Alas, any renegotiation of that December 31, 2011 date requires a new Iraqi governmentâ??and there is no sign of one emerging. That is the second and bigger serious problem. Much of the challenge is due to a constitutional conundrum that we helped create. Iraqâ??s presidency is too weak, and is also up for grabs right now. Because it is weak, neither Mr. Allawi nor Mr. Maliki sees it as an acceptable consolation prize in their pursuits of the prime ministership. Because it is up for grabs, the Iraqi president cannot discipline the political process as parties seek to form a governing coalition. For example, he cannot give each major party two to three weeks to form a coalition, before retracting the offer and sequentially moving to the next party in the queueâ??as might happen in a different type of parliamentary system.My colleague Ken Pollack recommends making the Iraqi president commander in chief of the security forces by constitutional review. That makes sense to me. If the constitution could be revised in the same voting process that codified a new coalition government, and accorded the presidency to whichever top Iraqi leader did not become prime minister, we might have a solution. Another approach, if the above proves too ambitious, is to create a â??friends of Iraqâ? contact group that could temporarily (perhaps under UN auspices) play the role of referee in the coalition formation process temporarilyâ??not because Iraqis are inherently incapable of doing so, but because we saddled them with an electoral system that is in need of emergency repair to get through this current growing crisis. - Michael O'Hanlon [Emphasis mine]
Does anyone else find this less than reassuring? We're in a mess of our own design, but no worries, the same people who engineered the mess know just how to fix it. What could possibly go wrong?
