Max Boot semi-defends my imputation that Ahmed Chalabi played a significant role in luring neoconservatives into believing things about Iraq that turned out to be disastrously wrong but were nonetheless convenient in selling the Iraq war to the American people.
For the record, here is my post in its entirety:
Many neoconservatives are demanding that the U.S. throw its full weight behind the Iranians in their pursuit of freedom. On the surface, this is obviously a noble idea, but itâ??s worth remembering that the very people making confident predictions about the predilections of the Iranian people were duped by an Iranian stooge.
Then Boot writes:
But I also believe Greg Scoblete is wrong: First place, the Green movement in Iran is not a figment of some exileâ??s imagination. Second, simply because Chalabi is now an Iranian stooge does not mean he was one in 2003. My read is that he is an opportunist, out to grab power for himself, who will make use of whatever allies he finds helpful.
First, yes, obviously the Green Movement is real. Second, I don't know if Chalabi was on Tehran's payroll in 2002 but I do think Boot's take rings true. That does not change the basic premise of my post, which was admittedly not spelled out very clearly in those three sentences. To wit: there is a tendency, especially among those prone to foreign policy activism, to assume the best.
My interview with Robert Kagan was illustrative of this mindset I think. Kagan admitted he wasn't quite sure where we'd end up with Iran's Green Movement but that we should just "press all the buttons" with Iran and see what happens. The default assumption, as it was with Iraq in 2002, is that it is preferable to plunge ahead even when it is honestly acknowledged that we do not know what we're doing or where we're going because doing anything is better than doing nothing.
We see a protest movement in Iran demanding democracy and assume that should it take power, things would be better. This assertion is rife throughout Contentions. But what's the basis for this assumption? The only comprehensive study of Iranian attitudes, that I'm aware, shows that the Green Movement is a lot less influential than we'd like it to be. Nor is there any data, that I'm aware, that indicates that if the Green Movement or its representatives were to take power, that there would be a monumental shift in Iran's appetite for nuclear development, regional stature, or any systemic changes in its foreign policy interests. Maybe this is analysis is way off the mark, and if there's data that contradict it, I'd gladly post it and acknowledge it.
The broader point is that foreign policy activists spend inordinate amounts of time worrying about the hypothetical danger of inaction and almost no time contemplating the possible negative consequences of their proposed solutions. (See Heritage's James Phillips for Exhibit A). With Iraq, they pooh-poohed those who warned of the consequences of an invasion and drew erroneous conclusions about the capacity of Iraq's middle class to reconstitute itself and for oil wealth to pay the way during reconstruction, because such a theory helped sell a desired activism.
And so we turn to Iran's Green Movement, upon whose backs our hopes for regime change now rest. We hear endless calls for throwing the full weight of American support behind her based on assumptions that such a course can't do much harm and could possibly redound to our benefit. We're even told that they'd welcome a bombing campaign!
To my mind, the burden of proof should no longer be on those advising a "wait and see" attitude toward issues like Iran and on those who make grandiose claims on behalf of the potential of the Green Movement or America's ability to shape events in Iran to our liking. Especially after the manifold failures of prediction and analysis that marked the run-up to the Iraq war.
