Spencer Ackerman makes the case:
But more often than not, Romney accepts the policy framework that Obama created. On Iran, heâ??ll propose â??new sanctionsâ? and to â??tighten the sanctions we currently have,â? which is the cornerstone of Obamaâ??s Iran policy (along with cyberattacks). On Afghanistan, he â??will pursue a real and successful transition to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014,â? which is the cornerstone of Obamaâ??s Afghanistan policy. On Libya, Romney will â??support the Libyan peopleâ??s efforts to forge a lasting government that represents all of them,â? which is the cornerstone of Obamaâ??s Libya policy. Perhaps most surprisingly, Romney will recommit to negotiating peace between Israel and Palestine, which was a cornerstone of Obamaâ??s Mideast policy before it crumbled into dust.The differences Romney outlines from Obama tend to shrink under scrutiny. To confront Iran, Romney will pledge to â??restore the permanent presence of aircraft carrier task forces in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf.â? But Obama has kept two carrier strike groups off Iranâ??s shores for at least a year, an increase from the Bush administration, along with an additional naval surge of minesweepers, gunboats and commandos. On Syria, Romney says heâ??ll â??identify and organize those members of the opposition who share our values and ensure they obtain the arms they need.â? But the CIA is on the Turkey-Syrian border trying to sort out which Syrian rebels are worth funneling foreign weapons to â?? a difficult proposition at best â?? and, as the New York Timesâ?? David Sanger points out, Romney stops short of promising American weapons to the rebels. Romney doesnâ??t like Obamaâ??s 2014 timetable for ending U.S. combat in Afghanistan (a â??politically timed retreat,â? Romney calls it), but, again, heâ??ll say heâ??ll stick to it while â??evaluat[ing] conditions on the ground,â? something less than a pledge to stay longer. But since Obama isnâ??t leaving Afghanistan after 2014, either, finding distinctions on Afghanistan is like counting angels on the head of a pin.
Most incoming administrations talk loudly about the foreign policy failures of their predecessors while preserving most of the substance of those policies. President Obama has been no exception.
This reflects the fact that there is a basic consensus among policymakers about most of the contours of U.S. foreign policy. This kind of bipartisan uniformity does have its merits: it prevents wild and erratic swings in behavior which could be unnerving and potentially destabilizing. But it also has the effect of calcifying some counterproductive policies as well.
