?”

But let's turn this question around - how long do we have to stay there for Pakistan to stop hedging? Five more years? Ten more years? A little further on, Gates says that the U.S. will win Pakistan over by bribing them. But we know that such aid is insufficient - it simply frees Pakistan up to spend money on conventional and nuclear weapons to deter India.

Absent making Afghanistan the 51st state, it's perfectly reasonable for Pakistani officials to reason that at some point in the future, the U.S. will not be occupying Afghanistan.

(AP Photos)

August 12, 2009

The Right Metric for Afghanistan

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Richard Holbrooke believes that, like pornography, the U.S. will know success in Afghanistan when we see it. Well. That's reassuring.

More substantively, Katherine Tiedemann offers a few more tangible metrics.


National Security Advisor Jim Jones has reportedly "approved a classified policy document on July 17 setting out nine broad objectives for metrics to guide the administration's policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan," but another couple of months are needed to work out the details. One metric under consideration is an opinion poll to gauge how corrupt Afghans view their public officials.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top American commander in Afghanistan, has said that another measure of success is the number of civilians protected, not the number of Taliban militants killed (and indeed, CENTCOM is not publicizing the latter). Although that first metric is much harder to calculate, it shows the Obama administration's focus on implementing counterinsurgency strategies in the Afghan theater.

Another yardstick of progress will be how legitimate the international community considers the August 20 presidential elections.

I find it fairly remarkable that none of the metrics floating around for Afghanistan include: 1. al Qaeda; 2. al Qaeda's ability to attack the U.S. Isn't that what this is supposed to be about?

(AP Photos)

August 11, 2009

Does Defeating al Qaeda Mean Nation Building?

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Marc Lynch asks whether the costs of nation building in Afghanistan are worth the benefits:


What are the strategic reasons for expanding the commitment in Afghanistan? Why should the US be committing to a project of armed state building now, in 2009?

I hope that the argument isn't that it's to prevent al-Qaeda from reconstituting itself in the Afghan safe havens. That's a fool's game. It makes sense to keep the pressure on al-Qaeda, but does that require "armed state building"?

Suppose the U.S. succeeded beyond all its wildest expectations, and turned Afghanistan into Nirvana on Earth, an orderly, high GDP nirvana with universal health care and a robust wireless network (and even suppose that it did this without the expense depriving Americans of the same things). So what? Al-Qaeda (or what we call al-Qaeda) could easily migrate to Somalia, to Yemen, deeper into Pakistan, into the Caucasus, into Africa --- into a near infinite potential pool of ungoverned or semi-governed spaces with potentially supportive environments. Are we to commit the United States to bringing effective governance and free wireless to the entire world? On whose budget?

I think there is a legitimate worry that a U.S. policy that focuses solely on drone attacks is going to very quickly alienate much of the world and particularly Pakistan, a country we can't exactly afford to see destabilized. That said, the alternative, as Lynch demonstrates, doesn't strike me as tenable either.

In this vein, it's also worth considering the warning of the American Security Project's Bernard Finel:


In terms of [Obama administration's] diagnosis, there is still a broad reliance on macro causes to explain individual behavior. There is good reason to doubt this linkage — analytically and more significantly strategically. As I have pointed out many times, there are more gang members in Los Angeles than “jihadists” worldwide. If we can’t prevent gang violence in our own cities, how can we hope to prevent people from joining terror networks abroad? As long as groups like al Qaeda can survive by recruiting a few thousand individuals out of a potential pool of 1.3 billion Muslims, it seems tremendously unlikely that we will ever be able to eliminate “upstream” factors enough make a dent in the capabilities of terrorist groups.

I think there's a lot of merit to that argument, but it's also elides an important point. Those who are joining radical movements may do so from a mix of motives, but it's usually the case that they join movements that are tied to a broader political struggle pitting the Islamist group against a local or international enemy. In Somalia, it's al-Shabaab against the Transitional Federal Government. In Chechnya, it was the SPIR (and others) against Russia. In the Palestinian territories, it's Hamas against Israel.

The U.S. does not have the ability to reach into individual minds and turn them away from terrorism. It can't "develop" foreign societies or political systems so that terrorism is less attractive. But it can, if it chose, not make itself a party to every struggle that involves Muslim insurgencies. It could be less accommodating to the autocratic rulers of the Persian Gulf. These things wouldn't "solve" the threat of terrorism, but it would, I think, diminish the pool of willing recruits.

