Winning Iran, Losing Israel

David Sanger highlights a possible conundrum in the potential thaw in U.S.-Iranian relations:

But there is no question a new dynamic is afoot, one that seems likely to become even more complicated after today’s election in Israel is settled. If the government that emerges is even more determined to end the Iranian nuclear program by any means necessary, Mr. Obama may find himself trying to negotiate with one of America’s most determined adversaries while restraining one of its closest allies.

“I could draw you a scenario in which this new combination of players leads to the first real talks with Iran in three decades,” one of the key players on the issue for President Obama said last week, declining to speak on the record because the new administration has not even named its team, much less its strategy. “And I could draw you one in which the first big foreign crisis of the Obama presidency is a really nasty confrontation, either because the Israelis strike or because we won’t let them.”

This strikes me as a perfect rendering of Washington's famous admonition against "entangling alliances" - and it cuts both ways.

Ultimately, it would be easier for the U.S. to live with a nuclear Iran than it would be for Israel. The Iranian regime is a thorn in our side in Iraq and Afghanistan and a potential threat to the free transit of oil through the Persian Gulf (although one that I think is overblown), but there is no chance that the Iranians are going to destroy the fabric of American society. Hegemony in the Gulf looks a lot less imposing when oil is at $40 a barrel and the risks of a regional nuclear arms race - while real and frightening - could be mitigated. Hence, the downside risks of an American attack - as Robert Gates elucidated - are pretty steep compared to the payoff.

Not so with Israel. Even if you accept the argument that Iran is not going to launch a genocidal nuclear assault against the Jewish state, it's very easy to imagine them stepping up a campaign of conventional terrorism secured by a nuclear deterrent. So some kind of military action on the part of Israel would be warranted if all else fails.

Yet because of the nature of the relationship and because of the extensive presence of American power in the region, it's impossible for the U.S. and Israel to go their separate ways on this. It is difficult (perhaps impossible) for the Israelis to act on what they perceive as their best interests, and it is likewise impossible for the U.S. not to be seen as implicated in an Israeli decision.

Wouldn't both parties benefit from greater freedom of action?