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September 30, 2013

Al-Qaeda Goes Global

"Bin Laden is dead and General Motors is alive!" beamed a triumphant Vice President Joe Biden, as he was campaigning for re-election in 2012. President Obama agreed, often reciting that "Al-Qaeda is on the run."

Well, not exactly. A phenomenal must-read analysis by The Economist explains:

From Somalia to Syria, al-Qaeda franchises and jihadist fellow travellers now control more territory, and can call on more fighters, than at any time since Osama bin Laden created the organisation 25 years ago.

They also have a map of Al-Qaeda & Friends.

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Do yourself a favor and read the entire piece.

(Image: The Economist)

September 23, 2013

Why Did Angela Merkel Win a Third Term?

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The results are in: Angela Merkel will remain queen chancellor of Germany for another four years. Not only did she win, but she won big. Her party received 41.5% of the vote, a bigger share than it received in 2005 (35.2%) or 2009 (33.8%). And this happened at a time when Europe has been tossing most of its bums incumbents to the curb. (See Nicolas Sarkozy, Silvio Berlusconi and Gordon Brown.) So why did Germans decide to stick by their Mutti ("Mommy")?

Before the election, The Economist had a briefing on Angela Merkel, and it nicely answers that question.

1. Ms. Merkel is seen as a safe bet. By imposing austerity and reform on the profligate peripheral countries, such as Greece, she is perceived as having handled the euro crisis well. However, she hasn't been perfect. Far from it. The Eurozone is still in serious trouble, and Ms. Merkel has blocked major necessary reforms, such as joint eurobonds. The Eurozone's survival is no guarantee, but Germans trust her instinct for caution.

2. Other parties don't offer a compelling reason to vote for them. Ms. Merkel has a habit of poaching ideas from other parties. The Green Party is (unscientifically) opposed to nuclear power. After the disaster at Fukushima, Ms. Merkel -- who has a PhD in quantum chemistry and really ought to know better -- decided to shut down the country's nuclear power plants. It was a cunning political move; in one fell swoop, she largely eliminated the major reason to vote Green.

3. Germans know she is the most powerful person in Europe. Actually, according to Forbes, she's the 2nd most powerful person in the world. A new leader, while still being powerful, will not have the same clout as Ms. Merkel.

4. Germans are (more or less) pleased with the status quo. The German economy is doing quite well. However, that is not guaranteed to continue indefinitely: It is facing a major demographic crisis in the not-too-distant future, and the country needs to implement some domestic reforms. So far, Ms. Merkel hasn't done so. Despite being seen overseas as the second coming of the Iron Lady, the Germans perceive her as something of a wet noodle.

One of America's great adages is, "If it ain't broke, don't fix it." It appears that sentiment dominated the German election.

(Source: The Economist)

(AP Photo)

September 19, 2013

Iran May Not Learn the Right Lessons from Syrian Diplomacy

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Max Fisher and Daniel Drezner argue that those who claim the Obama administration has lost its "credibility" toward Iran have it all wrong. Here's Fisher:

Obama's decision to back off Syria strikes, and I'm bolding this part because it's important, boosts the credibility of his stated position that he isn't seeking Iran's destruction and that he will seek peace with Iran if they first meet his long-held demands on nuclear enrichment. That's exactly the message Tehran needs to hear right now.

I think we need be careful not to get too carried away. The Russian plan has barely been put to the test. We don't know if the Assad regime is genuinely willing to hand over its chemical arsenal or whether they're simply going to stall for time and hope that the political will to launch punitive strikes further erodes in Washington. If Assad is simply stalling and manages to avoid military strikes without surrendering his arsenal, Tehran will likely draw a very different lesson than the one Drezner and Fisher think they're currently receiving.

Moreover, it's going to be very difficult for Iran to accept the idea that the Syrian deal shows the Obama administration isn't seeking Iran's destruction when the Pentagon talks openly about arming Syria's opposition even with a chemical weapons deal in place. That sends exactly the opposite message to Iran, who need only look to Libya to understand the consequences of accepting a Western disarmament deal.

Finally, it's also worth considering what lesson Washington will take away from this: namely, that threats of military force are vital to forging a diplomatic breakthrough (something many Iran analysts have been arguing for a long time). If this becomes the conventional wisdom, it could provoke the administration into another high-wire act, threatening military strikes against Iran and then banking on a last minute diplomatic breakthrough to peaceably bring about a deal.

(AP Photo)

September 16, 2013

Seeing the Mideast Through a Cold War Lens Will End Badly for America

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While I took issue with Andrew Sullivan's idea that Vladimir Putin now "owned" the mess in Syria, Commentary's Jonathan Tobin evidently took the idea to heart and is terrified at the prospect. According to Tobin, it's quite possible that Putin could end up "owning" the Middle East with damaging results for the U.S. around the world:

The guiding principle of Russian foreign policy is twofold: annoy, humiliate, and defeat the United States every chance they get and thereby help rebuild the lost Soviet empire whose fall Putin still mourns. Russian adventurism in Syria won’t stop there. It will extend into Asia and cause havoc and diminish American influence there and everywhere else.

