Talking to Tehran

Mehdi Khalaji on talking to Iran's Supreme Leader:

Based on past experience, as long as the Iranian supreme leader does not see dialogue with the United States as necessary for the survival of the regime, he will be unlikely to make much effort to alter the status quo. Of course, receiving an offer from the next administration for unconditional negotiations will place Khamenei in a difficult position. He has always tried to portray America as responsible for the strains in U.S.-Iranian relations. Asking him to negotiate would undercut this argument and place the burden of responsibility on him for the lack of dialogue.

Khamenei's management model in the past two decades has been to have as much authority as possible with as little responsibility as possible. The first step for dealing directly with the Iranian government is to make its supreme leader responsible. Addressing him directly and publicly with a call to initiate a dialogue will close the exit doors available to him and require him to make a decision. In dealing with the United States, Khamenei's ideal scenario has been "no war, no peace." This strategy has allowed him to continue the nuclear program and minimize the damage associated with it. Given the fact that Iran could well obtain the ability to produce a nuclear bomb in the near future, the United States has to convince him that the "no war, no peace" strategy will no longer work, and that he has to choose either war or peace.

This is indeed the problem with the so-called "Grand Bargain" approach to Iran, as I've mentioned here in the past. The tiny, cultish cabal that runs the Islamic Republic of Iran needs self-imposed isolation in order to rationalize its existence. They resent and loathe "Westoxication," but they more importantly need it in a peripheral sense in order to retain control of their country. It is the yin to their totalitarian yang. The constant threat of Western encroachment is far more valuable to them than its actual defeat. This is why Iranian democrats and human rights activists ask the West to stay out of Iranian affairs -- it only serves to bolster the reactionaries in power.

And it's becoming abundantly obvious that a U.S. president willing to call Tehran's bluff frightens them. Barack Obama presents a legitimate soft-power threat to the Khomeinists, and forces the regime to be either at war or at peace. Iran's happy in-between could soon collapse. No matter the rhetoric, one thing must be understood: Iran doesn't really want to engage in serious, comprehensive negotiations. To do so would undermine their national ideology.

This puts President Obama in a bind. Rapprochement with Iran will cause domestic discontent politically, and it may yield little reciprocation. Should he continue the George Bush/Robert Gates policy of isolation, pressure and carrots, or must President Obama dump more carrots on the table? Which policy path does he choose?

We may soon find out, as President-elect Obama decides whether or not to keep Secretary Gates as a member of his administration.

UPDATE:

Spencer Ackerman offers a false choice on the matter:

All of a sudden, you’re deprived of a method of demagoguery that’s aided your regime for a generation. And if you refuse to negotiate, you’ve just undermined everything you told the international community you wanted, and now appear unreasonable, erratic, and unattractive to foreign capitols. Amazing how the prospects for peace are more destabilizing to the Iranian establishment than any inevitably-counterproductive-and-destructive bombing campaign or war of internal subterfuge.

The latter is debatable (we don't know that American involvement in the Iranian east will end under President Obama, and I don't know that Obama has promised to halt democracy promotion inside the republic's borders), and the former is mostly a manifestation of marginal neoconservative think-tanks and jittery leftists. President Bush categorically denied talk of an Iran attack, and the administration's behavior has been one of international compliance and pressure. They realize that the Iraq campaign has handcuffed them.

The real choice here, as I noted above, is whether or not to demand a halt in uranium enrichment prior to negotiations. The UN has called for it. The IAEA acknowledges that Iran has been uncooperative. If President Obama hopes to restore the validity of the international non-proliferation regime, well, wouldn't Iran be a good start? Does Tehran's disregard for said system bode well for future non-proliferation efforts?

Ed Morrissey shares my cynicism.