China as Counterweight to Russia
Much of the riot of commentary over the implications of Russia's new-found belligerence has drawn parallels with the rise of China, suggesting a "springtime for autocrats."
These worries miss one important point that was on display last week, though: Russia and China are probably rivals to each other more than either is to the US, recent events in Georgia notwithstanding. Hence the high-profile snub of Russia's actions delivered by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a regional grouping that brings together Russia and China with five Central Asian states.
China has plenty of reasons to be twitchy over a more active Russia. Its energy interests run counter to Russia's in Central Asia. China has long opposed the arguments that Russia is advancing to defend its actions in Georgia. Russian power in the Far East could hamper China's attempts to dominate, or at least lead, the region. And the two share a long history of conflict and competition.
The FT's Geoff Dwyer has made the argument that Russia could now be pushing China further into the arms of the West:
In the early 1960s, a swathe of western analysts missed the Sino-Soviet split because they confused a shared belief in Marxism-Leninism for a lock-step partnership. Just because the two countries are now pursuing forms of authoritarian capitalism does not mean they are automatic bedfellows. China has moved closer to Russia in recent years, but there are clear limits to the alliance that Washington could exploit.
But there is more room for the US and its allies to try to actively drive the two apart than Dwyer hints at, I think. The two have been an obstructionist duo at the UN for some time, working to rein in the more active impulses of the rest of the world on the Security Council. An active outreach to China that would secure more Chinese interests in return for quiet support for a tougher stance against Russia could go a long way towards bolstering the West's message and making it politically acceptable for even more states to sign on. Or even just implicitly reward China while increasing and dramatizing the costs of Russia's aggression.
A short list of possibilities: scotching the G8 and constituting a different group altogether, maybe a G11 with China, India, and Brazil; replacing EU-Russia and NATO-Russia partnership activities with ones including China; working to highlight China's role as donor and investor in Africa and Latin America; moving forward on plans to bring China into the International Energy Agency; supporting Asian regional organizations that would exclude Russia but highlight China.
China is working to be a "responsible stakeholder" internationally; Russia is demonstrating open contempt for the concept. There may be plenty of reasons not to move forward with any of the above. But finding more ways to formally include China in institutions and processes from which Russia is excluded might be worth bearing some costs that a few weeks ago made the above steps look too difficult.