I think Tobin is utterly wrong in his premise that a loss of influence in one area of the world will lead to a loss everywhere (an argument that should have been put to bed after it was thoroughly discredited during the Cold War), but just for the sake of argument, let's accept that his framing is correct. Does it therefore make sense to overthrow Assad? Not even close.

First, let's look at the lay of the land. Russia has one client -- a regime that is battered by a civil war and that looks to be battling a fierce insurgency for years. It has a second, tepid ally in Iran. The U.S., on the other hand, can count on all the other major countries in the region. It's a chessboard that looks distinctly favorable to the U.S. even if Assad stays in power.

Second, for all of Tobin's breathless talk about "Brezhnev-era" diplomacy and Putin's scheme to reconstitute the Soviet empire (!), there is no chance whatsoever that Russia can re-assemble anything remotely like the Soviet Union again. It will never reclaim Central or Eastern Europe. Central Asia is independent and is as likely to tilt toward China as it is toward Russia. Ukraine, Russia's best hope for a pliable neighboring client, is also balking at Russian overtures, despite the election of Viktor Yanukovych, who was widely seen as in Putin's pocket. As Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn noted recently, Russia's entire geopolitcal strategy for its near abroad is collapsing. The idea that saving Assad's bacon is an important building block in restoring Russian power makes sense only if you ignore almost every other development in Russia's Putin-era foreign policy. (It also ignores the strong evidence that Russia is in pretty bad shape domestically, too.)

Then there's the history. The last time the U.S. aided rebel groups to blunt the advance of Russian power, in Afghanistan, it ended in a transnational jihadist movement that killed thousands of Americans. Back then, the U.S. had the benefit of not knowing the danger of Islamic radicalism. Back then, Russia was a legitimate national security threat that warranted such risk taking. Today, there is no such excuse. Russia is hardly a large enough "threat" to the U.S. to warrant stoking a jihadist whirlwind in Syria just to give them a black eye.

(AP Photo)

September 13, 2013

Unfortunately, Obama Still "Owns" the Syrian Mess

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Andrew Sullivan thinks President Obama has just handed "ownership" of the Syrian morass to Vladimir Putin:

But the upshot right now – so far as I can see – is that Russia and not America now owns this conflict. It is Putin who is on the hook now – and the more Putin brags about his diplomatic achievement the more entrenched his responsibility for its success will become. And that is perfectly in line with Russia’s core interests: Putin is much closer to Syria than we are; he must be scared shitless of Sunni Jihadists who now loathe him and Russia more than even the Great Satan getting control of WMDs. Those chemical weapons could show up in Dagestan or Chechnya or the Moscow subway. It is Putin – and not Obama – who is therefore much more firmly stuck between the Sunnis and the Shia in Syria – not to speak of the Christians.

I'm not sure. It's true the ball is Putin's court, but the only way the Obama administration can keep it there is to keep threatening to do something reckless. Why else does Secretary Kerry continue to threaten military strikes against Syria? Because the administration thinks this is the only way to get Putin's attention and cooperation.

Obama, in other words, is in more-or-less the same spot he was in since the crisis began: making threats that he will have to follow through on for the sake of his "credibility" if he doesn't get the results he wants.

A wise administration would have used the Russia offer as cover to extricate itself from the quicksand of Syria's internal strife (quicksand the administration walked into with open eyes and careless lips), but instead they're doubling down on the same foolhardy gamble that landed them in this mess in the first place.

(AP Photo)

September 9, 2013

Does Obama Want Congress to Say 'No' to Syria?

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When UK Prime Minister David Cameron lost a parliamentary vote to strike Syria, I called for his resignation. One member of Parliament agreed, shouting "resign!" at the Prime Minister. (He has yet to heed our advice.) Why should he resign? Because a prime minister, whose position is like a combination of the U.S. presidency and the House speakership, must remain in firm control of parliament to be an effective leader.

The American system was designed differently. It is not uncommon for the President and Congress to squabble. However, one area in which the President is given nearly unlimited discretion is foreign policy. As the nation's Commander-in-Chief and Diplomat-in-Chief, the President is given wide latitude to act on our behalf.

And that's what makes President Obama's decision to ask Congress about striking Syria so puzzling. By virtue of the War Powers Resolution, the President can engage in brief military action without congressional approval. Even more head-scratching is the fact that Mr. Obama didn't ask Congress before joining a coalition to attack Libya.

So, why ask Congress about Syria?