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Photo credit: AP Photos

Applying Iraq Lessons to Afghanistan

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Much of the impetus behind the Obama administration's strategy for Afghanistan seems to be predicated on the fact that since a counter-insurgency strategy worked in Iraq, it will work in Afghanistan. Kimberly Kagan makes that argument in Foreign Policy today.

Leave aside the obvious dissimilarities between Iraq and Afghanistan, there's a bigger problem with this line of thought: we don't know if the counter-insurgency in Iraq succeeded. Yes, we know that the combination of counter-insurgency tactics, a surge in U.S. combat forces and the flipping of the Sunni tribes, brought violence down. What we don't know is whether this trend is irreversible and whether any of the underlying drivers of this violence have been adequately addressed. That's because, by their very nature, the answers to these questions reveal themselves over time.

What the surge and counter-insurgency in Iraq did accomplish is pave the way for an American exit. The Iraq war's supporters could claim victory, and the U.S. could withdraw with the trends lines pointing in the right direction. Perhaps this, rather than an enduring transformation of Afghanistan, is what the Obama administration is ultimately after.

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Photo credit: AP Photos

August 7, 2009

Obama's Missing Afghan Metrics

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David Sanger reports that the Obama administration committed additional forces and resources into Afghanistan without clearly articulating what success there would look like:

When President Obama unveiled his new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan in March, he emphasized the importance of these measures.

“We will set clear metrics to measure progress and hold ourselves accountable,” Mr. Obama said. “We’ll consistently assess our efforts to train Afghan security forces and our progress in combating insurgents. We will measure the growth of Afghanistan’s economy and its illicit narcotics production. And we will review whether we are using the right tools and tactics to make progress towards accomplishing our goals.”

All that now seems unlikely to be completed before his field commanders finish their proposals for carrying out their marching orders. Their recommendations were originally due at the Pentagon within the next two weeks, but Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates issued expanded instructions for the assessment to the commanders last weekend and gave them until September to complete their report.

One of the basic problems confronting the White House is that "success" in the context of Afghanistan is going to look pretty meager. Al Qaeda was driven out of the country in 2001. None of the other issues on the table - clearing out the Taliban, cleaning up the Kabul government - makes America significantly safer from Islamic radicals who can operate from any country around the world. To the extent that we want to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda again, why wouldn't drone strikes and bribes be able to accomplish as much as a full-bore nation building effort?

There is, as Stephen Biddle has said, the issue of Pakistan and the danger it would be in were Afghanistan to collapse. But how realistic is that scenario? Afghanistan was in abject chaos during the 1990s without it threatening the state of Pakistan. Quite the contrary, Pakistan found the situation quite useful as an opportunity to bolster parties it favored.

Another worry for the White House is declining support for the mission, particularly among Democrats. CNN reports:

Forty-one percent of people questioned in a CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey released Thursday say they favor the war in Afghanistan -- down 9 points from May, when CNN polling suggested that half of the public supported the war.

Fifty-four percent say they oppose the war in Afghanistan, up 6 points from May.

The administration may be able to skate by indefinitely without articulating metrics, but it will need to show results sooner rather than later.

Update: Peter Feaver, who's quoted in the Sanger piece, has more to say on the subject of metrics here.


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Photo credit: AP Photos

July 31, 2009

Biddle on Afghanistan: We Can Win. Maybe.

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Yesterday, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted a conference call with CFR senior fellow Stephen Biddle, fresh off a month-long stint in Afghanistan where he and other policy professionals worked on a strategic review of the war. Biddle's assessment was stark: the challenges are immense, the prospects for success are slim but on balance it's worth attempting a counter-insurgency strategy to stabilize the country.

Biddle argued that the U.S. had two reasons for sticking it out: 1. to prevent al Qaeda from regaining a state sanctuary in the event Afghanistan collapsed; 2. to prevent Taliban elements from taking root that could destabilize Pakistan.

It was this second factor which loomed larger for Biddle. He suggested that to leave Afghanistan only to watch Pakistan implode would be a foreign policy blunder far worse than the Iraq war.

But if those are the stakes, laboring to bring forth an Afghan government that is competent, moderately less corrupt and capable of governing the entire country is a sizable challenge, Biddle said. It is arguably more difficult than defeating the Taliban itself, he added.

