Cato's Malou Innocent writes that while important, the arrest of Taliban second in command Mullah Baradar will only bear fruit if the U.S. can ease tensions between Pakistan and India. Steve Coll suggests that the Obama administration just might be having success there:
I would guess at a more subtle motivation, one that might suggest a favorable pattern now emerging in the Obama Administrationâ??s and Central Commandâ??s approach to Pakistanâ??s role in the Afghan conflict. Over the last few months, by multiple means, the United States and its allies have been seeking to persuade Pakistan that it can best achieve its legitimate security goals in Afghanistan through political negotiations, rather than through the promotion of endless (and futile) Taliban guerrilla violenceâ??and that the United States will respect and accommodate Pakistanâ??s agenda in such talks. Pakistanâ??s support for the Afghan Taliban, especially in recent years, was always best understood as a military lever to promote political accommodations of Pakistan in Kabul. Baradar, however, has defiantly refused to participate in such political strategies, as he indicated in an e-mail interview he gave to Newsweek last year. The more the Talibanâ??s leaders enjoying sanctuary in Karachi or Quetta refuse to lash themselves to Pakistani political strategy, the more vulnerable they become to a knock on the door in the middle of the night.
I admit I was skeptical that the Obama administration's efforts to ease Pakistan and India tensions would work (at least if the U.S. tried to press hard on the Kashmir issue). And while it's still too soon to tell if it has, I'm hoping to be proved wrong.
UPDATE: Dan Twining raises some less optimistic interpretations:
What if Washington has cut a quiet deal with Pakistan's military high command, granting them a disproportionate role in determining Afghanistan's future in return for help facilitating the withdrawal of Western forces? In return for Pakistani cooperation over the next 18 months -- including Pakistani military offensives against violent extremists in its tribal regions, joint intelligence operations like the one that netted Mullah Baradar, delivering elements of the Afghan Taliban for serious talks on reconciliation with the Afghan government, and continued Western use of Pakistani territory to supply Western forces fighting in Afghanistan -- one could imagine a private U.S. understanding with Pakistani armed forces commander General Kayani that, once Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan, Pakistan can enjoy a free hand to resume its special relationship with the country's post-Karzai leadership in its continued quest for strategic depth against India.