The conventional wisdom would probably suggest that President Obama is seeking political cover. A clear majority of Americans do not want to get involved in Syria, but Mr. Obama feels that he needs to do something since he metaphorically drew a red line (which he is now denying, as if we don't have a video of him drawing a red line).

But there is another possibility -- albeit a very cynical one.

Mr. Obama saw what happened in the UK; Parliament put its foot down and flat-out rejected Mr. Cameron's call for action in Syria. So scolded, Mr. Cameron backed down and will not join any coalition to strike Syria.

Is it possible that Mr. Obama hopes that the same thing will happen in Congress?

After all, it's not a big secret that Mr. Obama isn't keen on going to war. He even admitted as much at the G-20 summit, when he remarked, "I was elected to end wars, not to start them." In light of his reluctance to use American force, it is quite possible that his "red line" comment was nothing more than an attempt to sound tough. In actuality, he never intended on using force in Syria. But, now his rhetorical mistake has taken on a life of its own and has morphed into a full-blown foreign policy crisis.

If that's true, then Mr. Obama isn't seeking "political cover"; he's seeking a way out.

Additionally, the President has already hinted at the possibility of using a rejection from Congress for political advantage. In Stockholm, Mr. Obama said that his credibility wasn't on the line, but the credibility of Congress was.

In the hyper-partisan environment that is Washington, DC, it is not difficult to imagine the President saying, "I wanted to punish Syria, but the Republicans didn't want to support me." Simultaneously, it is not difficult to imagine Republicans taking the opportunity to vote against the President, even if it weakens the institution of the presidency.

Let's hope that's not what's going on. Because if it is, both Mr. Obama and Congress are gambling with the very credibility of the United States.

(AP photo)

September 5, 2013

Is "Limited and Surgical" the Syrian War's "Cakewalk"?

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Washington interventionists have a bad habit of blundering blindly into foreign adventures, overly confident in their ability to shape events at the end of a bayonet. Prior to the Iraq war, we were assured the affair would be a "cakewalk" (which it technically was, until the decision to stick around and rebuild the country).

For the looming intervention in Syria, we're being assured that any U.S. action would be "limited" and "surgical." (Secretary Kerry went so far as to claim, in language equal parts Orwellian and risible, that the U.S. would not even be going to "war" with Syria, just, you know, bombing it.) Clearly, that's the Obama administration's preference, but once the missiles start to fly, they're not the only ones calling the shots.

In fact, there are a number of plausible scenarios in which a "limited" action could spiral into something altogether different:

1. The Syrian regime could respond by attacking U.S. allies, either covertly or overtly.

2. The regime could resume chemical weapon strikes, goading the U.S. to act again and more comprehensively.

3. Iran and Hezbollah could retaliate against the U.S. or Israel.

4. The attacks could succeed in breaking the chain of command that governs Syria's chemical weapons, leaving them vulnerable to theft by al-Qaeda-aligned militants or Hezbollah agents.

5. The attacks could lead to the collapse of the Syrian regime and lead, in turn, to a failed state that leads to even more violence spilling across Syria's borders.

Do I think any of these are likely to happen? Probably not. If I had to guess, I'd bet most of the consequences would be more of the long tail variety. But the idea that Washington can ensure that any intervention in Syria will be "limited" is absurd. There are plenty of ways it could be anything but.

(AP Photo)

September 2, 2013

The Results of Germany's One and Only Televised Debate

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Unlike the United States, which has three presidential debates, a vice-presidential debate and (what feels like) several thousand primary debates, Germany is treated to just one televised debate between the major parties and one televised debate between the minor parties. On Sunday, Chancellor Angela Merkel of the center-right CDU and her challenger, Peer Steinbrück of the center-left SPD, were given their chance to shine on national television.

Topics included: Greece and the Eurozone crisis, Syria, the American NSA spying on Germans, higher taxes on the wealthy and a national minimum wage. How did they do?

Reports indicate no major fireworks. This isn't a surprise. The Economist predicted that Ms. Merkel would talk "soothingly without saying anything" -- a rather familiar approach for the famously cautious politician. The AP reported, "neither contender scored a knockout blow or made a major mistake, and polls conducted by broadcasters showed no clear winner."

This is to Ms. Merkel's benefit and Mr. Steinbrück's detriment. Ms. Merkel maintains a 16-point lead over her challenger, so Mr. Steinbrück needed to shake up the race. But that most likely didn't happen.

Still, though the CDU will likely win the most votes, Ms. Merkel isn't guaranteed to return as Chancellor. Her current governing coalition, which includes the center-right FDP, is in trouble since the FDP may not receive enough votes to cross the 5 percent threshold to enter the Bundestag.

The speculation will be over soon. The election is on Sunday, Sept. 22.

(AP photo)

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