The Unilateralist Double Standard
I'm sympathetic to Michael Rubin's point here:
Bush-administration detractors lambasted the administration both for unilateralism and for failing to utilize diplomacy. The fact of the matter, however, is that the Bush administration—while schizophrenic—in went to the United Nations and won unilateral and near-unilateral sanctions demanding Iran suspend nuclear enrichment. This came after the IAEA had found Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement. By agreeing to negotiate without enrichment suspension, the Obama administration is casting aside unilaterally these U.N. Security Council resolutions. Rather than facilitate diplomacy, such a move hampers it in the long-term because it signals to Tehran that it need not take U.N. Security Council Resolutions seriously. We can never use threat of U.N. sanctions again to coerce Iran.
I'd say it's a little late to mourn the efficacy of the Security Council (see Iraq War, 2003).
That said, I think Rubin is on to something about the double standard of unilateralism here. Pundits and policy wonks wait and cheer for a "Nixon Goes to China" moment on Iran, yet they disregard the fact that such a move would undermine the international community's position as collective police officer when it comes to nuclear nonproliferation.
Wanting the U.S. at the table makes sense for the Iranians - America is really the only true guarantor of the regime's security. Dancing around the EU and the UN is a logical policy for Tehran; until they can get the "big guns" to the table, that is.
But catering unflinchingly to this waltz does seem a tad bit strange from an American perspective. Roger Cohen wants to move mountains for the Iranians, while asking for very little in return. President Obama should let them join the WTO immediately, but we apparently mustn't expect Tehran to reciprocate by respecting the decisions of other international institutions. (I happen to agree with most of what Cohen proposes, but it would be nice to see the Islamic Republic return the favor.)
We need to negotiate directly with the Iranians, and this is where Mr. Rubin and I likely part ways. But doing so without any immediate consequence for Iran seems to cheapen U.S. diplomacy, in my view. We may soon miss those heady days when simply getting the Americans to the negotiating table was considered to be an Iranian gain in and of itself.
UPDATE: Rubin responds with some fair points.