The once fearsome Islamic State group, also known by the acronym ISIS, has fallen off the front pages. The big news from the Syrian battlefield is Russia's air campaign to prop up the regime of President Bashar Assad by attacking various rebel groups. These groups include the Islamic State almost as an afterthought, and Russia's aim is to construct durable air and naval facilities on the Mediterranean coast.
Targeting the other groups first, Moscow claims to have destroyed dozens of Islamic State manpower, storage, resupply, and training targets, but Russian President Vladimir Putin's credibility is zero. In any case, in Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State's ground war has stalled. Its recent successes comprise far-away suicide bombings that may be inspired by ISIS, rather than organized by it. Claims that the Islamic State is still gaining ground or even maintaining its strength call for skepticism. Here are some of the relevant questions:
1. New recruits: how many new recruits in fact arrive each month? Where are they on the battlefield? One thousand is the official Western estimate, but is this number likely? Some of these would be new foreign fighters, others are fighters switching from al-Qaeda to ISIS for better salaries and the associated prestige. Poignant media stories about susceptible young people caught on their way to Syria have become rare. The charisma of the caliphate story is weakening. Even if the recruits number so many, what is the military quality of newly arrived, untrained fighters? With the exception of Chechen fighters - and how many are there of these? - the new arrivals lack experience. They are apparently first put into support and guard positions, but a mere few weeks training with weapons means they are likely to get killed early on. Their major asset is bravery, not fighting skills.
2. Does ISIS really control vast swaths of Syrian and Iraqi territory? This was questionable even when its army stormed out of northwest Syria last year, because most of the land is desert and mountains. Why (and how) would an irregular army estimated at a total 20,000-30,000 fighters waste manpower to control a vast swath of desert with a few villages in it? An adversary military force could probably have driven about this territory for an hour or two undisturbed. Current maps of effective ISIS control show a modest territory in a wine-glass configuration whose bulb is an area wedged between, to the east, an equal-size Kurdish-controlled area on the border with Turkey and, to the west, a small Damascus government-controlled territory around Aleppo, plus an edge of territory held by other rebels. ISIS controls the ancient city of Palmyra, but that sits in an isolated desert location in the center of the country. The glass stem is the vital area of Islamic State's territory. From its informal capital in Raqqa heading south, it involves control of the northern bank of the Euphrates River (government forces are on the south bank) on the way toward Ramadi, Fallujah, and Baghdad, where the river abuts the Tigris. This early achievement was part of Islamic State's strategic plan to control the water supply along a long area, ultimately to threaten Baghdad. Dams were closed, and the Euphrates at one point was diverted. Control of water may be Islamic State's most threatening weapon.
3. How solid is the caliphate infrastructure, and how motivated are the fighters holding it? With few recent battleground successes, morale among the fighters and occupiers may be sinking. Media reports suggest large numbers of professionals - medical personnel, businesspeople- are fleeing ISIS territory among the massive outpouring of Syrian and Iraqi refugees heading toward Europe. ISIS propaganda suggests it is worried about a drain of medical personnel, teachers, and other professionals such as oilfield managers. Some of these leave behind families they hope to bring with them later if they reach Europe.
4. Do ISIS fighting methods still terrorize the enemy? The shock value of barbarism has been played out. Videos of decapitations and other atrocities are hardly seen in Western media. While Syrian government soldiers, Kurds, and Iranian-backed militias know what might happen if they're captured, they are no longer terrified by it. Glamorized executions in other countries, such as happened on a Libyan beach, are rare. Islamic State fighters are now defeated with some frequency and are ousted from towns and strategic locations - most recently examples are the Baiji oil refinery, and a successful Kurdish/U.S. raid to rescue prisoners held in Hawija.