Key to that effort will be to predicate American assistance on changes in Afghan behavior. We have "enormous leverage" over events there, he said. Biddle suggested as an example, withholding travel visas to the children of prominent Afghan officials to the U.S. unless they clean up their corruption.

Biddle covered some of the same ground that he had sketched out in his article in the American Interest, which is well worth reading.

Either way, Biddle said that the clock is ticking and that if our new strategy does not show serious progress in 12 to 24 month, we should be ready to liquidate our presence there.

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Afghan President Hamid Karzai with supporters at a campaign rally. Photo credit: AP Photos

July 30, 2009

The Mission in Afghanistan

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Via Judah Grunstein, Sam Roggeveen raises an important question about whether the rationales for staying in Afghanistan would pass muster as a cause for going to war initially:

I wonder how convincing such arguments would be if we weren't in Afghanistan already. Would we now advocate an invasion and long-term occupation of Afghanistan to stabilise the Indian Ocean region, reduce the chances of nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, disrupt drug supplies, protect energy sources, substitute for the lack of a regional security framework and discourage Pakistani cooperation with the Taliban? More to the point, have any of these problems been reduced or made more manageable by the Western presence in Afghanistan? How?
Grunstein adds:
So to take Sam's thought experiment one step further, imagine that if instead of invading Afghanistan in 2001, we'd managed to destroy al-Qaida's base structure and safe haven there through precision air and missile strikes, with the same result of displacing AQ to the Pakistani FATA. What about the current situation in Afghanistan would argue for the introduction of a massive U.S. and allied military presence there, as opposed to military assistance to Afghan opposition forces of the sort that effectively defeated the brutal Soviet occupation in the 1980s?

And if the answer to that question is that we could accomplish whatever is realistically possible in Afghanistan indirectly through Afghan proxies, what about that answer is inconsistent with beginning a responsibly paced drawdown now?

Good questions.

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Photo credit: AP Photos

July 29, 2009

Leaving Afghanistan to Those Who Live There

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Simon Jenkins has a blistering piece in the Guardian about the British commitment to Afghanistan:

When Britain ruled the adjacent Punjab, its power was based on a large land army and the belief that it would never leave. It sent out its brightest and best. They stayed, and those who collaborated with them prospered. Today those who collaborate are murdered and night letters are pinned to their doors.

Everyone knows that the British will go but the Taliban will stay. That is why the strategy of take, hold and build is mere pastiche imperialism. It relies on the palpable nonsense that the Afghan army, a drugged militia of little competence and less loyalty, will fight and defeat its Pashtun cousins. It will not.

The British may leave, but I'm not altogether sure the U.S. will. Again, it all comes back to a admittedly complicated cost benefit analysis. After we pour billions of dollars and suffer hundreds more casualties, will we be correspondingly safer from Islamic terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland? I'm not sure.

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The body of a suspected Taliban fighter lies on an Afghan roadside. Photo credit: AP Photos

July 23, 2009

The War in Pakistan

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The Center for American Progress has a very useful interactive map showing the territory of various Pakistani militant groups. They also have a list and short bio of the major Taliban leaders.

In related Pakistani news, the Long War Journal takes a look at America's air war against the these groups, noting this statistics:

Beginning in August 2008, the US began stepping up strikes against Taliban and al Qaeda elements in the tribal agencies. There were 28 airstrikes in the tribal agencies between August and December 2008 – nearly double the total number of airstrikes in the previous four years combined (the first recorded Predator strike in the tribal agencies took place in June 2004). There was one recorded strike in 2004, one in 2005, three in 2006, and five in 2007.

In 2009, the frequency of Predator strikes in Pakistan has continued to trend upwards. There have already been 31 Predator strikes in Pakistan this year (as of July 18) – nearly matching the total of 36 strikes for all of 2008.

If airstrikes continue at the current rate, the number of strikes in 2009 could more than double the dramatic increase in Predator activity seen in 2008.

There are two main schools of thought regarding these drone attacks. One is that the long term costs to Pakistani stability are not worth the short term gains. The other, that these strikes are an effective, low-cost means of keeping the Taliban and al Qaeda off balance without the more destabilizing step of sending troops into Pakistan.

I happen to think that, given that the government of Pakistan is more or less on board with these strikes, it's the best of a lot of bad alternatives.

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Photo Credit: AP Photos

July 15, 2009

"There is growing uneasiness as to the course of affairs in Afghanistan."

The Irish Times reprints an editorial from 1880.

