Jundullah and Iranian Nationalism

I think David Frum makes a serious error in his analysis of yesterday's suicide attack in Iran:

Iran is not a nation-state. It was built as a multiethnic empire, and even today Persian speakers make up only about half the population. (51% is the conventional estimate.)

Iran is much more Shiite (over 80% at least) than it is Persian. But it’s an interesting question to what extent Iran’s distinctive Shiism should be understood as an expression of Persian nationalism. If so, that too might inflame the resentment of non-Persians against the regime.

It would be a mistake to assume--much as the Bush administration likely did--that Iran is a fractiously torn assortment of tribes, sects and races waiting to be exploited. While it's true that the idea of Greater Persia once extended well beyond the presently drawn borders, the nationstate of Iran is not the geographical product of imperialists or occupiers. The state as it exists today is very much the modernist product of Pahlavi nationalism.

Saddam Hussein couldn't flip Iran's Arabs, nor could Ayatollah Khomeini (a critic of the nation-state model) ever truly export his revolution--in the end, it was still about nationalism and the needs of Iranians; not Shiites.

Jundullah is a recurring problem for Tehran, and they're one that predates the June 12 unrest. The group has virtually nothing in common with embattled opposition leader Mir Hossein Mousavi and his base, and it would be a mistake to look for patterns tying the two together. One is a militant separatist group, while the other is asking for fair elections--a reformist impulse, not a revolutionary one.

The real story here is how the weekend's suicide bombing will affect relations between Tehran and Islamabad. It's often assumed that Pakistan's "Sunni Bomb" spurred Iran's own nuclear ambitions, and the suspicions held of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence can only be outdone in the Iranian imagination by Western and israeli intelligence outfits.

If anything, the attack highlights Washington's often bizarre choices in the Near East. American interests in the region are in truth more in sync with Tehran than other local actors. The weak states in both Pakistan and Afghanistan--coupled with the Sunni militants they foster--are as much a threat to Iran as they are to us. But until the West can reconcile its differences with the Islamic Republic it will continue to make illogical bedfellows in the Middle East and Asia in order to "isolate" the Iranians; who are, again, the more logical allies in the region