The Two Irans

Francis Fukuyama on Iranian constitutionalism:

The Iranian Constitution is a curious hybrid of authoritarian, theocratic and democratic elements. Articles One and Two do vest sovereignty in God, but Article Six mandates popular elections for the presidency and the Majlis, or parliament. Articles 19-42 are a bill of rights, guaranteeing, among other things, freedom of expression, public gatherings and marches, women’s equality, protection of ethnic minorities, due process and private property, as well as some “second generation” social rights like social security and health care.

This is a fair point, but a tad misleading. Yes, the Iranian constitution can be confusing, until one understands the evolution of the document. Its first manifestation - mostly a product of the revolutionary coalition's democrats and secularists - was ultimately rejected by Khomeini and the clerical class. The Assembly of Experts edited and remodeled the document, infusing it with Khomeini's principles of Islamic appellate authority.

And the document's enumerated powers didn't matter much in those early days anyway. Even in the republic's infancy, 'justice' was in fact administered at a grassroots level by the clerical class and their loyalists. There have always been two Irans -- one deliberative and perfunctory, the other anti-democratic and cruel.

Fukuyama goes on to suggest amendments to the current document:

Iran could evolve towards a genuine rule-of-law democracy within the broad parameters of the 1979 constitution. It would be necessary to abolish Article 110, which gives the Guardian Council control over the armed forces and the media, and to shift its function to something more like a supreme court that could pass judgment on the consistency of legislation with Shariah. In time, the Council might be subject to some form of democratic control, like the U.S. Supreme Court, even if its members needed religious credentials.

Eliminating religion altogether from the Iranian Constitution is more problematic. The rule of law prevails not because of its formal and procedural qualities, but because it reflects broadly held social norms. If future Iranian rulers are ever to respect the rule of law as traditional Muslim rulers once did, it will have to be a law that comes from the hearts of the Iranian people. Perhaps that will one day be a completely secular law. That is unlikely to be the case today.

This is pretty spot on. In many ways, it was The Shah's own misuse of the clerics that led to his undoing. He adopted his father's quasi-fascistic program of secular, western modernization, but lacked the competence and the sophistication needed to assuage the state's religious elites. By ostracizing, marginalizing and essentially defrocking the state-sponsored holy men, he inadvertently turned Shiism into a populist outlet for domestic discontent. Ironically, Pahlavi's disdain for the company and advice of the faithful contributed to his own undoing. By pushing them out of the royal tent, he ultimately gave a face to the revolution.

And as Dr. Fukuyama notes, it's crucial to remember that this is a popular component to the national identity. Secular liberalism - be it the 1906 constitutionalists, or even the 1979 coalition - has never had staying power in Iran. At its core, this is an Islamic country, and any reforms made in the future will likely reflect that.

I like Fukuyama's structural suggestions, and I recently made a few of my own along the same lines. Taking this a step further, what if Pahlavi had remained in power, but ceded authority at an earlier date? What if he had instead held the hand of the reform movement in 1969, rather than allowing the movement to boil over in 1979? My guess is it might be a more secular and freer Iran, but still decidedly Islamic in its governance (perhaps relegated to the judicial system).

Hypotheticals such as this one are amusing, interesting, but ultimately futile -- especially when they pertain to Iran. Those of us with an academic and/or policy interest in the country tend to see in Iran the regime we want, while ignoring the regime we actually have.

This brings us to the current unrest, and serves as a reminder of the constant diligence and perspective required whenever one discusses "reform" in the Islamic Republic. If Mir-Hossein Mousavi were somehow appointed Iranian president today, the regime would still be a source of regional instability, and it would remain a looming nuclear challenge for the international community. The IRGC, Basij and internal security forces would still operate with thuggish semi-autonomy, and Ali Khamenei would still be calling the final shots on foreign policy.