July 11, 2009

Would the GOP Turn on Afghanistan?

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Stephen Biddle has a must-read article in the current issue of the American Interest examining whether the war in Afghanistan is worth the costs. He concludes that it is, barely. But since this is a blog, let's pull out one the one questionable passage shall we:

The coming Afghanistan debate is unlikely to get as vitriolic as the one over in Iraq in 2006–07. That affair erupted from a potent mix of partisanship and anger at perceived deceit, and so is unlikely to recur. But the political problems the new antiwar movement will pose for Obama could actually be harder to overcome than those the Iraq opposition posed for Bush. After all, Bush was able to circle the wagons, rally his base, and push an unpopular position through Congress by holding the Republican Party together, thereby forcing congressional Democrats to either unite behind a different approach to Iraq or acquiesce in Republican policies. Democrats chose the latter, giving President Bush the freedom to conduct the war as he wished.

Obama, by contrast, heads a Democratic Party that is already divided on the Afghan war and likely to grow more so over time. He also faces a series of domestic crises that will require him to spend political capital in order to win support for his governing agenda. Republicans have shown little willingness to cooperate on anything else, and the Administration’s new ownership of the Afghanistan war gives the GOP another opportunity to retreat into opposition as the news from the front gets worse. Obama could face a situation in which a bipartisan antiwar coalition threatens the majority he will need to maintain funding for an increasingly unpopular war.

Does this sound plausible to you? The Republicans have spent an awful long time attacking the Democrats on their withdrawal proposals for Iraq. I would think it would be hard for them to suddenly pivot and demand a withdrawal from Afghanistan. But politics is a funny business and Republicans may suddenly rediscover their well founded skepticism of nation building. Unfortunately, it will be many years too late.

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Photo credit: AP Photos

July 2, 2009

Poll: Pakistan Turns on Taliban

As the Marines begin a major offensive in Afghanistan, there's some encouraging news on the other side of the Durand Line:

Most Pakistanis now see the Pakistani Taliban as well as al Qaeda as a critical threat to the country--a major shift from 18 months ago--and support the government and army in their fight in the Swat Valley against the Pakistani Taliban. An overwhelming majority think that Taliban groups who seek to overthrow the Afghan government should not be allowed to have bases in Pakistan.

That, via World Public Opinion, is the good news. Now for the bad news:

However, this does not bring with it a shift in attitudes toward the US. A large majority continue to have an unfavorable view of the US government. Almost two-thirds say they do not have confidence in Obama. An overwhelming majority opposes US drone attacks in Pakistan.

I think the Pakistani public's widespread dislike of the Taliban should further dampen the worries we were hearing a month ago when the Taliban were "60 miles" from the Pakistani capital. With just 5 percent of those polled voicing support for the Taliban, it seems hard to imagine them sweeping into the capital and assuming control.

But it should also serve to reaffirm the point below: people don't like other countries dropping bombs on them, no matter who they're dropping them on.

June 11, 2009

Al Qaeda Flees

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Critics of the Obama administration's nation building efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan have noted that one of the glaring vulnerabilities of the plan is al Qaeda's ability to pick up and move on. So while we continue to wage a campaign against the natives, the transnational threat (i.e. the one that would actually kill Americans in America) can relocate.

As the New York Times reports, this could be happening in Pakistan:

American officials say they are seeing the first evidence that dozens of fighters with Al Qaeda, and a small handful of the terrorist group’s leaders, are moving to Somalia and Yemen from their principal haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas. In communications that are being watched carefully at the Pentagon, the White House and the Central Intelligence Agency, the terrorist groups in all three locations are now communicating more frequently, and apparently trying to coordinate their actions, the officials said.

The report stresses that these are fighters - not the senior leadership - but it's not a stretch to imagine that if things get hot in Pakistan, they'll hit the road too. Of course, that's a good thing. Wherever they wind up won't have nuclear weapons, even if the prospect of al Qaeda getting their hands on a nuke is more of a sensational headline than serious probability. If they're moving across borders they're going to be very vulnerable. But it does raise the question of what we do if/when other jihadists base camps pop up in other failed/failing states. Particularly, what happens if these camps arise while the U.S. is still nation building inside Pakistan?

The U.S. military can deploy rapidly - but not as rapidly as al Qaeda. And once the U.S. military does deploy, they tend to stay put.

