An extraordinary amount of energy in Washington is expended these days looking for reasons to stay uninvolved in Syria. I understand every single impulse against deeper American involvement, but I also believe it is to America's discredit not to do something more than it is doing, for the obvious humanitarian reasons, and for some fairly obvious strategic reasons as well (the removal of Iran's only Arab ally from the scene obviously helps the American position in the nuclear debate, as would a perception in the Sunni Arab world that the U.S. will stand up to the slaughter of innocent people by the Assad-Khamenei-Nasrallah alliance.) - Jeffrey Goldberg
The problem is that these two sentiments - a desire to help the people of Syria and the desire to depose Assad and further isolate Iran - are almost certainly mutually exclusive. There is no way the U.S. can depose Assad that doesn't entail a sharp increase in short-term violence in Syria, which would result in more deaths and violence. There is also no way - none - that the U.S. can stabilize a post-Assad Syria should the rebels succeed in running him out. There is every possibility that toppling Assad will lead to even greater violence and lawlessness.
Proponents don't want to concede this. They insist that America's interests and values are served by "doing something" in Syria, but the reality is that - at best - only half of this statement is true.
As for U.S. interests in isolating Iran, it's true that losing Assad would be a blow but there's good news here: the Assad regime is already under stress - and the U.S. has done nothing but levy some sanctions and berate it publicly. If the Sunni Arab world is as concerned about Iran as we're told they are, they are far better positioned to offer material aid to Syria's rebels than the U.S. - and better placed to manage the fallout.
The U.S., on the other hand, has an abysmal track record of directing the internal development of Middle Eastern (and North African) states.
