Tehran-ology and Khatami

Last week, in response to my post on the subject, Matt Duss of Wonk Room had the following to say about my take on internal Iranian politics:

Sullivan writes that to “focus narrowly on Khamenei and the Royal [sic] Guard, would put us in the same place we were in the 1970s: out of touch with the situation on the ground, and disconnected from the concerns of ordinary Iranians. These decisions, as President Carter learned in 1979, have an impact on foreign policy.”

This is a little odd. We were out of touch with the situation on the ground in Iran in the 1970s mainly because we were the deeply committed sponsor of an oppressive Iranian regime that represented the crux of U.S. regional security strategy. That regime was overthrown, then they kicked us out. It’s a rather different situation now.

I don't wish to split too many hairs here, because it's my hunch that Duss and I are mostly in 9/10 of agreement and are merely debating the remainder. Nonetheless, I take a bit of an issue with his recollection of the Iranian policy time line.

Yes, we supported the Shah. But we supported that Shah for over two decades, and through five administrations. Some took different tracks with the Shah - Kennedy thought very little of the man, whereas Nixon and Kissinger trusted him implicitly - and applied different levels of pressure and leverage upon him to alter his policies. In truth, the United States had less control over the oil-rich Pahlavi by the 1970s than in previous years. But the primary mistake made by all of these men was to view the Iranian state in the context of one, monolithic figure. The revolution took years to brew, but ultimately, our failings in Iran were logistical. We understood very little about the country, and worse yet, knew very little about what fueled popular discontent. Because the Shah seemed mostly capable, we considered all other power centers in the country to be malleable and moot.