The Obama administration, as well as Senators Kerry and Lugar, have a lot invested in helping Pakistani civil society - to the tune of $5 billion. If the NY Times reporting is accurate, and if a broader movement of al Qaeda leadership should occur, it raises a number of questions: Is the money we've promised to Pakistan still good if bin Laden and company depart? Is the establishment of a new safe haven in Somalia going to require the U.S. to nation build there too?

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Photo credit: AP Photos

June 1, 2009

Will the British Surge in Afghanistan?

The Independent is reporting that British PM Gordon Brown is getting flack from his defense establishment for not committing more troops to Afghanistan:

Senior generals are bemused that the Prime Minister has turned down the advice of his own Defence Secretary, John Hutton, that a larger force should be sent to Afghanistan following the withdrawal from Iraq. Now they have warned Number 10 that the reputation of the armed forces will suffer in the eyes of senior American commanders unless Mr Brown authorises an autumn surge in troop numbers. Such a surge, they say, would signal Britain's intent to "pull its weight" in the Afghan conflict by plugging the shortfall in the multinational force.

On Saturday, two more British troops died in Helmand, bringing to 165 the total number killed in the conflict so far – just 14 fewer than the total number of British soldiers who died in Iraq.

Mr Brown has until now turned down, on cost grounds, the generals' proposal to send 2,500 extra troops in support of the projected US-led "surge" against the Taliban. Instead, he has authorised a deployment of 700 temporary troops to cover the period of the forthcoming elections in that country. But The Independent has learnt that defence chiefs have persuaded the Government to review the situation in the autumn. Even then, any increase is likely to be in the hundreds rather than in the numbers that the Army believes are needed.

Wherever you stand on the merits of nation building in Afghanistan, if you're going to do it, it would be useful to get all hands on deck.

May 22, 2009

War

Judah Grunstein notes that there are an estimated 300 al Qaeda terrorists ensconced in Pakistan :

Now, those 300 people, given the latitude, could do quite a bit of damage. [But] one of the by-products of the lazy use of labels -- whereby all attacks in Iraq from 2004-2007 were the work of terrorists, and the Taliban and al-Qaida have been lumped together into the same category of threat -- is that we've conceptually inflated the size and strength of the group that was interested in attacking us.

We've now got upwards of 40,000 troops in Afghanistan, with the ostensible mission to eliminate the threat posed by 300 guys. In Pakistan. Think about that.

Not only that, but in the midst of the worst economic crisis in generations, at a time when the U.S. is driving itself further and further into debt, we're about to pour billions of additional dollars into Pakistan and Afghanistan to shore up both states.

It's worth remembering that 9/11 reportedly cost about $500,000 to pull off. Between the Department of Homeland Security, the two wars, significant increases in defense and intelligence spending, etc., the U.S. is well over the trillion dollar mark, and counting. And yet five motivated terrorists could still arm themselves, stroll into a shopping mall and murder scores of people.

May 19, 2009

Viceroy Khalilzad?

I'm not entirely sure how to feel about this:

Zalmay Khalilzad, who was President George W. Bush’s ambassador to Afghanistan, could assume a powerful, unelected position inside the Afghan government under a plan he is discussing with Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, according to senior American and Afghan officials.

Mr. Khalilzad, an American citizen who was born in Afghanistan, had considered challenging Mr. Karzai for the presidency in elections scheduled for this summer.

But Mr. Khalilzad missed the May 8 filing deadline, and the American and Afghan officials say that he has been talking with Mr. Karzai for several weeks about taking on a job that the two have described as the chief executive officer of Afghanistan.

Such an alliance would benefit Mr. Karzai by co-opting a potential rival. For its part, the White House has made no secret of its growing disenchantment with Mr. Karzai, and some Afghanistan experts said that enlisting Mr. Khalilzad would have the virtue of bringing a strong, competent leader into an increasingly dysfunctional Afghan government.

The position would allow Mr. Khalilzad to serve as “a prime minister, except not prime minister because he wouldn’t be responsible to a parliamentary system,” a senior Obama administration official said. Taking the unelected position would also allow Mr. Khalilzad to keep his American citizenship.

Administration officials insisted that the United States was not behind the idea of enlisting Mr. Khalilzad to serve in the Afghan government, and they gave no further details on what his duties might be.

