A Nuclear Counter-Offer to Iran

By Jamsheed Choksy

Apparently, Iran has not completely rejected the nuclear deal from the IAEA. It is re-negotiating the initial terms.

Now Tehran seeks to ship its low enriched uranium (LEU) for processing outside Iran or have the LEU converted inside the country by a third party, in batches. Moreover, Tehran’s regime wishes to purchase nuclear fuel from abroad prior to relinquishing any of its own LEU. Basically, Iran’s leaders have “no confidence that they (i.e., the West) will give us 20% enriched fuel in exchange for 3.5% enriched fuel.”

Whether sent abroad or converted within Iran, the LEU can be replaced quickly. So even transforming the entire current stockpile--into civilian-use rods and plates--would only delay any Iranian nuclear weapons plan by approximately one year. Likewise, providing Iran with nuclear fuel not made from its own LEU--so long as no military use or uranium re-extraction is possible --would not really compromise the situation.

So why not respond positively to the tentative response from Tehran and at the same time include a counter-offer to Iran? After all, if Iran wishes to modify the deal’s terms so can the West.

In exchange for accepting Tehran’s modifications, the IAEA and P5+1 should require Iran permit the West to process not just the current stockpile but all LEU including future batches. Altering the form of Iran’s nuclear material has an added benefit--ensuring none of it will be of use to terrorists. Even better would be to propose that Tehran agree to halt its own enrichment so long as the West supplies nuclear fuel for medical research and energy production. Either accord would effectively restrict Iran’s use of uranium to civilian purposes for the long-term. Verification by the IAEA must continue as well.

Each constructive response by Washington and its partners puts more pressure on Tehran to demonstrate that it sincerely seeks “to cooperate” in solving problems rather than exploiting negotiations until breakout capability is reached. Cooperation will ensure trust is built up, too, by all involved. Ultimately, if the West and Iran can reconcile their positions to ensure that conversion and use of uranium is solely for civilian purposes then all nations stand to gain.

Jamsheed K. Choksy is professor of Iranian studies and former director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program at Indiana University. He also is a member of the National Council on the Humanities at the U.S. National Endowment for the Humanities. The views expressed are his own.