The U.S. in the Middle East

World Public Opinion's new survey of the Muslim world has some interesting observations:

A study of public opinion in predominantly Muslim countries reveals that very large majorities continue to renounce the use of attacks on civilians as a means of pursuing political goals. At the same time large majorities agree with al Qaeda's goal of pushing the United States to remove its military forces from all Muslim countries and substantial numbers, in some cases majorities, approve of attacks on US troops in Muslim countries....

Asked specifically about the US naval forces based in the Persian Gulf, there is widespread opposition across the Muslim world. Across eight Muslim publics on average, 66 percent said it was a bad idea; only 13 percent called it a good idea. Opposition is largest in Egypt (91%) and among the Palestinians (90%), but opposition is also large in America's NATO ally Turkey (77%).

Up until the mid 1990s and the rise of al Qaeda, the U.S. pretty much had a free hand in the region. Even if its policies were unpopular in the Middle East, it had the support of the region's autocrats and could safely overlook any roiling discontent on the "Arab street." Our regional interests trumped the meager costs of being unpopular.

Initially, it appeared as if 9/11 had changed this cost/benefit analysis significantly. You had President Bush acknowledging that U.S. policy in the Middle East had provoked its ire and Paul Wolfowitz explaining how U.S. military bases were inflaming Muslim sentiment. Much of President Bush's "freedom agenda" was premised on the conclusion that the current, U.S.-supported political order in the Middle East was fomenting radicalism.

Instead, what happened was a deepening of American military power in the Middle East while we simultaneously dismantled al Qaeda. So even as the U.S. became increasingly unpopular in the region, it successfully crippled the most deadly expression of that discontent. These tactical successes against al Qaeda have basically given Washington a pass on the difficult strategic question of whether it's in America's long-term interest to pursue policies in the Middle East that Washington itself admits generates radicalism.

Still, there is little chance that the U.S. will withdraw from the Middle East. Once the global economy recovers, which it will eventually, demand for oil will surge and supplies will tighten. Even though the U.S. consumes a fraction of the Persian Gulf's exports, its position as the Gulf's defender gives it key leverage over other oil-dependent nations such as China, a potential rival. Iran's nuclear program will only encourage the U.S. to strengthen its defense ties to Israel and the region's assorted despots and monarchs.

None of these developments imply that bases in the Middle East and an overall position of military supremacy in the region are necessary. But those bases and that supremacy are already in place, and like anything in Washington, sheer inertia has a way of constraining choices.