Steve Clemons is "intrigued and cautiously optimistic." Count me as a little more incredulous. I can see the utility in appointing a competent and experienced policy hand to clean the Afghan house, but this only furthers the notion that the United States is a heavy-handed occupier in the region. If the Obama administration is comfortable with this, and has no trouble dropping the purple-fingered pretense, then I suppose this could work.

Perhaps this is one of several first steps toward defining 'success' down in Afghanistan, but it's a little disappointing nonetheless. It's clear that President Bush failed, as CFR President Richard Haass puts it, to properly "resource the rhetoric" in Afghanistan. Still, it's difficult not to feel a little disappointed in where we have gone in such short time.

I also have some trouble digesting the West's 'disenchantment' with Hamid Karzai. The Afghan President has taken heat for his regime's alleged corruption, as well as his inability to stifle the country's drug trafficking.

Yes, it certainly is good that Western democracies are immune to such problems.

UPDATE

Josh Foust minces fewer words:

Zalmay Khalilzad is an absolute snake, totally untrustworthy, and poisonous to President Obama’s otherwise good intentions for Afghanistan.

May 18, 2009

The Good Pakistan's Nukes Could Do

We're used to viewing the Pakistani nuclear program with something approaching hair-pulling horror, but CATO's Ben Friedman looks on the bright side:

Lots of people point out that Pakistan’s big problem is India — that its preoccupation with its largely indefensible Indian border prevents it from devoting sufficient resources to pacifying its restive Pashtuns and encourages it to employ high-risk strategies like using extremists to tie down Indian forces in Kashmir.

What you don’t hear much is that nuclear weapons, and particularly the secure second strike capability that Pakistan is likely pursuing, is a potential solution to this problem. Nuclear weapons are a cheap form of defense. In theory, the security that they provide against Indian attack would allow Pakistan to limit its militarization, stop bankrolling extremists, and focus on securing its own territory as opposed to its border. (Note: I’m not arguing that that’s necessarily right, I’m arguing that if you think vulnerability to India is what creates danger for us in Pakistan, you should consider the utility of nuclear weapons in solving this problem).

I don't know enough about Pakistan's military doctrine to pass any kind of judgment on this, but it's worth pondering.

May 13, 2009

Going to War in Pakistan

Dov Zakheim makes a suggestion for the Obama administration:

Instead of trying to play politics in Islamabad, the United States should employ its forces to support those of Pakistan's military. Only in this manner can there be some assurance that Pakistani morale will not collapse, and that the Taliban insurrection can be crushed. The Pakistani military can be ruthless, and nothing else will do in dealing with the Taliban. American tactics and firepower can back up that ruthlessness.

Is there any indication at all that Pakistan would welcome such an overt role for the U.S. military in their country?

UPDATE: The LA Times reports:

The U.S. military has launched a program of armed Predator drone missions against militants in Pakistan that for the first time gives Pakistani officers significant control over routes, targets and decisions to fire weapons, U.S. officials said.

The joint effort is aimed at getting the government in Islamabad, which has bitterly protested Predator strikes, more directly engaged in one of the most successful elements of the battle against Islamist insurgents....

Under the new partnership, a separate fleet of U.S. drones operated by the Defense Department will be free for the first time to venture beyond the Afghan border under the direction of Pakistani military officials, who are working alongside American counterparts at a command center in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

"This is about building trust," said a senior U.S. military official, speaking on condition of anonymity because the program has not been publicly acknowledged. "This is about giving them capabilities they do not currently have to help them defeat this radical extreme element that is in their country."


May 9, 2009

Preventing the Next 9/11

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Traveling in Afghanistan, Defense Secretary Robert Gates suggested the U.S. learn from history:


After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, Gates said, the United States and the international community “basically turned our backs” on Afghanistan. Four years later, in 1993, al-Qaida launched made its first attack on the World Trade Center in New York. A car bomb failed to bring the building down, but it killed six people. Undeterred, and operating with impunity in Afghanistan, al-Qaida hatched the plan that killed thousands on Sept. 11, 2001.

As I understand it, al Qaeda was not operating out of Afghanistan in 1993 but Sudan. But more important, what was the "not turning our back" option in the 1980s when the Soviets retreated?

Turning back the clock, what exactly should the U.S. have done differently? And how could those policies have deterred or prevented bin Laden from waging a holy war against the West?

