Tony Blair goes there:
We should be clear also. Iran must not be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons capability.â?¨ They must know that we will do whatever it takes to stop them getting it.The danger is if they suspect for a moment we might allow such a thing.
Alex Massie writes:
The problem with this, however, is that it simply provides more incentives - if they needed any! - for Iran to press on with its nuclear programme to guarantee, from their perspective, their own defence.This, I think, is likely to be true whether the US or Israel launch airstrikes or not and also true even if those strikes "work". The rational response to being attacked is to build up your defences so it won't happen again. Why should we suppose that the Iranians would react any differently?
Equally, it's not hard to see how this sort of talk and behaviour both strengthens the existing (vile) regime and makes it likely that, for reasons of national pride and honour if nothing else, any alternative, successor regime (should there be one) will also be likely to press ahead with the nuclear programme.
So what, exactly, is Blair hoping to achieve with this sort of talk?
Nothing productive. There is no way to convince Iran we'll "do whatever it takes" unless we really are willing to do whatever it takes. And clearly there are a fair number of policy-makers in the U.S. and Europe that would rather not "do whatever it takes" but rather something short of that.
Proponents of keeping the military option publicly "on the table" don't seem to appreciate the fact that the more you talk about using military force, the more you narrow your options until you have to either stand down and be humiliated or actually use force. Threats are only credible if you're actually willing to see them through, which is why they should be used exceedingly sparingly.