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Photo Credit: AP Photo

May 8, 2009

Measuring Civilian Deaths in Pakistan

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In a new report, Anthony Cordesman argues that we shouldn't necessarily trust the numbers we're hearing from David Kilcullen on the number of Pakistani civilians killed by U.S. drone attacks:

Both casualty estimates and day-to-day new reports are also affected by the fact that casualty impact of air operations is systematically being exaggerated by Taliban and jihadist claims that fighters are innocent civilians, growing Taliban and Jihadist use of exaggerated casualty estimates as propaganda weapons, manipulation of bodies and grave sites (some of which may be empty), and the growing use of civilians as human shields. Bodies are buried almost immediately, fighters and other dead can be called casualties, after-action investigations are often impossible in insecure areas, and truth that comes too late is truth unheard. There often is no practical way to establish the facts, and a very real inability to distinguish who really is a fighter and who is not.

He then goes on to argue that regardless, airstrikes have a limited utility in the kind of war raging in Pakistan:

...no limits to the use of air power or improvements in its use can make up for a lack of the resources needed to win, inadequate ground troops, and for creating secure areas and winning the support of the local population. U.S. and NATO/ISAF commanders have repeatedly warned that there is no military path to victory in Afghanistan, and it is clear from the conduct of Pakistani force to date, that this is equally true in Pakistan.

Moreover, the same public opinion polls in Afghanistan that show such growing anger against air strikes in general reveal a pattern that has been clear in Iraq and virtually every counterinsurgency conflict where the insurgents have been defeated. Civilians see a very different reality when tactical clashes defeat the insurgents and are followed by forces that stay, bring lasting security, and which then are followed by a civil presence that brings government services and some degree of economic security.

If this is indeed true, and it's certainly the prevailing conventional wisdom, then it just underscores how little the U.S. can do in Pakistan without the full scale cooperation of the Pakistani government. They'll be the ones clearing, holding and building. Even with significant American assistance, if the Pakistanis have no will, there doesn't seem to be a way.

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Photo Credit: AP Photo

May 6, 2009

Drone Death Tolls & Double Standards

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Speaking before Congress, David Kilcullen said that U.S. Predator drone strikes in Pakistan had killed 14 al Qaeda leaders and 700 Pakistani civilians. "The drone strikes are highly unpopular," he said. "They are deeply aggravating to the population. And they've given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism. ... The current path that we are on is leading us to loss of Pakistani government control over its own population."

This led Commentary's Noah Pollack to observe:

...imagine that Israel had been conducting a Predator drone war over the past few years that had killed 14 Hezbollah leaders and 700 Lebanese civilians. Is there any chance that this would not be a constant source of global hysteria?

And so, as far as the U.S.’s drone war is concerned, I have a few questions: Where are the shrill denunciations of disproportionate force and extrajudicial killings? Where are the UN investigations? Where are the condemnations from Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN Human Rights Council? Where are the front-page New York Times exposes of American war crimes? Where are the indictments of U.S. officials by European judges? Why hasn’t Pat Buchanan compared the United States to the Nazis?...Why isn’t anybody detailing the outrageously disproportionate force the Army is employing against a group of rural tribesmen armed only with RPG’s and rifles?

That seems like a fair point to me.

Of course, it doesn't answer the central question: is the U.S. doing more damage to itself and the Pakistani government by killing this many civilians to reach al Qaeda leaders or not?

If Ralph Peters Had His Way

Writing in the New York Post, Ralph Peters offers some guidance on how to handle the situation in Pakistan:

A better strategy's obvious. But Washington has trouble with the obvious. At our pathetic State Department, habit trumps innovation every time. And the Pentagon can't seem to see beyond the immediate battlefield.

What should we do? Dump Pakistan. Back India.

Let's see if I follow this: influential portions of Pakistan's military and intelligence service nurture Islamic terrorists because they need a low cost way to attack India; these same forces worry even now that the U.S. is conspiring with India to splinter Pakistan; ergo openly backing India will make Pakistan turn on its jihadist allies, leaving them with no allies. Openly allying with India would also make Pakistan more willing to share information with the U.S. regarding the location and security of their nuclear weapons.

That doesn't sound plausible.

Granted, the status quo is lousy, but cornering Pakistan would likely make things worse. And things could still be worse.

May 5, 2009

Power Over Pakistan

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Tony Blankley wonders:

How did it come to be that the government of the most powerful nation in the history of humanity (population 300 million plus, with a gross domestic product of $14 trillion, larger than next three economies - Japan, China and Germany - combined) confesses that its options are limited on a "mortal threat" to our nation?

I suspect this is on a lot of people's minds lately. How can the world's foremost power stand powerless before Pakistan. It's a great question - one that Leslie Gelb happens to answer directly in his book Power Rules (see our review here and our interview with Gelb here). The short version is that what Blankley wants here is untenable - the U.S. cannot impose its will on Pakistan short of near genocidal warfare. Instead we have to work within confines imposed by resources and morality.

Looking at the problem more broadly, one of the oft-repeated and clearly dangerous elements of the situation in Pakistan is the prospect of the Taliban getting their hands on a nuclear weapon. Obviously simply getting a weapon and successfully transporting it and detonating it are two very different things, but nevertheless, it would still be immensely dangerous. But I'm not aware of too many scenarios wherein the U.S. can play a decisive role in preventing this. Can we track every last weapon and move quickly enough to prevent a theft or transfer? That doesn't sound too plausible to me.

Update: The New York Times rounds up some experts on just what the U.S. should be doing re: Pakistan's nukes.
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Photo Credit: AP Photo

In Pakistan, First Do No Harm

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National Journal canvases expert opinion on the increasingly unnerving situation in Pakistan. The only firm area of consensus seems to be that the situation is immensely problematic. At the newly launched American Enterprise Institute blog, Danielle Plekta notes the widespread confusion over how to handle the situation. And yet, there seems to be a pervasive sense that the administration must act now to avert a catastrophe.

While understandable, this may be a time to reach for the famous mantra: "don't just do something, stand there." If there is universal confusion over what to in Pakistan, plunging ahead blindly just to show the world or the American people that you're "doing something" doesn't seem to make much sense.

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Photo credit: AP Photo

April 29, 2009

How Important is Af-Pak?

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The Center for Strategic & International Studies' Anthony Cordesman has a new report out arguing that the Obama administration has to keep the Af-Pak conflict in proper perspective:


...US strategy must accept the fact that this is a limited war fought for limited objectives where the cost can exceed its value. The US cannot afford to become overcommitted to either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Its strategy must consider options that limit future US commitments and that focus on containment – undesirable as those options may seem. The US may well be able to win – particularly if the Afghan and Pakistani governments become more effective partners – but it cannot let a limited war fought for limited purposes become the central focus of its strategy and actions – even at the regional level.

Part of the problem with the whole "central front in the war on terror" language - which both Republicans and Democrats indulged in - is that it created the expectation that we'd fight a set piece battle with radicalism, and then move on. Unfortunately, it's not going to work that way. Instead, it's turned into a question of how much we care to invest in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq and to what degree this investment is going to stem the broader tide of radicalism.
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An Afghan police man stands guard as his colleague, rear, guides vehicles at a police check post on 17th anniversary of guerrilla fighters over the Soviet-backed Communist regime in Kabul, Afghanistan on Tuesday, April 28, 2009. Photo credit: AP Photo.

April 28, 2009

Removing Pakistan's Nukes

Over the course of an interesting post explaining why Pakistan is not on the cusp of a Taliban takeover, Juan Cole starts speculating:

What I see is a Washington that is uncomfortable with anything like democracy and civilian rule in Pakistan; which seems not to realize that the Pakistani Taliban are a small, poorly armed fringe of Pushtuns, who are a minority; and I suspect US policy-makers of secretly desiring to find some pretext for removing Pakistan's nuclear capacity.

I don't think it's much of a secret that many in Washington wish Pakistan didn't have nukes. But I find it difficult to believe they'd view the collapse of Pakistan into total anarchy as a pretext for anything other than a collective freak out.

April 2, 2009

The Afghan "Rape" Law

The American commitment to state building in Afghanistan makes us a party to stuff like this:

A new Afghan law makes it legal for men to rape their wives, human rights groups and some Afghan lawmakers said Thursday, accusing President Hamid Karzai of signing the legislation to bolster his re-election prospects. Critics worry the legislation undermines hard-won rights for women enacted after the fall of the Taliban's strict Islamist regime.

The law — which some lawmakers say was never debated in parliament — is intended to regulate family life inside Afghanistan's Shiite community, which makes up about 20 percent of this country of 30 million people. The law does not affect Afghan Sunnis.


Ultimately the U.S. can't legislate Afghan family life for the Afghans, regardless of how barbaric it is. But we should take a long hard look at just how much we want to invest in state building in the country if this is how they use their new found democratic institutions.